Research into two-party agentic delivery
Transferable assets, successor readiness, model substitution, and rehearsed switching.
AAO-095 / Resilience and Exit
Public-sector AI providers should design transition assets and evidence from the start. A service is more credible when an authorized successor can understand its configuration, pending work, rights, and operating limitations without depending on undocumented incumbent knowledge.
AAO-092 / Resilience and Exit
Vendor managers should test whether another authorized team can use the exported service artifacts to continue the required function. Data export and termination rights are necessary components, but neither establishes operational portability.
AAO-080 / Commercial and Vendor Management
Public-sector executives should settle rights to use, inspect, correct, retain, and transfer the artifacts required to operate an outsourced agentic service. Ownership language alone does not establish whether the authority or a successor supplier can continue the public function.
AAO-062 / Resilience and Exit
Bank vendor managers should test model substitution as a service change, not a procurement option. An alternative becomes credible when the bank can move the relevant context, tools, controls, and evidence and complete the critical service within its required tolerance.
AAO-048 / Resilience and Exit
Executives should require proof that the service can be transferred to a successor or retained team. Data-return rights alone do not establish access to the context, permissions, configurations, and operating knowledge needed to continue accepted work.
AAO-040 / Resilience and Exit
Critical-infrastructure boards should approve an AI supplier only with a feasible route to continue or restrict the service safely at exit. Termination rights and data exports do not establish a safe operating transition.