Akholi

FULL STUDY REPORT

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

A study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements, drawn from the accounts of 850 members of the vendors' delivery teams

Phil HatchOctober 2026akholi.com

REPORT INFORMATION

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Full Study Report

Author	Phil Hatch
Publication date	November 1, 2026
Version	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
Figshare DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890
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SUGGESTED CITATION

Hatch, Phil. 2026. *Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions: Full Study Report*. Version 1.8.2. Akholi. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559.

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USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Artificial intelligence tools were used to prepare this report. Appendix G discloses how they were used.

IN THE INTRODUCTION

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“What we did, in the end, was stop waiting on their change board and put a standing Friday call with the credit desk instead, which is not governance in any formal sense, but it does at least get a decision on the week's flagged names before the book closes. We also keep our own mapping of counterparty identifiers, maintained by two of our analysts, because the definitions their source systems produce disagree between themselves and, in fairness to them, they never claimed they would. It works, more or less. I would not hold it up as a model, and it does depend rather heavily on two people staying.”

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR
KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

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Introduction

Reported delivery difficulties, recurring manual alteration, and limited visibility into delivery work connect the engagement outcomes, governance concerns, and workforce experience examined in this study. Delivery teams described work sustained through human intervention alongside weaknesses in preparation and control. Their accounts require the reported performance of agentic AI outsourcing to be considered together with how that performance was achieved and what the two firms could observe. The report presents the structured results and written accounts from engagements at Tier 1 financial institutions, including null and conflicting findings.

The evidence is the reported experience of 850 members of vendor delivery teams on 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements serving Tier 1 financial institutions, collected once, between January and June 2026.

The report is organized into six Parts.

01 Engagement Outcomes and Their Correlates
Engagement outcomes on the four core study measures, with mixed evidence on their relationships to structural attributes and careful distinction among supported, equivalent, and inconclusive results.

02 The Five Failure Categories
Financial institution readiness, co-management, vendor capability, AI technology, and the third-party ecosystem.

03 Governance, Oversight, and Control
Reported weaknesses in governance, oversight, and control, their relationship to engagement performance, and the operational significance of authority, review, and visibility.

04 The Delivery Workforce
The delivery workforce's experience, working conditions, intent to leave, and the continuity of knowledge used during delivery.

05 Manual Alteration by the Delivery Team
Manual alteration by the delivery team, the reasons given for it and its disclosure to the financial institution.

06 Executive Action Plan
Seven proposed controls and a phased implementation schedule for assessing engagements, correcting identified gaps, and verifying that controls operate effectively.

A Appendices
The definitions, the indicator inventory, the method, the list of companion analyses, and an index.

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I feel we are being judged on something nobody in this market has finished learning yet. Our people can read a medical file and see what matters in it, that part is solid, and the staff they put on this desk inside three weeks is more than I expect. But the agent side we are building while we fly. There is nobody in the firm I can ring at ten at night when the summariser produces a different risk note on the same chart, and the QA method we use is still the one written for human summarisers. So I score those lower. It is not that leadership is hiding from it. But wanting the capability and having it are two different things, and right now we are somewhere in between."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

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About the Author

Phil Hatch is an outsourcing and workforce-development executive with more than 30 years of experience. He previously led the global outsourcing business of ManpowerGroup/Experis. His work includes service delivery, workforce strategy, and organizational development across industries and countries.

Hatch has also advised governments on labor and economic development, including workforce strategies intended to support investment and employment.

Following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Hatch was asked by the U.S. Department of State and USAID to advise Ukraine on workforce and economic development. His work has addressed technology, outsourcing, skills development, and international investment in support of economic recovery.

Through Akholi, Hatch advises organizations and governments on outsourcing and the implications of AI for work and service delivery.

> *We know how to run the agents; fourteen months on this account and the exception queue has never been the thing that broke. What we do not have is anybody in the delivery line who has sat on a retail bank's servicing floor. Practically: I would take two people off the account for six weeks and put them through the client's own dormancy and deceased-account training, and I would stop hiring for the platform and start hiring for the domain. That is a staffing decision, not a training budget one, and it needs somebody above me to make it."*
>
> **PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR**
> BPO, Payments, cards and disputes

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About Akholi

Akholi, established in 2003, is a research and advisory firm focused on outsourcing, service delivery, and global capability centers. Its work includes the 2026 study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements described in this report.

The study examines relationships among financial institution readiness, co-management, vendor capability, AI technology, the third-party ecosystem, and reported engagement outcomes. Its findings are observational and do not establish that any one category is the sole or primary cause of those outcomes.

Akholi applies this research through advisory and educational work with institutional leaders.

> *Problem the questionnaire cannot reach is why this is working, which is not process but people. Both sides put someone in the room who can actually say yes on a Tuesday afternoon without going back for approval, and in dispute work where Reg E clock is running that single fact is worth more than any governance document we have written. I have run engagements where the joint forum met fortnightly and everything of consequence happened between meetings. Here it is the reverse. My caution, and I would put it no stronger than caution, is that we are three months in with modest volumes, and arrangements of this kind tend to be tested at the first genuine backlog rather than in the quiet period."*
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Executive Summary

The surveyed engagements had a high cancellation rate and low reported customer satisfaction. By the study date, 56 of 150 engagements had been canceled (37.33%). Delivery teams rated cancellation as at least moderately likely for another 58 of the 94 active engagements. Together, 114 of 150 engagements (76.00%) had either been canceled or met the study's threshold for perceived cancellation risk. Vendor-reported customer satisfaction averaged 43.85 points on a 100-point scale across the 150 engagements.

Positive measured returns were reported for 17 of the 30 engagements that had reached Production, with a mean recorded return of 24.71% among those 17. The mean is the arithmetic average of the recorded values. These are reported return figures, not independently verified financial results. Only 84 of 782 respondents (10.74%) rated their engagement as achieving its stated key performance indicators, with a rating of 3 or below on the statement that it was not doing so.

Four findings warrant particular attention:

1. Manual alteration by the delivery team was reported on all 150 engagements when the five manual alteration methods were combined: manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data, manual alteration of financial institution processes, manual alteration of AI outputs, reporting alteration, and third-party work done by hand. Respondents described these interventions as necessary to sustain delivery. In the structured disclosure questions, discussion of data, process, or AI-output manual alteration with the financial institution was reported in 13 of 1,004 valid answers (1.29%).

2. Respondents reported that financial institution governance, oversight, and control arrangements were not being used as designed. The 19 selected governance indicators from financial institution readiness and co-management had a mean rating of 3.63 on the 10-point scale (n = 15,201 ratings). Here n denotes the number of ratings. Every engagement had at least one respondent reporting that financial institution governance, oversight, and control arrangements were not implemented as designed. This selected subset is distinct from the 47-indicator governance, oversight, and control score examined in Part 3.

3. Experience with agentic AI was limited. No respondent reported more than one year of personal agentic AI experience, and no respondent reported that the vendor had more than two years of agentic AI delivery experience. Vendor delivery-playbook maturity was distressed in 392 of 807 ratings (48.57%). Respondents also reported limited agentic AI knowledge among financial institution staff, with 418 of 793 ratings classified as distressed (52.71%).

4. Respondents reported limits in the financial institution's willingness to redesign processes for agentic AI. Distressed ratings were given in 429 of 804 answers (53.36%).

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The study organized 100 engagement indicators into five study-defined failure categories. Financial institution readiness had the lowest category mean (3.55), followed by co-management (3.65) and vendor capability (3.67). AI technology and the third-party ecosystem were rated more favorably, at 4.60 and 4.64, respectively, and both category means were below 5.0.

Figure 1. Mean indicator rating of the five failure categories on the 10-point scale, 150 engagements

Financial institution readiness, co-management, and vendor capability received lower mean ratings



Note: Each category mean averages the engagement-level means of its 20 indicators across 150 engagements. The amber bars identify organizational categories proposed as priorities for institutional review. The colors do not represent a measured degree of institutional control.

The study does not establish a regulatory or legal breach, and it contains no account from a financial institution. Its findings support the recommendation that financial institutions audit their agentic AI outsourcing engagements. Part 6 sets out the proposed response.

> *"The vendor's change log recorded release counts and cycle time but not which releases were later rolled back for validation failures, so the reported release velocity looked strong right up until the engagement was terminated."*

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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Study Design, Evidentiary Basis, and Definitions

The study is a single cross-section of vendor delivery teams' reported experience on agentic AI outsourcing engagements serving Tier 1 financial institutions. Each respondent answered once, between January and June 2026, about one engagement. The design establishes what the delivery teams reported and how their reports related to their engagements' outcomes. It does not establish the order in which events occurred, what any financial institution knew, or how far the findings extend beyond the 150 engagements studied. This study did not approach any financial institution or outsourcing vendor to corroborate findings or obtain commentary.

The analysis distinguishes engagement-level outcomes from respondent-level ratings. It uses four core measures: cancellation rate, customer satisfaction, engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave. Manual alteration and its disclosure are measured separately. Statistical interpretation distinguishes supported associations, results sensitive to analytical choices, estimates within specified equivalence bounds, and inconclusive results.

The full method appears in Appendix D. The companion analysis for each indicator includes the full form of every test statistic summarized in the report. (Available online at Akholi.com)

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1 Composition of the Study Set

The study includes 150 engagements and 850 respondents. An engagement is one contracted outsourcing arrangement between a vendor and a financial institution. A respondent is a member of the vendor's delivery team assigned to that engagement. Engagement-level summaries give each engagement one observation. Respondent-level summaries include multiple observations from some engagements. The relevant inferential procedures and their treatment of clustering are specified in Appendix D.

The study set spans the engagement lifecycle stages, four outsourcing models, two general work classifications, eight use case families, and 10 types of financial institutions. Each composition is reported at its own base in sections 1.1 to 1.6.

Figure 2. Respondents by role and engagements by lifecycle stage

The sample includes 850 respondents across 150 engagements



Note: Respondents are counted at respondent level and engagements at engagement level. The panels use separate bases. The panels use different units and bases. Role counts describe respondents. Lifecycle-stage counts describe engagements.

1.1 Respondents, Roles, and Engagements

The study covers 150 engagements and 850 respondents. Individual contributors, who perform the engagement's tasks, numbered 667 of the 850 respondents (78.47%). Engagement managers numbered

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150 of the 850 respondents (17.65%), with exactly one per engagement. Portfolio directors, who oversee several engagements, numbered 31 of the 850 respondents (3.65%). Two respondents were customer management executives.

Sample size is reported for each analysis. Estimates based on fewer than 30 observations require particular caution. Descriptive subgroups with fewer than 10 observations are reported as counts rather than rates. These thresholds refer to the denominator, not the number of affirmative answers. The two customer management executives are reported only as counts. Small subsets of voluntary written answers are also identified explicitly and are not treated as prevalence estimates.

1.2 Structured Fields and Written Answers

The survey collected two forms of evidence. The structured answers total 149,619, given to 172 numeric questions and 23 categorical questions (195 total). The numeric questions include ratings on a 10-point scale and typed numbers such as months, team size, or contract term. The 100 rated engagement indicators, 20 in each of the five failure categories, form the core of the numeric questions. The categorical questions record attributes such as the type of financial institution, the outsourcing model, and the respondent's role, and the yes-or-no questions on manual alteration and its disclosure.

Written answers totaled 8,918 responses to the study's 16 open questions. Each substantive written response was assigned a sentiment score on a scale from −10 to +10.

Written answers were voluntary and describe the experiences respondents chose to report. Their frequency is a count of supplied and coded accounts, not an estimate of prevalence among all engagements or the wider industry. Structured questions provide separate estimates for the conditions or practices they explicitly measure. A broad rating does not measure the prevalence of every mechanism mentioned in comments.

1.3 Distribution of Engagements by Lifecycle Stage

The sample included 60 engagements in Build-Out, 60 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 30 in Production. By the study date, 56 had been canceled, and 94 remained active. Cancellation occurred at every stage. The chi-square test compares cancellation frequencies across the stages. The difference in cancellation rates across stages was not statistically significant (chi-square 5.39, $p = 0.068$, $n = 150$ engagements). The p value is the probability, under the null model, of a result at least as extreme as the observed result.

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Figure 3. Engagements by status and lifecycle stage, 150 engagements

Cancellation occurred at every lifecycle stage



Note: canceled engagements: 56 (56 of 150 engagements, across all three stages).

Canceled engagements are counted across all three stages, 29 in Build-Out, 17 in Transition/Cut-Over and 10 in Production. The active engagements total 94.

Counts are engagements. Cancellation rates were 48.33% in Build-Out, 28.33% in Transition/Cut-Over, and 33.33% in Production. Overall, 56 of 150 engagements were canceled (37.33%). The lifecycle stages are categories, not elapsed-time observations.

1.4 Distribution of Engagements by Outsourcing Model

The four outsourcing models were represented in similar numbers. Customer experience management (CXM) accounted for 42 engagements, information technology outsourcing (ITO) for 40, business process outsourcing (BPO) for 37, and knowledge process outsourcing (KPO) for 31. The two classes of work were nearly even, with 76 engagements in a line-of-business operation and 74 in a corporate function.

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Figure 4. Engagements by outsourcing model, 150 engagements

The four outsourcing models were represented in similar numbers.



1.5 Distribution of Engagements by Institution Type

The engagements served 10 types of financial institutions, shown in Figure 5. Insurers were served by 14 engagements, and private equity and private capital firms by nine. The 23 engagements serving those two types fall outside the banking types. The report uses the term financial institution throughout.

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Figure 5. Engagements by type of financial institution, 150 engagements

The engagements served ten types of financial institutions



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1.6 Distribution of Engagements by Process Family

Each engagement's use case was assigned to one of eight process families, shown in Figure 6. Corporate and back-office functions accounted for 47 engagements and financial crime and client onboarding for seven.

Figure 6. Engagements by process family, 150 engagements

Corporate and back-office functions accounted for the largest process family



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“The problem for my team is not that client is difficult, they are not. It is that same merchant category is set up one way in the North region and another way in the South, so my agents cannot trust one rule. i have two people who do nothing but check which version applies before a case is closed. That is two people i would rather put on the dispute queue. Access we get quickly, credit to them, and the core servicing process itself is well written. i just wish it was written once.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Payments, cards and disputes

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2 Evidentiary Basis and Its Limits

The evidence consists of vendor delivery personnel's reported experience. The study did not directly observe operations, inspect engagement records, or interview the financial institutions. Ratings, counts, and written responses must be interpreted within that evidentiary boundary.

The findings do not establish what financial institutions knew or received through channels outside the respondents' accounts. Each engagement was surveyed once. Selection sought variation in engagement types rather than an industry-representative sample.

2.1 Vendor Delivery Team Members as the Sole Source of Evidence

Every respondent was employed by the vendor delivering the engagement. The study did not approach or obtain commentary from any financial institution, outsourcing vendor, AI provider, or third-party ecosystem vendor. The study views each engagement from one side: the people who performed its tasks and managed its delivery.

The sample was selected to include a range of financial institution types, outsourcing models, and use cases. The resulting composition does not estimate their relative prevalence in the industry.

2.2 Anonymization of the Collected Data

The study was designed to limit the collection of data that identifies the financial institution, its customer, and the outsourcing vendor. A third-party audit of all data collected was performed to ensure no identifiable data was provided to Akholi or this report’s author. The reviewer conducting the audit made one alteration to the collected data to ensure anonymity: Financial institution names were replaced by “the customer” or “the desk”, and the outsourcing vendor’s name was replaced by “the vendor”. An additional third party audited the work to ensure no other alterations to any collected data occurred.

2.3 Financial Institution Conditions Reported at Second Hand

Financial institution readiness is described by 20 of the 100 rated indicators, covering its data, processes, staff, governance, and response speed. Each rating reflects the delivery team's account of the circumstances it worked within.

A reported absence of disclosure identifies the communication described by the respondent. It does not establish institutional ignorance: other personnel, records, or reporting channels may have conveyed the information.

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2.4 Observational Reach of Each Respondent Role

Each role sees a different part of the engagement. Individual contributors see the data, the agents, and the daily tasks firsthand. Engagement managers see the engagement as a whole and the relationship with the financial institution. Portfolio directors see several engagements and the commercial terms behind them.

Respondents may have limited direct knowledge of indicators outside their operational remit. Individual contributors may lack visibility into management arrangements, while senior respondents may have limited or no direct knowledge of the delivery team's activities. Unless otherwise noted, this study did not filter responses to an indicator according to the respondent's role.

2.5 Standing of a Finding: Association Without Causal Direction

The primary customer-satisfaction analysis uses the 94 active engagements. This restriction excludes ratings recorded after cancellation but does not remove selection bias, confounding, or uncertainty about causal direction. Analyses of realized cancellation use all 150 engagements and are descriptive contrasts. Ratings from the 56 canceled engagements may reflect the cancellation itself. These contrasts are not forecasts of future cancellation.

Results are interpreted as associations. Statistical significance, sensitivity to alternative analyses, and equivalence within specified bounds are distinct properties of an estimate. None establishes causal direction in this cross-sectional design.

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3 The Ten-Point Rating Scale

The questionnaire used 10-point ratings with several orientations. Some items assigned higher values to more favorable conditions. Others assigned higher values to adverse conditions. A further group had no favorable direction. The analysis preserves these distinctions and identifies transformations before interpreting scores.

3.1 Favorable-Direction and Unfavorable-Direction Indicators

In most cases, favorability increases across the ten-point scale, where 1 is the most unfavorable score, and 10 is the most favorable. Such indicators are labeled as “favorable-direction” indicators. For example, respondents rated the quality of the financial institution’s data across the systems the engagement depended on, where a higher rating denotes higher data quality.

Some indicators are inverse, with 1 most favorable and 10 least favorable. These indicators are referred to as “unfavorable-direction” throughout this study. For example, respondents rated the statement that the engagement was not achieving its stated key performance indicators, where a higher rating denotes the less favorable outcome. Where the report converts such ratings to the favorable direction, each rating is subtracted from 11, so that a higher figure denotes the more favorable outcome, and the conversion is stated beside the figure.

Eight rated questions have neither a favorable nor an unfavorable end. For example, they ask whether the financial institution is scaling its agentic AI outsourcing or shifting work to its own global capability centers. For these questions, the report states whether each association was positive or negative, and does not define a favorability score for the indicator itself.

3.2 The Distressed Threshold

The study defines a distressed rating as 3 or below on a favorable-direction indicator, and 8 or above on an unfavorable-direction indicator. The threshold is an analytical classification of adverse ratings. It does not establish that the respondent diagnosed operational failure.

The threshold also applies to engagements. An engagement is distressed on a question when the mean of its respondents' ratings falls in the distressed range. For example, in answers to the statement that the engagement was not achieving its stated key performance indicators, 241 of 782 answers were distressed (30.82%). The engagement mean was distressed on 32 of the 150 engagements.

Indicators distressed is the share of an engagement's distressed indicator ratings. It is computed for each respondent across the 100 rated indicators, averaged within the engagement and then across the 150 engagements. Across the study set, 42.49% of indicator ratings were distressed (n = 150 engagements).

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3.3 Response Counts and the Base Convention

Percentages identify the relevant denominator: respondents, answers, or engagements. Percentages are generally reported to two decimal places, with small sample sizes stated explicitly.

The yes-or-no questions allowed “I do not know” and “I prefer not to answer.” Rates use valid yes-or-no answers only. For data alteration, 421 of 845 respondents selected yes and 418 selected no. The resulting rate is 421 of 839 valid answers (50.18%). The other six answers are excluded from that denominator.

For perceived factual attributes such as institutional asset size or contract term, “I do not know” is reported separately. It records the answer provided without explaining why the respondent could not or did not provide the information.

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4 Cancellation and Cancellation Risk

Realized cancellation is the status recorded for each engagement in the study's Engagements sheet. It differs from a respondent's rating of future cancellation likelihood. The study recorded 56 canceled engagements among 150.

Perceived cancellation likelihood is a respondent rating, not an observed outcome or calibrated probability. Although the question was worded for active engagements, numeric answers were recorded on all 150 engagements. Only ratings from the 94 active engagements were used to define prospective risk bands. Full-sample correlations are identified as descriptive comparisons.

4.1 Cancellation Likelihood on Active Engagements

The cancellation-likelihood question asked about engagements not yet canceled. Nevertheless, its 328 numeric responses represented all 150 engagements, including canceled engagements. Another 269 respondents selected “I do not know.”

The rating records perceived likelihood and was not validated as a forecast. Responses from canceled engagements require retrospective interpretation and cannot be treated as observations made before cancellation.

4.2 High Risk, Moderate Risk, and the Canceled-or-at-Risk Population

All 94 active engagements were placed in a risk band based on the mean of their respondents' ratings of cancellation likelihood on the original scale. An engagement whose mean was 7 or above is high risk, and one whose mean was 5 or above and below 7 is moderate risk. By that rule, 19 active engagements were high risk, 39 moderate risk, and 36 below moderate risk.

The combined category comprises 56 canceled engagements and 58 active engagements classified as having moderate or high perceived cancellation risk. It contains 114 of 150 engagements (76.00%). The total combines realized status with a subjective risk classification and should not be interpreted as a realized or predicted cancellation rate.

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5 The Four Core Study Measures and Supplementary Measures

Four core study measures are applied to every indicator in the report, always in the same order. They are cancellation rate, customer satisfaction, engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave. Together they describe whether an engagement survived, the satisfaction recorded against it, the circumstances it was delivered under, and whether its delivery team intended to stay.

The four measures were strongly correlated across the 150 engagements, with every pair having an absolute correlation of at least 0.72. One principal component, a statistical combination that captures shared variation among the measures, accounted for 88.23% of their variance. This shared statistical structure does not make the constructs interchangeable. Two supplementary measures, recorded return and the share of distressed indicator ratings, are reported separately.

5.1 Engagement Indicator Mean

The engagement indicator mean summarizes the circumstances under which an engagement was delivered. It is computed in three steps.

1. Each respondent's ratings on the 100 rated indicators are averaged.
2. The respondent means within each engagement are then averaged.
3. The figure for the study set is the mean across the 150 engagements. Across the study set, it was 4.02 on the 10-point scale (n = 150 engagements).

Each indicator is also one of the 100 components of the mean. When an indicator is tested against the engagement indicator mean, the mean is recomputed without that indicator. The leave-one-out rule prevents an indicator from self-correlation.

5.2 Cancellation Rate

Cancellation rate is the proportion of a specified group of engagements recorded as canceled by the study date. Across the study sample, it was 56 of 150 engagements (37.33%). A respondent-level calculation would weight engagements by their number of sampled respondents, which is not necessarily proportional to delivery-team size. Such respondent-level comparisons are identified separately from engagement cancellation rates.

5.3 Customer Satisfaction

Customer satisfaction is the vendor-reported score recorded for each engagement on a 100-point scale. The source field is labeled “Customer Satisfaction %”. The values are treated here as scale points, not as the percentage of customers who were satisfied. The mean was 43.85 points across 150 engagements

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and 64.10 points among the 94 active engagements. No financial institution record was available to verify these scores.

The primary estimate of an association with customer satisfaction uses active engagements. Scores for canceled engagements were recorded after cancellation and are used only in explicitly identified descriptive comparisons.

5.4 Intent to Leave

Intent to leave is the respondent's rating, from 1 to 10, of their likelihood of leaving the current job within 12 months. Higher original-scale scores indicate greater stated likelihood. The mean was 6.77 among 798 respondents. 430 of 798 (53.88%) rated their likelihood at 7 or above. This high-likelihood threshold differs from the study's distressed threshold of 8 or above for unfavorable-direction indicators.

Intent to leave is measured at the respondent level. Respondents on the same engagement share its circumstances, and tests against respondent-level questions use standard errors clustered by engagement. Where an engagement-level form is needed, the measure is the mean of its respondents' ratings.

5.5 Measured Return and Indicators Distressed

Measured return is the percentage recorded in the study's return field for the 30 engagements that had reached Production, as reported by the vendor’s delivery team. Positive values were reported for 17 engagements, averaging 24.71%. The other 13, including 10 canceled engagements, had no positive return recorded. The field does not establish a common investment denominator, measurement period, or gross-versus-net convention. The values should be interpreted as reported return percentages rather than standardized, independently verified returns on investment. No return is imputed for preproduction engagements.

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6 Manual Alteration as Defined and Counted

Manual alteration denotes delivery personnel's reported changes to institutional data or processes, agent output, or performance reporting. Examples include correcting input records, supplying an unresolved process step, and revising output before submission. The study also records manual work performed to compensate for third-party system limitations.

The five indicator categories describe assessed engagement conditions. Manual-alteration measures describe reported actions taken during delivery. Their association does not establish whether conditions caused the actions, and alteration is not presumed improper merely because it occurred.

6.1 The Five Manual Alteration Methods

The study counts manual alteration by five methods, shown in Table 1. Three methods were counted by a direct yes-or-no question, each followed by a written question asking why. Respondents reported altering financial-institution-provided data in 421 of 839 answers (50.18%), the financial institution's processes in 490 of 841 (58.26%), and AI outputs in 278 of 828 (33.57%).

Reporting alteration concerns changes to performance reports and dashboards. Of 775 respondents answering how the vendor altered such reports, 484 gave an answer other than “I do not know” (62.45%), representing 127 engagements. This broad response count is distinguished from narrower substantive and indicator-coded subsets in Part 5.

Third-party work done by hand, the last of the five methods, is the delivery team performing by hand a task that a third-party system did not perform. Respondents described pulling records from a third-party portal that offered no interface to an agent and keying in data that a broken feed did not deliver. Others described reopening records that a change by the third party had stopped. The method was rated on two questions and described in 91 written answers from 87 respondents on 63 engagements.

Table 1. The five manual alteration methods

Method	How it was counted	Respondents	Engagements
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	Yes-or-no question, then a written question asking why	421 of 839	127
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	Yes-or-no question, then a written question asking why	490 of 841	132
Manual alteration of AI outputs	Yes-or-no question, then a written question asking why	278 of 828	108

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Method	How it was counted	Respondents	Engagements
Reporting alteration	Written answers on how the vendor altered the reports the financial institution received, other than “I do not know”	484 of 775	127
Third-party work done by hand	Two rated questions and the written answers describing the method	87	63

6.2 Counting Conventions and Coverage

The coverage measures use overlapping definitions. Direct affirmative answers on data, process, or output alteration came from 619 respondents on 146 engagements. Adding reporting alteration and third-party manual work identified at least one reported manual alteration on all 150 engagements. The latter coverage remained after excluding answers that expressed no knowledge, denied alteration, supplied no substantive content, or criticized the survey.

The difference between 146 and 150 engagements reflects the additional measurement channels. It is not a discrepancy between estimates of the same practice.

6.3 Disclosure as a Separate Object

Disclosure is measured separately from intervention. Respondents reporting data, process, or output alteration were asked whether they had discussed it with vendor management and whether they or their management had discussed it with the financial institution.

Internal disclosure to the vendor's management was reported in 783 of 1,113 answers (70.35%). Financial institution disclosure was reported in 13 of 1,004 answers (1.29%). Both counts sum the answers to three questions, one for each method, and are counts of answers rather than of respondents.

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7 Statistical Methods and Reporting Conventions

The companion analyses document the tests applied to each indicator, field, and derived measure. This report summarizes the estimates, relevant uncertainty, analysis units, and material qualifications. Appendix D describes the statistical procedures and the distinction between the original analysis and subsequent analytical or coding revisions. All companion analyses are available online at Akholi.com.

At n = 150, the reported minimum detectable correlation was approximately 0.23 for a two-sided 5% significance level and 80% power. Equivalence testing used a separate bound of ±0.30. Meeting that criterion supports an estimate within the study's chosen bounds. It does not establish literal zero or prove that every smaller association is operationally unimportant.

7.1 Primary Estimates, Descriptive Contrasts, and Partial Tests

For numeric indicators, the principal analyses report Pearson correlations with the four core measures. Pearson correlation describes the strength and direction of a linear association. Cancellation contrasts use 150 engagements. Primary customer-satisfaction estimates use the 94 active engagements. The engagement indicator mean is recomputed without the indicator under examination. Intent-to-leave analyses use respondent observations with engagement-clustered inference where specified. The companion record identifies each estimate's sample and interval method.

A partial test asks whether an indicator was associated with a measure beyond what the engagement indicator mean already accounts for. Each of the 100 rated indicators was tested in this way against cancellation, customer satisfaction, and intent to leave (300 tests in total) with the false discovery rate controlled across the full set. This procedure limits the expected proportion of false discoveries among results declared statistically significant under its assumptions. Comparisons across segments of the study set were corrected for the number of comparisons by the Holm method, which limits the probability of at least one false-positive conclusion within the specified family of comparisons under its assumptions.

7.2 The Four States of a Reported Result

An association is described as supported when it meets the relevant significance criterion and remains consistent under the applicable multiplicity adjustment and sensitivity checks. The rated-indicator protocol includes 22 checks distributed across the four outcomes. It does not apply 22 separate checks to every association. Appendix D identifies their scope.

A result is qualified when it fails an applicable adjustment or sensitivity check. Equivalence means that the tested effect meets the specified equivalence criterion, rather than being literally zero. A statistically significant effect can also fall within the equivalence bounds. A nonsignificant result that does not meet

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those bounds remains inconclusive. These distinctions prevent failure to detect an association from being interpreted as proof of absence.

7.3 Tests for Unordered Attributes

Attributes without an order, such as the outsourcing model or the type of financial institution, were tested by comparing the levels of the attribute. Cancellation, a yes-or-no outcome, was compared across levels with the chi-square test, or with Fisher's exact test or a Monte Carlo test where an expected count was under five. The other measures were compared with Welch's analysis of variance. That test does not assume equal spread across levels.

Engagement-level attribute comparisons use one assigned value per engagement and exclude response levels with fewer than 10 eligible engagements. Separate indicator analyses also compare respondents by role and vendor type. Those analyses use different units and should not be interpreted as the same tests.

7.4 Engagement Indicator Quintiles

The indicator quintiles divide the 150 engagements into five bands of 30, ranked by engagement indicator mean, with ties broken by engagement identifier. The lowest indicator quintile contains the 30 engagements with the lowest engagement indicator means, and the highest contains the 30 with the highest means. The indicator quintiles allow every study measure to be compared across the full range of these reported assessments in five steps. Because the bands are built on the engagement indicator mean, the rise of that mean from band to band is true by construction and is not reported as a finding.

7.5 Reporting of Null Results

Null and inconclusive results are reported alongside supported associations. For several structural attributes, estimated relationships met the study's equivalence criteria. Those results constrain the size of the tested associations under the specified models. They do not eliminate the attributes as possible contributors through other mechanisms or in other populations.

Restricted variation limits what an analysis can detect. For example, all 571 respondents answering the vendor-experience item reported zero, one, or two years. That range restricts conclusions about more experienced vendors, but it does not mathematically require a zero association within the observed sample.

7.6 The Written Answers as Evidence

Each substantive written response is assigned a sentiment score from −10 to +10, in five fixed steps. A score of −10 marks a part of the engagement described at or near its worst, and −5 a clear but partial

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problem. A score of 0 marks no position, or good and bad in balance. A score of +5 marks a clear but partial strength, and +10 marks at or near its best. Each response is also identified by the indicators it addresses and by the recurring themes it contains.

A response is primary when it answers the indicator's own open question and secondary when it addresses the indicator in answer to another question. A respondent asked for comment on the financial institution may describe its data, its processes, and its speed of response in one answer, and that answer is evidence for each of the indicators it describes. When written responses provide direct contribution to the affiliated indicator, the response is marked as a primary theme contribution. Additional indicators that a written response references are marked as secondary theme contributions.

The report quotes written responses as the respondents wrote them, spelling and grammar unchanged, with words omitted only where an ellipsis marks the omission and the omission is immaterial. Names of financial institutions and vendors were replaced by a third party before the answers reached the author, as set out in Appendix D, section 10. Each quotation is attributed by role, outsourcing model, and process family.

> *I found this section difficult to answer genuinely, because it asks about joint decisions as though both firms are standing in the same room when something goes wrong. In a cardholder servicing operation the thing that matters is who holds the switch, and at two months in that is one named person on our side and nobody on theirs after six in the evening. A number between one and ten will not tell you that. Ask instead how long it takes to pull an agent off live cardholder traffic, and who is permitted to do it — that answer would have been thirty minutes on a weekday, and I would rather have given you it."*
>
> **PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR**
> CXM, Payments, cards and disputes

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8 Reading Conventions

Readers may consult individual indicators independently. Local sections retain the sample sizes and qualifications necessary to interpret their findings, while shared definitions and methods are consolidated in this Introduction and Appendix D.

8.1 Provenance of Every Figure

The numerical findings derive from the structured responses, coded written answers, and engagement records. The online study-data index links to the corresponding companion analyses, identified by subject and survey-item code. Appendix E provides the access location and explains the supporting materials. Repeated tables of diagnostics are retained in those analyses rather than reproduced throughout the narrative.

8.2 Relationship to the Companion Indicator Analyses

The 216 published companion analyses provide distributions, segment comparisons, sensitivity checks, equivalence tests, and the relevant coded written evidence. Each report section identifies the indicator by its subject heading. The companion record supplies the detailed calculations. The main text retains qualifications that materially affect interpretation.

8.3 Use of a Single Block in Isolation

The Introduction defines distressed ratings, favorable-direction scores, the four core measures, and the distinction between active-engagement estimates and cancellation contrasts. Appendix D supplies the analytical methods, and Appendix E identifies the online companion index. These references support detailed consultation without repeating the full method under every indicator.

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OVERVIEW

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Introduction

A study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements, drawn from the accounts of 850 members of the vendors' delivery teams

PUBLICATION DATE	November 1, 2026
VERSION	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
FIGSHARE DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890

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PART 1

Engagement Outcomes and Their Correlates

IN THIS PART

The Immaturity of Agentic AI Outsourcing

Cancellation and the Risk of Cancellation

Customer Satisfaction, Delivery Performance, and Measured Return

The Engagement Indicator Mean and the Interdependence of the Four Measures

Structural Attributes and Outcome Associations

REPORT INFORMATION

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Full Study Report

Author	Phil Hatch
Publication date	November 1, 2026
Version	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
Figshare DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890
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SUGGESTED CITATION

Hatch, Phil. 2026. *Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions: Full Study Report*. Version 1.8.2. Akholi. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559.

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USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Artificial intelligence tools were used to prepare this report. Appendix G discloses how they were used.

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I rated my own company low, and I will still say this in its defense, nobody has this figured out yet, and the ones who claim they do are selling something. We were asked to staff a capital markets platform with agent-assisted delivery eighteen months after the tools existed, and we did staff it, and the platform is live. Where we are short is testing work that lands different on every run, so my leads test it by reading it, at night, on top of their own sprint work. That is a real gap, and it is not a gap anyone trained us to fill."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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Engagement Outcomes and Their Correlates

Cancellation, lower reported customer satisfaction, less favorable indicator ratings, and greater intent to leave occurred together across the engagements studied. These relationships describe substantial delivery difficulties, but they do not identify independent causes. Structural attributes provided mixed evidence: some estimated relationships fell within the study's prespecified small-association bounds, others were supported, and others remained inconclusive. The analysis examines these findings alongside engagement maturity and commercial arrangements, distinguishing full-sample cancellation contrasts from estimates restricted to active engagements.

> *"We are four months into this engagement and customer satisfaction has collapsed. My team corrects client data almost every cycle before it can be used, legal research inputs arrive incomplete and inconsistent, and by the time it reaches the model it is not fit to work from." - Engagement Manager, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

The four core measures were strongly correlated. The engagement indicator mean summarizes respondents' ratings across the 100 engagement indicators, averaged within each engagement. Indicator quintiles are five equal groups ranked by that mean. However, each describes a different aspect of the engagement. The section "The Engagement Indicator Mean and the Interdependence of the Four Measures" examines their shared variance, the pattern across indicator quintiles, and the limits of attributing outcomes to individual indicators.

"

Decision rights and change control sit at rock bottom here... the joint sign-off process for exception handling takes weeks and breaks cannot wait that long, so the team ends up making the call itself under real time pressure. I have flagged this upward more than once and it has not moved, and with cancellation now confirmed, I am fairly sure it never will."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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“when i joined the playbook was already written and we follow it step by step, this is the strongest part. besides the QA people do check the agent output properly, i did not expect that. training is the weak part here. i learned the monitoring stack from my lead and from an old runbook, not from any course. so i have marked training low, but the rest i am satisfied with.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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The Immaturity of Agentic AI Outsourcing

Agentic AI outsourcing is a new form of delivery, and the engagements in the study were young. The mean is the arithmetic average, and n identifies the number of observations included in a result. Their mean age at the time of data collection was 5.69 months, and the oldest had run for 22 months (n = 150 engagements). Production had been reached by 30 of the 150 engagements, and the remaining 120 were in Build-Out or Transition/Cut-Over.

The vendors were new to agentic AI outsourcing as well. Every respondent who answered placed the vendor's experience of delivering agentic AI outsourcing at two years or less, with a mean of 1.0 year (n = 571 respondents). No respondent reported more than one year of personal experience with agentic AI (n = 793 respondents). Engagement managers who had run earlier outsourcing programs for the same vendor described what that inexperience meant on the engagement.

> *"The last program I ran for this employer was a contact center transition, and we were good at that, because we had done forty of them and there was a playbook that actually worked. Here there was no playbook, and the people who wrote the proposal had not run one of these either..." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"...we were sold into this as if the firm had done it before. It had not. There was no runbook for taking a screening agent from pilot into governed production, so we wrote the runbook ourselves at night while the alert backlog grew." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

The associations of engagement age, time in the current stage, and production-agent count with the four core measures met the study's equivalence criteria. Equivalence testing assesses whether a relationship lies within prespecified bounds treated as small under the study's criterion. It does not establish a zero relationship. Vendor experience also met those criteria, although its restricted range limits interpretation. These singular cross-sectional results do not demonstrate whether individual engagements improved over time.

Limited experience provides context for the findings. Written accounts described vendors developing delivery practices during paid engagements. Respondents also rated the agentic AI knowledge and skills of financial institution staff poorly: 418 of 793 ratings (52.71%) were distressed. These accounts identify perceived capability gaps without establishing their causal contribution to outcomes.

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"We are the first team in our unit to run agents on an investment platform build, so we are working out the method as we go, that is the honest position. Leadership are supportive and the people we are given are capable enough, but ownership when an agent puts a wrong assumption into the pricing module is still not settled anywhere above me." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"I have been in the industry a long time. The last six months have been rough. ... We are creating a new reality every day. AI behaviour changes without explanation, data feeds are not consistent. Our team has to make updates to data, the process, and the AI rules every day." -Portfolio Director, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes

"

Eight months in, this is better than it was. When we started, nobody had written down which of the feeds into the repository actually mattered, and we found out the hard way when one of them changed its date format over a weekend. Since then we've mapped the ones that touch classification and we put explicit checks where the old team used to just eyeball it and fix it themselves... that part I'd call solved. What hasn't moved is warning. We still find out that a provider changed something because the queue looks wrong on Monday morning, not because anyone told us. And the model retirement notices go to our platform group, not to us, so we get maybe a week. For a POC that's survivable. If this goes to production on the same footing I'd be nervous about it."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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1 Lifecycle Position of the Engagements

Cancellation occurred at every measured lifecycle stage. The sample included 60 engagements in Build-Out, 60 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 30 in Production. The observed rate differences must be distinguished from statistically supported differences and estimates meeting the study's equivalence criteria.

Cancellation was recorded for 29 of 60 Build-Out engagements (48.33%), 17 of 60 Transition/Cut-Over engagements (28.33%), and 10 of 30 Production engagements (33.33%). The chi-square test compares cancellation frequencies across stages. The stage difference did not reach statistical significance (chi-square 5.39, p = 0.068, n = 150). The p value is the probability, under the null model, of a result at least as extreme as the observed result. Among active engagements, the stage contrasts for customer satisfaction, engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave met the study's equivalence criteria. These results do not establish that the stage is irrelevant outside the observed sample.

Figure 1.1. Cancellation rate by lifecycle stage against the study-set rate

Cancellation occurred at every lifecycle stage



Note: The groups are ordered categories. The connecting lines do not represent elapsed time.

Canceled engagements: 29 of 60 in Build-Out, 17 of 60 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 10 of 30 in Production. The difference across stages did not reach significance (chi-square 5.39, p = 0.068, n = 150 engagements).

Counts are engagements. Cancellation rates were 48.33% in Build-Out, 28.33% in Transition/Cut-Over, and 33.33% in Production. Overall, 56 of 150 engagements were canceled (37.33%). The lifecycle stages are categories, not elapsed-time observations.

Engagements were canceled early as well as late. Respondents described an engagement that ended within weeks of starting.

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> *"We were canceled at eight weeks, which means most of what this section asks about was never actually tested..." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"On the Tuesday we agreed how vendor queries should route between their team and mine, by the Friday the client had pulled the work." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

1.1 Lifecycle Stage and Outcome Comparisons

INDICATOR C036 · WHAT STAGE IS THE ENGAGEMENT IN? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Cancellation was the most frequent respondent-reported lifecycle answer, although cancellation is recorded separately from the engagement's measured stage. The most frequent answer was Engagement Canceled, given by 309 of 810 respondents (38.15%). Where both a respondent's answer and the Engagements sheet recorded a stage, the two agreed in 501 of 501 cases.

Reported stage was associated with the engagement indicator mean (Welch F 40.50, $p < 0.001$, $n = 141$ engagements) and intent to leave (Welch F 71.51, $p < 0.001$, $n = 141$). The canceled category had a mean indicator score of 2.6 and a mean intent to leave of 9.3 ($n = 56$ engagements). Among active engagements, neither stage comparison reached statistical significance, and the customer-satisfaction contrast met the equivalence criterion. The full-sample result reflects the inclusion of cancellation as a response category.

The written responses that addressed the stage numbered 162, from 139 respondents on 69 engagements. 139 came from canceled engagements. Neutral scores were given to 124 of the 162 responses (76.54%), and the neutral responses recorded what the respondent had valued in an engagement that had ended. Among 61 responses on what respondents loved most about the job, 57 referred to the end of the engagement, each from a canceled engagement. An individual contributor named the end of the engagement itself as what they loved most about the job.

> *"...the fact that it is finally over" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"to be candid i felt relieved when they told us it is stopping. before this i was on a card disputes queue, small account, but the process was written down, one way to do the thing, and if you follow it the case closes. here it was never like that." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

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1.2 Engagement Age and the Four Study Measures

INDICATOR C035 · HOW LONG AGO DID THIS SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENT START, IN MONTHS? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The engagements were generally recent. The mean age was 5.69 months and the median 5.0 months, from 1.0 to 22.0 months (n = 150 engagements). The median is the middle value in an ordered distribution. Every respondent's answer on the age of the engagement matched in the study.

Figure 1.2. Engagement Age and the Four Study Measures: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean engagement age in months: 5.6 (n = 804 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 5.52. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.69. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.97. Build-Out (n = 161): 2.70. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 241): 5.68. Production (n = 98): 11.40. Canceled (n = 304): 5.17.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational. A confidence interval expresses uncertainty under the stated method. A p value is the probability, under the null model, of a result at least as extreme as the observed result.

The graphic includes the associations reproduced in the section. Additional results remain in the text.

The estimated associations of engagement age with all four measures met the equivalence criterion. Correlation, denoted r, expresses the direction and strength of a linear association. A confidence interval (CI) expresses uncertainty around an estimate under the stated method. The correlation with cancellation was −0.08 (95% CI −0.24 to 0.08, p = 0.327, n = 150 engagements). The correlation with customer satisfaction among active engagements was 0.09 (p = 0.374, n = 94 engagements). It was 0.12 with the engagement indicator mean (p = 0.142, n = 150 engagements). At respondent level, the correlation with intent to leave was −0.08 (p = 0.360, n = 798 respondents). Mean age ranged from 2.7

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months in active Build-Out engagements (n = 31) to 11.5 months in active Production engagements (n = 20). Age varied with stage without a detected outcome association under these tests.

The written responses that addressed age numbered 73, from 69 respondents on 48 engagements. In 15 of the 73, the engagement was too young for the survey's questions to be answered as asked. In 14, all from canceled engagements, it had ended within weeks or months. Seven said a problem had persisted for six months or more without improving.

> *"We are two month in and there is no platform yet, so what am i rating... i send a request for a schema and it sit for eleven days, then the reply is ask someone else." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Hard to answer these when engagement lasted four weeks. There was no joint model to speak of, only two kickoff calls and a governance pack nobody signed." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I feel these questions are asking about things which did not happen yet for us. We are two months in, nothing is in Production, so how do I answer for running many agents in live." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The scores look good because we are only one month in and the volume is small." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"19 months and nobody from their side came to sit with the queue for one hour." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

1.3 Time in the Current Stage and Outcome Associations

INDICATOR C037 · HOW MANY MONTHS HAS THE ENGAGEMENT BEEN IN ITS CURRENT STAGE? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Reported time in the current stage averaged 3.1 months, with a median of 2.0 (n = 794 respondents). Its estimated associations met the equivalence criterion for cancellation ($r = -0.10$, $p = 0.233$, $n = 150$ engagements), active-engagement customer satisfaction ($r = 0.07$, $p = 0.488$, $n = 94$), engagement indicator mean ($r = 0.15$, $p = 0.069$, $n = 150$), and intent to leave ($r = -0.11$, $p = 0.166$, $n = 745$ respondents).

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Figure 1.3. Time in the Current Stage and Outcome Associations: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean months in the current stage: 3.1 (n = 794 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 614): 3.08. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.18. Portfolio director (n = 28): 3.04. Build-Out (n = 167): 1.68. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 228): 3.12. Production (n = 98): 6.48. Canceled (n = 301): 2.81.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The time in stage varied with the lifecycle stage, as the age of the engagement did. It ranged from 1.7 months among respondents on active engagements in Build-Out (n = 167 respondents) to 6.5 months among those in Production (n = 98 respondents). Three written responses addressed it, each describing a stalled engagement or a request that went months without an adequate answer.

> *"We asked in March for role catalogue, we asked again in May, and what came back was a spreadsheet exported from an old attestation cycle, nine hundred groups, no description against most of them." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Once the pilot stalled, the vendor kept the infrastructure-readiness dashboard green by reporting only the cloud environments that had passed setup, quietly excluding the legacy on-prem systems that never cleared readiness testing." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

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1.4 Planned Time to Production

INDICATOR C038 · PER THE CURRENT PLAN, HOW MANY MONTHS FROM TODAY UNTIL THE ENGAGEMENT REACHES PRODUCTION/DELIVERY? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents reported how many months remained, under the current plan, until the engagement reached Production. The mean answer was 3.9 months (n = 545 respondents on 104 engagements), and 251 respondents answered "I do not know." Respondents on canceled engagements and on engagements already in Production reported zero. Active engagements in Build-Out reported a mean of 7.7 months (n = 163 respondents), and those in Transition/Cut-Over reported 3.9 months (n = 230 respondents).

Figure 1.4. Mean months remaining to production, by respondent role and engagement status

Respondents reported how many months remained, under the current plan, until the engagement reached Production.



Note: Mean months remaining to production: 3.9 (n = 545 respondents).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

A longer planned time to Production was associated with less cancellation (r = −0.37, 95% CI −0.53 to −0.19, p < 0.001, n = 104 engagements). The association rests on the zero answers of canceled engagements and did not hold with the thin-base segments removed. Among active engagements, none of the tested associations reached statistical significance. The customer-satisfaction estimate was within the study's equivalence bounds (r = −0.04, p = 0.680, n = 94 engagements).

> *"There are two issue trackers. We log in ours, they log in theirs, and when same issue is in both nobody merge them, so one problem has two statuses and two owners. I raise this in stand up in first month, nothing change." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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2 Depth of Agentic Operation and Vendor Experience

Few engagements were running agents in live operation, and few vendors had delivered agentic work for long. The mean number of agents running in production was 1.2, and the median was 0 (n = 787 respondents), and every respondent on an active engagement before Production reported none. The vendor's experience of agentic AI outsourcing was placed at two years or less by every respondent who answered (n = 571 respondents).

> *“We are not having many live systems running yet, which is why the low marks from me... the teams here are still learning on this one.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Production-agent count and reported vendor experience had estimated associations within the study's equivalence bounds for all four measures. These findings do not establish the adequacy of delivery methods or the effect of acquiring more experience. Both questions describe a sample with limited exposure to sustained agentic operation.

> *“We sold a data platform build with agents and we did not have anyone in the firm who had actually stood one up end to end, so my engineers were learning the orchestration layer at the same time as they were meant to be delivering it.” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“for me personally it has been good learning, i knew nothing about custody six month back and now i can read a statement properly. only thing, we are the first team doing this so every mistake is ours to find... that is tiring some weeks” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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2.1 Agents in Production

INDICATOR C043 · HOW MANY AI AGENTS ARE RUNNING IN PRODUCTION ON THIS ENGAGEMENT TODAY? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents on active Production engagements reported more agents operating in production than respondents on canceled engagements. Respondents on active engagements in Production reported a mean of 6.1 agents (n = 97 respondents) and a median of 0 (n = 787 respondents). Canceled engagements reported a mean of 1.2 (n = 304 respondents).

Figure 1.5. Agents in Production: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean AI agents in production: 1.2 (n = 787 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 612): 1.24. Engagement manager (n = 150): 1.21. Portfolio director (n = 25): 0.88. Build-Out (n = 161): 0.00. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 225): 0.00. Production (n = 97): 6.11. Canceled (n = 304): 1.21.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The estimated associations of production-agent count met the equivalence criterion for cancellation (r = −0.01, p = 0.922, n = 150 engagements), active-engagement customer satisfaction (r = 0.06, p = 0.573, n = 94), engagement indicator mean (r = 0.03, p = 0.746, n = 150), and intent to leave (r = 0.01, p = 0.913, n = 742 respondents). The median count of zero limits conclusions about engagements operating larger numbers of agents.

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Four written responses addressed the number of agents, each in a comment on the vendor. They described counts of five to about 40 agents and treated the capacity to run more as a gap in the vendor's readiness.

> *"What has not moved is running agents at any real number... we are fine with twelve, I would not want to be asked for two hundred tomorrow." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"Running many agents at once is not there yet, we have five and it is already manual" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

2.2 Vendor Tenure in Agentic Delivery Confined to Two Years or Less

INDICATOR C078 · HOW MANY YEARS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER BEEN DELIVERING AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

No respondent reported that the vendor had delivered agentic AI outsourcing for more than two years. Every answer was zero, one, or two years, with a mean of 1.0 year and a median of 1.0 year (n = 571 respondents). Another 220 respondents answered, "I do not know."

Figure 1.6. Vendor Tenure in Agentic Delivery Confined to Two Years or Less: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean years the vendor has delivered agentic AI outsourcing: 1.0 (n = 571 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 389): 0.98. Engagement manager (n = 150): 0.94. Portfolio director (n = 30): 0.97. Build-Out (n = 120): 1.05. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 177): 0.99. Production (n = 68): 1.12. Canceled (n = 206): 0.85.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

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Estimated associations of vendor experience met the equivalence criterion for all four core measures. The correlation with cancellation was r = −0.12 (p = 0.136, n = 150 engagements). It was r = −0.09 with customer satisfaction among active engagements (p = 0.407, n = 94 engagements) and r = 0.04 with the engagement indicator mean (p = 0.633, n = 150 engagements). At respondent level, the correlation with intent to leave was r = −0.02 (p = 0.726, n = 543 respondents). The restricted range of zero to two years limits inference about longer experience. It does not force a null result or establish that experience is unimportant.

Written responses described firms delivering agentic work for the first time.

> *"But nobody here has done this before, there is no playbook. Every time we ask how a agent goes to production the answer is different from each person." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Playbooks are better than three months back, hence i escalate less. But nobody senior here really knows the agent side, we learn it on shift." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"...nobody in my batch knew anything about agents when we joined, and the company did put us on a course. Two weeks. It was not enough for AML work but it was something, and the trainer did answer questions after also. The problem is nobody above the trainer has done this before either." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

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Cancellation and the Risk of Cancellation

The study recorded cancellation on 56 of 150 engagements (37.33%). Comparisons by institution type, outsourcing model, and vendor type did not detect statistically significant rate differences after the applicable adjustments. This does not establish equal rates across those groups.

Among the 94 active engagements, 19 had a mean original-scale cancellation-likelihood rating of at least 7 out of 10, and another 39 had a mean of at least 5 but below 7. Combining these 58 engagements with the 56 canceled engagements yields 114 of 150 (76.00%). The combined measure describes realized cancellation and perceived risk, not a forecast of eventual cancellations.

Figure 1.7. Composition of the 150 engagements by cancellation and rated risk of cancellation

Most engagements were canceled or rated at moderate or high perceived risk



Note: Risk bands use the engagement mean of cancellation likelihood among the 94 active engagements: high risk 7 or above, moderate risk 5 or above and below 7. Canceled or at risk: 114 of 150 engagements (76.00%).

High perceived risk means a mean cancellation-likelihood rating of 7 or above. Moderate perceived risk means a mean rating of at least 5 and below 7. These ratings express respondents' perceptions. The strip partitions all 150 engagements. Risk categories use the 94 active engagements as their base.

Cancellation contrasts compare ratings recorded after the outcome. Active-engagement analyses avoid that particular temporal problem but remain cross-sectional and subject to confounding and selection. The cancellation-likelihood item requires an additional distinction because respondents on canceled engagements also answered it.

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“If I am honest we were flying blind. We asked for custodian access in week two and still didn't have it when the plug was pulled.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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1 Realized Cancellation

Realized cancellation is the engagement status recorded in the study dataset. Unlike a rating of future likelihood, it identifies an event reported as already having occurred. Its associations describe differences between canceled and active engagements. The status record does not independently verify the sequence or causes of their operational difficulties.

1.1 Realized Cancellation and Its Association With Indicator Ratings and Intent to Leave

The Engagements sheet records 56 of the 150 engagements as canceled (37.33%). Canceled engagements had a markedly lower engagement indicator mean ($r = -0.72$, 95% CI −0.79 to −0.63, $p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements). Respondents on canceled engagements reported markedly higher intent to leave ($r = 0.76$, cluster bootstrap 95% CI 0.70 to 0.81, $p < 0.001$, $n = 798$ respondents). The cluster bootstrap resamples whole engagements to retain the grouping of respondents within engagements. Both associations held in every robustness check computed.

No tested segment difference in cancellation rate remained statistically significant after Holm adjustment. That procedure limits false-positive conclusions within a specified family of comparisons. This includes institution type, outsourcing model, process family, class of work, and vendor type. The satisfaction distributions for canceled and active engagements did not overlap, as detailed in section 1.1 of “Customer Satisfaction, Delivery Performance, and Measured Return”. Their correlation is a full-sample descriptive contrast rather than an active-engagement estimate.

The ratings of canceled engagements were given after the cancellation, and the associations describe how those engagements were rated, not what preceded the decision. The written responses from canceled engagements describe requests that went unanswered until the engagement ended.

> *“I flagged forty odd vendor records with two different bank details back in March, no answer, chased it twice, still nothing when the account got pulled. There is no one on their side who is allowed to say yes to anything, so the queue just grows and we work round it.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“Before that I would put a surveillance rule change in our tracker and it would just sit. … We do not have a shared risk list either. We keep ours in jira and they keep theirs in whatever they use, and when an alert set went wrong last month it took two days to even agree it was a problem.” - Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

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“The vendor's monthly report aggregated error rates across all payroll cycles run that month, diluting the visibility of the specific cycle where a paycheck error triggered the cancellation, so the dashboard never flagged the real risk building underneath.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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2 Perceived Cancellation Likelihood

The active-engagement risk bands use only the 94 engagements still operating. The broader indicator analysis includes numeric answers from all 150 engagements, despite wording that restricted the question to engagements not yet canceled. The distinction is necessary when interpreting its full-sample correlations.

2.1 Delivery Team Estimates of Cancellation Likelihood

INDICATOR C039 · IF THE ENGAGEMENT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELED, HOW LIKELY IS THE CUSTOMER TO CANCEL THE ENGAGEMENT? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The cancellation-likelihood item received 328 numeric responses across 150 engagements and 269 “I do not know” responses. Its favorable-direction mean and median were both 5.0. Higher values indicate lower perceived likelihood of cancellation. These pooled summaries include responses from canceled engagements and should not be read as prospective ratings for active engagements alone.

Figure 1.8. Delivery Team Estimates of Cancellation Likelihood: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “If the engagement has not been canceled, how likely is the customer to cancel the engagement?”.

Distressed ratings: 76 of 328 answers (23.17%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 145): 4.72. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.06. Portfolio director (n = 31): 6.26. Build-Out (n = 76): 5.59. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 91): 5.91. Production (n = 40): 5.92. Canceled (n = 121): 3.70.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

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The indicator is converted to the favorable direction as 11 minus the original rating before these comparisons.

The favorable-direction rating was associated with lower realized cancellation (r = −0.54, 95% CI −0.65 to −0.42, n = 150 engagements), higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.52 to 0.76, n = 94), and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.69, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.76, n = 150). At the respondent level, it was associated with lower original-scale intent to leave (r = −0.64, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.55, n = 316). These results passed the applicable checks in the 22-check protocol. The cancellation contrast includes retrospective responses and cannot establish predictive accuracy. Distressed ratings came from 76 of the 328 answers (23.17%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 26 of the 150 engagements.

Individual contributors judged cancellation more likely than portfolio directors, at a mean of 4.7 (n = 145 respondents) against 6.3 (n = 31 respondents). Nine written responses addressed the likelihood of cancellation. Seven, all from canceled engagements, described an end the respondent had expected.

> *“...this whole engagement already feel like it is ending badly so one more issue doesnt change much” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *“i dont know if anyone above me even knows, happens almost every day, i just override it and keep moving because nobody will fix this before it gets canceled” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

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Customer Satisfaction, Delivery Performance, and Measured Return

Recorded customer satisfaction was substantially lower on canceled engagements, with no overlap between the canceled and active distributions. Section 1.1 reports their ranges. Both the recorded score and the separate perception rating were supplied by vendor personnel. Neither was verified against financial institution records.

Delivery-date performance, budget performance, and progress against key performance indicators received mean ratings between 4.8 and 4.9. These indicator-level results and their associations are reported in section 2. They describe perceived delivery performance rather than independently verified service outcomes.

> *“The problem is we raise the same funding cutoff issue on every status call and get nowhere, we learned the actual process just by watching their ops team work it live. And any decision that needs sign off stalls enough to blow the settlement window.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“KPIs keep slipping and nobody agrees on why” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *“ROI case for this was shaky from the start” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Return analysis is restricted to Production engagements and, for the reported correlations, to the 17 with positive recorded returns. The small selected sample and unspecified financial measurement conventions limit comparison and generalization (section 3).

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1 Recorded and Perceived Customer Satisfaction

The study distinguishes a 100-point satisfaction score recorded for each engagement from a separate 10-point item asking whether the financial institution was satisfied with performance. Figure 1.9 presents the distribution of recorded scores.

Figure 1.9. Engagements by recorded customer satisfaction, in ten equal bands, 150 engagements

Recorded customer satisfaction varied widely across engagements



Note: The three lowest bands hold 56 engagements, exactly the canceled engagements (amber). No engagement recorded a value from 27.4 to 36.2.

1.1 Non-Overlapping Satisfaction of Canceled and Active Engagements

Recorded customer satisfaction averaged 43.85 points, with a median of 53.50, across 150 engagements. Active engagements averaged 64.10 points and ranged from 40.00 to 89.00 (n = 94).

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Canceled engagements averaged 9.88 points and ranged from 1.00 to 20.00 (n = 56). The two distributions did not overlap.

Satisfaction was associated with every other study measure, and the associations were retained under the applicable checks in the 16-check measure protocol. Its association with cancellation (r = −0.94, 95% CI −0.96 to −0.92, n = 150 engagements) measures the separation between the two groups. Higher satisfaction was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). It was also associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.84, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.87 to −0.81, n = 798 respondents).

The associations with the engagement indicator mean and with intent to leave did not depend on the canceled engagements. Among the 94 active engagements alone, they held at r = 0.84 and r = −0.63, respectively. Among the engagements still running, those delivered under better circumstances recorded higher satisfaction, and their delivery teams were less inclined to leave.

1.2 Delivery Team Perception of Financial Institution Satisfaction

INDICATOR C048 · THE CUSTOMER IS HAPPY WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT THIS STAGE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Individual contributors assessed financial institution satisfaction less favorably than portfolio directors, and ratings were lowest on canceled engagements. The mean rating was 5.0, and the median was 5.0 (n = 379 respondents). 244 respondents answered: “I do not know.”

Figure 1.10. Delivery Team Perception of Financial Institution Satisfaction: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “The customer is happy with the performance of the engagement at this stage”.
Distressed ratings: 89 of 379 answers (23.48%).

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Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 196): 4.76. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.00. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.97. Build-Out (n = 80): 5.88. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 110): 5.65. Production (n = 46): 5.61. Canceled (n = 143): 3.69.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The graphic includes the associations reproduced in the section. Additional results remain in the text.

Perceived financial institution satisfaction was associated with all four core measures and passed the applicable checks in the 22-check protocol. Its correlation with cancellation was −0.57 (95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, its correlation with recorded customer satisfaction was 0.53 (95% CI 0.36 to 0.66, n = 94 engagements). Its correlation with the engagement indicator mean was 0.74 (95% CI 0.65 to 0.80, n = 150 engagements), the largest observed coefficient among these comparisons. Coefficient ordering alone does not establish a difference in the underlying association strengths. Distressed ratings came from 89 of the 379 answers (23.48%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 29 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses that addressed the financial institution's satisfaction numbered 13, from 13 respondents on 12 engagements, and 9 of the 13 were negative.

> *"When the agent mis-cleared a set of cash breaks in March, our own side took two weeks to decide who owned the fix. The platform is good, the answer on accountability was slower than the client's patience." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"…I sat between the client asking why supplier records were still wrong and my own management asking me for a green status. Both directions, every day. …" -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Not everything here is same, main thing is templates get changed their side, we find out when client complains" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

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2 Delivery Against Dates, Budget, and Key Performance Indicators

Reported delivery assessments were concentrated in a narrow range, with favorable-direction means from 4.8 to 4.9 (n = 554–798 respondents). The four questions addressed delivery dates, budget adherence, progress toward key performance indicators, and respondents' knowledge of those indicators. The measures and the practices described in written answers remain distinct subjects.

> *"sign off arrive after the filing deadline it was even meant for, the Review Board sit too rarely to help, so i decide myself and kindly hope it hold up later" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

2.1 Reported Meeting Delivery Dates

INDICATOR C049 · THE ENGAGEMENT IS MEETING DELIVERY DATES SUCCESSFULLY · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Ratings of meeting delivery dates were lowest on canceled engagements and less favorable among individual contributors than portfolio directors. The mean rating was 4.8 and the median 5.0 (n = 798 respondents). Canceled engagements rated lowest, at 3.4 (n = 304 respondents), and individual contributors rated lower than portfolio directors.

Figure 1.11. Reported Meeting Delivery Dates: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "The engagement is meeting delivery dates successfully".
Distressed ratings: 234 of 798 answers (29.32%).

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Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 624): 4.61. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.19. Portfolio director (n = 24): 6.46. Build-Out (n = 161): 5.55. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 5.56. Production (n = 97): 5.79. Canceled (n = 304): 3.43.
r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Ratings of delivery against dates were associated with all four study measures, each association holding under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements rated as meeting their dates had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.60, 95% CI −0.70 to −0.49, n = 150 engagements). They also recorded higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.59, 95% CI 0.44 to 0.71, n = 94 engagements). The largest observed absolute coefficient was for the engagement indicator mean (r = 0.78, 95% CI 0.71 to 0.84, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated delivery higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.61, n = 751 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 234 of the 798 answers (29.32%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 30 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses that addressed delivery dates numbered 57, from 54 respondents on 42 engagements, and 42 of the 57 were negative. In 14 responses, approvals arrived after the deadline, and the respondent decided without them or let the date slip.

> *"I just made the call myself, the change approval group meets barely at all and the decision always lands after the deadline its needed for, so I tweak the account data to match what the workflow expects and push it through myself before anyone signs off." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"In June we had a release window on a Friday evening, and the change record needed an approver from their platform team, who had gone on leave without delegating, so the deploy sat until Monday even though everything else was ready." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Another 14 written responses described meeting deadlines by bypassing a process or approval, and seven described reports that concealed delays from the financial institution. These are respondent accounts, not independently inspected delivery or reporting records.

> *"...change process is too slow for how fast we work, so I catch it myself and keep report on time" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"The delivery methodology gaps got hidden by scoping every missed milestone as a change request, which reset the baseline schedule each time and kept the reported on-time delivery rate looking healthy." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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"And do note it happen most weeks, i tell my lead about the same issue every time, nothing change so i just fix it and the payroll goes out on time" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

"The vendor reported fleet-scaling milestones as met by counting agents deployed to a test environment rather than production, so the status report showed steady progress for months while zero tickets were actually being routed live." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations

2.2 Budget Pressure From Effort the Plan Did Not Price

INDICATOR C050 · THE ENGAGEMENT IS WITHIN BUDGET · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

More favorable assessments of delivery within budget were associated with all four core study measures. The mean rating was 4.9, and the median was 5.0 (n = 554 respondents), and 242 respondents answered: "I do not know." Delivery within budget was associated with all four study measures, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Engagements rated within budget had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.54, 95% CI −0.64 to −0.42, n = 150 engagements). Their customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher (r = 0.62, 95% CI 0.48 to 0.73, n = 94 engagements). The largest observed absolute coefficient was for the engagement indicator mean (r = 0.76, 95% CI 0.69 to 0.82, n = 150 engagements). Distressed ratings came from 151 of the 554 answers (27.26%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 31 of the 150 engagements.

Figure 1.12. Budget Pressure From Effort the Plan Did Not Price: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "The engagement is within budget".

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Distressed ratings: 151 of 554 answers (27.26%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 375): 4.79. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.10. Portfolio director (n = 28): 6.07. Build-Out (n = 117): 5.72. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 164): 5.58. Production (n = 70): 5.96. Canceled (n = 203): 3.62.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The graphic includes the associations reproduced in the section. Additional results remain in the text.

Seven written responses addressed the budget, each negative. Six described effort or cost that the engagement absorbed outside its plan or fee, in the form of rework, staff added under a fixed fee, repeated runs of the AI tools, and manual checks.

> *"In June we were asked to add two more allocation reviewers and were told the fee is fixed on the numbers agreed last year, which nobody has revisited since agents took half the run. So we absorbed it." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"on my last project the bot was a script, you knew the cost. this one burns through budget re-runing the same patch check four times, nobody warned us about that part" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

> *"We check output every run now, it move on its own sometimes, feels like extra work nobody planned for but we do it anyway." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Scope-creep tickets tied to mandate changes were logged under a generic 'change request' bucket, which kept the reported schedule variance small while the real rework hours piled up underneath it." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

2.3 Engagements Not Achieving Stated Key Performance Indicators

INDICATOR C051 · THE ENGAGEMENT IS NOT ACHIEVING STATED KPIS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Individual contributors assessed progress toward the engagement's stated key performance indicators less favorably than portfolio directors. Converted to the favorable direction, on which a higher figure marks an engagement closer to its targets, the mean rating was 4.8 (n = 782 respondents). Individual contributors rated the engagement furthest from its targets, at 4.7 (n = 608 respondents), and portfolio directors closest, at 5.8 (n = 24 respondents).

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Figure 1.13. Engagements Not Achieving Stated Key Performance Indicators: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "The engagement is not achieving stated KPIs".

Distressed ratings: 241 of 782 answers (30.82%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 608): 4.65. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.06. Portfolio director (n = 24): 5.83. Build-Out (n = 166): 5.63. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 229): 5.53. Production (n = 93): 5.83. Canceled (n = 294): 3.35.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The indicator is converted to the favorable direction as 11 minus the original rating before these comparisons.

The graphic includes the associations reproduced in the section. Additional results remain in the text.

Progress toward the key performance indicators was associated with all four study measures, and the associations held under every one of the applicable robustness checks. Engagements rated further from their targets had a higher cancellation rate (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.69 to −0.48, n = 150 engagements). Engagements rated closer to their targets recorded higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.62, 95% CI 0.48 to 0.73, n = 94 engagements). They also had a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.79, 95% CI 0.72 to 0.84, n = 150 engagements). Distressed ratings came from 241 of the 782 answers (30.82%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 32 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses that addressed the indicator numbered 14, from 13 respondents on 12 engagements, and 12 of the 14 were negative. Respondents described key performance indicators that were missed and service levels that declined once agents took on the tasks. Four responses, given to the question on how the vendor altered its reports, described missed targets presented to the financial institution under other headings. Part 5 examines the alteration of performance reporting.

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"Missed KPI targets get reclassified as data-quality exceptions rather than performance misses, which keeps the official miss rate lower than what the team actually experiences month to month." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications

"SLAs collapsed once agents touched the work" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Client servicing and communications

"KPIs are missed almost every cycle and nobody above me seems alarmed enough" -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"SLA and KPI targets collapsed the moment agent output stopped matching human pace" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

2.4 Delivery Team Knowledge of Financial Institution Key Performance Indicators

INDICATOR C047 · I KNOW THE KPIS THE CUSTOMER USES TO MEASURE SUCCESS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents rated the statement that they knew the key performance indicators the financial institution used to measure success, with a mean rating of 4.8 and a median of 5.0 (n = 787 respondents). Canceled engagements rated lowest, and individual contributors rated lower than portfolio directors.

Figure 1.14. Delivery Team Knowledge of Financial Institution Key Performance Indicators: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "I know the KPIs the customer uses to measure success".
Distressed ratings: 226 of 787 answers (28.72%).

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Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 609): 4.65. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.05. Portfolio director (n = 26): 6.08. Build-Out (n = 162): 5.59. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 5.56. Production (n = 95): 5.85. Canceled (n = 296): 3.36.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The graphic includes the associations reproduced in the section. Additional results remain in the text.

Self-rated knowledge of performance targets was associated with lower cancellation (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements), higher active-engagement customer satisfaction (r = 0.65, 95% CI 0.51 to 0.75, n = 94), and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.81, 95% CI 0.75 to 0.86, n = 150). The applicable sensitivity checks did not overturn these associations. The coefficient for the indicator mean was numerically largest among the four delivery indicators, without establishing an independent contribution or a statistically confirmed ranking. Distressed ratings came from 226 of the 787 answers (28.72%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 30 of the 150 engagements.

The single written response on the indicator described expectations the financial institution had not stated to the delivery team.

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3 Measured Return in Production

The recorded-return field applies to the 30 Production engagements. It is not populated for the other 120 engagements. A full-sample mean would mix observed values with structural absence. The financial definition and source limitations are stated in the Introduction, section 5.5 of “Study Design, Evidentiary Basis, and Definitions.”

3.1 Measured Return Confined to Active Production Engagements

ANALYSIS · REPORTED RETURN ON THE ENGAGEMENT, ROI % · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

3.1 Positive Measured Return Confined to Active Production Engagements

All 30 Production engagements had a return value recorded. Seventeen had positive values, averaging 24.71% and ranging from 6.00% to 47.00%. The other 13 were recorded at zero: 10 canceled engagements and three active engagements. All positive-return engagements were active. These values describe the study record, not an independent financial verification. The recorded zeros do not establish whether the respondent lacked the information, the engagement had achieved no return, or a return had not yet been realized.

Within the 17 engagements that reported a return, a higher return was associated with higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.71, 95% CI 0.35 to 0.89, p = 0.001, n = 17 engagements). A higher return was also associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.71, 95% CI −0.89 to −0.34, p = 0.002, n = 17 engagements). The association with the engagement indicator mean was positive and inconclusive (r = 0.47, 95% CI −0.01 to 0.78, p = 0.056, n = 17 engagements), a test with power of 0.48 at this base. Every result rests on 17 engagements, and the intervals are wide.

The return is provided by the vendor delivery team. The study had no method to validate the provided figures or the level of first-hand knowledge by the respondents. The study holds no record from the financial institution against which to confirm it.

Two engagement managers, writing on the vendor's reporting, described return calculations that overstated the return. Individual contributors described efficiency figures computed without the hours staff spent checking or completing the agents' work.

> *“The vendor's ROI tracker recalculated the baseline savings assumption each quarter to match whatever the actual result was, so the reported ROI never fell short even as the underlying business case kept eroding.” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“The vendor's monthly value report counted every hour the agent spent on forecasting as fully productive, with no line for the hours controllers then spent reconciling those forecasts against the ledger, which made the ROI case look real when it was not.” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

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"The vendor's efficiency report calculated hours saved against a fully manual baseline without netting out the additional hours analysts spent verifying agent-flagged outputs, inflating the apparent productivity gain shown to the desk." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

"The vendor reported time saved based on tasks routed to the agent, without considering the extra time staff spent manually completing the same tasks after the agent hit an API wall, which overstated the actual efficiency gain." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"

The vendor's client-facing performance dashboard rolls up billing accuracy as a single blended percentage across all fee types, which lets a persistent error rate on complex tiered fee calculations get diluted by the much larger volume of simple flat fees the agent handles cleanly, so the dashboard never isolates the tiered-fee problem that audit would actually care about."

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR
BPO, Payments, cards and disputes

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“We base the dashboards on real data, but AI still creates statistics that are not correct. We try to fix these before the customer can see but the dashboards are real time. If they look at the dashboard during their work hours, I don't know if what they see is good.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

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The Engagement Indicator Mean and the Interdependence of the Four Measures

The engagement indicator mean summarizes ratings across the five indicator categories. This section examines its distribution, shared variation with the other core measures, and the extent to which individual indicators retain associations after adjustment for that mean.

The indicators should be interpreted as correlated assessments of engagement conditions. None of the 300 partial tests met the multiplicity-adjusted significance criterion. This limits claims about indicator-specific associations but does not prove that individual conditions have no independent effect.

> *The vendor's reporting rolled up successful completions across all payroll runs company-wide, which buried the specific business unit where repeated errors were occurring until the pattern was undeniable and the contract had already soured."*

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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1 The Engagement Indicator Mean as a Summary Measure

The summary averages respondents' ratings across the 100 indicators and then aggregates them by engagement. Its construction and the leave-one-out procedure are defined in the Introduction, section 5.1 of “Study Design, Evidentiary Basis, and Definitions.”

Across the 150 engagements, the engagement indicator mean was 4.02 and the median 3.8, from 1.2 to 7.3. The rating behind it was given by all 850 respondents, each of whom rated at least one of the 100 indicators. Canceled engagements recorded a mean of 2.6 (n = 56 engagements), compared with 4.8 to 4.9 in the three active stages.

A higher engagement indicator mean was associated with less cancellation (r = −0.72, 95% CI −0.79 to −0.63, n = 150 engagements). It was associated with higher customer satisfaction among the active engagements (r = 0.84, 95% CI 0.77 to 0.89, n = 94 engagements). The mean was also associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.78, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.82 to −0.74, n = 798 respondents). The associations were retained under the applicable checks in the 15-check measure protocol.

Honestly it comes down to the deadline being fixed while everything else moves. Model output shifts between runs, nobody on the client side is willing to own the call, and change control cannot keep pace, so I sign off on adjusted numbers myself rather than let the deadline slip again. I know it is not strictly how this is meant to work, and I have said so to both sides without anything changing.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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2 Shared Structure Across the Four Study Measures

The four core study measures shared substantial variation across engagements, and the other three measures differed systematically across the engagement indicator quintiles. Pairwise correlations and principal component analysis describe the shared structure. Principal component analysis identifies statistical combinations that capture shared variation among the measures. Figure 1.15 shows the observed cancellation gradient across those quintiles.

Figure 1.15. Cancellation rate by engagement indicator quintile, five bands of 30 engagements

Cancellation declined across the engagement indicator bands



Note: The groups are ordered categories. The connecting lines do not represent elapsed time.
Canceled engagements: 28, 19, 9, 0, and 0 of 30 in bands 1 to 5. The bands differed in cancellation (chi-square 85.32, df = 4, $p < 0.001$, n = 150 engagements).

The measures share substantial variance. An indicator associated with several outcomes does not supply several independent confirmations of the same finding. Common respondent perceptions and engagement circumstances may contribute to the pattern.

2.1 A Single Dominant Component Across the Four Study Measures

The four core measures were correlated with one another in every pair across the 150 engagements. The absolute correlations ranged from 0.72 to 0.94. The strongest pair was cancellation with customer satisfaction ($r = -0.94$, 95% CI −0.96 to −0.92, $p < 0.001$, n = 150 engagements). The weakest was cancellation with the engagement indicator mean ($r = -0.72$, 95% CI −0.79 to −0.63, $p < 0.001$, n = 150 engagements).

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Principal component analysis identified one dominant component, accounting for 88.23% of variance across the 150 engagements. An eigenvalue is the variance represented by a component. Its eigenvalue was 3.53, compared with 0.30 for the second component. A loading expresses how strongly a measure relates to a component. Absolute loadings on the first component were at least 0.91. Cancellation and intent to leave loaded negatively. The result describes shared variation, not a causal mechanism or the interchangeability of the four measures.

2.2 Differences in the Study Measures Across Indicator Quintiles

The 150 engagements were ranked by engagement indicator mean and divided into five bands of 30. No study measure was worse in any band than in the band before it.

Table 1.1. The study measures by engagement indicator quintile

Band	Engagements	Engagement indicator mean	Canceled	Cancellation rate	Customer satisfaction (mean)	Intent to leave (engagement mean)
1, lowest	30	2.2	28	93.33%	13.0	9.1
2	30	3.0	19	63.33%	24.3	8.5
3	30	3.8	9	30.00%	43.0	7.0
4	30	4.9	0	0.00%	63.2	5.4
5, highest	30	6.2	0	0.00%	75.8	3.8

The bands differed in cancellation (chi-square 85.32, df = 4, $p < 0.001$, n = 150 engagements). They differed in customer satisfaction ($F = 84.65$, df = 4 and 145, $p < 0.001$, omega squared 0.690, n = 150 engagements). The bands also differed in intent to leave ($F = 76.29$, df = 4 and 145, $p < 0.001$, omega squared 0.668, n = 150 engagements). Here F is the test statistic for differences in means, df denotes degrees of freedom, and omega squared estimates the proportion of variation associated with the groups. Degrees of freedom describe the information available to estimate variation. The rise of the engagement indicator mean from band to band follows from how the bands were built and is not a finding. The behavior of the other three measures is. Engagements in the lowest indicator quintile were almost all canceled, at 28 of 30. None of the 60 engagements in the two highest indicator quintiles had been canceled.

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2.3 Persistence of the Associations Among Active Engagements

Among the 94 engagements not canceled by the study date, the three remaining core measures were correlated in every pair. Higher customer satisfaction was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean ($r = 0.84$, 95% CI 0.77 to 0.89, $p < 0.001$, $n = 94$ engagements). It was associated with lower intent to leave ($r = -0.73$, 95% CI −0.81 to −0.62, $p < 0.001$, $n = 94$ engagements). A higher engagement indicator mean was associated with lower intent to leave ($r = -0.69$, 95% CI −0.78 to −0.57, $p < 0.001$, $n = 94$ engagements).

Among active engagements, higher perceived cancellation likelihood was associated with lower customer satisfaction ($r = -0.66$, 95% CI −0.76 to −0.52, $p < 0.001$, $n = 94$). This is an additional subjective-risk measure. Realized cancellation is constant in the active group, so the active-only analysis supports associations among the three remaining core measures rather than reproducing the original four-measure structure.

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3 Indicators Net of the Engagement Indicator Mean

Partial correlations examine whether an indicator retains an association after accounting for the engagement indicator mean. These tests inform interpretation of individual indicators. They do not identify causal effects or demonstrate that all conditions operate as a single mechanism.

Each of the 100 rated indicators was correlated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, and the engagement mean of intent to leave, with the engagement indicator mean held constant. The mean was recomputed without the indicator under test. In 33 of the 300 tests, p was under 0.05, against 15 expected by chance alone.

None of the 300 partial tests remained statistically significant after false-discovery-rate adjustment. The smallest adjusted q value was 0.323. The largest absolute partial correlation was 0.25. Its magnitude was below the study's 0.30 equivalence bound, but a point estimate alone does not establish equivalence.

Accordingly, the report does not attribute outcomes independently to an individual indicator. Differences in observed coefficients are descriptive unless a specified comparison test supports a stronger conclusion. The written accounts help distinguish the conditions respondents described without establishing their separate causal contributions.

> *To be fair the outside systems were not what killed this. The card platform worked, the statement print vendor did what they said. We just never got far enough to test any of it properly, two months and it was over. What broke was on our side and their side, the feeds we build ourselves. I would not put the outside people in the same bucket, they held up fine in the little we did."*
>
> **INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR**
> BPO, Payments, cards and disputes

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Structural Attributes and Outcome Associations

The structural analysis covers institution type, outsourcing model, work characteristics, commercial terms, vendor characteristics, and team size. Ten of 19 attributes met the study's equivalence criteria against all four core measures. Other results included supported associations and inconclusive estimates. This mixed pattern requires attribute-specific interpretation rather than a general conclusion that structural characteristics do not matter.

Each attribute's result against each core measure is stated in one of the four states of a reported result.

Table 1.2. Structural attributes against the four core study measures

Attribute	Cancellation rate	Customer satisfaction	Engagement indicator mean	Intent to leave
Type of financial institution	Equivalent to zero	Inconclusive	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Asset size of the financial institution	No difference	No difference	No difference	No difference
Financial institution operates capability centers	Equivalent to zero	Inconclusive	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Financial institution scaling agentic outsourcing	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Financial institution adding agentic engagements	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Financial institution shifting work to its capability centers	Associated	Associated	Associated	Associated
Length of the vendor's relationship	Equivalent to zero	Inconclusive	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Concurrent agentic engagements with the financial institution	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Outsourcing model	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Class of work	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Process family	Inconclusive	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Inconclusive
Pricing model	Inconclusive	Not tested	Inconclusive	Equivalent to zero
Contract term	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero

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Attribute	Cancellation rate	Customer satisfaction	Engagement indicator mean	Intent to leave
Annual contract value (31 engagements)	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Inconclusive
Vendor type	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Vendor size	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Vendor's agentic engagements for financial institutions	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Current size of the delivery team	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero	Equivalent to zero
Peak size of the delivery team	Associated	Equivalent to zero	Associated, not among active engagements	Associated, not among active engagements

Two attributes are exceptions, each with a limit. Engagements whose respondents agreed that the financial institution was shifting more work to its own global capability centers recorded worse outcomes on every measure, and the noncancellation associations were retained in the active-engagement analyses. The rating records the respondents' view of the financial institution's plans, and the study holds no evidence on which came first. Engagements that had reached a larger peak team had a higher cancellation rate. Two of the three associations of peak team size did not hold among active engagements, and the data do not show whether teams grew in response to problems.

Many respondents selected “I do not know” for commercial attributes: 228 of 575 for pricing model, 258 of 597 for contract term, and 243 of 597 for relationship length. All 150 engagement managers and 31 portfolio directors answered whether the institution operated capability centers, compared with 168 of 667 individual contributors (25.19%). These differences concern the information respondents supplied and may reflect role-specific access or responsibilities.

> *“The playbook that exists is the old staffed-delivery playbook with the word agent inserted. Pricing was still constructed on headcount and hours.” -Portfolio Director, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Written accounts described preparation and pricing concerns that differ from the attributes tested statistically. Such accounts can identify possible mechanisms for further investigation, but they do not resolve inconclusive comparisons or demonstrate why outcomes differed.

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“The vendor priced the expense agent's throughput against the old FTE headcount baseline instead of actual hours saved, so the billed 'efficiency gain' stayed flat no matter how many expense reports the agent cleared on its own.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

“Pricing model still assumes FTE hours nobody is spending anymore” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations

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1 The Financial Institution

Institution type, asset size, capability-center presence, and reported expansion plans produced a mixture of equivalent and inconclusive estimates. Reported movement of work to capability centers was associated with weaker outcomes. Each result below is interpreted according to its own measure and sample.

Information availability varied by role. “I do not know” responses exceeded numeric ratings on reported growth in agentic engagements, and 334 of 576 respondents (57.99%) selected that response for institutional asset size. The pattern does not establish whether respondents needed that information to perform their duties.

1.1 Institution Type and Outcome Comparisons

INDICATOR C031 · WHAT TYPE OF A BANK IS THE CUSTOMER? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Institution-type comparisons supported equivalence for three core measures, while the active-engagement customer-satisfaction comparison remained inconclusive. The Engagements sheet classifies the financial institution served by each engagement into 10 types, from 24 engagements in asset management to nine in private equity and private capital. The type of financial institution showed no statistically significant association with cancellation (chi-square 5.71, df = 8, p = 0.693, n = 141 engagements). It showed no statistically significant association with the engagement indicator mean (Welch F 1.03, p = 0.425, n = 141 engagements) or with intent to leave (Welch F 0.83, p = 0.583, n = 141 engagements). Each of the three results was within the study’s equivalence bounds. The test of customer satisfaction, on the four types with 10 or more active engagements, did not reach significance and was inconclusive (Welch F 2.39, p = 0.097, n = 46 engagements).

Table 1.3. The four core study measures by type of financial institution, 150 engagements

Type of financial institution	Engagements	Cancellation rate	Customer satisfaction	Indicator mean	Intent to leave
Asset management	24	13 of 24 (54.17%)	37.83	3.85	7.21
Wealth management and private banking	23	8 of 23 (34.78%)	44.74	4.09	6.49
Investment banking (advisory and capital-markets origination)	19	9 of 19 (47.37%)	34.84	3.42	7.66
Insurance (life, property and casualty, health)	14	5 of 14 (35.71%)	47.00	4.00	6.91

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Type of financial institution	Engagements	Cancellation rate	Customer satisfaction	Indicator mean	Intent to leave
Commercial and business banking	13	4 of 13 (30.77%)	46.54	4.46	6.50
Payments and merchant acquiring (networks, acquiring, processing)	13	3 of 13 (23.08%)	49.77	4.20	6.34
Credit card and payments issuing	12	5 of 12 (41.67%)	39.33	3.69	6.47
Retail and consumer banking	12	4 of 12 (33.33%)	50.50	4.43	5.76
Markets and trading (sales and trading, global markets)	11	3 of 11 (27.27%)	49.91	4.38	6.71
Private equity and private capital	9	2 of 9	49.11	4.09	7.11

Note: Cancellation rate is canceled engagements over engagements of the type. Customer satisfaction, indicator mean, and intent to leave are means of the engagement values across all engagements of the type, canceled and active. Every type rests on fewer than 30 engagements. Private equity and private capital rest on nine engagements, below the base of 10 at which the study prints a rate. Its cancellation is shown as a count.

Investment banking engagements recorded the lowest customer satisfaction among active engagements (mean 56.40 points, n = 10 engagements). They also recorded the lowest engagement indicator mean (3.4, n = 19 engagements) and the highest intent to leave (7.7, n = 19 engagements). None of the three comparisons reached statistical significance.

Six written responses addressed the type of financial institution, and four were negative. Each negative response placed the difficulty in the vendor's preparation for that type of institution, not in the type itself. No written response provided additional comparative performance analysis between financial institution types.

> *"The spend on training is real, I will grant that, but the courses are generic and nothing in them touches an asset manager's book." -Portfolio Director, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"On the estate they are no better or worse than most asset managers we deal with at this stage. Their people answered when we raised things, and the business case never wobbled." -Portfolio Director, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

1.2 Reported Knowledge of Financial Institution Asset Size

INDICATOR C062 · WHAT IS THE CUSTOMER'S APPROXIMATE TOTAL ASSET SIZE, IN USD? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Most respondents answering the question about the financial institution's approximate total asset size did not know it. The question was answered by 576 of the 850 respondents, and 334 of the 576 (57.99%)

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answered “I do not know.” Those answers came from 141 of the 150 engagements. Among the 242 respondents who gave a listed size, the most frequent answer was $250 billion to under $1 trillion (90 respondents, 37.19%).

The proportion supplying an asset-size category increased with seniority: 146 of 667 individual contributors (21.89%), 64 of 150 engagement managers (42.67%), and 30 of 31 portfolio directors (96.77%). With “I do not know” retained as a response category, the answer showed no statistically significant association with cancellation (chi-square 3.96, df = 4, p = 0.411, n = 115 engagements). It showed no statistically significant association with customer satisfaction (F 1.48, df = 4 and 110, p = 0.215, n = 115 engagements), the engagement indicator mean (F 0.91, df = 4 and 110, p = 0.460, n = 115 engagements), or intent to leave (F 0.93, df = 4 and 110, p = 0.449, n = 115 engagements). The results for cancellation, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave were within the study’s equivalence bounds, and the customer-satisfaction result was inconclusive. Only one listed size category held 10 or more engagements, so the listed categories were not compared with one another.

1.3 Financial Institution Capability Centers as Reported by the Delivery Team

INDICATOR C063 · DOES THE CUSTOMER OPERATE ITS OWN GLOBAL CAPABILITY CENTERS? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Knowledge of whether the financial institution operated global capability centers varied substantially by respondent role. The question was answered by 596 of the 850 respondents, and 247 of the 596 (41.44%) answered: “I do not know.” The financial institution operated its own capability centers on the account of 190 of the 349 respondents who answered yes or no (54.44%).

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Figure 1.16. Share answering Yes to “Does the customer operate its own global capability centers?”, by respondent role and engagement status

Knowledge of whether the financial institution operated global capability centers varied substantially by respondent role.



Note: True or Yes answers: 190 of 349 answers (54.44%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

All 150 engagement managers and 31 portfolio directors gave a yes-or-no answer, compared with 168 of 667 individual contributors (25.19%). Among the 78 engagements assigned a yes or no answer, reported capability-center presence showed no statistically significant association with cancellation (chi-square 0.60, df = 1, p = 0.439, n = 78 engagements). It showed no statistically significant association with the engagement indicator mean (Welch F 0.14, p = 0.711, n = 78 engagements) or with intent to leave (Welch F 0.02, p = 0.892, n = 78 engagements). Each of the three results was within the study’s equivalence bounds. The comparison of customer satisfaction among active engagements did not reach significance and was inconclusive (Welch F 2.15, p = 0.148, n = 53 engagements). Presence and reported transfer of work are separate constructs and should not be conflated.

1.4 Shift of Work to Financial Institution Capability Centers and Uniformly Weaker Outcomes

INDICATOR C068 · THE CUSTOMER IS SHIFTING MORE WORK TO THEIR GLOBAL CAPABILITY CENTERS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Stronger agreement that the financial institution was shifting work to its own global capability centers was associated with less favorable outcomes on every core measure. The question's scale had neither a favorable nor an unfavorable end. The mean rating was 6.1, and the median 6.0 (n = 341 respondents), and 246 respondents answered: “I do not know.”

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Figure 1.17. Shift of Work to Financial Institution Capability Centers and Uniformly Weaker Outcomes: associations with the study measures



Note: mean rating: 6.1 (n = 341 respondents).

Survey question: "The customer is shifting more work to their global capability centers".

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 160): 6.53. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.93. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.83. Build-Out (n = 73): 5.42. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 101): 5.62. Production (n = 46): 5.13. Canceled (n = 121): 7.31.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Stronger agreement was associated with worse outcomes on every measure, beginning with more cancellations (r = 0.54, 95% CI 0.42 to 0.65, n = 150 engagements). Agreement was associated with lower customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = −0.66, 95% CI −0.76 to −0.53, n = 94 engagements). It was also associated with a lower engagement indicator mean (r = −0.76, 95% CI −0.82 to −0.68, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who agreed more strongly reported higher intent to leave (r = 0.63, cluster bootstrap 95% CI 0.54 to 0.71, n = 323 respondents). The applicable robustness checks retained the associations, including active-only checks for the indicator mean and intent to leave. Cancellation itself is constant within active engagements. Agreement was strongest on canceled engagements and among individual contributors, and weakest among portfolio directors.

The finding has a clear limit. The rating records how respondents perceived the financial institution's plans, not a measured movement of work. The study holds no evidence on which came first. Work may have moved in-house before the engagement weakened, or after it. No written response addressed the indicator.

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1.5 Reported Scaling of Agentic Outsourcing

INDICATOR C066 · THE CUSTOMER IS SCALING THEIR AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENTS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The estimated relationships between reported scaling of the financial institution's agentic AI outsourcing engagements and the core measures met the study's equivalence criteria. The question's scale had neither a favorable nor an unfavorable end. The mean rating was 5.5, and the median 5.0 (n = 364 respondents), and 256 respondents answered: “I do not know.”

Figure 1.18. Reported Scaling of Agentic Outsourcing: associations with the study measures



Note: mean rating: 5.5 (n = 364 respondents).

Survey question: “The customer is scaling their agentic AI outsourcing engagements”.

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 183): 5.48. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.53. Portfolio director (n = 29): 5.55. Build-Out (n = 75): 5.29. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 115): 5.68. Production (n = 46): 5.48. Canceled (n = 128): 5.49.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Estimated associations of reported scaling met the equivalence criterion for all four core measures. The correlation with cancellation was r = −0.04 (p = 0.640, n = 150 engagements). It was r = 0.02 with customer satisfaction among active engagements (p = 0.846, n = 94 engagements) and r = 0.06 with the engagement indicator mean (p = 0.476, n = 150 engagements). At respondent level, it was r = 0.00 with intent to leave (p = 0.990, n = 352 respondents). These estimates concern perceived financial institution plans, not measured changes in outsourcing volume.

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1.6 Reported Growth in the Number of Engagements Unknown to Most Respondents

INDICATOR C067 · THE CUSTOMER IS INCREASING THE NUMBER OF AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENTS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

More respondents did not know whether the financial institution was increasing the number of its agentic AI outsourcing engagements than supplied a rating, 345 against 247. The question's scale had neither a favorable nor an unfavorable end. The mean rating was 5.3 and the median 5.0 (n = 247 respondents).

Figure 1.19. Reported Growth in the Number of Engagements Unknown to Most Respondents: associations with the study measures



Note: mean rating: 5.3 (n = 247 respondents).

Survey question: “The customer is increasing the number of agentic AI outsourcing engagements”.

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 162): 5.36. Engagement manager (n = 52): 5.38. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.29. Build-Out (n = 59): 5.27. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 63): 5.19. Production (n = 29): 5.66. Canceled (n = 96): 5.40.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The estimated associations of reported growth met the equivalence criterion for all four core measures. The correlation with cancellation was r = 0.04 (p = 0.635, n = 127 engagements). It was r = −0.07 with customer satisfaction among active engagements (p = 0.563, n = 77 engagements) and r = −0.08 with the engagement indicator mean (p = 0.392, n = 127 engagements). At respondent level, it was r = 0.05 with intent to leave (p = 0.442, n = 235 respondents). The high number of unknown responses limits conclusions about the financial institution's wider program.

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“

We asked the client's collections team for their hardship scripts in week two and got four different versions from four regions. In fairness that is not carelessness on their part. Collections practice in this bank grew up branch by branch over twenty years and every region has its own regulator conversation behind it, so of course the documentation is uneven. Their change board has been quick with us, and the account data itself is clean, which is more than I usually see at three months. What they do not have is one person who can sit with us for a full day and settle what a compliant arrangement offer looks like. That person exists somewhere. We cannot get her diary.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Payments, cards and disputes

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2 The Relationship Between the Two Firms

Relationship length and the number of concurrent agentic engagements describe different aspects of the relationship between the firms. Most estimated associations met the equivalence criteria, but the customer-satisfaction result for relationship length was inconclusive. Conflicting accounts of relationship duration also limit interpretation.

2.1 Relationship Length and Outcome Comparisons

INDICATOR C064 · HOW MANY MONTHS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER BEEN SERVING THIS CUSTOMER ACROSS ALL WORK, NOT JUST THIS ENGAGEMENT? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The length of the vendor's relationship with the financial institution met the study's equivalence criteria for cancellation, engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, while the active-engagement customer-satisfaction result was inconclusive. The question covered the vendor's relationship across all services and was answered in months. The mean answer was 32.6 months and the median 33.0 months, ranging from 3.0 to 67.0 months (n = 354 respondents), and 243 respondents answered: “I do not know.”

Figure 1.20. Relationship Length and Outcome Comparisons: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean months the vendor has served the institution: 32.6 (n = 354 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 172): 33.38. Engagement manager (n = 150): 31.79. Portfolio director (n = 31): 32.06. Build-Out (n = 69): 32.13. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 101): 28.83. Production (n = 48): 37.35. Canceled (n = 136): 34.07.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

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The length of the relationship showed no statistically significant association with cancellation (r = 0.05, p = 0.524, n = 150 engagements). The engagement indicator mean showed no statistically significant association with it either (r = 0.05, p = 0.576, n = 150 engagements). No statistically significant association was detected for intent to leave (r = −0.06, p = 0.467, n = 340 respondents), and each of the three results was within the study's equivalence bounds. The association with customer satisfaction among active engagements was positive and did not reach significance (r = 0.20, 95% CI 0.00 to 0.39, p = 0.055, n = 94 engagements). Two robustness checks did not hold, and the result is inconclusive.

Five written responses addressed relationship length. Three described relationships lasting 14 years, 15 years, and two decades, exceeding the maximum structured answer of 67 months. The difference remains unresolved and may reflect inconsistent units or interpretations of the relationship. The structured estimates are retained as recorded, and the longer written accounts are not treated as corroborating the same duration measure.

> *"Fourteen years of relationship equity gone in one incident" -Portfolio Director, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"Fifteen years of a dependable client relationship" -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"two decades of relationship history to draw on" -Engagement Manager, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

2.2 Concurrent Agentic Engagements With the Same Financial Institution

INDICATOR C065 · HOW MANY AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENTS DOES YOUR EMPLOYER RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THIS CUSTOMER TODAY? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Most respondents answering the question about concurrent agentic AI outsourcing engagements between the vendor and the financial institution did not know the number. More respondents answered "I do not know" than gave a number, 362 against 254. Among those who gave a number, the mean was 17.2 and the median 18.0, from 2.0 to 30.0 (n = 254 respondents on 129 engagements).

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Figure 1.21. Concurrent Agentic Engagements With the Same Financial Institution: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean concurrent agentic engagements with the institution: 17.2 (n = 254 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 163): 17.61. Engagement manager (n = 58): 16.36. Portfolio director (n = 31): 16.26. Build-Out (n = 56): 15.75. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 78): 17.55. Production (n = 26): 14.00. Canceled (n = 94): 18.65.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The count of concurrent engagements was within the study's equivalence bounds against each of the four study measures. It recorded r = 0.10 with cancellation (p = 0.267, n = 129 engagements) and r = 0.03 with customer satisfaction among active engagements (p = 0.804, n = 83 engagements). With the engagement indicator mean it recorded r = 0.03 (p = 0.716, n = 129 engagements), and with intent to leave r = 0.04 (p = 0.691, n = 243 respondents). The scale of the two firms' agentic work together did not distinguish the engagements that held from those that were canceled.

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3 The Work Outsourced

The sample covered contact-center work, trade settlement, identity management, financial-crime screening, investor communications, and other processes. Outsourcing model and class-of-work comparisons met the study's equivalence criteria. Process-family results were mixed, including inconclusive cancellation and intent-to-leave comparisons. Delivery location is descriptive only.

Written responses also describe why respondents valued particular tasks. Their positive content must be interpreted in light of the question asking what they valued most. It is not an independent comparison of all possible sources of job satisfaction.

3.1 Outsourcing Model and Outcome Comparisons

INDICATOR C032 · WHAT IS THE OUTSOURCING TYPE? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The Engagements sheet classifies each engagement by outsourcing model, with CXM on 42 engagements, ITO on 40, BPO on 37, and KPO on 31. Every respondent's answer matched The study. No statistically significant differences by outsourcing model were detected for the four study measures, and each result was within the study's equivalence bounds. Cancellation recorded chi-square 0.08 (p = 0.994, n = 150 engagements), and customer satisfaction among active engagements Welch F 0.78 (p = 0.510, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean recorded Welch F 0.90 (p = 0.444, n = 150 engagements), and intent to leave Welch F 0.47 (p = 0.703, n = 150 engagements).

Table 1.4. The four core study measures by outsourcing model, 150 engagements

Outsourcing model	Engagements	Cancellation rate	Customer satisfaction	Indicator mean	Intent to leave
CXM	42	15 of 42 (35.71%)	44.43	4.24	6.48
ITO	40	15 of 40 (37.50%)	44.20	4.07	7.09
BPO	37	14 of 37 (37.84%)	45.57	3.71	6.72
KPO	31	12 of 31 (38.71%)	40.58	4.01	6.81

Note: Cancellation rate is canceled engagements over the engagements in the row. Customer satisfaction, indicator mean, and intent to leave are means of the engagement values across all engagements in the row, canceled and active.

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The models differed in vendor and process composition, while the tested outcome contrasts met the equivalence criteria. One engagement manager on a canceled engagement described a mismatch between the commercial model and staffing arrangements.

> *"Training on funds and NAV work is decent, I will give them that. On agents the knowledge is thin. We were sold as an AI delivery and staffed as an ordinary BPO." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

3.2 Class of Work and Outcome Comparisons

INDICATOR C033 · IS THE OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENT CORPORATE FUNCTIONAL, OR LINE OF BUSINESS OPERATIONAL? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Table 1.5. The four core study measures by class of work, 150 engagements

Class of work	Engagements	Cancellation rate	Customer satisfaction	Indicator mean	Intent to leave
LOB Operational	76	30 of 76 (39.47%)	42.54	3.99	6.85
Corporate Functional	74	26 of 74 (35.14%)	45.20	4.05	6.69

Note: Cancellation rate is canceled engagements over the engagements in the row. Customer satisfaction, indicator mean, and intent to leave are means of the engagement values across all engagements in the row, canceled and active.

The Engagements sheet classifies each engagement as serving a line-of-business operation (76 engagements) or a corporate function (74 engagements). The respondents' answers on the class of work agreed with the study in every case. No statistically significant differences between the two classes were detected on the four study measures, and every result was within the study's equivalence bounds. The test of cancellation gave chi-square 0.30 (p = 0.583, n = 150 engagements), and the test of customer satisfaction among active engagements gave Welch F 0.05 (p = 0.828, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean gave Welch F 0.07 (p = 0.795, n = 150 engagements), and intent to leave Welch F 0.17 (p = 0.678, n = 150 engagements).

The class followed the process served. Corporate and back-office and technology engagements were mostly corporate functions, while servicing, trade, and payments engagements were mostly line-of-business operations. Whether an engagement served the business directly or a function behind it showed no statistically significant association with its outcomes.

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3.3 Study Use Cases

ENGAGEMENT FIELD · USE CASE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Each engagement's use case is assigned to one of eight process families, from 47 engagements in corporate and back-office functions to seven in financial crime and client onboarding. The process family showed no statistically significant association with customer satisfaction among active engagements (Welch F 0.16, p = 0.850, n = 63 engagements). It showed no statistically significant association with the engagement indicator mean either (Welch F 1.20, p = 0.325, n = 125 engagements), and both results were within the study's equivalence bounds. The test of cancellation (chi-square 7.48, df = 4, p = 0.113, n = 125 engagements) did not reach significance and was inconclusive. The test of intent to leave (Welch F 1.77, p = 0.155, n = 125 engagements) was inconclusive as well.

Table 1.6. The four core study measures by process family, 150 engagements

Process family	Engagements	Cancellation rate	Customer satisfaction	Indicator mean	Intent to leave
Corporate and back-office functions	47	19 of 47 (40.43%)	41.68	3.92	6.90
Technology engineering and operations	35	10 of 35 (28.57%)	49.91	4.33	6.55
Client servicing and communications	16	9 of 16 (56.25%)	34.25	3.75	7.40
Trade, settlement and reconciliation	15	8 of 15 (53.33%)	35.53	3.56	7.54
Payments, cards and disputes	12	2 of 12 (16.67%)	56.08	4.36	5.25
Credit, underwriting and suitability	9	1 of 9	57.78	4.73	6.15
Regulatory, audit, tax and legal	9	4 of 9	37.33	3.81	7.18
Financial crime and client onboarding	7	3 of 7	37.43	3.42	6.78

Note: Cancellation rate is canceled engagements over the engagements in the row. Customer satisfaction, indicator mean, and intent to leave are means of the engagement values across all engagements in the row, canceled and active. Credit, underwriting and suitability, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal and Financial crime and client onboarding rest on fewer than 10 engagements, the base below which the study prints no rate. Cancellation is shown as a count.

The written responses that addressed the use case numbered 33, and 27 of the 33 responses were positive (81.82%), among the most favorable written evidence in the study. Most answered the question on what the respondent loved most about the job and named the use case or the problem it addressed. Respondents on canceled engagements valued the problem they had been asked to solve as well.

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"The fraud detection problem itself was worth solving" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding

"Solving identity sprawl at this scale is real work worth doing" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"Genuinely hard problem, keeps me sharp" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

3.4 Delivery Location

Delivery was located in India on 92 of the 150 engagements and in the United States on 19, with the remaining 39 delivered from other locations. Delivery location showed no statistically significant association with cancellation (chi-square 0.47, df = 2, p = 0.790, n = 150 engagements). It showed no statistically significant association with customer satisfaction (F 0.34, df = 2 and 147, p = 0.711, n = 150 engagements), the engagement indicator mean (F 0.46, df = 2 and 147, p = 0.630, n = 150 engagements), or intent to leave (F 0.40, df = 2 and 147, p = 0.670, n = 150 engagements). Each of the four results was within the study's equivalence bounds, so outcomes did not differ by delivery location.

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4 Commercial Terms

No statistically significant association was detected in the reported tests of pricing model, contract term, or annual value, but several estimates were inconclusive and customer satisfaction could not be tested for pricing model. Written pricing accounts address perceived incentives rather than providing an alternative statistical test of those associations.

4.1 Pricing on Human Effort for Work Performed by Agents

INDICATOR C044 · WHAT IS THE PRICING MODEL FOR THIS ENGAGEMENT? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Of 575 respondents answering the pricing question, 228 selected "I do not know." Among the 347 naming a model, 140 reported full-time-equivalent staffing as the pricing basis (40.35%). Tested differences did not reach statistical significance for cancellation (chi-square 2.97, simulated p = 0.413, n = 71 engagements), engagement indicator mean (Welch F 1.31, p = 0.290, n = 71), or intent to leave (Welch F 0.79, p = 0.511, n = 71). Only the last met the equivalence criterion. Customer satisfaction was not tested.

Table 1.7. The four core study measures by pricing model, 107 engagements

Pricing model	Engagements	Cancellation rate	Customer satisfaction	Indicator mean	Intent to leave
FTE-based	35	11 of 35 (31.43%)	47.80	4.07	6.50
Fixed price	13	5 of 13 (38.46%)	44.00	4.20	6.63
Hybrid	13	4 of 13 (30.77%)	43.77	3.75	6.59
Consumption based	10	6 of 10 (60.00%)	29.00	3.38	7.71
Transaction or outcome based	8	6 of 8	25.00	3.79	8.44
I do not know	28	12 of 28 (42.86%)	41.68	3.85	6.82

Note: Cancellation rate is canceled engagements over the engagements in the row. Customer satisfaction, indicator mean, and intent to leave are means of the engagement values across all engagements in the row, canceled and active. Each engagement carries the pricing answer assigned to it from its respondents' answers. Transaction or outcome based rests on fewer than 10 engagements, the base below which the study prints no rate. Cancellation is shown as a count.

All 33 written pricing responses were negative. Twenty-one described pricing or billing based on headcount, seats, or hours while agents performed some tasks. At least three respondents described a

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perceived incentive conflict in which automation reduced billable human effort without providing a corresponding commercial benefit to the vendor. These accounts concern particular arrangements. They do not establish a general effect of staffing-based pricing.

> *"As long as this is billed on heads, every hour an agent saves is an hour I am asked to explain, and on that basis there is no incentive anywhere in my chain to let the thing work properly." - Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"We are still sold and staffed as a headcount deal, forty seats on a monitoring queue, while the deck that won the work promises the agents do the first pass. So when the agents do less than that, the only lever I have is more analysts, which I cannot get, and when they do more, we are billing for seats nobody needs." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"The vendor billed the engagement on a per-FTE-equivalent basis calculated from pre-agent staffing levels, so the invoice looked justified on paper even though the agent had already absorbed most of the manual expense-processing work months earlier." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Merchant onboarding volume went up nearly double after client launched new acquiring product, and our agents absorbed it without adding headcount. Good news, except that our invoice to client is still built on seats. So we did more work and billed less, and i had to explain to my own director why revenue on account went flat in a month where we handled forty percent more cases." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"We must stop pricing this as if it were bodies on a floor." -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

4.2 Contract Term and Outcome Associations

INDICATOR C045 · WHAT IS THE CONTRACT TERM OF THIS ENGAGEMENT, IN MONTHS? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Reported contract terms averaged 30.9 months, with a median of 36 months, or three years, and a range of 12–60 months (n = 339 respondents on 150 engagements). Another 258 respondents selected "I do not know."

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Figure 1.22. Contract Term and Outcome Associations: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean contract term in months: 30.9 (n = 339 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 156): 31.38. Engagement manager (n = 150): 30.48. Portfolio director (n = 31): 30.58. Build-Out (n = 73): 32.55. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 95): 32.08. Production (n = 43): 29.30. Canceled (n = 128): 29.62.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Each association of the contract term with the four study measures was within the study's equivalence bounds. Its correlation with cancellation was r = −0.10 (p = 0.223, n = 150 engagements), and with customer satisfaction among active engagements r = 0.03 (p = 0.744, n = 94 engagements). With the engagement indicator mean it was r = 0.08 (p = 0.302, n = 150 engagements), and with intent to leave r = −0.02 (p = 0.781, n = 327 respondents). A longer contract term showed no statistically significant association with less cancellation.

4.3 Contract Value Unknown to Most of the Delivery Team

INDICATOR C046 · WHAT IS THE ANNUAL CONTRACT VALUE OF THIS ENGAGEMENT, IN USD? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Most respondents answering the question about annual engagement contract value did not know it, and knowledge increased with seniority. The question was answered by 601 of the 850 respondents, and 353 of the 601 (58.74%) answered "I do not know." Among the 248 who gave a listed value, 106 (42.74%) answered $1 million to under $5 million and 102 (41.13%) $5 million to under $10 million. The share who gave a value was greater in each more senior role, from 152 of the 667 individual contributors (22.79%) to 30 of the 31 portfolio directors (96.77%).

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At engagement level, no statistically significant association was detected for contract value, and most results were inconclusive on a base of 31 engagements. Respondent-level comparisons retained “I do not know” as a category and differed for cancellation ($F = 3.74$, $p = 0.006$, $n = 601$) and the respondent indicator mean ($F = 3.06$, $p = 0.018$, $n = 601$). Respondents selecting the largest contract-value category were most often on canceled engagements, but both extreme categories contained fewer than 30 respondents. The results require caution and do not establish a relationship between contract value and performance.

“

What would actually help is having one person on the team from day one who has run an internal service desk. We have people who know the AI side well, that part is fine. What we don't have is anyone who can tell a desk owner what a realistic deflection number looks like, so I end up guessing. The other piece is pricing. We are still selling this shaped like a staffing deal, and it gets awkward when the agent takes the volume and the invoice looks the same.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Client servicing and communications

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5 The Vendor

Three survey questions described the firm that delivered each engagement. They asked for the type of company, the number of its employees worldwide, and the number of agentic AI engagements it runs for financial institutions. No statistically significant cancellation differences were detected for these attributes. Each was tested against cancellation, customer satisfaction among active engagements, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and all 12 results were within the study's equivalence bounds. The results do not establish identical outcomes across vendor types. They showed no statistically significant association with the size of the vendor or with the breadth of its agentic work for financial institutions.

For vendor size, 260 of 798 respondents answering the question selected "I do not know" (32.58%). For the vendor's number of financial-institution agentic engagements, 328 of all 850 respondents supplied a number (38.59%). These figures describe response coverage, not verified ignorance of the vendor's business.

5.1 Vendor Type and Outcome Comparisons

INDICATOR C076 · WHAT TYPE OF COMPANY IS YOUR EMPLOYER? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

IT services majors accounted for the largest reported share of vendors, followed by BPO specialists. An IT services major was named in 316 of the 793 answers (39.85%), and a BPO specialist in 198 (24.97%). A consulting firm was named in 117 of the 793 answers (14.75%), a boutique or specialist provider in 87 (10.97%), and a pure-play agentic AI firm in 75 (9.46%). The respondents on each engagement gave the same answer, and the question classifies the 150 engagements as well. IT services majors delivered 59 of the 150 engagements (39.33%) and pure-play agentic AI firms 14 of the 150 (9.33%).

Table 1.8. The four core study measures by vendor type, 150 engagements

Vendor type	Engagements	Cancellation rate	Customer satisfaction	Indicator mean	Intent to leave
IT services major	59	19 of 59 (32.20%)	46.92	4.07	6.62
BPO specialist	37	17 of 37 (45.95%)	37.22	3.68	7.11
Consulting firm	23	8 of 23 (34.78%)	44.04	4.31	6.59
Boutique or specialist provider	17	7 of 17 (41.18%)	44.41	4.04	6.99
Pure-play agentic AI firm	14	5 of 14 (35.71%)	47.50	4.17	6.57

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Note: Cancellation rate is canceled engagements over the engagements in the row. Customer satisfaction, indicator mean, and intent to leave are means of the engagement values across all engagements in the row, canceled and active. Each engagement carries the vendor type assigned to it from its respondents' answers.

The engagement-level comparisons did not detect statistically significant differences by vendor type, and each met the equivalence criterion: cancellation chi-square 2.02 (p = 0.731, n = 150 engagements), active-engagement customer satisfaction Welch F 0.76 (p = 0.524, n = 85), engagement indicator mean Welch F 0.74 (p = 0.573, n = 150), and engagement-level intent to leave Welch F 0.31 (p = 0.872, n = 150). These tests differ from respondent-level vendor-type comparisons used in individual indicator analyses. Vendor types differed in their outsourcing models and process families without a detected outcome difference under the reported tests.

5.2 Vendor Size and Outcome Associations

INDICATOR C077 · APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY EMPLOYEES DOES YOUR EMPLOYER HAVE WORLDWIDE? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described vendors with widely differing worldwide headcounts, but their estimates were not independently verified. The mean was approximately 110,955 employees, the median 90,854, and the range 321–340,114 (n = 538 respondents on 150 engagements). Another 260 respondents selected "I do not know," including at least one respondent on 127 of 150 engagements (84.67%). The estimates were not independently verified against employer records.

Figure 1.23. Vendor Size and Outcome Associations: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean vendor employees worldwide: 110,955 (n = 538 respondents).

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Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 356): 111,081.72. Engagement manager (n = 150): 108,780.67. Portfolio director (n = 31): 122,090.48. Build-Out (n = 121): 105,430.31. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 152): 98,560.89. Production (n = 70): 161,431.73. Canceled (n = 195): 105,924.09.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Vendor size recorded results within the study's equivalence bounds on all four study measures. Against cancellation, it recorded r = −0.06 (95% CI −0.22 to 0.10, p = 0.471, n = 150 engagements). Against customer satisfaction among active engagements, it recorded r = −0.07 (95% CI −0.27 to 0.13, p = 0.500, n = 94 engagements). Against the engagement indicator mean, it recorded r = −0.01 (95% CI −0.17 to 0.15, p = 0.901, n = 150 engagements). Against intent to leave it recorded r = −0.01 (cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.17 to 0.15, p = 0.901, n = 508 respondents). The typed sizes differed markedly by vendor type, from the IT services majors to the pure-play agentic AI firms, consistent with the vendor types respondents named.

5.3 Breadth of Vendor Agentic Work for Financial Institutions

INDICATOR C079 · HOW MANY AGENTIC AI ENGAGEMENTS DOES YOUR EMPLOYER RUN FOR BANKS TODAY? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Fewer than half the respondents supplied a number for the vendor's agentic AI engagements serving financial institutions. A number was typed by 328 of the 850 respondents (38.59%), 242 (28.47%) answered "I do not know," and 280 (32.94%) left the question blank. Among those who gave a number, the mean was 24.6 engagements and the median 25.0, from 5.0 to 40.0 (n = 328 respondents on 150 engagements).

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Figure 1.24. Breadth of Vendor Agentic Work for Financial Institutions: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean agentic AI engagements the vendor runs for financial institutions: 24.6 (n = 328 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 145): 24.17. Engagement manager (n = 150): 24.39. Portfolio director (n = 31): 27.65. Build-Out (n = 72): 24.43. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 98): 25.20. Production (n = 40): 24.00. Canceled (n = 118): 24.42.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The breadth of the vendor's agentic work showed no statistically significant association with the four study measures, each result within the study's equivalence bounds. The correlation with cancellation was r = 0.02 (95% CI −0.14 to 0.18, p = 0.833, n = 150 engagements). With customer satisfaction among active engagements, it was r = 0.09 (95% CI −0.11 to 0.29, p = 0.390, n = 94 engagements). With the engagement indicator mean, it was r = 0.03 (95% CI −0.13 to 0.19, p = 0.743, n = 150 engagements). With intent to leave, it was r = −0.05 (cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.21 to 0.10, p = 0.501, n = 312 respondents).

The count records the breadth of a vendor's agentic work for financial institutions. It does not record whether the vendor had delivered the same service before. An engagement manager described a vendor that had sold a service it had never delivered.

> *"...this is not about the engineers... they were good, they were simply sent in without a pipeline of our own to deploy from. We sold release automation to a global bank and we do not have a working reference of it anywhere." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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6 Size of the Delivery Team

The survey distinguished current, peak, and planned team size. Current headcount had estimated associations within the equivalence bounds for all four measures. Peak headcount was higher on canceled engagements. Planned headcount was associated with engagement status and, among active engagements, with customer satisfaction. These measures do not establish whether staffing changes preceded or followed performance changes.

Written accounts addressed staffing sufficiency rather than headcount alone. That distinction is retained below. Part 4 examines its relationship to workforce experience.

6.1 Current Team Size and Outcomes

INDICATOR C040 · HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE ON THE VENDOR TEAM FOR THIS ENGAGEMENT TODAY? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Reported current delivery-team headcounts agreed with the engagement-level data on every engagement. The mean was 8.4 people and the median 8.0, from 3.0 to 16.0 (n = 150 engagements). Respondents were also asked how many people were on the delivery team today, and every answer equaled the headcount recorded for the engagement (n = 789 respondents on 150 engagements).

Figure 1.25. Current Team Size and Outcomes: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean delivery team headcount today: 8.8 (n = 789 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 617): 8.93. Engagement manager (n = 150): 8.35. Portfolio director (n = 22): 8.86. Build-Out (n = 157): 8.49. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 9.11. Production (n = 96): 7.71. Canceled (n = 304): 9.12.

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r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Against the four study measures, every association of the headcount was within the study's equivalence bounds. Its correlation with cancellation was r = 0.12 (95% CI −0.05 to 0.27, p = 0.159, n = 150 engagements). With customer satisfaction among active engagements, it was r = 0.02 (95% CI −0.18 to 0.22, p = 0.851, n = 94 engagements). With the engagement indicator mean, it was r = −0.10 (95% CI −0.26 to 0.06, p = 0.226, n = 150 engagements). With intent to leave, it was r = 0.09 (cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.07 to 0.24, p = 0.289, n = 798 respondents).

The headcount followed the type of engagement. After Holm correction, it differed by process family (Welch F 4.28, Holm p = 0.022, n = 150 engagements) and by class of work (Welch F 12.32, Holm p = 0.003, n = 150 engagements). Corporate and back-office engagements and corporate functional engagements had the smaller teams.

The written responses addressed whether the team was large enough for its tasks. There were 33 written responses on the size of the team, from 33 respondents on 29 engagements, and 23 of the 33 (69.70%) were negative. The most common statement, made in 17 of the 33, was that the team was too small for its tasks. Six described members who had left, had been moved, or were looking to leave.

> *"If you only read one line of this: we don't have the people. I was given three analysts for a diligence workstream that needs six, and two of them had never seen a data room before this." - Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"...my team is only four people and two already looking for other job." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"My lead is asking for more people every week, nobody give him..." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Talent shortage means we're always short-staffed" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

The voluntary accounts concern perceived sufficiency for assigned tasks. A headcount measure does not directly test that judgment, so its null associations do not establish that staffing was adequate.

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6.2 Team Size at Peak

INDICATOR C041 · WHAT WAS THE PEAK VENDOR TEAM HEADCOUNT ON THIS ENGAGEMENT TO DATE? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Mean peak delivery-team headcount exceeded mean current headcount at engagement level. The mean answer was 10.5 people, and the median 10.0, from 3.0 to 18.0 (n = 787 respondents on 150 engagements), and no respondent answered: “I do not know.” At engagement level, the mean peak team was 10.0 people against a mean current headcount of 8.4 (n = 150 engagements).

Figure 1.26. Team Size at Peak: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean peak delivery team headcount: 10.5 (n = 787 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 611): 10.66. Engagement manager (n = 150): 10.01. Portfolio director (n = 25): 10.88. Build-Out (n = 167): 10.02. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 230): 10.39. Production (n = 91): 8.81. Canceled (n = 299): 11.46.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Engagements with a larger peak team had a higher cancellation rate (r = 0.24, 95% CI 0.09 to 0.39, p = 0.003, n = 150 engagements). They also had a lower engagement indicator mean (r = −0.25, 95% CI −0.39 to −0.09, p = 0.002, n = 150 engagements). Respondents on those engagements reported higher intent to leave (r = 0.23, cluster bootstrap 95% CI 0.09 to 0.37, p = 0.002 with standard errors clustered by engagement, n = 739 respondents). The peak team showed no statistically significant association with customer satisfaction among active engagements, and that association was within the study’s equivalence bounds (r = −0.10, 95% CI −0.30 to 0.10, p = 0.322, n = 94 engagements). Canceled engagements reported the largest peak teams.

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Two of the three associations did not hold among active engagements alone. Within the 94 active engagements, the association with the engagement indicator mean was r = −0.15 (p = 0.136, n = 94 engagements). Among respondents on those engagements, the association with intent to leave was r = 0.09 (p = 0.358). Those two associations reflect the difference between canceled and active engagements more than a gradient within active work.

The data record the largest size the team reached. They do not record the course of the team before or after that point, or whether it grew in response to problems on the engagement. One individual contributor described a team reduced in a single day, partway through a task.

> *"in March they moved two people off my team to another account in one day, no handover. And we were mid way through tuning the screening rules. My lead found out from the rota, not from anyone above him. After that backlog went to nine days and the same managers sat in review asking why disposition quality dropped... nobody joined those two things." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

6.3 Planned Team Size as a Marker of Continuation

INDICATOR C042 · PER THE CURRENT PLAN, HOW MANY PEOPLE WILL BE ON THE VENDOR TEAM 12 MONTHS FROM NOW? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Knowledge of the planned delivery-team headcount 12 months ahead was limited across the engagements. A number was given by 339 of the 850 respondents (39.88%). The question was answered by 589 respondents, and 250 of the 589 (42.44%) answered: "I do not know." On 131 of the 150 engagements (87.33%), at least one respondent did not know the plan for the team. Among the respondents who gave a number, the mean was 5.6 people and the median 6.0 (n = 339 respondents).

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Figure 1.27. Planned Team Size as a Marker of Continuation: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean planned delivery team headcount in 12 months: 5.6 (n = 339 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 157): 5.46. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.71. Portfolio director (n = 31): 6.29. Build-Out (n = 63): 9.70. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 100): 9.50. Production (n = 41): 8.46. Canceled (n = 135): 0.00.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

All 135 numeric answers from respondents on canceled engagements reported a planned headcount of zero. The resulting cancellation association ($r = -0.86$, $p < 0.001$, n = 150 engagements) largely reflects reported engagement status. The full-sample associations with engagement indicator mean ($r = 0.73$, n = 150) and intent to leave ($r = -0.78$, n = 323 respondents) require the same qualification. They do not establish that staffing plans caused continuation or cancellation.

Among active engagements, where the plan is a forecast, the 204 respondents gave a number typed from 2.0 to 19.0 people. A larger planned team was associated with higher customer satisfaction ($r = 0.47$, 95% CI 0.30 to 0.62, $p < 0.001$, n = 94 engagements). It was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean ($r = 0.35$, 95% CI 0.16 to 0.52, $p < 0.001$, n = 94 engagements). Among respondents on the active engagements, it was associated with lower intent to leave ($r = -0.35$, 95% CI −0.47 to −0.22, $p < 0.001$). The association is descriptive. The data do not show whether the plan for the team followed the state of the engagement or anticipated it.

The structural results provide limited support for attributing outcomes to engagement type, vendor scale, or current headcount. Several estimates remain inconclusive, and associations involving peak and planned staffing have unresolved temporal direction. Part 2 examines the reported delivery conditions that covaried with outcomes, without treating those associations as causal explanations.

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“

ai made this job easier for me… i came in a year ago and i was scared i would be answering the same laptop and leave balance questions all day. Now i get the odd ones, the ones where somebody is upset about their shift or a policy nobody understands, and i actually have time to read the case properly. My team is smaller than it would have been”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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About the Author

Phil Hatch is an outsourcing and workforce-development executive with more than 30 years of experience. He previously led the global outsourcing business of ManpowerGroup/Experis. His work includes service delivery, workforce strategy, and organizational development across industries and countries.

Hatch has also advised governments on labor and economic development, including workforce strategies intended to support investment and employment.

Following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Hatch was asked by the U.S. Department of State and USAID to advise Ukraine on workforce and economic development. His work has addressed technology, outsourcing, skills development, and international investment in support of economic recovery.

Through Akholi, Hatch advises organizations and governments on outsourcing and the implications of AI for work and service delivery.

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About Akholi

Akholi, established in 2003, is a research and advisory firm focused on outsourcing, service delivery, and global capability centers. Its work includes the 2026 study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements described in this report.

The study examines relationships among financial institution readiness, co-management, vendor capability, AI technology, the third-party ecosystem, and reported engagement outcomes. Its findings are observational and do not establish that any one category is the sole or primary cause of those outcomes.

Akholi applies this research through advisory and educational work with institutional leaders. Recommendations derived from the study require assessment against the circumstances and evidence of each engagement.

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“

Our quality control system for customer support tickets was built for batch processing at the end of the day. No one thought about how agents would interact with it before we went live. We fixed it but we had to keep our team in the office over the weekend.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
CXM, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

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PART 1

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Engagement Outcomes and Their Correlates

A study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements, drawn from the accounts of 850 members of the vendors' delivery teams

PUBLICATION DATE	November 1, 2026
VERSION	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
FIGSHARE DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890

READ THE FULL STUDY AND ITS DATA

akholi.com/outsourcing-2026-agentic-ai-tier-1-banks

02

PART 2

The Five Failure Categories

IN THIS PART

Comparative Standing of the Five Failure Categories

Financial Institution Readiness

Co-Management

Vendor Capability

AI Technology

Third-Party Ecosystem

REPORT INFORMATION

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Full Study Report

Author	Phil Hatch
Publication date	November 1, 2026
Version	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
Figshare DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890
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SUGGESTED CITATION

Hatch, Phil. 2026. *Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions: Full Study Report*. Version 1.8.2. Akholi. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559.

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USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Artificial intelligence tools were used to prepare this report. Appendix G discloses how they were used.

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The Five Failure Categories

Financial institution readiness, co-management, and vendor capability received less favorable ratings than AI technology and the third-party ecosystem. The written accounts distinguish the delivery constraints behind these assessments without establishing independent causes of engagement outcomes. The survey asked each respondent to rate 100 indicators of the engagement, 20 in each of five failure categories. Financial institution readiness covers the financial institution's data, systems, processes, staff, management of the engagement, and business case. Co-management covers the structures through which the two firms governed the engagement together. Vendor capability covers the vendor's leadership, commercial model, methods, knowledge, and talent. AI technology covers the reliability, control, and observability of the agentic AI tools. The third-party ecosystem covers the outside providers, interfaces, and data feeds on which the agents depended.

A distressed rating in this Part is 3 or below on the favorable-direction 10-point scale. The section “Comparative Standing of the Five Failure Categories” compares their means and distressed shares. The sections “Financial Institution Readiness” through “Third-Party Ecosystem” distinguish the underlying constructs and written evidence.

The 100 indicators also shared a broad pattern of outcome associations. Section 2 of “Comparative Standing of the Five Failure Categories” reports the coefficient ranges and sensitivity results. This consistency must be interpreted alongside their substantial shared variance.

None of the 300 indicator-specific partial tests remained significant after multiplicity adjustment (Part 1). The indicator evidence distinguishes reported practices without assigning an independent causal effect to an indicator or ranking its importance from an unadjusted coefficient.

Governance indicators remain in their respective categories. Part 3 synthesizes their implications for control design and oversight, with cross-references to the detailed results here.

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“These questions assume there were two firms managing something jointly. There was my team, and there was a document-control group that changed its contact three times in four months. Being asked to score how well we did it together does not fit what actually happened here.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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Comparative Standing of the Five Failure Categories

Respondents generally assessed AI technology and external systems more favorably than the organizational arrangements under which they operated. Table 2.1 reports category means. Section 1 compares the proportions of distressed ratings. The category labels organize the survey and do not establish sources of failure.

Table 2.1. The five failure categories ranked by mean rating

Failure category	Indicators	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share	Correlation with cancellation, range across the indicators
Financial institution readiness	20	3.55	8,219 of 15,966	51.48%	−0.60 to −0.56
Co-management	20	3.65	7,866 of 15,968	49.26%	−0.65 to −0.61
Vendor capability	20	3.67	7,687 of 15,943	48.22%	−0.60 to −0.56
AI technology	20	4.60	5,113 of 15,911	32.14%	−0.69 to −0.63
Third-party ecosystem	20	4.64	5,062 of 15,947	31.74%	−0.66 to −0.63

Note: The mean is the arithmetic average. Correlation describes the direction and strength of a linear association. Distressed-answer counts pool ratings across the indicators in a category and do not count distinct respondents.

Some written accounts attributed difficulties to preparation, access, or management arrangements while describing the technology itself more positively.

> *"The tool was the least of it, in truth. My people spent their evenings re-keying metadata on deal documents the agent had already processed once, and kindly note that is what wore them down, not anything the model got wrong." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"AI is not what fails here. It reads a long spec paper and finds the right section, that part is fine … I would ask you to understand nobody gave it clean test data either." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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> *"To be fair the agent itself is steady, it gives me the same answer most times and the facts come out right. What moves underneath it is the manager Dashboard, they push a change and the flow breaks, then everyone says the AI is unreliable. It is not the AI, it is the platform below it" - Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"AI gets blamed for things that are not its fault. Half the flags it raises wrong are because the exposure file arrives before the month close is done." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"the security approval queue is the real blocker here, not the model" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

The category ranking describes relative ratings within this sample. It does not identify the cause of weak outcomes. Shared variance and the nonsignificant adjusted partial tests limit claims about the independent contribution of any category or indicator.

The written evidence differentiates the categories by the tasks and constraints respondents described. Detailed accounts are retained under the relevant indicators. Part 5 consolidates the measurement and disclosure of manual intervention.

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“

What I did is change the output before sending, because the AI give different answer for same case every time and only one of them can be correct, so somebody has to pick, and that somebody end up being me most of the time. And this is not one case, this is basically every case I touch, nine out of ten probably, I dont even bother counting exact anymore because the number stop meaning anything after a while. I dont want to say exactly who all knows about this on my side, its not really a straight answer, some people know some of it, nobody knows all of it probably including me. The informations coming in from HR system and payroll dont even match each other half the time, so before I even get to the AI part I already fixing their data, and then the AI part on top of that just add another layer I have to fix. Some case take me five minute extra, some take twenty, and there no way to plan for which kind you get until you already in it, and then the next case load and I start over again, same routine, and I have honestly stopped expecting it to change”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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1 Concentration of Distress in Three Categories

Distressed ratings were more frequent in the three organizational categories. Financial institution readiness had 8,219 of 15,966 answers classified as distressed (51.48%). Co-management had 7,866 of 15,968 (49.26%), and vendor capability had 7,687 of 15,943 (48.22%). The corresponding shares were 5,113 of 15,911 (32.14%) for AI technology and 5,062 of 15,947 (31.74%) for the third-party ecosystem. These are pooled answer counts across each category's 20 indicators, not counts of distinct respondents.

Figure 2.1. Share of answers in the distressed range, by failure category

Distressed ratings were more frequent in the three organizational categories.



Note: Distressed answers by category are financial institution readiness, 8,219 of 15,966. Co-management, 7,866 of 15,968. Vendor capability, 7,687 of 15,943. AI technology, 5,113 of 15,911. And third-party ecosystem, 5,062 of 15,947. A distressed rating is 3 or below on the favorable-direction scale. A respondent may contribute answers to multiple items.

Respondents on canceled engagements rated every category lower than those on active engagements. Individual contributors also rated each category lower than engagement managers and portfolio directors. The exact category ordering varied by group: co-management was lowest among canceled engagements. Table 2.2 reports the mean of the 20 indicator means within each group.

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Table 2.2. Mean rating of each failure category by engagement status, lifecycle stage and respondent role

Failure category	Canceled	Active, Build-Out	Active, Transition/Cut-Over	Active, Production
Financial institution readiness	2.36	4.14	4.27	4.32
Co-management	2.22	4.67	4.61	4.07
Vendor capability	2.46	4.41	4.29	4.60
AI technology	3.16	5.46	5.47	5.34
Third-party ecosystem	3.13	5.42	5.62	5.52

Failure category	Individual contributors	Engagement managers	Portfolio directors
Financial institution readiness	3.39	3.81	4.67
Co-management	3.52	3.90	4.98
Vendor capability	3.54	3.95	4.60
AI technology	4.44	4.93	5.46
Third-party ecosystem	4.48	4.94	5.96

Among active engagements, the co-management mean was 4.67 in Build-Out and 4.07 in Production, the largest observed stage difference among the categories. Portfolio directors rated each category more than one point above individual contributors. These descriptive contrasts do not establish whether stage or role independently accounts for the differences.

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2 Uniform Association of Every Indicator With the Study Measures

Higher ratings on each of the 100 indicators were associated with lower cancellation, higher customer satisfaction among active engagements, a higher leave-one-out engagement indicator mean, and lower intent to leave. Each indicator passed its 22 applicable checks distributed across the four outcomes, for 2,200 checks in total. Passing these checks does not address every possible source of bias.

The associations also lay in a narrow band. The correlation coefficient r describes the direction and strength of a linear association, and n identifies the number of observations. Against cancellation, the 100 correlations ranged from r = −0.69 to r = −0.56 (n = 150 engagements each). Against customer satisfaction among active engagements, they ranged from r = 0.59 to r = 0.75 (n = 94 engagements each). Against the engagement indicator mean, they ranged from r = 0.76 to r = 0.88 (n = 150 engagements each). Against intent to leave, they ranged from r = −0.69 to r = −0.56.

No category stood outside the band. Each indicator of the two technology categories, rated highest, was associated with cancellation at r = −0.63 or stronger (n = 150 engagements). The three categories rated lowest ranged from r = −0.65 to r = −0.56 (n = 150 engagements each).

Low ratings tended to occur together. Respondents assessing data poorly also tended to assess management, vendor readiness, and technology poorly. This covariance is consistent with shared engagement conditions, common respondent perceptions, or both. It does not establish that operational failures occurred simultaneously or caused one another.

> *Numbers shift between runs even though nothing changed on our end, mostly because their system keeps timing out mid query, so I adjust output manually before it gets sent, happens enough that I check every run now.”*
>
> **INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR**
> BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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Financial Institution Readiness

Financial institution readiness received the lowest category mean, with distressed ratings distributed across its constituent indicators. Financial institution readiness covers data, systems, processes, personnel, governance, and the business case. Its category mean was 3.55 across 150 engagements, with 8,219 of 15,966 ratings (51.48%) classified as distressed. These are vendor personnel's assessments of institutional conditions, not independent measures of institutional readiness or control.

The 20 indicators were rated within a narrow range of one another, from a mean of 3.47 to 3.61 (n = 789 to 811 respondents). Every one had about half of its answers in the distressed range. No single part of the financial institution's readiness stood out as the weak point. The delivery teams rated the financial institution's preparation as uniformly poor.

Table 2.3. The indicators of financial institution readiness, from the lowest mean rating

Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share
6.1 Diffuse Ownership of AI Across Financial Institution Functions	3.47	417 of 802	52.00%
8.1 Business Case and Return Definition That Moved After Work Began	3.48	420 of 794	52.90%
4.2 Agentic AI Knowledge of Financial Institution Staff	3.48	418 of 793	52.71%
3.4 Automation of Processes as They Stand Rather Than Redesign	3.48	429 of 804	53.36%
4.3 Availability of Financial Institution Subject Matter Experts	3.49	427 of 793	53.85%
6.2 Missing Instruments of Financial Institution Agent-Risk Oversight	3.49	417 of 797	52.32%
3.1 Undocumented Processes Rebuilt by Observation	3.49	430 of 795	54.09%
1.3 Normalization of Financial Institution Data Across Source Systems	3.50	413 of 809	51.05%
1.2 Accessibility of Financial Institution Data to the Engagement	3.51	402 of 798	50.38%
2.2 Readiness of Financial Institution Infrastructure for Agentic AI	3.51	419 of 803	52.18%
5.2 Speed of Financial Institution Response to Issues Raised by the Engagement	3.51	404 of 789	51.20%
3.2 Unstandardized Processes Without a Single Version to Automate	3.51	396 of 789	50.19%

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Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share
4.1 Organizational Readiness to Absorb Changes to Daily Work	3.52	396 of 794	49.87%
2.1 Legacy Systems Without an Interface for Agents	3.52	416 of 801	51.94%
7.1 Agent Access Provisioned Through Borrowed and Shared Credentials	3.53	410 of 801	51.19%
3.3 Inconsistency of Processes Across Business Units and Regions	3.56	408 of 801	50.94%
6.3 Financial Institution Change Control Calibrated to Human-Paced Release Cycles	3.57	411 of 800	51.38%
5.1 Decision Rights Unassigned in Financial Institution Management of the Engagement	3.58	398 of 811	49.08%
1.1 Quality of Financial-Institution-Provided Data	3.59	387 of 795	48.68%
1.4 Absence of Ownership and Validation in Financial Institution Data Governance	3.61	401 of 797	50.31%

Mean ratings in Table 2.3 are computed across respondents. The category figure of 3.55 is computed across engagements.

Written accounts described vendor personnel correcting input data, documenting workflows, and making decisions where respondents considered institutional guidance inadequate. Some described recurring work and limited disclosure. The open question on the financial institution received comments from 557 of 850 respondents (65.53%). The accounts inform the interpretation of ratings but do not establish that responsibilities transferred formally or uniformly.

> *"Every file come in different. One branch send payslips as pdf, other one send a photo of the payslip taken on a phone, and the tool cannot read a photo so that file come to me. I do maybe thirty of these a day ... Nobody on their side seem to know this is happening." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"The agent is fine. It is being fed rubbish and asked to be careful with it..." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Some respondents distinguished helpful institutional staff from deficiencies in organizational preparation. Their accounts described responsive personnel working with unclear data ownership, restricted system access, or unresolved decision authority. This distinction prevents a low organizational rating from being interpreted automatically as criticism of individual staff.

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The category includes three indicators of the financial institution's governance of agentic AI, covering the ownership of AI across its functions, its capacity to oversee agent risk, and its change control. The three are reported in section 6 with the other indicators of the category. They also inform the examination of the controls meant to govern work performed by agents (Part 3).

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1 Financial-Institution-Provided Data

Data-quality concerns occurred alongside restricted access, inconsistent definitions, and unclear ownership, each of which was reported to require additional delivery work. Four indicators describe the data the financial institution provided, covering its quality, its accessibility to the engagement, its normalization across source systems, and the governance over it. Each had about half of its answers in the distressed range, from 387 of 795 answers (48.68%) for quality to 413 of 809 (51.05%) for normalization. All four indicators were associated with each core study measure, without exception across the applicable robustness checks.

Figure 2.2. Share of answers in the distressed range, the four indicators of financial-institution-provided data

About half of the answers to each data indicator were in the distressed range



Note: Distressed answers: 413 of 809 (normalization), 402 of 798 (accessibility), 401 of 797 (governance), 387 of 795 (quality).

The written accounts distinguish defective data from inaccessible data, inconsistent definitions, and unclear ownership. Detailed response counts and examples appear under the corresponding indicators below.

> *"The problem is data quality, it is worst I have seen. My last project was service desk for same type of bank, at least there the user list is clean. Here the joiner leaver file still has people who left in 2019." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Respondents described interactions among these problems. Inaccessible systems prompted manual extracts. Inconsistent identifiers required reconciliation, and unclear ownership delayed decisions about

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valid values. These are reported mechanisms, not a tested causal model of how the four indicators combine.

> *"The people on their side are not the problem and I want that on record ... The same vendor sits in there three times with three tax numbers, spend categories are free text in one region and coded in another, and nobody owns that record. We are asking agents to reason over a file that no human has agreed on." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"in march i needed the sector holdings file from their old research store, it comes only as a weekly pdf dump. so for two days i am typing figures by hand into the model sheet. nobody on their side could say who owns that system" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 examines the reported data alterations, their stated reasons, and their disclosure. Here, the focus is on the data conditions respondents associated with that work.

1.1 Quality of Financial-Institution-Provided Data

INDICATOR C094 · RATE THE QUALITY OF THE CUSTOMER'S DATA ACROSS THE SYSTEMS THIS ENGAGEMENT DEPENDS ON · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described recurring manual correction of financial-institution-provided data before agents could use it, with data-quality ratings lowest on canceled engagements and among individual contributors. The median is the middle value in an ordered distribution. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 795 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the data lowest (mean 2.4, n = 305 respondents). Among the roles, individual contributors, who handle the data, rated it lowest (mean 3.4, n = 614 respondents).

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Figure 2.3. Quality of Financial-Institution-Provided Data: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the quality of the customer’s data across the systems this engagement depends on”.

Distressed ratings: 387 of 795 answers (48.68%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 614): 3.44. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.95. Portfolio director (n = 29): 4.79. Build-Out (n = 167): 4.41. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 4.24. Production (n = 91): 4.42. Canceled (n = 305): 2.41.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational. A confidence interval expresses uncertainty under the stated method. A p value is the probability, under the null model, of a result at least as extreme as the observed result.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

A confidence interval (CI) expresses uncertainty around an estimate under the stated method. The cluster bootstrap resamples whole engagements to retain the grouping of respondents within engagements. The rating of the quality of the financial institution's data was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements that rated the data higher had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.60, 95% CI −0.70 to −0.49, n = 150 engagements). They recorded higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.55 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). The rating was associated with the engagement indicator mean, computed without the indicator, at r = 0.81 (95% CI 0.74 to 0.86, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the data higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.61, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.53, n = 748 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 387 of the 795 answers (48.68%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 58 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the quality of the data numbered 582, from 415 respondents on 133 engagements, and 499 of the 582 (85.74%) were negative. In 226 of the 582 responses (38.83%), the response received the strongest negative score. Most came from the questions on altering financial-institution-provided data, where respondents described correcting the financial institution's data by

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hand before it could be used, in many accounts every cycle or most days. Many of the corrections were reported within the vendor and not to the financial institution.

> *"CMDB is half empty so my team is filling asset details by hand before we can trust any playbook. It is not difficult work but it is night work, because we can only touch prod inside their window. Two of us are on that shift now instead of building." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Their user directory is old, half the entries have no manager listed and no location... so the agent cannot even tell who is asking for what. For me this means my day is phone calls to verify identity, one by one ... Two of us have left already." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Second week the agent restarted a claims application node at 3am because the asset register shows it as non production, it is very much production. Their own infrastructure team did not know that record was wrong either. Consequently we now verify every entry by hand before the agent is allowed near it" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"the problem is files come in already broken before we even open them, every single time, i fix it so exception queue does not build up but honestly it never stop, i clean same three field every week and next week same three field broken again" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I dont raise a ticket for every duplicate, there are too many, I just fix it and move on, my lead knows but nobody tells the client, it eats an hour most days and nobody counts that hour anywhere." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Respondents who commented rated data quality lower than those who did not, at means of 3.0 (n = 389) and 4.2 (n = 406), respectively. Some favorable accounts identified other difficulties, including access, ownership, or decision authority. Descriptions of time spent correcting records indicate perceived additional work. The study did not measure its aggregate cost.

1.2 Accessibility of Financial Institution Data to the Engagement

INDICATOR C095 · RATE HOW ACCESSIBLE THE CUSTOMER'S DATA IS TO THIS ENGAGEMENT WHEN AND WHERE THE WORK REQUIRES IT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Delayed or unavailable access to financial institution data was accompanied by reported reliance on emailed extracts, periodic files, and manual transfer. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 798 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated access lowest (mean 2.4, n = 305 respondents), and individual contributors rated it lower than any other role with 10 or more answers (mean 3.4, n = 618 respondents).

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Figure 2.4. Accessibility of Financial Institution Data to the Engagement: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how accessible the customer’s data is to this engagement when and where the work requires it”.

Distressed ratings: 402 of 798 answers (50.38%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 618): 3.38. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.79. Portfolio director (n = 28): 4.79. Build-Out (n = 165): 4.24. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 4.19. Production (n = 94): 4.27. Canceled (n = 305): 2.36.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the accessibility of the financial institution's data, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Higher ratings were associated with less cancellation (r = −0.57, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, n = 150 engagements). They were associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.67, 95% CI 0.54 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator was higher where access was rated higher (r = 0.78, 95% CI 0.71 to 0.84, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.52, n = 749 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 402 of the 798 answers (50.38%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

Data-access comments numbered 190, from 176 respondents on 101 engagements. 163 were negative (85.79%). Respondents described delays in obtaining logins, service accounts, or firewall approvals and interim reliance on emailed extracts, screenshots, and periodic files. Some reported copying data manually because the required system connection had not been approved.

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> *"What they did was give us read only rights on the case system for two weeks, we could see the alert but not close it, so my queue kept growing. i asked twice, no answer. Then one day the access is there, nobody tells us." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"Last month I wait nine days for a service account on their claims warehouse... On my previous project, a health insurer also, the access came in two days and there is a named person for it. Here nobody owns that." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"In March we wait eleven days for a firewall rule so the agents could reach their case system, and the queue builds the whole time. Their monitoring platform is from 2009 and everything we take out of it comes through a nightly file, there is no interface." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"i put in a request for read access on their HR feed in january and still we do not have it, so every joiner list comes to us as a file by email once a day. And by the time we get it the person already started." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Last week we needed three months of prior notes and their system only gives us export twice a week. So we work from whatever came in the last export and flag the gap in the summary" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

Respondents who commented rated access lower than those who did not, at means of 3.1 (n = 171) and 3.6 (n = 627). Their accounts described manual data transfer while access remained unavailable or delayed.

1.3 Normalization of Financial Institution Data Across Source Systems

INDICATOR C096 · RATE HOW WELL THE CUSTOMER'S DATA IS NORMALIZED, WITH CONSISTENT FORMATS AND DEFINITIONS ACROSS SOURCE SYSTEMS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Inconsistent formats and definitions across the financial institution's source systems required manual reconciliation in respondents' accounts. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 809 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated normalization lowest (mean 2.3, n = 311 respondents), and individual contributors rated it lowest of the roles (mean 3.4, n = 627 respondents).

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Figure 2.5. Normalization of Financial Institution Data Across Source Systems: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well the customer’s data is normalized, with consistent formats and definitions across source systems”.

Distressed ratings: 413 of 809 answers (51.05%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 627): 3.36. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.86. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.61. Build-Out (n = 166): 4.16. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.28. Production (n = 97): 4.28. Canceled (n = 311): 2.33.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every association of the normalization of the financial institution's data with the four core study measures held, in each of the applicable robustness checks. Engagements that rated normalization higher had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.60, 95% CI −0.69 to −0.49, n = 150 engagements). Their customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.56 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). So was the engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator (r = 0.81, 95% CI 0.75 to 0.86, n = 150 engagements). Their respondents reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.63, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.56, n = 758 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 413 of the 809 answers (51.05%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 63 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing normalization numbered 199, from 184 respondents on 106 engagements, and 180 of the 199 (90.45%) were negative. They describe the same account holder, vendor, employee, or account recorded under different codes, names, and formats in different systems of the financial institution, and file layouts that changed from one delivery to the next. On several engagements, the differences arose because business units, regions, or merged companies had kept their own codes, and the financial institution had named no owner of a single definition. The delivery team reconciled the records by hand before the agents could use them.

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> *"Last month we tried to build a single joiner record for one branch. Same person appeared three times across their directory, their HR feed and the core entitlement store, each with different identifier and different spelling of name. Nobody owns reconciliation." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Three systems hold job codes and none of them agree, and we spent the first six weeks just proving which one was authoritative. Thus the agent inherited a mess nobody on either side had owned before." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Here every business unit sends employee data in its own format. One uses employee id, one uses email, one sends a pdf. Nobody on their side thinks that's a problem." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"What i did is keep a small mapping file of how each system writes the trade reference, because settlement side and confirmations side do not write it the same way... one puts the counterparty code in front, the other one puts it at the end. So before the agent picks up the exception queue i run my mapping over the file and make the references match. It take maybe twenty minutes each morning." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I feel angry writing this again... Same column means one thing in file today and different thing in file next week, client dont check before sending it to us, so I fix number myself before we can use it in system" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Their data is the worst I have seen in nine years, one prospect sits four times in the CRM with four spellings and no client id, so the agent makes four leads and the relationship manager sees the same family twice in a week and stops trusting the list. ... There is no name against AI anywhere in that organisation, that is the real gap." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Client servicing and communications*

Some respondents praised institutional staff's responsiveness while criticizing inconsistent data definitions. Commenters rated normalization at 2.8 (n = 178), compared with 3.7 among noncommenters (n = 631). Reported reconciliation of multiple identifiers illustrates a specific burden. It does not establish that every automated process requires the same manual intervention.

1.4 Absence of Ownership and Validation in Financial Institution Data Governance

INDICATOR C097 · RATE THE MATURITY OF THE CUSTOMER'S DATA GOVERNANCE OVER THE DATA THIS ENGAGEMENT USES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Unclear ownership and inadequate validation of financial institution data left delivery teams reporting their own checks and decisions about conflicting values. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 3.0 (n = 797 respondents). Ratings were highest among active engagements in Build-Out (mean 4.4, n = 160 respondents) and lowest among canceled engagements (mean 2.5, n = 305 respondents). Individual

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contributors gave the lowest ratings of the roles (mean 3.5, n = 614 respondents) and portfolio directors the highest (mean 4.8, n = 31 respondents).

Figure 2.6. Absence of Ownership and Validation in Financial Institution Data Governance: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the maturity of the customer's data governance over the data this engagement uses".

Distressed ratings: 401 of 797 answers (50.31%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 614): 3.51. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.75. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.81. Build-Out (n = 160): 4.41. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 233): 4.25. Production (n = 99): 4.38. Canceled (n = 305): 2.45.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The maturity of the financial institution's data governance showed an association with each of the four core study measures that survived all applicable robustness checks. Engagements with higher ratings had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where governance was rated higher (r = 0.67, 95% CI 0.54 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). Higher ratings were associated with a higher engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator (r = 0.76, 95% CI 0.68 to 0.82, n = 150 engagements). They were associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.53, n = 750 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 401 of the 797 answers (50.31%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 60 of the 150 engagements.

Data-governance comments numbered 172, from 155 respondents on 99 engagements. 152 were negative (88.37%). Recurring accounts described unclear ownership and inadequate validation before

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transfer to the vendor. Respondents reported receiving conflicting or absent definitions of fields and performing their own checks before processing.

> *"The thing a number cannot show is that their data is not so bad, it is the ownership of it which is missing ... when we ask who decides what a field is supposed to mean, there is nobody. Two teams give two answers and both are confident." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"on their side the account classification has no owner. every month different person tell us which portfolios sit in which composite, next month it change again, and no one can say who approved it." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"In week three we asked for the data dictionary for the client positions warehouse. What came back was a spreadsheet from 2021 with half of tables missing. Since then we have been mapping fields by reading the source tables ourselves." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"In May we found dormant-account flags on core system were three days behind the servicing platform, so agents were writing to customers whose accounts had already been reactivated. Took client eleven days to confirm which system was master." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"But nobody upstream owns the fix, so i keep cleaning the same file every month and it keeps arriving dirty, i if you would flag it each cycle and my lead knows, nothing changes on their side though." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Respondents who commented rated governance at 3.0 (n = 145), compared with 3.7 among noncommenters (n = 652). Some described selecting a value when institutional personnel did not resolve conflicting records. This is an account of decision-making during delivery, not verification that the selected value was correct.

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2 Legacy Systems and Technical Infrastructure

Unavailable interfaces and infrastructure limitations were reported to require manual transfer or constrain the environments in which agents operated. Legacy-system integration and infrastructure readiness assess different technical constraints. The first concerns connection to existing systems. The second concerns the environments and capacity needed to operate agentic AI.

Written accounts described unavailable interfaces, manual transfers, and test environments that differed from production. The legacy-system item attracted substantially more comments than infrastructure readiness, so the two bodies of qualitative evidence differ in scope as well as subject.

> *"Legacy HR systems still fight the agent at every handoff" -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

2.1 Legacy Systems Without an Interface for Agents

INDICATOR C098 · RATE HOW WELL THE CUSTOMER'S LEGACY SYSTEMS SUPPORT THE INTEGRATION THIS ENGAGEMENT REQUIRES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described manual extraction and file transfer where the financial institution's legacy systems lacked the interfaces needed for agent integration. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 801 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the systems lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 308 respondents).

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Figure 2.7. Legacy Systems Without an Interface for Agents: associations with the study measures

Legacy systems without an interface for agents: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well the customer's legacy systems support the integration this engagement requires".

Distressed ratings: 416 of 801 answers (51.94%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 618): 3.40. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.75. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.81. Build-Out (n = 164): 4.10. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 4.37. Production (n = 97): 4.30. Canceled (n = 308): 2.33.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The support the legacy systems gave to integration was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Higher ratings were associated with less cancellation (r = −0.58, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.46, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where the systems were rated higher (r = 0.72, 95% CI 0.60 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator was also higher (r = 0.82, 95% CI 0.76 to 0.87, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the systems higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.53, n = 755 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 416 of the 801 answers (51.94%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

The legacy-systems indicator received 231 written responses from 212 respondents on 116 engagements. 216 responses (93.51%) were negative. Within the question asking for the three principal challenges to job satisfaction, 128 answers from 128 respondents were coded to legacy systems. Other accounts described absent programmatic interfaces, nightly file transfers, manual extraction, and integrations affected by provider releases.

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> *"the systems it sits in are very old and there is no way for us to reach them directly, everything comes through a person, and that person is on leave or in another meeting." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"the platform the expenses sit in is very old and there is no clean way in or out, so what reaches us is an extract, and the extract is only as good as whoever set it up years back. And nobody there today knows who set it up or why the columns are in that order." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Last month we ask for the case API and their SIEM version does not expose it, so agent enrichment runs off a nightly export instead of live." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Legacy platform integration broke constantly and nobody owned the fix" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Some respondents distinguished inherited system limitations from the conduct of institutional staff. More negative written sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave and, at engagement level, higher cancellation. The comments described manual transfer where integration was unavailable. They do not establish that no alternative technical solution existed.

2.2 Readiness of Financial Institution Infrastructure for Agentic AI

INDICATOR C099 · RATE THE READINESS OF THE CUSTOMER'S TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT THE AGENTIC AI THIS ENGAGEMENT DEPLOYS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Financial institution infrastructure received its lowest ratings on canceled engagements, while written accounts identified mismatched test environments and inadequate operating capacity. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 803 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the infrastructure lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 297 respondents).

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Figure 2.8. Readiness of Financial Institution Infrastructure for Agentic AI: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the readiness of the customer's technical infrastructure to support the agentic AI this engagement deploys".

Distressed ratings: 419 of 803 answers (52.18%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 620): 3.39. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.74. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.68. Build-Out (n = 166): 4.11. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 242): 4.25. Production (n = 98): 4.40. Canceled (n = 297): 2.28.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Infrastructure readiness was associated with all four core measures and passed the applicable sensitivity checks. Higher ratings were associated with lower cancellation (r = −0.60, 95% CI −0.69 to −0.49, n = 150 engagements). They were associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.74, 95% CI 0.63 to 0.82, n = 94 engagements) and a higher engagement indicator mean computed without the infrastructure indicator (r = 0.84, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated infrastructure readiness higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.61, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.53, n = 755 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 419 of the 803 answers (52.18%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

Few written responses addressed the infrastructure: 23 of 23 respondents on 22 engagements, and 18 of the 23 were negative. The evidence is thin and supports no general statement on its own. The negative responses named test environments that no longer matched production, servers that could not handle the volume, systems that timed out, and environments not ready for cloud services. Each of the five positive responses described the infrastructure as ready and named a different problem.

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“The test environment is the thing nobody asks about. It is a copy of prod from about two years ago, and half the deal types we support now do not exist in it. So we build against something that isn't real and find out on release night.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

“It comes down to one thing, the log sources feeding our triage agent are only about half mapped, so severity keeps coming back wrong on anything touching the acquiring platform.” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

“We were handed a genuinely solid environment to work in, access and identities were provisioned quickly and that is not always our experience. What would help now is one named owner for the custodian data definitions.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

The ratings measure perceived infrastructure readiness. They do not estimate the frequency of particular problems such as timeouts or mismatched test environments. The 23 written accounts illustrate experiences within the commenting subset.

“

Their infrastructure is fine, thats not the issue. What would help is a standing read only account on the uat pricing database, instead of raising a ticket every time we need a sample set and waiting three days. And they want the current workflow automated exactly as it stands, screen order and all.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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3 Process Documentation, Maturity, and Redesign

Missing documentation and inconsistent working practices left respondents describing uncertainty over which financial institution process an agent should implement. Four indicators describe the financial institution's processes. They cover how completely the processes were documented, how standardized they were, how consistently they were performed across business units and regions, and how willing the financial institution was to redesign them for agentic AI. Each had about half of its answers in the distressed range, from 396 of 789 answers (50.19%) for standardization to 430 of 795 (54.09%) for documentation. Documentation had the highest distressed share of any indicator in the category. The four were associated with every core study measure, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association.

Documentation, standardization, cross-unit consistency, and willingness to redesign are distinct process attributes. The written accounts describe missing or outdated documentation, multiple local variants, and requests to automate existing steps without redesign. A recurring implication is uncertainty over which process definition the agent should implement.

> *"they told us up front not to change any of the workflow, just make the agent do it the way the underwriters already do it. so my whole week is teaching it to copy a bad process." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

Respondents described observing staff to document workflows, reconciling regional variants, and implementing steps before receiving a definitive institutional decision. Part 5 examines the separately measured process alterations. These accounts suggest possible links between process definition and Manual alteration without establishing causation.

3.1 Process Documentation and Reported Reconstruction

INDICATOR C100 · RATE HOW COMPLETELY THE CUSTOMER'S PROCESSES ARE MAPPED AND DOCUMENTED TO THE DEPTH AGENTIC AI REQUIRES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Incomplete or outdated financial institution process documentation left delivery teams reporting reconstruction of workflows from observed practice. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 795 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated documentation lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 303 respondents).

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Figure 2.9. Process Documentation and Reported Reconstruction: associations with the study measures

Process documentation and reported reconstruction: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate how completely the customer's processes are mapped and documented to the depth agentic AI requires".

Distressed ratings: 430 of 795 answers (54.09%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 613): 3.37. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.73. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.73. Build-Out (n = 166): 3.95. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 229): 4.28. Production (n = 97): 4.32. Canceled (n = 303): 2.38.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The documentation of the financial institution's processes showed an association with each of the four core study measures that survived all applicable robustness checks. Higher ratings were associated with less cancellation (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). They were associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.57 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). Documentation was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator (r = 0.81, 95% CI 0.74 to 0.86, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated it higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.57, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.65 to −0.49, n = 748 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 430 of the 795 answers (54.09%), the highest distressed share among the 20 indicators of financial institution readiness, and the engagement mean was distressed on 70 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing documentation numbered 270, from 238 respondents on 121 engagements, and 229 of the 270 (84.81%) were negative. The largest group came from the question on why the respondent had altered the financial institution's processes. Respondents described processes that had never been written down, documents that did not match what the financial institution's staff actually did, and workflows the delivery team rebuilt by watching those staff at work.

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> *"the process doc they handed us was from 2019. it didnt match anything. the desk does it one way, the doc says another, and the two floors dont even do it the same. so we sat with one of their people for a week and wrote down what actually happens. that isnt our job but nobody else was going to." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"In fairness nobody there was hiding, they simply dont have the process written anywhere, so each person answers from memory." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The signed off process is not what the finance leads actually do day to day... i adjust my workflow to match how they really work, otherwise the model calibration breaks every month." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Here the reconciliation steps are mostly in peoples heads, we ask and somebody explains it on a call." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"what the numbers don't show is nobody has written down how they actually handle a disputed charge. every senior agent on their side does it slightly diffrent." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

Commenters rated documentation at 3.0 (n = 225), compared with 3.7 among noncommenters (n = 570). Some described unanswered clarification requests and reliance on observed practice rather than an approved document. The distinction is between reported operational practice and a formally agreed process specification.

3.2 Process Standardization and Repeatability

INDICATOR C101 · RATE THE MATURITY OF THE CUSTOMER'S PROCESSES IN SCOPE, MEANING HOW STANDARDIZED AND REPEATABLE THEY ARE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described financial institution processes that varied between people and locations rather than operating through standardized, repeatable steps. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 789 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the processes lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 295 respondents).

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Figure 2.10. Process Standardization and Repeatability: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the maturity of the customer’s processes in scope, meaning how standardized and repeatable they are”.

Distressed ratings: 396 of 789 answers (50.19%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 607): 3.39. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.78. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.50. Build-Out (n = 164): 3.95. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 4.31. Production (n = 94): 4.20. Canceled (n = 295): 2.42.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the maturity of the financial institution's processes, and the applicable robustness checks left each association intact. Engagements that rated the processes higher had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.57, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, n = 150 engagements). They recorded higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.72, 95% CI 0.61 to 0.81, n = 94 engagements). Process maturity was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator (r = 0.80, 95% CI 0.74 to 0.85, n = 150 engagements). It was associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.56, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.64 to −0.49, n = 742 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 396 of the 789 answers (50.19%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 62 of the 150 engagements.

Process-maturity comments numbered 85, from 79 respondents on 59 engagements. 74 were negative (87.06%). Respondents described variation between people, desks, or regions and unresolved choices about the process to implement. All four comparisons of written sentiment with the study measures reached significance. These analyses concern the commenting subset and do not establish an independent causal contribution.

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"Every desk contact on their side confirms trades a different way. Some use the Portal. Some just email a PDF. Some call and read numbers off a screen. And there is no single process document that says which one is correct for which counterparty, so we made our own version months ago and just follow that now." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

"each fund still runs its attribution its own way, so what we built for one desk did not carry across to the next. They were never going to redesign how attribution is done — only who does it." -Portfolio Director, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

"The problem is every exception gets handled a different way depending which person from Client team responds that day, so I make the call on Process myself and note it internally, revert back if anyone ask." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

"On my last account, a card client, the process was written down and every team followed it. Here every desk route their tickets their own way." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations

3.3 Inconsistency of Processes Across Business Units and Regions

INDICATOR C102 · RATE HOW CONSISTENTLY THE CUSTOMER PERFORMS THE SAME PROCESSES ACROSS ITS BUSINESS UNITS AND REGIONS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Differences in how financial institution business units and regions performed the same process complicated the definition of a common workflow for agents. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 3.0 (n = 801 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated consistency lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 300 respondents).

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Figure 2.11. Inconsistency of Processes Across Business Units and Regions: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how consistently the customer performs the same processes across its business units and regions”.

Distressed ratings: 408 of 801 answers (50.94%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 620): 3.44. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.79. Portfolio director (n = 29): 4.83. Build-Out (n = 165): 4.16. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.29. Production (n = 101): 4.39. Canceled (n = 300): 2.39.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The consistency of the financial institution's processes across business units and regions was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. More consistent processes were associated with less cancellation (r = −0.58, 95% CI −0.68 to −0.47, n = 150 engagements). They were associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.74, 95% CI 0.63 to 0.82, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator was higher where consistency was rated higher (r = 0.83, 95% CI 0.78 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower (r = −0.61, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.53, n = 755 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 408 of the 801 answers (50.94%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing consistency numbered 44, from 44 respondents on 35 engagements, all in comment on the financial institution, and 35 of the 44 (79.55%) were negative. They describe the same process performed differently by each region, desk, branch, or business unit. On one engagement, the financial institution had been formed from four companies that never merged their rules.

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> *"the client is four companies that never merged their HR rules. Leave entitlement, asset return, even the shift codes are different in each one, also nobody there could tell us which version was correct. We were asked to automate a process that has four versions and no owner." - Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Each region books the same account closure with a different reason code. What I do is keep a small list of which code belongs to which branch group, and I map them before the file goes in, otherwise the agent will raise exception on every one of them." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"New business in the west region orders requirements one way, the east does it different, and the agent has to be told twice. Same product, two workflows." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"What has not changed is every region does invoce approval a different way, so rules we set for one business unit do not fit the next one, and nobody wrote any of it down." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

No statistically significant association was detected between written sentiment and the study measures on the 44-response base. These accounts concern cross-unit variation specifically, whereas section 3.2 addresses process standardization more broadly. The quantitative outcome associations reported here derive from the ratings.

3.4 Automation of Processes as They Stand Rather Than Redesign

INDICATOR C103 · RATE THE CUSTOMER'S WILLINGNESS TO REDESIGN PROCESSES FOR AGENTIC AI RATHER THAN AUTOMATE THEM AS THEY ARE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described requests to automate existing financial institution workflows without reconsidering their steps or the checks they required. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 804 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the financial institution's willingness lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 307 respondents).

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Figure 2.12. Automation of Processes as They Stand Rather Than Redesign: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the customer’s willingness to redesign processes for agentic AI rather than automate them as they are”.

Distressed ratings: 429 of 804 answers (53.36%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 3.33. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.83. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.68. Build-Out (n = 166): 3.95. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.26. Production (n = 96): 4.34. Canceled (n = 307): 2.36.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The financial institution's willingness to redesign its processes for agentic AI showed an association with each of the four core study measures that survived all applicable robustness checks. Engagements where the willingness was rated higher had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). Their customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.58 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). Willingness to redesign was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator (r = 0.82, 95% CI 0.76 to 0.87, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated it higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.59, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.66 to −0.52, n = 755 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 429 of the 804 answers (53.36%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 67 of the 150 engagements.

Redesign comments numbered 43, from 43 respondents on 38 engagements. 34 were negative. Respondents described requests to reproduce existing workflows or accelerate them without reconsidering their steps. Some reported difficulties when human checks were removed. These accounts do not establish that unchanged workflows always fail under automation.

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> *"the client wants the agent to produce the summary in exactly the same shape their underwriters have always done it, box for box, including the sections nobody reads. We ask twice about redesigning the template for a machine and each time we are told to keep it as is. And that one decision costs us more rework than anything else in month one." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"They want same close process as before, only faster, no appetite to change any step. Their data itself is fine, we get clean trial balance every month, accordingly I went higher on those. Its the willingness which is missing, not the informations." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Nobody re-engineered the process before handing it to the agent" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"A specific case last month, the change sat for two weeks because nobody would take the decision, so we applied it ourselves. Nobody ever updated the process for how an agent actually works, so it falls on us to catch what should be flagged" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Written sentiment on redesign was not significantly associated with the study measures on this 43-response base. The accounts suggest that the suitability of retained checks and handoffs should be assessed during redesign. They do not support a universal distinction between the errors people and agents can make.

Two months in, we have opened three of their internal applications, so any judgment on infrastructure is a guess. The form assumes we have seen the systems. Their SMEs do show up when asked, and they will redesign a process rather than lift it as is."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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4 Organizational Readiness and Staff Capability

Cooperation from financial institution staff did not necessarily provide the agentic AI knowledge, specialist availability, or changed working practices that delivery required. Three indicators describe the financial institution's people. They cover the organization's readiness to absorb the changes agentic AI makes to daily work, the agentic AI knowledge and skills of its staff on the engagement, and the availability of its subject matter experts. The knowledge of the staff was distressed for 418 of 793 respondents (52.71%) and the availability of experts for 427 of 793 (53.85%). Readiness to absorb change was distressed in 396 of 794 answers (49.87%). The associations of all three with the four core study measures held under each of the applicable robustness checks.

The comments distinguish willingness to cooperate from experience with agentic AI. Some respondents described responsive institutional staff who nevertheless lacked experience operating or overseeing agents. The ratings address capability and readiness. The positive accounts of cooperation remain relevant counterevidence to a general claim of institutional unwillingness.

The expert-availability item concerns timely access to institutional judgment. Accounts of staff shared across assignments, particularly during time-sensitive work, are examined in section 4.3.

> *"It's that there is nobody on the deal team who can answer a question. I sent a question about which entity a set of payroll files belonged to on a Tuesday, got an answer nine days later, and the answer was a guess." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

4.1 Organizational Readiness to Absorb Changes to Daily Work

INDICATOR C107 · RATE THE CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION'S READINESS TO ABSORB THE CHANGES TO DAILY WORK THAT AGENTIC AI INTRODUCES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Readiness to absorb changes to daily work received its lowest ratings on canceled engagements, while written accounts distinguished cooperation from actual changes in working practice. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 4.0 (n = 794 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the organization's readiness lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 305 respondents).

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Figure 2.13. Organizational Readiness to Absorb Changes to Daily Work: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the customer organization’s readiness to absorb the changes to daily work that agentic AI introduces”.

Distressed ratings: 396 of 794 answers (49.87%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 611): 3.37. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.79. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.90. Build-Out (n = 165): 4.25. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 227): 4.29. Production (n = 97): 4.19. Canceled (n = 305): 2.34.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every association of the organization's readiness to absorb changes to daily work with the four core study measures held in each of the applicable robustness checks. Engagements that rated the organization's readiness higher had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.69 to −0.48, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among their active engagements was higher (r = 0.73, 95% CI 0.61 to 0.81, n = 94 engagements). Readiness was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator (r = 0.83, 95% CI 0.78 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). It was associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.66 to −0.53, n = 746 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 396 of the 794 answers (49.87%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

Few written responses addressed the indicator: 26 from 25 respondents on 23 engagements, and the evidence is divided. Negative responses numbered 16 and positive responses 10. The positive responses described staff who were open to the change and placed the difficulty elsewhere. The negative responses described staff who continued working as before, and adoption was reported as complete without being measured.

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> *"their own staff are not ready for any of this, half of them still ask us to mail the same note across because they dont open the tool." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"i felt bad putting one against their people but its not really the people, its that their night shift still works off the old runbook and wont touch the triage queue at all. day team is fine with it. thats the whole of that score." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The vendor reported system uptime as the primary success metric on a tool where the actual risk was answer accuracy, so the dashboard stayed green through months of advisors quietly stopping use of the assistant." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

Written sentiment was not significantly associated with the study measures on the 26-response base. The comments include both favorable and unfavorable experiences of organizational change. The broader readiness ratings cannot determine the prevalence of each specific behavior described in those comments.

4.2 Agentic AI Knowledge of Financial Institution Staff

INDICATOR C104 · RATE THE AGENTIC AI KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS OF THE CUSTOMER STAFF WORKING WITH THIS ENGAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents reported limits in the agentic AI knowledge and skills of financial institution staff, alongside favorable accounts that identified other delivery constraints. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 793 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the staff's knowledge lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 307 respondents).

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Figure 2.14. Agentic AI Knowledge of Financial Institution Staff: associations with the study measures

Agentic AI knowledge of financial institution staff: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate the agentic AI knowledge and skills of the customer staff working with this engagement".

Distressed ratings: 418 of 793 answers (52.71%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 610): 3.35. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.77. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.45. Build-Out (n = 163): 4.10. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 4.24. Production (n = 91): 4.35. Canceled (n = 307): 2.32.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the agentic AI knowledge and skills of financial institution staff, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Where the staff's knowledge was rated higher, cancellation was less common (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.69 to −0.48, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where the staff's knowledge was rated higher (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.58 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator was higher as well (r = 0.82, 95% CI 0.75 to 0.86, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the staff's knowledge higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.53, n = 750 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 418 of the 793 answers (52.71%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 60 of the 150 engagements.

Comments on staff knowledge numbered 36, from 36 respondents on 30 engagements. 24 were negative. Negative accounts described limited experience with agents, while positive accounts credited staff understanding and identified other constraints, including data, access, and ownership.

> *"their manager is fine, hes responsive, the analysts under him just dont have any experience with this stuff yet." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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"What they did, please note, is answer us quickly - when we raised the failed release in June their platform team was on the call the same afternoon, which I cannot fault. The difficulty is the people sitting with us have never run a pipeline with an agent in it, so I explain the same rollback twice ... " -Engagement Manager, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes

"Their process documents are actually fine, this i will say. But their people have never worked with an agent before, so every request come back with question. And access to the Config environment took five weeks." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications

More negative written sentiment about staff knowledge was associated with higher intent to leave, but no significant association was detected with cancellation or customer satisfaction. Some respondents described additional explanation and checking responsibilities. The study does not establish that staff inexperience caused those responsibilities or subsequent workforce intentions.

4.3 Availability of Financial Institution Subject Matter Experts

INDICATOR C106 · RATE THE AVAILABILITY OF THE CUSTOMER'S SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS WHEN THIS ENGAGEMENT NEEDS THEM · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Limited availability of financial institution subject matter experts left some delivery teams reporting process decisions and data correction without the requested guidance. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 793 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated availability lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 299 respondents).

Figure 2.15. Availability of Financial Institution Subject Matter Experts: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the availability of the customer's subject matter experts when this engagement needs them".

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Distressed ratings: 427 of 793 answers (53.85%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 613): 3.38. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.73. Portfolio director (n = 29): 4.45. Build-Out (n = 158): 4.02. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 237): 4.31. Production (n = 99): 4.19. Canceled (n = 299): 2.32.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The availability of the financial institution's subject matter experts was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements that rated the experts more available had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.68 to −0.47, n = 150 engagements). They recorded higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.58 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). Availability was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator (r = 0.82, 95% CI 0.77 to 0.87, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the experts more available reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.58, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.64 to −0.50, n = 748 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 427 of the 793 answers (53.85%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 69 of the 150 engagements.

Expert-availability comments numbered 220, from 202 respondents on 113 engagements. 184 were negative (83.64%). Respondents described limited specialist capacity shared with other assignments. Some reported making process decisions or correcting data without the requested guidance. Positive accounts described prompt expert responses and located difficulties elsewhere, including data or access.

> *"There is exactly one person on client side who understands how their shift allowance and arrears rules actually work, she sits in one meeting a week with us and she is covering three other projects ... We had a cycle where fourteen queries sat nine days for want of one answer, and then payroll ran anyway because payroll always runs." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The bankers are never free when a book is live, which is exactly when we need them. So we dont ask in the moment anymore. We keep our own note of how each desk has allocated in the past, deal by deal, and we work from that, then we confirm after pricing rather than before." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"the problem is we wait weeks for one modeler to answer a question, then everything lands at once. my team ends up burning weekends to catch up. and it repeats every quarter" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"there is one guy who knows the expense policy and he is booked out three weeks. so my team just guesses and eats it when its wrong." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

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> *“the problem is a break on one Fund in March, we send the query up on Monday and no informations come back for two weeks, by then NAV is already signed off. My team lead says the SME on Bank side is put on other project.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

More negative written sentiment about expert availability was associated with higher engagement cancellation. The accounts describe decisions made without timely specialist input, but they do not independently establish what guidance was available elsewhere or whether the resulting decisions were appropriate.

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5 Management of the Financial Institution's Side of the Engagement

Unresolved authority and escalations were reported even where individual financial institution staff responded promptly. Two indicators describe how the financial institution managed its own side of the engagement. They measure the effectiveness of that management and the speed with which the financial institution responded when the engagement raised an issue that needed its action. The management of the engagement was distressed in 398 of 811 answers (49.08%), and the speed of response in 404 of 789 (51.20%). Both indicators held every association with the four core study measures through the applicable robustness checks.

The written accounts distinguish prompt responses from individual staff from decisions requiring formal authority. Respondents described unresolved escalations, conflicting answers, and decisions made by vendor personnel to meet delivery requirements. Some reported that these decisions were not communicated to the financial institution.

> *“we get an answer same day now, used to be a week. what hasnt changed is who owns it when the tool misroutes something. everybody agrees it needs fixing, nobody signs anything.” - Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

The qualitative analyses examine associations between these accounts and outcomes. Their results are reported under the two indicators below. Because ratings and comments come from the same respondent population, agreement between them is not independent-source validation.

5.1 Financial Institution Management and Decision Authority

INDICATOR C105 · RATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CUSTOMER'S MANAGEMENT OF ITS SIDE OF THIS ENGAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Unclear ownership and decision authority were recurring concerns in accounts of the financial institution's management of its side of the engagement. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 811 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the financial institution's management lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 305 respondents).

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Figure 2.16. Financial Institution Management and Decision Authority: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the effectiveness of the customer’s management of its side of this engagement”.

Distressed ratings: 398 of 811 answers (49.08%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 631): 3.43. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.87. Portfolio director (n = 29): 5.03. Build-Out (n = 168): 4.15. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 239): 4.28. Production (n = 99): 4.43. Canceled (n = 305): 2.43.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The effectiveness of the financial institution's management of its side was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose delivery teams rated the financial institution's management of its side higher had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). They recorded higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.72, 95% CI 0.60 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). Effective management by the financial institution was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the management indicator (r = 0.82, 95% CI 0.76 to 0.87, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the management higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.59, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.66 to −0.51, n = 763 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 398 of the 811 answers (49.08%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

Comments on institutional management numbered 196, from 173 respondents on 104 engagements. 184 were negative (93.88%), including 157 assigned the strongest negative score. Recurring accounts described unclear task ownership or decision authority and vendor personnel making decisions after institutional responses were delayed.

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> *"The people we sat with were fine, they answered on chat, they showed us things when they could. The problem is above them. Nobody there was allowed to say yes to anything. Their engineer told me straight, he cant open a service account for a bot without a sign off that does not exist yet, so we wait. Four weeks we wait and then the project is closed." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"In the meantime the product team in London was using one definition of the peer group and the team in Singapore was using another, and both told us theirs was the approved one ... Nobody on their side owned it, so we didnt get a decision, only opinions. By the time an answer came the deal review had already passed." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"To be blunt it is a joke, we correct their identity data every single week and nobody above them seems to care, they defer every decision to us and we absorb it, as such I stopped raising it and just fix things myself now." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"nobody on their side owns this piece, that is the real problem. on my first desk, card refunds, there was one name on the wall and i could ask her. here i send question and it goes round three teams, nobody answer" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Engagements with a negative management comment had a higher observed cancellation rate. More negative respondent sentiment was associated with greater intent to leave, while no significant association was detected with customer satisfaction. Respondents commonly distinguished decision-authority problems from the effort of the institutional staff they worked with.

5.2 Speed of Financial Institution Response to Issues Raised by the Engagement

INDICATOR C109 · RATE HOW QUICKLY THE CUSTOMER RESPONDS WHEN THIS ENGAGEMENT RAISES ISSUES THAT NEED CUSTOMER ACTION · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Prompt responses from financial institution staff did not always resolve the formal decisions on which delivery depended. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 789 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the speed of response lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 297 respondents).

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Figure 2.17. Speed of Financial Institution Response to Issues Raised by the Engagement: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how quickly the customer responds when this engagement raises issues that need customer action”.

Distressed ratings: 404 of 789 answers (51.20%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 609): 3.37. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.89. Portfolio director (n = 29): 4.59. Build-Out (n = 161): 4.10. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.22. Production (n = 96): 4.36. Canceled (n = 297): 2.35.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the speed of the financial institution's response to issues raised by the engagement, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Faster response was associated with less cancellation (r = −0.60, 95% CI −0.69 to −0.48, n = 150 engagements). Faster response by the financial institution was associated with higher customer satisfaction among the active engagements (r = 0.74, 95% CI 0.63 to 0.82, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator was higher where response was rated faster (r = 0.84, 95% CI 0.78 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the response faster reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.59, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.65 to −0.51, n = 740 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 404 of the 789 answers (51.20%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the speed of response numbered 498, from 382 respondents on 142 engagements, and 437 of the 498 (87.75%) were negative. Most came from the questions on manual alteration. There, respondents described questions that sat for days or weeks, answers that arrived after the deadline, and a delivery team that made the decision without the financial institution. The comments

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on the financial institution were more divided. Many respondents said the people they dealt with answered quickly, and others described waits that stalled the engagement.

> *"every question we raise on the billing cycle sits for two weeks, and the business case has been rewritten three times in eight weeks." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"I raise it, they say we will discuss about it in the next call. Next call is cancelled. We build the note anyway because the deadline does not move, then I rebuild the same note three times when the list changes again." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Escalation goes to my lead, my lead sends to vendor manager, vendor manager sends to their side. Answer comes back in three or four days. Agent sends fifty responses in that time. Nothing else from me on it" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"i have not had a full weekend since January. Their environment team answer once a week, Friday evening usually, so my team sit idle four days then works the whole night to make the window... two of us have asked for transfer." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"last week ticket needed system access but their Security team wont approve connection, again, same as every time, and i had to enter data by hand instead, like always." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"We asked three times for a methodology note and got a call instead, forty minutes, two of their people disagreeing with each other while we listened. So we built to what we heard, and then the review came back saying the outputs did not look like what they expected - which is fair, except nobody had told us what they expected." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Written sentiment about response speed was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, and intent to leave. The comments distinguish interpersonal responsiveness from formal authorization: some staff answered promptly while escalated decisions remained unresolved. Reports of vendor decisions made without subsequent disclosure are examined in Part 5.

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6 Governance of Agentic AI Within the Financial Institution

Diffuse ownership, limited agent-risk oversight, and change approvals mismatched to operational needs were distinct reported weaknesses in the financial institution's governance. Three indicators describe how the financial institution governed agent work on its own side. They cover the assignment of ownership and accountability for AI, the capacity to oversee the risks of agents performing the engagement's tasks, and the capacity of change control to handle the changes the engagement required. About half of the answers on each were distressed: 417 of 802 answers (52.00%) for ownership of AI, 417 of 797 (52.32%) for oversight of agent risk, and 411 of 800 (51.38%) for change control. None of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association of the three with the four core study measures. Diffuse ownership of AI had the lowest mean rating of the 20 indicators in the category, 3.47 (n = 802 respondents).

The comments described unclear ownership across institutional functions, oversight frameworks respondents considered unsuitable for agents, and approval schedules that did not match reported operational changes. Their limited volume constrains generalization, and favorable accounts of established risk functions are retained below.

> *"Moreover their governance model assumes changes happen at release pace, not the pace an agent generates cases, so we adapted the workflow ourselves." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

The three indicators record the financial institution's own controls over work performed by agents. With the joint controls of co-management, they inform the examination of how the controls meant to govern agent work were bypassed or absent (Part 3).

6.1 Diffuse Ownership of AI Across Financial Institution Functions

INDICATOR C112 · RATE HOW CLEARLY OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR AI ARE ASSIGNED INSIDE THE CUSTOMER ORGANIZATION · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The assignment of AI ownership and accountability received the lowest mean rating among the financial institution readiness indicators. The mean rating was 3.47, the lowest of the 20 indicators of financial institution readiness, and the median 3.0 (n = 802 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the assignment of ownership lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 306 respondents).

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Figure 2.18. Diffuse Ownership of AI Across Financial Institution Functions: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how clearly ownership and accountability for AI are assigned inside the customer organization".

Distressed ratings: 417 of 802 answers (52.00%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 3.32. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.85. Portfolio director (n = 29): 4.48. Build-Out (n = 163): 4.17. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.18. Production (n = 98): 4.17. Canceled (n = 306): 2.32.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every association of the assignment of ownership for AI inside the financial institution with the four core study measures held, in each of the applicable robustness checks. Clearer ownership of AI at the financial institution was associated with less cancellation (r = −0.57, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, n = 150 engagements). It was associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). Engagements where ownership of AI was rated clearer had a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the ownership indicator (r = 0.81, 95% CI 0.75 to 0.86, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who saw clearer ownership of AI (r = −0.59, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.66 to −0.52, n = 755 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 417 of the 802 answers (52.00%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 67 of the 150 engagements.

Ownership comments numbered 46, from 46 respondents on 40 engagements. 41 were negative. Recurring descriptions included responsibilities divided among functions, referrals between teams, and delayed decisions about permitted agent actions. The accounts concern perceived ambiguity rather than a verified inventory of institutional responsibilities.

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> *"there is nobody on their side who owns AI. Risk own the watchlist, technology own the platform, and when the agent flags an obligor wrongly, both of them say it is the other one. Their credit analysts do turn up when we ask, that is fair, but they cannot approve anything." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"the client does not have anybody who owns what the agent is allowed to do. thats the whole problem right there ... i flagged it same day. it took eleven days to get a yes or no on whether we keep repairing them or return the whole batch. eleven days of me sitting on a queue and aging it." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"I came away impressed, and the softer answers here come down to one thing. Their desk leads are strong and the endpoint data is clean. But nobody on their side owns which ticket categories an agent may close unsupervised, and that call keeps moving between people" -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"My last engagement was a smaller bank and their finance team gives us one owner for the model, one person to ask. Here nobody owns it. I send a question on the entity heirarchy and it goes round three teams and comes back to me." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

No statistically significant association was detected between ownership sentiment and the study measures. Some respondents praised institutional staff while reporting unresolved authority across functions. This distinction concerns organizational decision rights, not a demonstrated lack of individual competence.

6.2 Financial Institution Oversight of Agent Risk

INDICATOR C111 · RATE THE CUSTOMER'S CAPACITY TO GOVERN AND OVERSEE THE RISKS OF AI AGENTS DOING THIS WORK · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents identified gaps in the financial institution's oversight of agent risk, including delayed review and arrangements they considered inadequately adapted to agentic work. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 797 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the financial institution's capacity lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 306 respondents).

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Figure 2.19. Financial Institution Oversight of Agent Risk: associations with the study measures

Financial institution oversight of agent risk: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate the customer's capacity to govern and oversee the risks of AI agents doing this work".

Distressed ratings: 417 of 797 answers (52.32%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 615): 3.37. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.75. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.47. Build-Out (n = 162): 4.02. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 231): 4.26. Production (n = 98): 4.36. Canceled (n = 306): 2.34.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The financial institution's capacity to oversee the risks of AI agents showed an association with each of the four core study measures that survived all applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common on engagements that rated the oversight capacity higher (r = −0.57, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, it was associated with higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.75, 95% CI 0.64 to 0.83, n = 94 engagements). Oversight capacity was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the oversight indicator (r = 0.83, 95% CI 0.77 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the oversight higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.61, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.54, n = 750 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 417 of the 797 answers (52.32%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 71 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing oversight of agent risk numbered 45, from 44 respondents on 38 engagements, and 37 of the 45 were negative. Most came from the question on the challenges that most reduced job satisfaction, where respondents listed challenges in a few words each. They named the oversight the financial institution lacked, model-risk review that arrived late or never closed, audit frameworks that did not exist for agents, and vendor-risk terms not written for this form of work. A small

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number described an institution whose risk function was strong, or whose AI oversight forum existed before the engagement began.

> *"nobody on their side is really watching what agent does with it" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Asking how quickly they govern AI risk when nobody has been named to govern it is not a question anyone here can answer." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Client could not audit the agent's recon decisions and we had no answer" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Model-risk sign-off lags the build" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Written sentiment about agent-risk oversight was not significantly associated with the study measures. The comments identify functions respondents considered absent or inadequate, including review and audit arrangements. The study did not inspect those functions directly. The ratings measure perceived oversight capacity.

6.3 Financial Institution Change Control and Release Requirements

INDICATOR C110 · RATE HOW WELL THE CUSTOMER'S CHANGE CONTROL PROCESS HANDLES THE CHANGES THIS ENGAGEMENT REQUIRES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Financial institution change control did not consistently match the frequency of changes required in delivery, according to respondents' accounts. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 3.0 (n = 800 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the financial institution's change control lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 304 respondents).

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Figure 2.20. Financial Institution Change Control and Release Requirements: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well the customer’s change control process handles the changes this engagement requires”.

Distressed ratings: 411 of 800 answers (51.38%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 617): 3.44. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.89. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.48. Build-Out (n = 161): 4.37. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 238): 4.26. Production (n = 97): 4.33. Canceled (n = 304): 2.36.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The financial institution's change control, as rated by the delivery team, was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements that rated the financial institution's change control higher had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.69 to −0.48, n = 150 engagements). Their customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher (r = 0.75, 95% CI 0.64 to 0.83, n = 94 engagements). So was their engagement indicator mean computed without the indicator (r = 0.84, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Their respondents reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.62, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.55, n = 751 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 411 of the 800 answers (51.38%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 62 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing change control numbered 85, from 80 respondents on 64 engagements, and 69 of the 85 were negative. The central complaint was pace. Respondents described change processes and boards built for a change a month, or meeting weekly or monthly, against work that changed several times a day, and changes made without waiting for approval as a result. The positive responses described a quick change process and placed the difficulty elsewhere.

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> *“it is sign-off where we lose everything. A fix we write in two days sits four weeks in their change queue.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“What they did not have was a change process that could absorb a rule set moving weekly rather than quarterly, and I don't think that is a failing so much as an artifact of how regulatory systems are governed everywhere. Their own model validation group has a mandate written for annual releases.” -Portfolio Director, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *“the problem is the way client set up change process only expect maybe one update a month, but we adjust ticket routing rule several time a day just to keep queue moving, so i just update it myself when it need fixing” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *“My team sits late every second Thursday waiting on their approval, the window opens at 11pm and we are still online at 2. Two people already ask for shift change because of it” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“A composite construction decision sat waiting on client sign-off for eleven days -- the change board only meet monthly, as such we made the call ourselves and moved it through.” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

No significant association was detected between change-control sentiment and the study measures. Some respondents described implementing changes before approval or outside the formal process. Such practices could make change records incomplete, but the study did not compare those records with actual system changes.

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7 Provisioning of System Access and Agent Identities

Delayed access was reported to be supplemented by manual transfer and borrowed or shared credentials, raising questions about attribution and segregation of duties. Access provisioning concerns the identities, permissions, and connections needed for agent operation. Written accounts describe manual entry, file transfers, and borrowed or shared credentials when approved access was delayed. These arrangements can weaken attribution and segregation of duties. Their actual control consequences depend on the surrounding access and logging architecture.

7.1 Ability to Provision Access and Identities for Agents

INDICATOR C108 · RATE THE CUSTOMER'S ABILITY TO PROVISION THE SYSTEM ACCESS AND IDENTITIES THAT AI AGENTS REQUIRE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Delays in provisioning the system access and identities required by agents were accompanied by reported manual transfer and use of borrowed or shared credentials. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 801 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated provisioning lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 307 respondents).

Figure 2.21. Ability to Provision Access and Identities for Agents: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the customer's ability to provision the system access and identities that AI agents require".

Distressed ratings: 410 of 801 answers (51.19%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 618): 3.40. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.81. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.71. Build-Out (n = 161): 4.17. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 4.30. Production (n = 101): 4.32. Canceled (n = 307): 2.36.

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r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.
The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The applicable robustness checks left intact each association between the provisioning of system access and agent identities and the four core study measures. Cancellation was less common where provisioning was rated higher (r = −0.58, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.46, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, better provisioning was associated with higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.69, 95% CI 0.57 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the provisioning indicator, was higher on engagements that rated provisioning higher (r = 0.80, 95% CI 0.74 to 0.85, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated provisioning higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.59, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.66 to −0.51, n = 751 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 410 of the 801 answers (51.19%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 59 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing access and identities numbered 437, from 348 respondents on 135 engagements, and 403 of the 437 (92.22%) were negative. They describe access requests that waited weeks or months and agents with no identity of their own. Delivery teams worked from emailed files, typed data in by hand, or entered systems through borrowed and shared logins.

> *"Their identity team treats a service account for an agent exactly like a request for a new joiner, same form, same four week SLA, and nobody has explained to them that it is a different animal. So we are building dashboards off extract files that somebody mails us on Fridays." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"We waited five weeks for processor sandbox credentials and in the end we got a shared login that three teams were using, which is its own problem ... Every screen wants a human login. So we sat a human in front of it and called it agentic." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"i send request, it goes to a team mailbox, three approvers are named and each one thinks other two will do it. so nothing move for four five days." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"access provisioning never finish before we go live so the agents patch around missing permissions constantly, happens most days." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Access provisioning for the agent took weeks instead of days" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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Negative access comments were associated with higher engagement cancellation and lower customer satisfaction. More negative respondent sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. Accounts of borrowed or shared credentials raise a separate attribution concern. They may limit identification of the person or system performing an action, but the study did not establish whether other records permitted that identification.

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8 Stability of the Business Case

Revisions to scope or measured-return assumptions after delivery began were reported to require rework. Business-case stability concerns whether the scope and definition of expected return remained sufficiently consistent to guide delivery.

8.1 Changes to the Business Case and Return Definition

INDICATOR C113 · RATE THE STABILITY OF THE CUSTOMER'S BUSINESS CASE AND ROI DEFINITION FOR THIS ENGAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Changes to the financial institution's business case and definition of measured return were reported as sources of rework after delivery began. The mean rating was 3.5 and the median 3.0 (n = 794 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the stability of the case lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 298 respondents).

Figure 2.22. Changes to the Business Case and Return Definition: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the stability of the customer's business case and ROI definition for this engagement".

Distressed ratings: 420 of 794 answers (52.90%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 612): 3.34. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.78. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.60. Build-Out (n = 166): 3.93. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 4.25. Production (n = 94): 4.32. Canceled (n = 298): 2.35.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

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The stability of the business case showed an association with each of the four core study measures that survived all applicable robustness checks. A more stable case and definition of return were associated with less cancellation (r = −0.57, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.46, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where the case was rated more stable (r = 0.72, 95% CI 0.60 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). Business-case stability was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the stability indicator (r = 0.82, 95% CI 0.76 to 0.87, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated the case more stable (r = −0.59, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.65 to −0.51, n = 746 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 420 of the 794 answers (52.90%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 67 of the 150 engagements.

Business-case comments numbered 34, from 33 respondents on 25 engagements. 30 were negative. Respondents described repeated revisions to scope or return assumptions after delivery began. Four positive accounts described clear objectives from the outset.

> *“We ask, it goes to their platform team, then to their security, then it stops. The business case also changes twice in that period, so we are never sure what we are building towards.” - Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“Here it is a ticket for every access and the ROI story changes each quarter, consequently i stopped asking” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“Scope on their side moves after work is already underway. What that costs my team is not the rework itself, it is that I must ask same four people to redo something they finished on Friday, and I am running out of ways to ask it” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *“Business case kept shifting to justify a bad bet” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

No significant association was detected between business-case sentiment and the study measures. The accounts describe reported rework following scope or assumption changes but do not establish why those changes occurred or whether they were justified.

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“We have had no trouble at all getting to their data. It is well structured and the definitions hold across their card and merchant systems, which is why data readiness scored high from me. The lower marks are narrower than they look. Their business sponsors are still moving the goalposts on what the benefit case is meant to be, and the people who own the metrics have not sat down with us to agree the definitions behind them. And their staff are new to working this way. That is a starting position, not a criticism of them.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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Co-Management

Distressed ratings across co-management identified concerns about the two firms' shared decisions, coordination, and review arrangements. Co-management is the category of indicators that exist only because two firms share the engagement. Its 20 indicators describe how the financial institution and the vendor governed the engagement together, managed its risks and issues, and controlled changes to the agents. They also describe how the two firms reviewed agent output and adapted their joint structures to the work performed by agents. The category had a mean of 3.65 across the 150 engagements, second lowest of the five, and 7,866 of its 15,968 answers (49.26%) were distressed. Its indicators are reported in the order of the survey section from which they come.

Table 2.4. The indicators of co-management, from the lowest mean rating

Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share
5.4 Readiness of the Joint Model for Expected Agent Autonomy	3.60	407 of 808	50.37%
4.5 Quality Measures Calibrated to Human Rather Than Agent Error	3.61	405 of 792	51.14%
1.2 Unsettled Boundary of Agent Autonomy	3.61	406 of 808	50.25%
2.4 Authority to Stop a Misbehaving Agent	3.62	406 of 804	50.50%
3.2 Agent Updates Disclosed to the Other Firm After the Fact	3.62	394 of 803	49.07%
5.3 Joint Governance Model Designed for Work Performed by People	3.63	395 of 803	49.19%
2.1 Separate Risk Records Maintained by the Two Firms	3.64	383 of 793	48.30%
4.1 Placement of Human Review Points Across the Two Firms	3.64	393 of 797	49.31%
4.3 Routine Approval of Agent Output at Human Review Points	3.65	393 of 794	49.50%
2.3 Resolution Speed Against the Spread of Agent Error	3.65	400 of 809	49.44%
1.1 Co-Management Structures That Existed on Paper	3.66	385 of 789	48.80%
1.4 Accountability for Problems Arising From Agent Action Dissolved Across the Two Firms	3.66	402 of 799	50.31%
3.3 Unmonitored Agent Drift Between Releases	3.66	388 of 806	48.14%

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Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share
1.3 Unowned Handoffs in Shared Workflows	3.67	388 of 808	48.02%
4.2 Human Review Capacity Against Agent Output Volume	3.67	381 of 805	47.33%
3.1 Joint Change Control Outpaced by Agent Behavior	3.68	399 of 798	50.00%
4.4 Quality Checks Designed for Human Rather Than Agent Error	3.68	377 of 787	47.90%
5.1 Agent Actions Visible Only Inside Each Firm's Own Tools	3.68	392 of 780	50.26%
5.2 Joint Decision Speed Mismatched to Agent Speed	3.69	381 of 786	48.47%
2.2 Issue Management Through Separate Lists	3.73	391 of 799	48.94%

Mean ratings in Table 2.4 are computed across respondents. The category figure of 3.65 is computed across engagements.

The category differs from the others in two respects. Respondents on the 56 canceled engagements rated it lower than any other category, at a mean of 2.22 across its indicators (Table 2.2). Among active engagements it was rated lower by respondents on the 20 engagements in Production (4.07) than on the 31 in Build-Out (4.67), the widest difference between stages of any category. Its indicators were associated with intent to leave as closely as any in the study, from r = −0.69 to r = −0.64. Their associations with customer satisfaction among active engagements lay in the lowest range of any category, from r = 0.59 to r = 0.63 (n = 94 engagements each).

Written accounts described weaknesses in joint decision-making, shared records, review capacity, and change coordination. Some respondents considered the arrangements insufficiently adapted from earlier staffed delivery. The open question on co-management received comments from 551 of 850 respondents (64.82%). Both favorable and unfavorable experiences are reported below.

> *“The joint calls work, but I am the one holding the gap between an agent that acts in seconds and a decision that comes on Thursday. That sits with me personally, and my leads know to call me at any hour when the queue backs up.” -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“It is that neither side see what the other changed until the allocation is already posted... for that reason we find out at month end, every month” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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Some respondents described acting before approval or outside formal procedures. Part 3 examines the implications of these reported practices for control design and verification.

> *We had a weekly joint call and a shared issue list from week one, which is more than I usually get at this stage. The gap was on review. Three of us were approving routing decisions we did not have time to actually look at, and the volume was still small. But we never got far enough for any of it to be tested properly. Accountability was clear on paper at least"*

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Technology engineering and operations

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1 Joint Governance and Decision Rights

Accounts of joint governance contrasted working decision forums with unresolved autonomy limits, workflow ownership, and responsibility for remediation. Four indicators describe how the two firms managed the engagement together and settled who decides. They cover the effectiveness of co-management, the boundary of agent autonomy, the ownership of each step in a shared workflow, and the accountability for problems arising from agent action. Each had about half of its answers in the distressed range, from 388 of 808 answers (48.02%) for the ownership of workflow steps to 406 of 808 (50.25%) for the boundary of autonomy. Across the four, every association with the core study measures held under the applicable robustness checks.

Negative accounts described inactive forums, unresolved autonomy limits, unclear workflow ownership, and disputes over remediation. Positive accounts also described joint structures that met regularly and resolved issues. The presence of a forum does not by itself establish whether its individual governance functions operate effectively.

> *"What it costs us is Fridays. Because it has never been settled which policy questions the agent may answer alone, my leads sit in a two-hour joint review every week clearing a backlog of held tickets that mostly should never have been held. The team notices, and it is the part of the week they resent." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The problem is nobody can tell me who is allowed to switch the thing off. In February the tool post same vendor exception into queue forty times, maybe more, and I ring my lead, my lead ring somebody else, and by then it is next morning already." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

1.1 Effectiveness of Co-Management Structures

INDICATOR C136 · RATE HOW EFFECTIVELY THE CUSTOMER AND VENDOR JOINTLY MANAGE THIS ENGAGEMENT NOW THAT AGENTS PERFORM PART OF THE WORK · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of co-management distinguished joint arrangements that resolved decisions from meetings and separate records that left delivery teams without effective support. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 789 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated co-management lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.2, n = 299 respondents).

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Figure 2.23. Effectiveness of Co-Management Structures: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how effectively the customer and vendor jointly manage this engagement now that agents perform part of the work".

Distressed ratings: 385 of 789 answers (48.80%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 607): 3.54. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.84. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.00. Build-Out (n = 165): 4.73. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 4.58. Production (n = 93): 4.02. Canceled (n = 299): 2.23.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Co-management of the engagement by the two firms was associated with every core study measure, without a single association overturned in the applicable robustness checks. Engagements that rated co-management higher had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.61, 95% CI −0.70 to −0.50, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where co-management was rated higher (r = 0.62, 95% CI 0.48 to 0.73, n = 94 engagements). Effective co-management was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the joint-management indicator (r = 0.84, 95% CI 0.78 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated co-management higher (r = −0.67, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 739 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 385 of the 789 answers (48.80%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing co-management numbered 209, from 199 respondents on 115 engagements. They were more evenly divided than for most indicators, with 127 of the 209 responses negative (60.77%) and 79 of the 209 responses positive (37.80%). The negative responses described co-management that did not exist, or that met without deciding anything, while the engagement proceeded

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through separate trackers and private records. The positive responses described joint calls that worked and placed the remaining weakness in the review step or in the means to stop an agent.

> *"There was a joint operating forum on paper — I have the terms of reference still, names on it, a weekly slot — and in eight months it met four times, twice with only my side in the room. So the ones are not a judgment on the people, they are a judgment on a structure that existed only in a document." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Two firms is generous, it is whoever picks up the exception queue that morning deciding what a stalled contract exception does next, and whatever we decide is what happened. Nobody above either side ever looks at it." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"We had a finding on duplicate vendor payments sitting for eleven days, nobody would say if it was theirs to sign or ours. In the end my lead just approved it himself, and the review after that was one person clicking through forty items in an hour." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"On my previous ITO account we have a joint bridge for every P2 and both sides sit on it. Here the client incident manager joins only when it is already a P1, so the middle cases drift for a day or two." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"my last account was pension admin, one weekly call. here there is a joint call every morning, my lead sits in it and sometimes an answer comes back same day. that is better than what i had before, even if none of it reaches my queue" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Client servicing and communications*

Negative joint-management comments were associated with higher cancellation and lower customer satisfaction. More negative respondent sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. These associations do not establish direction. The written accounts identify both functional arrangements and cases in which operational personnel made decisions without effective joint support.

1.2 Unsettled Boundary of Agent Autonomy

INDICATOR C137 · RATE HOW CLEARLY THE TWO FIRMS HAVE SETTLED WHO DECIDES WHAT AGENTS MAY DO WITHOUT HUMAN APPROVAL · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The boundary between permitted agent action and required human approval remained unresolved in several written accounts. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 3.0 (n = 808 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the settlement of autonomy lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.2, n = 309 respondents).

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Figure 2.24. Unsettled Boundary of Agent Autonomy: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how clearly the two firms have settled who decides what agents may do without human approval".

Distressed ratings: 406 of 808 answers (50.25%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 625): 3.48. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.91. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.81. Build-Out (n = 163): 4.66. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 240): 4.56. Production (n = 96): 4.12. Canceled (n = 309): 2.16.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The settlement of agent autonomy between the two firms was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and no robustness check overturned an association. Cancellation was less common where the boundary of autonomy was rated settled (r = −0.62, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.51, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where the boundary of autonomy was settled (r = 0.59, 95% CI 0.44 to 0.71, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the autonomy indicator, was higher where the boundary was settled (r = 0.84, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the boundary settled reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.67, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.73 to −0.60, n = 758 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 406 of the 808 answers (50.25%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 68 of the 150 engagements.

Autonomy-boundary comments numbered 48, from 48 respondents on 42 engagements. 34 were negative. Half described an absent or unresolved agreement on actions requiring human approval. Some respondents proposed a single agreed list. Favorable accounts described using such an agreement. Its reported existence is distinct from evidence that it was consistently enforced.

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> *"Give us checklist for what the agent is allowed to write without review, because right now every one of us decide by ourself." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"We set the decision rights in the first two weeks and wrote them down, that part has held up. Anything the agent does above a sev-3 goes to a named person on the bank side and a named person on ours. Where it is thinner is review depth." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"In my last job on the fraud queue there is one name against every rule, if it break you know who to call. Here nobody know who says yes when the agent close an alert by itself. My Lead ask them, they ask us back, and we keep triaging by hand in the middle." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"At present every material disposition still comes back to a person on our side, which is safe but it does not scale, and we have not had the conversation with their compliance leadership about which alert types the agent may close on its own. That conversation has been deferred twice now." -Portfolio Director, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"Decision rights are clear, we know what the agent can file without a person signing off." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

No significant association was detected between autonomy-boundary sentiment and the study measures. The accounts concern definition and implementation of approval requirements. They do not measure net time savings from automation or demonstrate that a written list alone provides effective control.

1.3 Unowned Handoffs in Shared Workflows

INDICATOR C138 · RATE HOW CLEARLY OWNERSHIP OF EACH WORKFLOW STEP IS ASSIGNED WHEN AGENTS, VENDOR STAFF, AND CUSTOMER STAFF WORK IN THE SAME PROCESS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Unassigned ownership of workflow steps left some cases waiting while the two firms disputed responsibility for the handoff. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 808 respondents). The assignment of step ownership was rated lower on canceled engagements than on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.2, n = 305 respondents).

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Figure 2.25. Unowned Handoffs in Shared Workflows: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how clearly ownership of each workflow step is assigned when agents, vendor staff, and customer staff work in the same process".

Distressed ratings: 388 of 808 answers (48.02%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 626): 3.54. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.89. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.26. Build-Out (n = 165): 4.77. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 239): 4.58. Production (n = 99): 4.24. Canceled (n = 305): 2.18.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every association of workflow-step ownership with the four core study measures held, in each of the applicable robustness checks. Engagements that rated the ownership of each workflow step higher had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.55, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among their active engagements was higher (r = 0.61, 95% CI 0.47 to 0.72, n = 94 engagements). Clear ownership of each step was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the ownership indicator (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated step ownership higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.69, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.74 to −0.62, n = 758 respondents). After Holm correction, which limits false-positive conclusions within a specified family of comparisons, the rating also differed by process family. Distressed ratings came from 388 of the 808 answers (48.02%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the ownership of workflow steps numbered 82, from 81 respondents on 58 engagements, and 70 of the 82 were negative. Among the 68 responses in the comment field on co-management, 40 described a step in the shared process that belonged to neither firm. When the agent or a person handled that step wrongly, each firm said it belonged to the other, and the case waited. The remedy respondents proposed was a name against each step.

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"When the assistant sends a HR case to wrong queue and it sits four days, we have meeting about it and both sides explain why it is not their part. And then next week same thing. My lead says we cannot change the routing rules ourself because it is joint decision, but joint decision takes longer than the SLA it is breaking." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"A single attribution rule change sat for eleven weeks ... Word came back it was our call to make, our lead said it was theirs, and in the meantime the agent kept producing breakdowns on the old basis." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

"Nobody owned the step where a generated test case gets accepted, we assumed their QA lead did, he assumed we did, and it sat there. Also every decision we raised took three weeks to revert back, which is not a pace anything can be built at." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"Last month close we get 400 exceptions in one night and only two of us to review them. But nobody decide who signs off the ones the agent already cleared. i check them all myself, hence we finish late" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

"We keep our own sheet now. Every morning my senior analyst lists which summaries the agent touched overnight and who on their side signs each one, and we walk through it on a fifteen minute call before their clinical lead starts. It is not governance. But it is the only place both firms see the same list." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

"Overrides on NAV breaks sit for days because sign off belong to nobody, not the client, not us, and my team clear them anyway so the pack go out on time." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

Negative comments on workflow ownership were associated with higher cancellation, and more negative respondent sentiment with higher intent to leave. Respondents described delayed cases and disputed responsibility where ownership was unclear. These are reported experiences rather than a verified causal sequence.

1.4 Allocation of Accountability Between the Firms

INDICATOR C139 · RATE HOW CLEARLY ACCOUNTABILITY LANDS ON ONE FIRM WHEN AN AGENT'S ACTION CAUSES A PROBLEM IN THIS ENGAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described delays in assigning responsibility between the two firms after problems arising from agent action. The mean was 3.7 and the median 3.0 (n = 799 respondents). The mean on canceled engagements was 2.2 (n = 299), lower than in each active stage.

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Figure 2.26. Allocation of Accountability Between the Firms: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how clearly accountability lands on one firm when an agent's action causes a problem in this engagement".

Distressed ratings: 402 of 799 answers (50.31%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 616): 3.54. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.86. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.94. Build-Out (n = 164): 4.70. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 239): 4.64. Production (n = 97): 4.05. Canceled (n = 299): 2.18.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Accountability for problems arising from agent action showed an association with each of the four core study measures that survived all applicable robustness checks. Clearer accountability was associated with less cancellation (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where accountability was rated clearer (r = 0.61, 95% CI 0.46 to 0.72, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the accountability indicator, was closely associated with it (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated accountability clearer (r = −0.68, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.73 to −0.61, n = 750 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 402 of the 799 answers (50.31%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing accountability numbered 51, from 50 respondents on 37 engagements, and 45 of the 51 were negative. When a problem arose from an agent's action, respondents described days spent deciding which firm was at fault before either fixed it, and incident records that named a symptom in place of an owner. Several said that stopping the agent was quick and that deciding who owned the harm was not.

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"both firms are perfectly able to describe what went wrong and neither is willing to write down who carries it. We have a joint issue log, on paper. In practice the log records symptoms. When a suite the agent generated missed a defect that later surfaced in UAT, the entry reads environment instability, which is true enough, and also convenient for everyone in the room, ourselves included." -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"There was a letter that went out with the wrong deal date in it last quarter and eleven days went by before anyone would say where the fault sat, and in the end no one did." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications

"escalation is the whole issue here. when the agent dispositions an alert wrong nobody owns it after. my side says compliance owns disposition, compliance says we built the rule. so it sits in queue for weeks and then ages out. which is why the backlog number they report is meaningless." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding

"when the assistant mis-reads an underwriting requirement and a new-business file sits for a week, there is nobody on our side who carries it. I raise it, my manager raises it, and it comes back as a question for the client." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

"nobody owns errors when the agent ships something broken" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes

No significant association was detected between accountability sentiment and the study measures. Respondents described disputes over investigation and remediation after incidents. The accounts suggest unresolved responsibility in those cases, without establishing the contractual allocation or legal liability of either firm.

"

The incident report attributed the failed release to a 'process gap' rather than naming the specific agent action that triggered it, which let the dashboard show a process metric instead of the accountability question everyone actually wanted answered."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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2 Shared Risk and Issue Management

Separate records and unresolved authority were reported to impede coordinated responses to agent-related risks and operational problems. Four indicators describe how the two firms managed the risks and issues that agent work produced. They ask whether the firms kept one view of agent risk and managed issues as one team. The indicators also ask whether the firms resolved issues at the speed at which agent error spreads and could stop an agent behaving badly in live operation. Each had about half of its answers in the distressed range, from 383 of 793 answers (48.30%) for the shared view of risk to 406 of 804 (50.50%) for the authority to stop an agent. All four held their associations with the core study measures under the applicable robustness checks.

Shared risk management concerns prospective threats. Issue management concerns problems that have occurred. Both require coordinated records, ownership, and follow-up. Respondents described fragmented records and delays in obtaining authority to suspend an agent. The subsections distinguish record coordination, resolution speed, and suspension capability.

> *"The change control part is honestly fine, we see their updates before they land and they see ours... you should ask about the stopping instead. If the agent starts pushing rubbish into the pipeline on a Friday night, I do not know who I ring, my lead says it is their side, they say it is ours."*
> *-Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Some accounts described automated processing continuing while an incident remained unresolved. The relevant control question is whether the firms can detect the problem and suspend affected processing promptly. Neither human nor automated errors are inherently confined to a single action.

2.1 Separate Risk Records Maintained by the Two Firms

INDICATOR C140 · RATE HOW WELL THE TWO FIRMS MAINTAIN A SINGLE SHARED VIEW OF THE RISKS THAT AGENT WORK INTRODUCES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Separate, unreconciled risk lists were a recurring concern in accounts of the two firms' shared view of agent-related risks. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 793 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the shared view of risk lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.2, n = 297 respondents).

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Figure 2.27. Separate Risk Records Maintained by the Two Firms: associations with the study measures

Separate risk records maintained by the two firms: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well the two firms maintain a single shared view of the risks that agent work introduces".

Distressed ratings: 383 of 793 answers (48.30%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 612): 3.50. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.92. Portfolio director (n = 29): 5.00. Build-Out (n = 164): 4.65. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 4.57. Production (n = 96): 4.03. Canceled (n = 297): 2.21.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The applicable robustness checks left intact each association between a shared view of agent risk and the four core study measures. Engagements where the two firms kept a shared view of risk had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.62, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.51, n = 150 engagements). A shared view of risk was associated with higher customer satisfaction among the active engagements (r = 0.62, 95% CI 0.48 to 0.73, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the risk-view indicator, was higher where the view was shared (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the shared view higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.67, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.73 to −0.61, n = 744 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 383 of the 793 answers (48.30%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

Shared-risk comments numbered 26, all supplied in the joint-management field. 19 were negative. Sixteen described separate risk lists that were not reconciled, including duplicate discussion without clear resolution. Positive accounts described a jointly reviewed log.

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> *"What did not exist, and would have to next time, is one risk log rather than two, and some way for each side to see what the other's agents had actually done on a ticket without having to ask … None of that is hard. It just needs doing before day one rather than at month two." -Portfolio Director, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"same for the shared view of risk. two firms, two lists, nobody put them side by side." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"What is missing is a common risk list. Their side keeps their own, we keep ours, and QA only catches a bad suggestion in the pricing code when somebody remembers to compare them." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Both sides keep one risk log for the agents, this works well. our Lead meets their dispute team every week and issues get closed in that call." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

More negative risk-management sentiment was associated with higher cancellation and intent to leave. Separate records may impede coordination, but their existence alone does not establish that either firm lacked knowledge of a risk. The study did not examine other communication channels or risk systems.

2.2 Issue Management Through Separate Lists

INDICATOR C141 · RATE HOW EFFECTIVELY THE TWO FIRMS MANAGE ISSUES ARISING FROM AGENT WORK AS ONE TEAM RATHER THAN THROUGH TWO SEPARATE PROCESSES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Separate issue trackers could leave the two firms with inconsistent statuses and unresolved problems, while favorable accounts described coordinated joint review. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 799 respondents). Its mean of 3.73 was the highest of the 20 indicators of co-management (n = 799 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated joint issue management lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 302 respondents).

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Figure 2.28. Issue Management Through Separate Lists: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how effectively the two firms manage issues arising from agent work as one team rather than through two separate processes".

Distressed ratings: 391 of 799 answers (48.94%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 616): 3.58. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.04. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.94. Build-Out (n = 162): 4.81. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 240): 4.57. Production (n = 95): 4.19. Canceled (n = 302): 2.33.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Co-management of issues as one team was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and no robustness check overturned those associations. Cancellation was less common where issues were managed jointly (r = −0.61, 95% CI −0.70 to −0.50, n = 150 engagements). Joint issue management was associated with higher customer satisfaction among the active engagements (r = 0.61, 95% CI 0.47 to 0.72, n = 94 engagements). It was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the issue-management indicator (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated joint issue management higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 749 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 391 of the 799 answers (48.94%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 63 of the 150 engagements.

Issue-management comments numbered 54, all supplied in the joint-management field. 39 were negative. Twenty-six described separate trackers that were not reconciled, sometimes with inconsistent statuses or an additional vendor-maintained list. Positive accounts described effective joint calls or a shared list. Unlike the prospective risks in section 2.1, these comments concern problems already requiring action.

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> *"we and the bank keep two separate issue logs, and neither is complete. Ours records what the agent got wrong, theirs records what reached their desk, and the overlap is maybe half. What that means in practice is this: when we sit down every fortnight we spend the first half hour agreeing what happened, before anyone can decide anything." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"when an inquiry lands with the wrong relationship team, nobody on their side takes it, our lead takes it, thus it is our fault by default. Accordingly I stopped raising them. Two processes, and me in the middle." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"In March an agent put hold on around forty accounts wrongly. Our side found it in an hour, but their servicing team was running its own investigation separately and we only joined up next day... same issue, two diffrent calls." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"Weekly call with their service manager, Tuesday. Issues get logged both sides, one in their tool one in ours, so same ticket sits in two places." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"My marks in this section are high because of one thing, the joint triage call on thursday actually works, and their middle office lead reads every classification we flag. It is a person, not a process." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

More negative issue-management sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. The qualitative distinction is between the existence of records and coordination of resolution. A shared list does not by itself establish timely action or accountability.

2.3 Resolution Speed Against the Spread of Agent Error

INDICATOR C142 · RATE HOW WELL THE SPEED OF JOINT ISSUE RESOLUTION MATCHES THE SPEED AT WHICH AGENT-CAUSED PROBLEMS CAN SPREAD · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Written accounts described agent processing continuing while joint issue resolution and escalation remained incomplete. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 809 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the speed of resolution lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 306 respondents).

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Figure 2.29. Resolution Speed Against the Spread of Agent Error: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well the speed of joint issue resolution matches the speed at which agent-caused problems can spread".

Distressed ratings: 400 of 809 answers (49.44%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 628): 3.53. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.85. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.17. Build-Out (n = 168): 4.68. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 237): 4.58. Production (n = 98): 4.00. Canceled (n = 306): 2.26.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Each of the four core study measures was associated with the speed at which the two firms resolved issues together, and all applicable robustness checks upheld the associations. Faster resolution was associated with less cancellation (r = −0.62, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.51, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where resolution was rated faster (r = 0.60, 95% CI 0.46 to 0.72, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the resolution-speed indicator, was higher as well (r = 0.84, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated resolution faster (r = −0.64, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.57, n = 758 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 400 of the 809 answers (49.44%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 61 of the 150 engagements.

Few written responses addressed the speed of resolution, 18, all in comment on co-management, and 16 of the 18 were negative. Most described an agent that kept acting while the two firms resolved the problem. One described 50 responses sent during a three-day escalation, and another 20 more new hires moved through a misfiring step before anyone saw the alert. A third described 100 more lines processed while the firms discussed a wrong supplier record.

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> *"When an onboarding journey misfires, the agent has already moved twenty more new hires through the same step before anyone reads the alert. What we need is a standing call, not a weekly one, and one named individual at the bank who can halt a journey without waiting for the Thursday forum." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"when an agent-generated validation output turns out wrong, we spend the first day of the escalation deciding whose problem it is rather than fixing it. That part has not improved in nine months." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"Practical change is who can stop the run. when matching goes wrong on a broker statement i must log it our side and again their side, two tickets, two waiting... by then breaks are already double. one named person per shift with right to pause the Agent, and one issue list instead of two." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"It is better than first month, now we have one call together on Thursday and issue list is shared. Still if the policy Bot gives wrong answer on leave rules it stays like that till weekly call, nobody there can pause it" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

No significant association was detected in the written-sentiment analysis, which rests on only 18 responses and cannot establish the absence of a relationship. The accounts illustrate continued processing during unresolved incidents and difficulties reaching personnel authorized to suspend the agent.

2.4 Authority to Stop a Misbehaving Agent

INDICATOR C143 · RATE HOW QUICKLY THE TWO FIRMS TOGETHER CAN STOP AN AGENT THAT IS BEHAVING BADLY IN LIVE OPERATIONS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described uncertainty about who possessed both the authority and the technical means to stop a misbehaving agent. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 3.0 (n = 804 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the ability to stop an agent lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.2, n = 312 respondents).

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Figure 2.30. Authority to Stop a Misbehaving Agent: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how quickly the two firms together can stop an agent that is behaving badly in live operations".

Distressed ratings: 406 of 804 answers (50.50%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 3.49. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.93. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.71. Build-Out (n = 162): 4.57. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 4.63. Production (n = 94): 4.12. Canceled (n = 312): 2.22.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every association of the joint ability to stop a misbehaving agent with the four core study measures held, in each of the applicable robustness checks. Engagements that could stop an agent more quickly had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.63, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.52, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among their active engagements was higher (r = 0.60, 95% CI 0.45 to 0.71, n = 94 engagements). The ability to stop an agent was closely associated with the engagement indicator mean, computed without the stopping indicator (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated it higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.67, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.73 to −0.61, n = 753 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 406 of the 804 answers (50.50%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 62 of the 150 engagements.

Comments on suspension authority numbered 73, from 71 respondents on 51 engagements. 59 were negative. Nearly half described uncertainty over who could stop the agent or a perceived inability of either firm to do so. Some reported continued processing for hours or days. Several proposed assigning a named person with both authority and the technical means to suspend operation.

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“The agent started auto closing help desk tickets that were still open on the floor side, about forty of them in an hour, because someone had changed a rule on a Friday and nobody told us. So i go to the bank's IT lead and ask him to switch it off. He says he cannot, it is our tool. i ask our own side and they say the change has to go through the joint forum, and the forum sits every second week ... In the end one of my analysts stopped it from the console himself and we wrote it up afterwards, and to this day nobody has told us whether that was allowed.” -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

“We spotted it fast and the client's credit head was on the call within the hour, but actually switching it off took three people and nearly two hours... the shared risk log worked, the stop button did not really exist.” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

“One thing... nobody can switch it off. Last month the model start flagging every counterparty in one sector, hundreds of alerts in a morning. I ask my team lead who stops it and he does not know either. It runs the full cycle. Then we sit and clear the alert list one by one after.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

“In week six the generator produced a joining letter with the wrong notice period. Our QA caught it before any new hire saw it. But then we spent two days deciding who was permitted to switch the thing off, us or their HR team.” -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

“Escalation has improved, we can halt an agent inside the hour now and both sides accept it without argument.” -Portfolio Director, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

More negative sentiment about suspension capability was associated with higher intent to leave. Favorable accounts distinguished rapid suspension from later disputes about remediation. Negative accounts described unavailable authorization or technical access and subsequent manual correction. The distinction separates the power to stop processing from responsibility for its consequences.

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“The problem is nobody can decide anything. And I mean nobody, not my lead, not the person above him, not the people on their side who were meant to sign off the escalation matrix. So the fix is not complicated, you name one person over there with authority to say yes on a policy answer that is not in the handbook, and you give that person a number we can actually reach. That is it. That is the whole of it. Right now an edge case comes in, a leave entitlement question the handbook does not cover, and it goes into a queue nobody empties, which is why I end up writing the answer myself and hoping. And when it is wrong the ticket carries my name, not theirs. Second thing, and this one is smaller, somebody has to be allowed to switch the agent off for one queue without calling a meeting. We had three days where it was handing out the old parental leave policy and everybody knew, everybody, and it kept going out because turning it off was not anyone's decision to make. Three days. I do not think the people above understand that when nothing gets decided the work does not stop, it just gets done by whoever is sitting there. Which was us. Furthermore this was all raised in week two.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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3 Joint Change Control

Respondents described approval delays, updates discovered after implementation, and changes in behavior between formal releases as separate limits on joint change control. Joint change control is assessed through approval responsiveness, advance visibility of updates, and governance of behavioral changes between formal releases. The last construct is termed drift in the survey. A behavioral change does not by itself show autonomous self-modification: it may reflect inputs, provider updates, configuration, memory, or other causes not identified by the questionnaire.

The written accounts distinguish delayed approval, inadequate notice, and unmonitored behavioral variation. These are related control problems but require different responses: authority to approve, communication before implementation, and detection of changes outside the scheduled release process.

> *"Here there is no such forum. Changes to the agent behaviour happen and I find out from my own team, not from the client and not from our side either." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"these questions assume both sides agree what change even is, we discuss about a change for weeks then agent behaviour move on its own in between" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Some respondents described informal approvals through messages or conversations. Whether these practices left the formal record incomplete requires comparison with actual change records. The survey did not perform that comparison.

3.1 Joint Change Control Outpaced by Agent Behavior

INDICATOR C144 · RATE HOW WELL THE JOINT CHANGE CONTROL PROCESS KEEPS PACE WITH THE SPEED OF AGENT BEHAVIOR CHANGES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Joint change approvals were reported to operate more slowly than the changes required during agentic delivery. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 3.5 (n = 798 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated joint change control lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.2, n = 303 respondents).

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Figure 2.31. Joint Change Control Outpaced by Agent Behavior: associations with the study measures

Joint change control outpaced by agent behavior: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well the joint change control process keeps pace with the speed of agent behavior changes".

Distressed ratings: 399 of 798 answers (50.00%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 616): 3.50. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.11. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.03. Build-Out (n = 164): 4.66. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 4.67. Production (n = 95): 4.08. Canceled (n = 303): 2.25.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Joint change control, as rated against the pace of agent change, was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose change control kept better pace had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.63, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.52, n = 150 engagements). Their customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher (r = 0.60, 95% CI 0.45 to 0.72, n = 94 engagements). Change control that kept pace was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the change-control indicator (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated it higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 752 respondents). After Holm correction, ratings of joint change control also differed by process family. Distressed ratings came from 399 of the 798 answers (50.00%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

Joint-change-control comments numbered 71, from 70 respondents on 53 engagements. 57 were negative. Respondents described weekly, every-two-week, or monthly approval cycles that did not match the frequency of required changes. Some reported delays of days or weeks and changes agreed outside the formal process.

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> *"In March they changed the tolerance on the price check and we found out when the breaks tripled next morning. Nobody told us ... The problem is the override queue, one firm waits for the other and the break sits four days. Accordingly nobody is accountable and everybody is polite." - Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Change requests reach me directly from the deal desk, in email, sometimes in a hallway call, and they are not raised as change orders, so the sprint absorbs them and the burndown reads as though we estimated badly ... There is no shared record of what changed and when it changed." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Practically, the reviewer on their side approves our rule changes in a batch every Thursday and cannot possibly read them all. We would need two named owners per rule set, one there and one here, and the authority to push a low-risk config change without waiting for the Thursday meeting" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"Ran change board with them again last week, same outcome. What must change is simple, both sides need to see rule updates before they take effect, not in following month's minutes. When their team altered retention period for claims files, our classifier kept filing to old rule for nearly three weeks, and nobody told us." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"A tuning change to how alerts are ranked took eleven days to sign off on both sides" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

More negative written sentiment about joint change control was associated with higher cancellation. The accounts identify approval latency and informal authorization as possible control weaknesses. They do not establish that the timing of meetings caused engagement outcomes.

3.2 Agent Updates Disclosed to the Other Firm After the Fact

INDICATOR C145 · RATE HOW WELL AGENT UPDATES MADE BY ONE FIRM BECOME VISIBLE TO THE OTHER FIRM BEFORE THEY TAKE EFFECT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described discovering the other firm's agent updates after implementation rather than receiving advance visibility. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 803 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the visibility of updates lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.2, n = 306 respondents).

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Figure 2.32. Agent Updates Disclosed to the Other Firm After the Fact: associations with the study measures

Agent updates disclosed to the other firm after the fact: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well agent updates made by one firm become visible to the other firm before they take effect”.

Distressed ratings: 394 of 803 answers (49.07%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 3.50. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.89. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.77. Build-Out (n = 166): 4.62. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 237): 4.56. Production (n = 94): 4.03. Canceled (n = 306): 2.24.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the visibility of each firm's agent updates to the other before they took effect, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Cancellation was less common where updates were visible in advance (r = −0.62, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.51, n = 150 engagements). Advance visibility of updates was associated with higher customer satisfaction among the active engagements (r = 0.60, 95% CI 0.45 to 0.72, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the visibility indicator, was higher where updates were visible (r = 0.84, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who saw updates in advance (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.59, n = 756 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 394 of the 803 answers (49.07%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 66 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the visibility of updates numbered 48, from 48 respondents on 44 engagements, and 38 of the 48 were negative. Most said that a change to an agent made by one firm reached the other only after it had taken effect. It was discovered from the output, from a failure, or at the next weekly meeting. Several respondents said the vendor's side did the same.

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> *"Somebody on their side changes what the assistant is allowed to answer and we find out from the tickets, not from a note. Last month it started closing password resets on its own and nobody on my team knew that was turned on. And afterwards we are asked why the numbers moved." - Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Every time someone on my team changes a prompt or a mapping we write it in The study with the date and who did it... And their engineers do the same thing on their side, only we never see theirs and they never see ours ... So then we make a rule between ourselves. Before you push anything you ping the other three people on the team group. Not the official channel, the group chat. That is the whole change control now." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Main thing is we find out the bot wording changed by hearing it come out on a live call, nobody tells us before, accordingly my team loses the first hour of shift working out what is different today" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"Last sprint we update the prompt template for the code review agent on friday, the bank QA lead only comes to know on monday when his report looks different. Nothing broke but he was not happy about it. After that we start putting every change in the shared tracker, still it is only us doing this, not them" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"For any change agent make to the build script, my team put note in group chat and hold it till thursday release call... not official process but it stop surprises on their side." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

More negative update-visibility sentiment was associated with higher cancellation and intent to leave. Respondents described discovering changes after implementation. One proposed advance notice during the daily call. The study did not evaluate that proposal's effectiveness or implementation burden.

3.3 Governance of Behavioral Drift Between Releases

INDICATOR C146 · RATE HOW WELL THE TWO FIRMS JOINTLY GOVERN CHANGES AGENTS MAKE TO THEIR OWN BEHAVIOR BETWEEN FORMAL RELEASES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Changes in agent behavior between formal releases were reported to expose gaps in monitoring and ownership. Its wording described changes agents made to their own behavior, but the responses do not identify the technical cause of those changes. The mean was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 806 respondents). Canceled engagements had a mean of 2.2 (n = 301), lower than each active stage.

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Figure 2.33. Governance of Behavioral Drift Between Releases: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well the two firms jointly govern changes agents make to their own behavior between formal releases".

Distressed ratings: 388 of 806 answers (48.14%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 624): 3.55. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.85. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.97. Build-Out (n = 169): 4.76. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 239): 4.59. Production (n = 97): 4.04. Canceled (n = 301): 2.19.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The joint governance of drift in agent behavior between releases was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and the associations held through every robustness check. Engagements that governed drift better had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.62, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.51, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, governance of drift was associated with higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.59, 95% CI 0.44 to 0.71, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the drift indicator, was higher where drift was governed better (r = 0.83, 95% CI 0.78 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the governance of drift higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.67, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 756 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 388 of the 806 answers (48.14%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 62 of the 150 engagements.

Fourteen written responses addressed behavioral drift, all in the joint-management field. 12 were negative. They described monitoring and ownership gaps for changes outside formal releases. The accounts do not establish whether those changes arose from autonomous modification, provider updates, configuration, or other causes.

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"the matching behaviour change on its own between releases and nobody on either side is watching for that... formal changes are handled fine, that part works, we get told and we test it. But when the match rate drift on the trading flow cash items there is no forum for it, my lead tell their ops lead informally and it stay there." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

"The checkpoints sit in the right spots. What nobody owns is when the bot quietly starts answering a ticket type diffrently than it did last month" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"Tuesday joint call has helped, issues that used to sit for weeks now close in two days. Change control is the weak part still, agent updates itself between releases and neither side looks at it until a pipeline falls over" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"Bot changed how it sorted leave cases and nobody told us... my team took blame for two weeks of backlog" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

"What number cannot show is how quick both leads pick up the phone. Only gap is when the agent changes its own behaviour between releases, that we notice late" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

The written-sentiment tests did not detect significant associations on this 14-response base. Precision is limited. Respondents described discovering behavioral changes through altered output or failures, suggesting a need to distinguish release authorization from ongoing monitoring.

"

The joint quality review scores accuracy of the shortlist. It does not score the interviews we had to rebook. Model behavior changes between releases are noted in our log only, the client's recruiting ops team is informed at the monthly meeting."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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4 Human Review and the Joint Quality Assurance Loop

Reported human review weaknesses concerned where checks occurred, whether reviewers had sufficient capacity, and whether approval reflected substantive scrutiny. Five indicators describe how the two firms checked the agents' output. They cover where human review points were placed, whether review capacity kept up with the volume of output, and how much scrutiny output received at those points. The indicators also cover how reliably the joint quality loop caught agent errors before live operation, and whether the firms' quality measures captured the errors agents actually make. Each had about half of its answers in the distressed range, from 377 of 787 answers (47.90%) for the quality loop to 405 of 792 (51.14%) for the calibration of quality measures. Across the five, no robustness check overturned an association with the core study measures.

The review indicators distinguish placement, capacity, substantive scrutiny, detection procedures, and the adequacy of quality measures. Their common concern is whether approval corresponds to an effective check. Detailed counts and examples are retained under each function below.

> *"Marked the review one lower for a reason. Most days volume is fine but Mondays it backs up alot and two of us are checking messages for the whole floor. Everything else about how the two sides work together has been fine." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

The accounts describe review occurring after output had been released, approval without examination, and checks that missed plausible but incorrect results. These problems are not exclusive to agents. Their relevance here is whether controls addressed the outputs and failure modes of the deployed systems.

4.1 Placement of Human Review Points Across the Two Firms

INDICATOR C147 · RATE HOW WELL HUMAN REVIEW POINTS ARE PLACED ACROSS THE TWO FIRMS AT THE MOMENTS WHERE AGENT ERRORS WOULD MATTER MOST · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Some reported human review points occurred after release or relied on the producer to review the output, limiting the opportunity for independent intervention before an error reached its recipient. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 797 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the placement of review lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.2, n = 303 respondents).

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Figure 2.34. Placement of Human Review Points Across the Two Firms: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well human review points are placed across the two firms at the moments where agent errors would matter most".

Distressed ratings: 393 of 797 answers (49.31%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 614): 3.52. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.90. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.74. Build-Out (n = 168): 4.60. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 229): 4.66. Production (n = 97): 4.01. Canceled (n = 303): 2.23.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The placement of human review points was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and the applicable robustness checks upheld each association. Cancellation was less common on engagements whose review points were rated well placed (r = −0.62, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.51, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where review points were rated well placed (r = 0.60, 95% CI 0.46 to 0.72, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the placement indicator, was higher too (r = 0.84, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the placement of review higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 747 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 393 of the 797 answers (49.31%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

Review-placement comments numbered 105, from 103 respondents on 75 engagements. 75 were negative. Accounts described checks occurring after release and, in some cases, output reviewed only by its producer. Other respondents considered placement appropriate but identified capacity or scrutiny problems, addressed in the following subsections.

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> *"Last week the agent matched a cash item onto the wrong value date and it went out with the pack, nobody had looked at it. For my manual clears there is a checker, it has always been that way, but whatever the agent matches goes straight through." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Agent does gross to net and then it just goes, there is no point in the run where somebody on their side puts a name against it. On our side my Lead checks what he can, but he has four people and one cycle is eleven thousand records, so he checks sample and that is it." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The checker on our side signs off two hundred fee lines a day and the approval on their side is a same-day formality, so a wrong tier rate can pass both and only surface when an advisor complains a month later." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"We keep a two person rota for reading the drafted notes each morning before the desk opens, this is not written in the governance pack anywhere, we make it in week three ourselves." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

More negative sentiment about review placement was associated with higher intent to leave. A correctly located review point can still lack capacity or substantive scrutiny. Conversely, a thorough check performed after release may not prevent the initial error from reaching its recipient.

4.2 Human Review Capacity Against Agent Output Volume

INDICATOR C148 · RATE HOW WELL JOINT HUMAN REVIEW CAPACITY KEEPS UP WITH THE VOLUME OF OUTPUT THE AGENTS PRODUCE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described human review capacity that did not keep pace with agent output volume and additional checking assigned to analysts. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 805 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated review capacity lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.2, n = 304 respondents).

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Figure 2.35. Human Review Capacity Against Agent Output Volume: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well joint human review capacity keeps up with the volume of output the agents produce”.

Distressed ratings: 381 of 805 answers (47.33%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 624): 3.54. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.91. Portfolio director (n = 29): 5.17. Build-Out (n = 166): 4.73. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 238): 4.63. Production (n = 97): 4.01. Canceled (n = 304): 2.25.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Joint review capacity against the volume of agent output showed an association with each of the four core study measures, upheld in all applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose review capacity kept up had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.62, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.52, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among their active engagements was higher (r = 0.59, 95% CI 0.43 to 0.70, n = 94 engagements). Review capacity was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the capacity indicator (r = 0.82, 95% CI 0.76 to 0.87, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated review capacity higher (r = −0.67, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 755 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 381 of the 805 answers (47.33%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

Review-capacity comments numbered 145, from 135 respondents on 89 engagements. 134 were negative (92.41%). More than half came from the question about challenges reducing job satisfaction. Respondents described output volumes exceeding available review capacity and additional checking assigned to analysts. These accounts concern perceived capacity rather than a measured workload-to-staffing ratio.

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> *"the release notes and the config diffs the agent puts together land in a review queue and the review queue is me and one other person, and we are also the ones doing the actual releases. so we read the ones that touch card auth and we tick the rest, because there is no time." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"Same for review capacity, there is no joint review, there is me." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

> *"review is mostly quick approve, i will be honest... when queue is long the checker just click through. but this is not because anyone is careless, the volume of claimant messages is very high and both side are only small team." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"The validation queue backs up at month-end. Two weeks into the month, and we still haven't finished last month's QA." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Human review became the bottleneck everyone blamed but nobody fixed" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

More negative review-capacity sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. Some reporting-alteration accounts described dashboards that omitted review backlogs (Part 5). Capacity constraints and reporting practices should be verified separately: one does not establish the other.

4.3 Routine Approval of Agent Output at Human Review Points

INDICATOR C149 · RATE HOW MUCH GENUINE SCRUTINY AGENT OUTPUTS RECEIVE AT HUMAN REVIEW POINTS RATHER THAN ROUTINE APPROVAL · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Routine approval without substantive scrutiny was reported at human review points, particularly where review capacity did not match output volume. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 794 respondents). Ratings were highest among active engagements in Build-Out (mean 4.7, n = 160 respondents) and lowest among canceled engagements (mean 2.2, n = 300 respondents). Individual contributors, the role whose output the review is meant to check, gave the lowest ratings of the roles (mean 3.5, n = 612 respondents).

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Figure 2.36. Routine Approval of Agent Output at Human Review Points: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how much genuine scrutiny agent outputs receive at human review points rather than routine approval".

Distressed ratings: 393 of 794 answers (49.50%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 612): 3.50. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.93. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.97. Build-Out (n = 160): 4.73. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 4.61. Production (n = 98): 4.10. Canceled (n = 300): 2.16.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The scrutiny of agent output at human review points was associated with every core study measure, and every association held under each of the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose output received more scrutiny had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where output received more scrutiny (r = 0.62, 95% CI 0.48 to 0.73, n = 94 engagements). The rating was most closely associated with the engagement indicator mean, computed without the indicator (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated scrutiny higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.69, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.74 to −0.63, n = 747 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 393 of the 794 answers (49.50%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing scrutiny numbered 66, from 63 respondents on 50 engagements, and 59 of the 66 (89.39%) were negative. The account given in 36 of the 50 responses written in answer to the indicator's own question was a review point that approved agent output without reading it. Respondents attributed it chiefly to review capacity that did not match the volume of output. Respondents who wrote rated scrutiny lower than respondents who did not, at a mean of 2.6 (n = 62 respondents) against 3.7 (n = 732 respondents).

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Figure 2.37. Reported approval of agent output without substantive scrutiny

Respondents described approval of agent output without reading it

Reported practice	Control implication	Evidence boundary
In 36 of 50 answers to the indicator's own question, respondents described a review point that approved agent output without reading it.	Approval without substantive examination could create a misleading impression that review occurred.	The study did not inspect audit trails. This is a control implication of reported practice.

Note: The indicator drew 66 written answers from 63 respondents on 50 engagements. Fifty answers addressed the indicator's own question. These bases differ.

Responses from 63 respondents on 50 engagements. 59 of the 66 (89.39%) were negative. A score of –10 marks the part of the engagement described at or near its worst.

> *"Every release goes through a review step and someone ticks it, but nobody reads what the agent changed in the pipeline, it is a tick and nothing more. I have watched approvals come back in under a minute for a change that touched twenty files." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"We set a target of reviewing a sample of guided filings each day and we are not hitting it. In practice the reviewer opens the transcript, checks the loss date and the policy number match, and signs it. That is not scrutiny, that is a tick. Nobody has time for more than that at current volume, and volume is going up when the pilot widens in the fall." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"Approvals come back same day mostly, but they are ticked through, nobody really reads the claimant message before it goes... so my team reads it twice ourselves instead." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"We send exception pack for sign off on tuesday. Their approver return it in nine minutes with no comment, 300 lines. Same nine minutes every week, so we stop expecting real check and just fix it ourself" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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> *"Last month the reviewer approve one batch of alerts in two minutes. Nobody can read 300 in two minutes." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"Last month the agent shut a whole run of alerts overnight, because threshold was changed on their side. Review is one click, my lead approve forty at a time. Nobody catch it for three days" - Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

Written sentiment about scrutiny was not significantly associated with the study measures. Approval without substantive examination could create a misleading impression that review occurred. The study did not inspect audit trails, so this is a control implication of the reported practice rather than a verified finding about institutional records.

4.4 Reliability of Joint Quality Assurance

INDICATOR C150 · RATE HOW RELIABLY THE JOINT QUALITY ASSURANCE LOOP CATCHES AGENT ERRORS BEFORE THEY REACH LIVE OPERATIONS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Reported weaknesses in joint quality assurance concerned the coverage and timing of error detection before live operation. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 787 respondents). On canceled engagements, the quality loop was rated lower than on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.3, n = 297 respondents).

Figure 2.38. Reliability of Joint Quality Assurance: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how reliably the joint quality assurance loop catches agent errors before they reach live operations". Distressed ratings: 377 of 787 answers (47.90%).

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Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 605): 3.55. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.93. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.80. Build-Out (n = 158): 4.70. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.60. Production (n = 97): 4.07. Canceled (n = 297): 2.29.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the reliability of the joint quality assurance loop, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. A more reliable quality loop was associated with less cancellation (r = −0.61, 95% CI −0.70 to −0.50, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where the loop was rated reliable (r = 0.60, 95% CI 0.45 to 0.71, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the quality-loop indicator, was higher as well (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the loop reliable reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.59, n = 742 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 377 of the 787 answers (47.90%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 60 of the 150 engagements.

Quality-assurance comments numbered 29, mostly in the joint-management field. 22 were negative. Respondents described checks limited to typing or formatting, checks occurring after release, and separate team procedures outside the joint process. These accounts concern the coverage and timing of detection.

> *"Last month the assistant told an employee our parental leave was 12 weeks off the old policy pdf. Logs showed where it pulled it from. Nothing caught it before it went out." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"the checks we run were built for human mistakes, transposed digits and such, they would never catch the way the agent gets a break wrong." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"i felt embarrassed. tool generate welcome pack with wrong leave policy, it reach new joiner, two days nobody decide who fix it, in end my team do." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"QA method for agent decisions never got built before launch" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

More negative quality-assurance sentiment was associated with higher cancellation and intent to leave. Reported examples included outdated source material and incorrect classification. These errors can occur in human or automated work. The relevant issue is whether the checks used on the engagement detected them.

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4.5 Coverage of Agent Errors in Quality Measures

INDICATOR C151 · RATE HOW WELL THE QUALITY MEASURES BOTH FIRMS USE CAPTURE THE KINDS OF ERRORS AGENTS ACTUALLY MAKE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Some written accounts described quality measures that missed the types of error respondents encountered in agent output. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 3.0 (n = 792 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the quality measures lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.2, n = 300 respondents).

Figure 2.39. Coverage of Agent Errors in Quality Measures: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well the quality measures both firms use capture the kinds of errors agents actually make”.

Distressed ratings: 405 of 792 answers (51.14%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 609): 3.48. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.79. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.97. Build-Out (n = 165): 4.54. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 231): 4.59. Production (n = 96): 3.99. Canceled (n = 300): 2.21.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every association of the calibration of quality measures to agent errors with the four core study measures held, in each of the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose quality measures captured agent errors had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.61, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.50, n = 150 engagements). Calibrated quality measures were associated with higher customer satisfaction among the active engagements (r = 0.63, 95% CI 0.49 to 0.74, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the calibration indicator, was closely associated with them (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150

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engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated the calibration higher (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 743 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 405 of the 792 answers (51.14%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 66 of the 150 engagements.

Quality-measure comments numbered 14. 11 were negative. Seven described inherited measures that did not capture the errors respondents encountered in agent output. Examples included an outdated policy response, totals that concealed incorrect allocations, and a mapping error that generated no exception.

> *"What neither firm measures is the kind of mistake the agent actually makes, which is a funding position that is right in total and wrong per merchant. Our quality sampling counts breaks cleared, consequently it scores that as a pass." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"The checking is not real. Approver just sign off the vendor onboarding queue, they do not open the record. And the QA sheet do not have any line for the mistake the bot actually make" - Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The quality checks we agreed cover accuracy of the policy answer only. They do not cover the answer being out of date, which is what actually goes wrong. That gap is open since we start." - Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"On my last posting it is a claims process and the QA is just sampling ten files a week. Here they decide things much faster, which I like. But the checks we run still look for the mistakes a person makes... the agent does not make those. It makes a different kind." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"Data-transformation error rates were reported only for errors that triggered a system exception, so the silent hallucinated mappings that ran without throwing an error never appeared in the official error rate at all." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Written-sentiment tests reached significance for cancellation and intent to leave, but the 14-response base makes these exploratory results imprecise and potentially sensitive to individual observations. They should not be dismissed solely because the base is small, or treated as conclusive because a significance threshold was crossed. The substantive accounts identify gaps in what the quality measures captured.

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5 The Shift From Managing People to Managing Agents

Joint governance was reported to provide insufficient cross-firm visibility or decision speed for work performed by agents. Four indicators describe whether the co-management of the engagement had been adapted to work performed by agents. They ask whether each firm could see what the other firm's agents had done and whether joint decisions kept pace with the agents. The remaining two ask whether the joint governance model fit work performed by agents and whether it was ready for the autonomy the respondent expected within two years. Each had about half of its answers in the distressed range, from 381 of 786 answers (48.47%) for the speed of joint decisions to 407 of 808 (50.37%) for readiness for future autonomy. Readiness was the lowest-rated indicator of the category. Each of the four was associated with every core study measure, and the applicable robustness checks left those associations intact.

The comments raise questions about whether governance arrangements accommodated automated operation. The distinct issues are cross-firm visibility, decision authority and timing, overall suitability, and preparedness for greater autonomy. Section 3 addresses change-control latency in detail. It is not repeated here as a separate mechanism.

> *“the joint model is not failing, it is simply calibrated to a cadence that no longer exists. The governance forum meets monthly, which was entirely reasonable when a change meant a release ... It is a design that predates the thing it governs, and no one on either side has yet been willing to say so out loud.” -Portfolio Director, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“governance can't match agent speed” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Some respondents considered institutional and vendor personnel capable but constrained by inherited governance arrangements. That interpretation is part of their reported experience rather than an independently tested explanation.

5.1 Agent Actions Visible Only Inside Each Firm's Own Tools

INDICATOR C152 · RATE HOW FULLY EACH FIRM CAN SEE WHAT THE OTHER FIRM'S AGENTS ACTUALLY DID WHEN QUESTIONS ARISE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Limited visibility into the other firm's agent actions left respondents describing manual reconstruction from separate statements, logs, or spreadsheets. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 3.0 (n = 780 respondents). Visibility was weakest on canceled engagements, where the mean rating was 2.2 (n = 293 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.40. Agent Actions Visible Only Inside Each Firm's Own Tools: associations with the study measures

Agent actions visible only inside each firm's own tools: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: “Rate how fully each firm can see what the other firm’s agents actually did when questions arise”.

Distressed ratings: 392 of 780 answers (50.26%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 598): 3.55. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.89. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.13. Build-Out (n = 165): 4.65. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 230): 4.74. Production (n = 92): 3.88. Canceled (n = 293): 2.25.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Cross-firm visibility was associated with a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.62, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.51, n = 150 engagements), higher active-engagement customer satisfaction (r = 0.62, 95% CI 0.48 to 0.73, n = 94), and a higher leave-one-out indicator mean (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.89, n = 150). Respondents rating visibility more favorably reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 732 respondents). These associations passed the applicable sensitivity checks and concern realized cancellation rather than rated future likelihood. Distressed ratings came from 392 of the 780 answers (50.26%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing visibility numbered 66, from 64 respondents on 49 engagements, and 62 of the 66 were negative. Respondents described each firm's agents as opaque to the other. When a question arose, an account of what an agent had done was rebuilt by hand, from statements, logs, or a private spreadsheet.

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> *"Their release manager and I keep a running note — what our agent touched, what their pipeline did, timestamps from both sides — because neither firm's tooling shows the other's actions and we got tired of arguing from memory on the Monday call. We update it by hand each evening ... Formal risk log gets written afterwards, from that note." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"A release went out and half the config was not what we signed off, we asked their side what their automation had changed and nobody could show us, they only have the final state not the steps. We spend two days rebuilding it from our own notes." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The vendor buries agent decision logs inside a proprietary trace format our audit team cannot query directly, so every review request becomes a manual export they control the timing and scope of." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"When a requirement comes back wrong we cannot see what their side's tool did with the file, only what came out, so the first hour goes to reconstructing it. ... Decision speed itself is acceptable. The visibility is not." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"Observability logs get trimmed to the final agent decision only, so the intermediate steps that would show where a judgment call went wrong never make it into the audit trail the vendor shares with us." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Cancellation was more common where the written responses on visibility were more negative. Respondents who wrote more negatively about visibility reported higher intent to leave. In answer to the question on how the vendor altered its reports, respondents described agent logs trimmed, aggregated, or held in a format the financial institution's auditors could not query (Part 5).

5.2 Joint Decision Speed Mismatched to Agent Speed

INDICATOR C153 · RATE HOW CLOSELY THE SPEED OF JOINT DECISION MAKING MATCHES THE SPEED AT WHICH THE AGENTS ACT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The speed of joint decisions was reported to lag the pace at which agents acted and operational changes required authorization. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 786 respondents). The speed of joint decisions received a mean rating of 2.2 on canceled engagements (n = 294 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.41. Joint Decision Speed Mismatched to Agent Speed: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how closely the speed of joint decision making matches the speed at which the agents act".

Distressed ratings: 381 of 786 answers (48.47%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 604): 3.57. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.83. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.30. Build-Out (n = 163): 4.67. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.65. Production (n = 94): 4.23. Canceled (n = 294): 2.21.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Where joint decisions kept pace with the agents, all four core study measures were more favorable, and each association survived the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common where joint decisions kept pace (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements with faster joint decisions reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.62, 95% CI 0.47 to 0.73, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the decision-speed indicator, moved closely with the rating (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who saw joint decisions keep pace with the agents reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.67, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.73 to −0.61, n = 738 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 381 of the 786 answers (48.47%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

Decision-speed comments numbered 14, all in the joint-management field. 13 were negative. Respondents described operational changes requiring decisions faster than the joint process supplied them. Some considered the governance design otherwise appropriate but its authorization schedule unsuitable for the work.

> *"the agent does in an hour what then waits nine days for two people to agree on. That gap is the whole problem" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

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> *"Decisions here take longer than the work does. That is the whole of it really ... Here it goes into a shared log that both firms look at and neither one closes. I have watched an item sit in there for a month. Nobody is being difficult about it. Their side thinks we have it, we think they have it." - Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"We escalated a flagged exposure last month and it took nearly two weeks to get a joint call on it... by then the account had already moved two grades. That is the thing I want the reader to understand. The agents work in minutes and the two firms still discuss about it for a fortnight." - Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"We meet Tuesday to agree access changes, the agent works through joiner queue every hour. So a bad role assignment can sit live for six days before anyone talks about it. And nobody has said what we do when that is two hundred accounts instead of two." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"it asks how quickly the two firms decide together, and for that there must be a decision somewhere, i have not seen one yet. we sent up the question of which flagged events are safe for the RMs to act on, that was month two, it is still sitting there and the project is closed now." - Individual Contributor, KPO, Client servicing and communications*

> *"When the agent picks wrong supplier record, nobody is switching it off. I raise, then two firms discuss about it and by then hundred more lines are done" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

No significant association was detected in the written-sentiment tests on this 14-response base. The accounts identify delays in authorization. They do not estimate the effect of faster decisions on outcomes. Related change-approval practices are described in section 3.1.

5.3 Joint Governance Model Designed for Work Performed by People

INDICATOR C154 · RATE HOW WELL TODAY'S JOINT GOVERNANCE MODEL FITS WORK PERFORMED BY AGENTS RATHER THAN WORK PERFORMED BY PEOPLE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described joint governance arrangements retained from work performed by people without corresponding changes in decision authority for agentic delivery. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 803 respondents). On canceled engagements the mean rating for the fit of the model was 2.2 (n = 301 respondents), lower than respondents gave on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.42. Joint Governance Model Designed for Work Performed by People: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well today's joint governance model fits work performed by agents rather than work performed by people".

Distressed ratings: 395 of 803 answers (49.19%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 3.47. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.93. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.23. Build-Out (n = 164): 4.62. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 4.60. Production (n = 102): 4.05. Canceled (n = 301): 2.19.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every association of the fit between the joint governance model and agent work with the four core study measures held, in each of the applicable robustness checks. A model fitted to agent work was associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where the model fit agent work (r = 0.60, 95% CI 0.45 to 0.72, n = 94 engagements). The fit of the model was closely associated with the engagement indicator mean computed without it (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who judged the model fit for agents (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 758 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 395 of the 803 answers (49.19%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 67 of the 150 engagements.

Few written responses addressed the fit of the governance model, 10, nearly all in comment on co-management, and 9 of the 10 were negative. The most common account was a governance model drawn up for people performing the tasks by hand and left in place after agents took over much of it. Respondents described decisions that neither firm's people in the room could authorize and agent changes that both firms learned of afterward.

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> *"The governance we have was written for a team of people doing checks by hand, and now most of the checking is not done by hand at all. So the shape of it is wrong from the start." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"There was a call on a Thursday in February where their reconciliation manager and I sat for forty minutes, agreed exactly what should happen with the unmatched cash items, and both of us knew that neither of us could authorise it ... What we were handed was a governance model written for forty people doing manual matching, and then agents were put underneath it and nobody rewrote a line of it." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"when it was people doing this, my lead could just decide. now there is a agent doing the matching and nobody want to be the one who says it is allowed to post something. so it waits. i dont think anyone was lazy. it is just nobody was given the authority." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"The incident that sticks with me was a retraining push on the resolution model that went in on a Thursday and only came up in the following weeks steering call, by which point the desk had already seen a run of odd closures and worked around them. Nobody did anything wrong, procedurally, which is sort of the point. ... What we dont have is a shared picture of what changed and who owns it when the agent gets something wrong" -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

No significant association was detected between governance-fit sentiment and the study measures on the 10-response base. The small sample limits precision. These comments concern the allocation of authority within the joint model, complementing the separate measures of decision speed and update visibility.

5.4 Readiness of the Joint Model for Expected Agent Autonomy

INDICATOR C155 · RATE HOW READY THE JOINT MANAGEMENT MODEL IS FOR THE LEVEL OF AGENT AUTONOMY YOU EXPECT IN THIS ENGAGEMENT WITHIN TWO YEARS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Readiness for the agent autonomy expected within two years received the lowest mean rating among the co-management indicators. The mean rating was 3.60, the lowest of the 20 indicators of co-management, and the median 3.0 (n = 808 respondents). Readiness was rated lowest on canceled engagements (mean 2.2, n = 306 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.43. Readiness of the Joint Model for Expected Agent Autonomy: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how ready the joint management model is for the level of agent autonomy you expect in this engagement within two years".

Distressed ratings: 407 of 808 answers (50.37%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 626): 3.46. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.91. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.77. Build-Out (n = 165): 4.52. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 238): 4.59. Production (n = 99): 4.03. Canceled (n = 306): 2.19.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Readiness of the joint model for the autonomy expected within two years was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose model was rated ready had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.63, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.52, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where readiness was rated higher (r = 0.63, 95% CI 0.49 to 0.74, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the readiness indicator was higher as well (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who judged the model ready reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 761 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 407 of the 808 answers (50.37%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

Only three written responses addressed readiness for future autonomy: two negative and one neutral. The negative accounts referred to existing control problems, including separate issue logs and a review point that detected an error after a letter had been sent. They provide examples, not a basis for estimating prevalence.

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"The review point sits at the end only. If the agent codes a dispute reason wrongly it is found after the letter is already sent, not before. For the autonomy expected in two years this model will not hold." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes

The ratings measure respondents' assessment of readiness for the autonomy they expected within two years. They are neither a forecast of that autonomy nor a test of future governance performance. The three comments illustrate how current experiences informed some respondents' judgments.

"

Simple version, someone has to be allowed to say yes. Right now if the model needs a new discount rate assumption, my lead asks their analyst, their analyst asks someone else, and it comes back four days later as a maybe. What would fix it is a name against each assumption, somebody over there who owns it, and if that person is out then a backup name. Thats it. That alone would take a week out of every deal. Second thing, when the agent changes how it pulls comparables we find out by reading the output. There should be a note somewhere that says what changed and when, we dont have that, so every time the numbers move we spend the morning proving it wasnt us. I have done that maybe six times now. And the review points are fine where they are, thats not the problem, the problem is nobody knows who is on the hook if a number goes out wrong. My honest guess is it would land on us. Nobody has ever said that out loud, but thats how it feels, and if it was written down somewhere at least we would know. Would definately slow us down for a month and then be faster after."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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In my last posting the process was written down and we get proper training first. Here nothing is written, we learn from whoever sit next to us. Trainings are only generic slides, no fund accounting in it"

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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Vendor Capability

Vendor capability was rated almost as low as the financial institution's own readiness. Its 20 indicators had a mean of 3.67 on the 10-point scale across the 150 engagements, and 7,687 of their 15,943 answers (48.22%) were distressed. The respondents rating the vendor were its own employees. They rated the vendor's leadership, commercial model, management processes, knowledge, production experience, talent, training, playbook, quality assurance, and platforms, and placed each one in the distressed range in about half of the answers.

Table 2.5. The indicators of vendor capability, from the lowest mean rating

Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share
3.2 Depth of Vendor Knowledge of Agentic AI	3.58	416 of 807	51.55%
1.1 Effectiveness of Vendor Top Leadership	3.60	381 of 792	48.11%
2.4 Vendor Qualification for Elite Agentic Outsourcing to Financial Institutions	3.61	385 of 803	47.95%
2.3 Management of Agentic Engagements for Global Financial Institutions	3.63	381 of 779	48.91%
4.1 Vendor Experience Running Agents Beyond Pilots	3.64	383 of 794	48.24%
3.1 Depth of Vendor Knowledge of the Financial Industry	3.64	392 of 802	48.88%
1.3 Pricing of Agentic Work When Hours No Longer Measure Value	3.65	383 of 795	48.18%
6.1 Immaturity of the Playbook From Concept to Governed Production	3.65	392 of 807	48.57%
5.3 Adequacy of Vendor Investment in Training	3.66	388 of 789	49.18%
2.1 Vendor Management Processes Left Unchanged From Staffed Delivery	3.66	388 of 799	48.56%
7.1 Accountability for Agent Error Left With the Analyst on Shift	3.67	373 of 794	46.98%
5.2 Process and Leadership Development Programs	3.67	393 of 803	48.94%
6.2 Quality Assurance for Non-Deterministic Agent Output	3.68	377 of 794	47.48%
1.2 Transformation of the Vendor Commercial Model	3.69	386 of 812	47.54%

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Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share
2.2 End-to-End Management of Agentic Engagements	3.69	364 of 787	46.25%
4.2 Operation of Large Numbers of Agents Without an Operations Function	3.69	379 of 798	47.49%
5.4 Practical Agentic Skills Built by Vendor Training	3.69	380 of 804	47.26%
5.1 Supply of Qualified Agentic Talent	3.69	382 of 802	47.63%
6.3 Optimization of Vendor Platforms for Agentic Outsourcing	3.70	384 of 794	48.36%
5.5 Financial Industry Knowledge Built by Vendor Training	3.72	380 of 788	48.22%

Mean ratings in Table 2.5 are computed across respondents. The category figure of 3.67 is computed across engagements. Section 8 reports one further question on the vendor, its preparedness compared with five years earlier. The survey placed that question in its section on the respondent's relationship with the vendor, and it is not one of the category's 20 indicators.

Negative vendor accounts described limited production experience, delivery methods adapted from staffed outsourcing, general training, and scarce experienced personnel shared across engagements. Some respondents reported learning through live delivery. These accounts identify perceived gaps without establishing that all vendors lacked adequate methods or that commercial commitments systematically exceeded capability.

> *"We are sold into a capital-markets client as though the firm has done investor communications with agents before, and it has not. There is one person in the whole delivery organisation who understands what a quiet period means, and she is not on this engagement ... Internally the machinery has not changed at all, same weekly status pack, same utilisation questions, none of which describe what my team actually does now." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"What I would want noted above everything else is that our leadership is good at winning this kind of work and we are still learning how to run it. Nobody at home has answered who pays when an agent gets an onboarding step wrong." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

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> *"They sold this in about eight weeks and then handed us a delivery model built for staffed work - that gap is most of the story ... What is missing is anyone senior owning the space between a signed pilot and a working operating rhythm." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

The vendor-comment question received answers from 530 of 850 respondents (62.35%). Some distinguished capable colleagues and immediate managers from deficiencies they attributed to senior support, preparation, or commercial arrangements. Favorable accounts of training and operational support are retained in the relevant subsections.

> *"My own lead is very good, that is not what these numbers say. The gap is higher up, whoever writes the training deck has not run an agent on a live pipeline, we get slides about concepts and then work the rest out on the platform ourselves. So the low marks are about the company, not my team" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

The category's correlations occupied a narrow range: −0.60 to −0.56 for cancellation and 0.85 to 0.88 for the engagement indicator mean (n = 150 engagements for each estimate). These coefficients do not establish a ranking of independent importance.

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1 Leadership and the Commercial Model

Vendor leadership and commercial arrangements were reported to retain gaps in accountability and tension between agentic delivery and staffing-based revenue. Three indicators describe the vendor at the level of the firm. They cover the effectiveness of its top leadership and the transformation of its commercial model as agents reduce the billable human effort it sells. The third is its ability to price agentic work profitably once hours no longer measure value. The effectiveness of leadership was distressed in 381 of 792 answers (48.11%), the transformation of the commercial model in 386 of 812 (47.54%), and the pricing of agentic work in 383 of 795 (48.18%). All three were associated with each core study measure, and no association failed any of the applicable robustness checks.

Leadership comments described perceived gaps in senior support, decision authority, and experience with agentic delivery. Some respondents praised immediate managers while criticizing the assistance available to them from more senior personnel.

The commercial items assess different constructs: adaptation of the business model and ability to price agentic work profitably. Both attracted predominantly negative comments. Part 1, section 4.1 of "Structural Attributes and Outcome Associations," describes actual reported pricing arrangements. The commercial ratings concern respondents' assessments of the vendor's response to those arrangements.

1.1 Effectiveness of Vendor Top Leadership

INDICATOR C115 · RATE THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF YOUR EMPLOYER'S TOP LEADERSHIP TEAM · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described gaps in vendor leadership accountability and experience, including uncertainty about who owned decisions and remediation across the engagement. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 792 respondents). The mean rating of leadership on canceled engagements, 2.4 (n = 304 respondents), was lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.44. Effectiveness of Vendor Top Leadership: associations with the study measures

Effectiveness of vendor top leadership: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: “Rate the overall effectiveness of your employer’s top leadership team”.

Distressed ratings: 381 of 792 answers (48.11%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 609): 3.46. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.99. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.52. Build-Out (n = 164): 4.27. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 229): 4.35. Production (n = 95): 4.46. Canceled (n = 304): 2.42.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The effectiveness of the vendor's top leadership was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose respondents rated leadership more effective had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.58, 95% CI −0.68 to −0.46, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where leadership was rated more effective (r = 0.71, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the leadership indicator, was higher too (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated their leadership higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.52, n = 741 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 381 of the 792 answers (48.11%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 60 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing leadership numbered 30, and 23 were negative. Respondents placed the weakness at levels senior to their immediate managers. They described the absence of anyone who owned the engagement end to end or who would answer for an agent's error, and senior people who had not run agentic work before. Accounts of training were mixed.

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"Training was actually useful, we got proper sessions on the matching Agent and i could use it directly on custodian breaks... that part improved. Top management is different matter. nobody owns it end to end, and when exception queue builds up nobody is watching." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

"What no question here asks is who I am supposed to ring at two in the morning when the agent has miscalculated a run and the file is already sitting with their bank. There is a playbook for a staffed process, there is nothing for this, I asked twice and got a name that turned out to be somebody who left ... it is that nobody above has thought past winning the work." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

"What hasnt changed is anyone above my manager. Nobody at the top has run one of these to the end, and it shows the minute a client asks a hard question." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

"My reservation sits higher up. Nobody has told me who signs the letter if one of these responses goes out wrong." -Portfolio Director, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"and leadership send mails about ai every month but nothing reach the floor, no training, no time set aside. we are learning the policy assistant on live queries and hoping we catch the wrong ones" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

Negative leadership comments and more negative engagement-level sentiment were associated with higher cancellation. The accounts concerned responsibility for decisions and remediation. They do not establish that senior leadership conduct caused cancellation.

1.2 Transformation of the Vendor Commercial Model

INDICATOR C116 · RATE HOW WELL YOUR EMPLOYER IS TRANSFORMING ITS COMMERCIAL MODEL AS AGENTIC AI REDUCES THE BILLABLE HUMAN EFFORT IT SELLS TODAY · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of vendor commercial-model change identified tension between agentic delivery and revenue or internal targets based on billable human effort. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 812 respondents). The transformation of the commercial model was weakest on canceled engagements, where the mean rating was 2.4 (n = 306 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.45. Transformation of the Vendor Commercial Model: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well your employer is transforming its commercial model as agentic AI reduces the billable human effort it sells today".

Distressed ratings: 386 of 812 answers (47.54%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 629): 3.58. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.91. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.58. Build-Out (n = 166): 4.54. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 242): 4.25. Production (n = 98): 4.74. Canceled (n = 306): 2.44.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the transformation of the vendor's commercial model, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Cancellation was less common where the transformation was rated further advanced (r = −0.60, 95% CI −0.69 to −0.48, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where the commercial model had been transformed (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.55 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the commercial-model indicator moved closely with the rating (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the transformation higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.62, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.68 to −0.54, n = 762 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 386 of the 812 answers (47.54%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 56 of the 150 engagements.

Commercial-model comments numbered 145. 132 were negative. Responses in the challenges field emphasized tension between agentic work and revenue based on human staffing. Longer comments on the vendor described reduced billable effort under particular arrangements and internal targets that continued to emphasize headcount.

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> *"When the agents absorb most of the query volume my headcount goes down and the invoice goes down with it, and nobody has said what replaces it. The answer each time is that a new model is coming. Until it arrives we are, in effect, penalised for the very thing we were asked to build." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"The heavy work is the first six weeks of teaching the routing rules, and after that the volume costs us almost nothing, but we are still billing as though a person sits behind every ticket. Nobody above me has told us how the next phase is meant to be priced … " -Engagement Manager, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"vendor's own FTE model fights the agent's success" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Vendor defended FTE margins over fixing the black box" -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

No significant association was detected between commercial-model sentiment and the study measures. The comments describe a perceived incentive conflict under staffing-based arrangements, not a measured relationship between vendor revenue and automation gains. The quantitative outcome associations derive from the ratings.

1.3 Pricing of Agentic Work When Hours No Longer Measure Value

INDICATOR C128 · RATE YOUR EMPLOYER'S ABILITY TO PRICE AGENTIC WORK PROFITABLY WHEN BILLABLE HOURS NO LONGER MEASURE THE VALUE DELIVERED · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described pricing that did not consistently reflect agentic delivery effort or support an agreed basis for profitable work. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 795 respondents). Pricing received a mean rating of 2.5 on canceled engagements (n = 303 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.46. Pricing of Agentic Work When Hours No Longer Measure Value: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate your employer's ability to price agentic work profitably when billable hours no longer measure the value delivered".

Distressed ratings: 383 of 795 answers (48.18%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 615): 3.54. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.85. Portfolio director (n = 29): 4.72. Build-Out (n = 160): 4.34. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.27. Production (n = 97): 4.59. Canceled (n = 303): 2.50.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The vendor's ability to price agentic work was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and each association withstood the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose vendor priced agentic work better had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where pricing was rated better (r = 0.72, 95% CI 0.60 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). Pricing was also closely associated with the engagement indicator mean computed without it (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated pricing higher (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.53, n = 748 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 383 of the 795 answers (48.18%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 62 of the 150 engagements.

Of the 137 written responses addressing pricing, 136 were negative. Respondents described uncertain prices, continuing disputes over commercial terms, and charges that did not reflect delivery effort. Longer accounts described headcount-based pricing and financial institution reports that, according to respondents, omitted the associated reduction in vendor margins.

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> *"Put it plainly, we were sold as an agentic engagement and then priced and staffed like an ordinary ITO ramp. Nobody above me could explain what we bill for once the agent clears an access request itself." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"We priced this one on a blended rate against estimated human effort, and then the entire premise of the engagement was that the human effort would fall, which meant every week we succeeded technically we lost money and every week we struggled we looked incompetent." -Portfolio Director, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"The vendor priced and reported deliverable turnaround in hours claimed by the agent, without a separate line for the senior banker hours spent re-deriving key assumptions the agent could not justify, masking the true cost of the engagement." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"We are sold as tax research capability by people who have never priced work that is not measured in hours, and effect on me personally is that I defend a delivery model I did not design and do not believe in." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"Pricing conversations stall because nobody wants to admit FTE hours are dropping" -Engagement Manager, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

More negative engagement-level pricing sentiment was associated with cancellation. More negative respondent-level sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. The accounts suggest a mismatch between existing pricing methods and agentic delivery, although the study did not independently examine contracts, margins, or financial institution reports.

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“

Training is the one I keep coming back to. When I joined this account I got two half days on the platform, mostly someone sharing their screen, and then a set of e-learning modules written for a different kind of work altogether. Nothing about HR data. Nothing about what an attrition table or a comp table should look like before you trust it. The person running the session had never opened a payroll extract in her life, that was obvious in ten minutes. The e-learning is a seperate world from what we actually do. Since then I have had nothing. My lead is good, he will sit with you if you ask, but he is only teaching me what he taught himself, and he learned it the same way I did, on live work. There is a certification the company talks about, I did most of it on my own weekends and the licence ran out before I finished. I am not saying the people here are not capable. We do the work. But it is all picked up sideways from whoever is sitting next to you, and when someone leaves it goes with them. Nine months on this account and there is still no written handbook for any of it. That is why those questions got a 1 from me.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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2 Management Processes and End-to-End Engagement Management

Accounts of vendor management identified procedures inherited from staffed delivery, limited preparation for agentic work, and unclear end-to-end ownership. Four indicators assess the vendor's management processes, end-to-end engagement management, capability with global financial institutions, and overall delivery qualifications. Quantitative ratings and written accounts address different aspects of these capabilities.

Across the limited written evidence, respondents described management practices developed for staffed delivery, incomplete preparation for agentic work, and unclear engagement ownership. No written response specifically addressed capability with global financial institutions.

2.1 Adaptation of Vendor Management Processes

INDICATOR C117 · RATE HOW WELL YOUR EMPLOYER'S INTERNAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES HAVE BEEN REDESIGNED FOR AGENTIC AI DELIVERY RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL STAFFED DELIVERY · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Vendor management processes were reported to retain rosters, headcount reporting, and utilization targets developed for staffed delivery. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 799 respondents). On canceled engagements, the redesign of management processes was rated lower than on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.5, n = 295 respondents).

Figure 2.47. Adaptation of Vendor Management Processes: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well your employer's internal management processes have been redesigned for agentic AI delivery rather than traditional staffed delivery".

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Distressed ratings: 388 of 799 answers (48.56%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 616): 3.51. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.03. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.68. Build-Out (n = 171): 4.37. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 4.30. Production (n = 99): 4.43. Canceled (n = 295): 2.48.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Each of the four core study measures was associated with how far the vendor had redesigned its internal management processes, and the applicable robustness checks upheld every association. Engagements whose vendor had redesigned its processes further had a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.57, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where the processes had been redesigned (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.55 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the process indicator was closely associated with the redesign (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the redesign higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.57, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.64 to −0.49, n = 749 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 388 of the 799 answers (48.56%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 61 of the 150 engagements.

Of the 25 written responses addressing vendor management processes, 23 were negative. Nearly all appeared in comments about the vendor. Respondents described continued reliance on shift rosters, monthly headcount reports, utilization targets, and checklists developed for manual work.

> *"My utilization target counts heads on the account, not tickets the agent closed, so every hour I spend tuning intent routing shows up as idle time on my own report. Nobody above me has said that out loud yet." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"our internal process is still built for staffed delivery, headcount reports, utilization, all of it, none of that tells anybody how model is performing. Third, stop putting people on production work whose only experience is pilot." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"Our internal process still assumes headcount. Every week I still fill the same shift Tracker even though the Agent is doing the routing... What needs to change is the reporting we do, it should measure tickets closed correctly, not hours logged." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"My manager is good and I dont have complaints there. What the numbers dont show is that were still run like a body shop - hours booked, tickets closed - when half the work now is checking what the tool did." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

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> *"Nobody above me has redesigned the delivery playbook, they took the old seat-based model and put agents where the seats used to be, and the reporting rolls up exactly as it always did." - Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Written sentiment on management processes showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. The 25 responses describe staff adapting established procedures to agentic delivery, sometimes by working outside them. This small qualitative sample provides context rather than a reliable estimate of the prevalence of those practices.

2.2 End-to-End Management of Agentic Engagements

INDICATOR C119 · RATE YOUR EMPLOYER'S ABILITY TO MANAGE AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENTS END TO END · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of end-to-end vendor management contrasted inadequate preparation and unassigned engagement ownership with effective delivery that retained specific weaknesses. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 787 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements gave end-to-end management a mean rating of 2.5 (n = 294 respondents), lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.48. End-to-End Management of Agentic Engagements: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate your employer's ability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements end to end".

Distressed ratings: 364 of 787 answers (46.25%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 606): 3.58. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.97. Portfolio director (n = 29): 4.38. Build-Out (n = 167): 4.35. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 4.35. Production (n = 94): 4.55. Canceled (n = 294): 2.51.

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r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.
The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The applicable robustness checks left intact each association between end-to-end management of agentic engagements and the four core study measures. Cancellation was less common on engagements with stronger end-to-end management (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where end-to-end management was rated stronger (r = 0.72, 95% CI 0.61 to 0.81, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the end-to-end indicator was closely associated with it (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated end-to-end management higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.61, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.68 to −0.53, n = 738 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 364 of the 787 answers (46.25%), the lowest distressed share of the 20 indicators of vendor capability, and the engagement mean was distressed on 65 of the 150 engagements.

Of the 17 written responses addressing end-to-end management, 11 were negative, and 6 were positive. Nearly all appeared in comments about the vendor. Negative accounts described inadequate preparation and the absence of an accountable engagement owner. Positive accounts described generally effective delivery with specific remaining weaknesses.

> *"We were placed in front of a regulatory client with nobody who had run agents through a live filing cycle, and when it broke, ownership landed on my team and stayed there." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"Nobody put us on this account with a plan and not one question here reaches that. My lead did everything right, she was the only one who answered anything." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"My employer was given three weeks to stand up the screening queue, kindly note that is not enough for KYC. The people tried. The preparation was not there" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"What has to change is above that. Somebody needs to own the whole thing end to end insted of four leads each owning a piece." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"End to end we run engagement well, I stand by that. But I have asked twice up the line who carries the cost if it goes wrong, and both times I got a workshop invitation." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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More negative written sentiment was associated with cancellation and higher intent to leave. Because the qualitative analysis draws on only 17 responses, these associations should be treated as exploratory. The larger structured-rating sample provides the principal quantitative evidence.

2.3 Management of Agentic Engagements for Global Financial Institutions

INDICATOR C121 · RATE YOUR EMPLOYER'S ABILITY TO MANAGE AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENTS FOR GLOBAL BANKS IN PARTICULAR · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Vendor capability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements for global financial institutions received lower ratings on canceled engagements than on active engagements in any measured stage. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 779 respondents). This ability was weakest on canceled engagements, where the mean rating was 2.4 (n = 292 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.49. Management of Agentic Engagements for Global Financial Institutions: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate your employer's ability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements for global banks in particular".

Distressed ratings: 381 of 779 answers (48.91%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 597): 3.50. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.90. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.50. Build-Out (n = 161): 4.39. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.20. Production (n = 91): 4.64. Canceled (n = 292): 2.43.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

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Each association between the management of engagements for global financial institutions and the four core study measures held in all applicable robustness checks. Engagements rated more capable on this measure had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where this ability was rated higher (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.58 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without this indicator, was higher too (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated this ability higher (r = −0.59, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.66 to −0.50, n = 732 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 381 of the 779 answers (48.91%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 63 of the 150 engagements.

No written response specifically addressed the vendor's capability with global financial institutions. Consequently, this indicator supports conclusions about respondents' ratings but provides no direct qualitative explanation for them. Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 examine related management capabilities.

2.4 Overall Vendor Qualifications for Agentic Outsourcing

INDICATOR C134 · RATE YOUR EMPLOYER'S OVERALL QUALIFICATION TO DELIVER ELITE AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING SERVICES TO BANKS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described a gap between services sold as highly qualified agentic AI outsourcing and the production experience available during delivery. The survey described the service standard as "elite." The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 803 respondents). The survey described the service standard as "elite." The mean rating of the vendor's qualification on canceled engagements, 2.5 (n = 306 respondents), was lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.50. Overall Vendor Qualifications for Agentic Outsourcing: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate your employer's overall qualification to deliver elite agentic AI outsourcing services to banks".

Distressed ratings: 385 of 803 answers (47.95%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 3.46. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.00. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.63. Build-Out (n = 166): 4.33. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 4.21. Production (n = 97): 4.49. Canceled (n = 306): 2.49.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The vendor's overall self-assessed qualification for agentic outsourcing showed an association with each of the four core study measures that survived all applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common where respondents rated the vendor better qualified (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements whose vendor was rated better qualified reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.72, 95% CI 0.61 to 0.81, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the qualification indicator, was closely associated with the rating (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who judged the vendor better qualified reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.58, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.65 to −0.50, n = 757 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 385 of the 803 answers (47.95%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 67 of the 150 engagements.

Of the 28 written responses addressing vendor qualifications, 17 were negative. Nearly all appeared in comments about the vendor. Negative accounts described services sold before the firm had acquired relevant production experience, with teams learning during live delivery. Several positive accounts also identified specific weaknesses.

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> *“nobody in our firm has run early-warning work with agents before, so we are learning on a live portfolio, and the two seniors who do understand it are shared across other work. I do not think this is dishonesty, it is a firm selling something it has not built yet, which is a different fault.” - Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *“The problem is nobody above the trainer has done this before either. When the agent closed a batch of alerts wrong in March, my lead asked me what the process is, and i asked him the same thing. There is no process. So we made one up on the call and wrote it after.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *“We were staffed for a document backlog, not for standing up an agent platform, and please understand that nobody at our end ever pretended otherwise. The people they gave me worked hard. The company simply sold what it has yet to build.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“there is no box for saying the people here are fine and the firm above them is not.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

More negative written sentiment was associated with cancellation and higher intent to leave. These associations are exploratory because the qualitative sample contains only 28 responses. The accounts suggest a perceived gap between commercial commitments and delivery experience. They do not independently establish the firm’s qualifications.

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3 Knowledge of the Financial Industry and of Agentic AI

Financial-industry knowledge and agentic AI knowledge were reported as distinct capabilities, with strength in one not necessarily accompanied by strength in the other. Two indicators assess the depth of vendor knowledge in the financial industry and agentic AI. The distinction matters because familiarity with the financial institution's business does not itself establish the technical capability to operate agents, and technical capability does not establish knowledge of financial processes.

Respondents described both types of knowledge gap. Some considered the vendor knowledgeable about financial services but inexperienced in agent operations. Others described technically capable teams learning the financial business from financial institution documents. These accounts do not establish how often firms possessed both capabilities.

Several accounts also described expertise concentrated in individual staff members and limited technical support from senior management.

> *"our depth in market abuse work sits in about four people company-wide, and I get them for a week at a time when I ask nicely." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

3.1 Depth of Vendor Knowledge of the Financial Industry

INDICATOR C120 · RATE THE DEPTH OF YOUR EMPLOYER'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Some respondents described learning the financial business during delivery, while favorable accounts of vendor industry knowledge located the weakness in agent operations. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 802 respondents). On canceled engagements, the vendor's industry knowledge was rated lower than on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 302 respondents).

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Figure 2.51. Depth of Vendor Knowledge of the Financial Industry: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the depth of your employer’s knowledge of the financial industry”.

Distressed ratings: 392 of 802 answers (48.88%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 619): 3.52. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.94. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.65. Build-Out (n = 166): 4.39. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.31. Production (n = 99): 4.59. Canceled (n = 302): 2.41.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the depth of the vendor's knowledge of the financial industry, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Deeper industry knowledge was associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where the vendor's industry knowledge was rated deeper (r = 0.71, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the industry-knowledge indicator, was higher as well (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the vendor's industry knowledge higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.68 to −0.52, n = 755 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 392 of the 802 answers (48.88%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 60 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the vendor's industry knowledge numbered 64, all in comment on the vendor, with 45 negative and 18 positive. The negative responses described delivery team members who did not know the financial business they served and learned it on live work, in some accounts from the financial institution's own documents. The positive responses held that the firm's domain knowledge was sound and placed the gap in running agents.

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> *"In week three I asked for two analysts who had done entitlement reviews before. What arrived were two people who had completed the internal AI course and had never seen a bank access review. I spent a fortnight teaching segregation of duties instead of running the engagement." - Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"We have the audit domain people, that has never been the gap here ... Where we are thin is running the same agents past a pilot. This was the first continuous auditing build any of us had taken beyond a demo environment, and it showed in how long it took us to work out what to do when a control test failed for the wrong reason." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"One thing plainly, the people my employer puts onto a deposits account do not know deposits. For that reason I spend the first month of every intake explaining what a hold is, what a dormancy flag is." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"above him nobody has worked in a bank, because of that the training deck they gave us was written for a call centre, not for payroll cases" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"we were given the tool and a two day session, nothing about private capital in it. nobody on our side could explain what a management fee offset is, i had to ask the client team through my lead" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

More negative written sentiment about industry knowledge was associated with higher intent to leave, but no statistically significant association was detected with the engagement-level measures.

3.2 Depth of Vendor Knowledge of Agentic AI

INDICATOR C131 · RATE THE DEPTH OF YOUR EMPLOYER'S KNOWLEDGE OF AGENTIC AI · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Vendor knowledge of agentic AI received the lowest mean rating among the vendor capability indicators. The mean rating was 3.58, the lowest of the 20 indicators of vendor capability, and the median 3.0 (n = 807 respondents). The vendor's agentic knowledge received a mean rating of 2.4 on canceled engagements (n = 308 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.52. Depth of Vendor Knowledge of Agentic AI: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the depth of your employer's knowledge of agentic AI".

Distressed ratings: 416 of 807 answers (51.55%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 625): 3.43. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.93. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.70. Build-Out (n = 164): 4.28. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.21. Production (n = 100): 4.57. Canceled (n = 308): 2.40.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The depth of the vendor's knowledge of agentic AI was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose vendor was rated more knowledgeable about agents had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.57, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where agentic knowledge was rated deeper (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.56 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the agentic-knowledge indicator, was higher where that knowledge was rated deeper (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower where respondents rated the vendor's agentic knowledge higher (r = −0.59, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.66 to −0.51, n = 758 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 416 of the 807 answers (51.55%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 63 of the 150 engagements.

Of the 26 written responses addressing agentic knowledge, 18 were negative. All appeared in comments about the vendor. Negative accounts described limited technical knowledge above the delivery-team level, brief initial training, and learning during live work.

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"The problem is nobody above us really know these agents, so when we get stuck we solve it ourselves from Google. It make my team tired, we are learning on live tickets and there is no one to ask" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"They put us through the training and it was decent, I'll say that, better than the last place. But nobody above me actually knows this stuff to the depth the work needs. We're figuring out the agent side on the desk." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

"Nobody from my company could explain what the agent had done. i asked my lead, he asked somebody else, then it came back to me." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding

"They taught me the banking side properly. The agent side we are all guessing" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"The knowledge sits in perhaps a dozen individuals, which is why I marked the capability question higher than the playbook one; what we lack is not understanding but the written route from a working prototype to a governed sanctions process, and that gap is real." -Portfolio Director, KPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

Written sentiment on agentic knowledge showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. The 26 responses suggest that expertise was concentrated in particular individuals, but the small qualitative sample limits broader inference about management capability.

"

i left some of these blank, i cannot rate what i do not see. our AI knowledge is good, the people who wrote triage playbook know it well. but scoring training out of ten is not useful, we get one induction then you learn from tickets"

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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4 Live Production Experience and the Operation of Large Numbers of Agents

Respondents distinguished limited experience beyond pilots from gaps in monitoring and exception handling as agent populations expanded. Two indicators distinguish experience operating agents beyond pilots from the capability to manage large agent populations, including monitoring and exception handling. The distinction separates prior production exposure from the operational capacity required to sustain delivery at scale.

> *"Not one person at my firm has done this before. Nobody. They sold agent desk support to a trading bank and then went looking for who knows how to run it, and the answer was nobody, so they put us on it and told us learn. That is not malice. That is a firm out of its depth that will not say so out loud..." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"But running hundreds of agents at once is different from running ten, and our own alerting for the agents themselves is thin. We watch the client estate closely and the bots not at all." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

4.1 Vendor Experience Running Agents Beyond Pilots

INDICATOR C132 · RATE THE DEPTH OF YOUR EMPLOYER'S EXPERIENCE RUNNING AGENTIC AI SYSTEMS IN LIVE PRODUCTION, BEYOND PILOTS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Limited vendor experience running agents beyond pilots was a recurring concern in accounts of learning during live production work. The mean rating was 3.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 794 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the vendor's production experience lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 300 respondents).

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Figure 2.53. Vendor Experience Running Agents Beyond Pilots: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the depth of your employer’s experience running agentic AI systems in live production, beyond pilots”.

Distressed ratings: 383 of 794 answers (48.24%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 611): 3.55. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.78. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.65. Build-Out (n = 159): 4.41. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 237): 4.24. Production (n = 98): 4.66. Canceled (n = 300): 2.43.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The depth of the vendor's experience running agents beyond pilots was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and every association survived the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose vendor had deeper production experience had lower observed cancellation rates (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where production experience was rated deeper (r = 0.73, 95% CI 0.62 to 0.81, n = 94 engagements). So was the engagement indicator mean computed without the production-experience indicator (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated production experience deeper reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.52, n = 747 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 383 of the 794 answers (48.24%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 62 of the 150 engagements.

Of the 54 written responses addressing production experience, 51 were negative, including 42 assigned the most negative sentiment score. Negative comments about the vendor described limited prior production experience, brief preparation, and learning during live work for the financial institution. Some

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respondents perceived a gap between the experience implied during sales and the capability available during delivery.

> *"Nobody in my company has done this before. Not in real production. We are told the model will triage the alerts and we only look at what it is not sure about, but on my shift i am running maybe half of them again by hand because i do not trust what it closed... a closed alert on card fraud is not same as closed ticket for a printer." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"when we started, nobody in my team had seen an agent run a case queue before, we learnt on the job. What must change practically is two things. First, someone senior with production experience should sit with the team for the first month, not a deck at kickoff." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"When we won this, the induction was two days of reading and then we were on live composites. Nobody in the firm had run agents in production on a compliance account before -- we found that out afterwards." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"To be fair nobody in this company has run credit early-warning agents before... they are learning same as me. But they sold it like they have. And training is two videos, that part I cannot defend." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"What we do not have is people who have run agents in live production rather than in pilots" -Engagement Manager, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Written sentiment on production experience showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. The predominance of negative responses restricted variation in sentiment and may have reduced the analysis's ability to detect an association. The accounts nevertheless identify a recurring concern about limited experience before production deployment.

4.2 Operational Capacity for Large Agent Populations

INDICATOR C133 · RATE YOUR EMPLOYER'S ABILITY TO OPERATE LARGE NUMBERS OF AGENTS IN PRODUCTION, INCLUDING MONITORING AND EXCEPTION HANDLING · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of operating large agent populations identified gaps in monitoring ownership, exception handling, and escalation as the number of agents increased. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 798 respondents). The operation of large numbers of agents was rated lowest on canceled engagements, at a mean of 2.4 (n = 297 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.54. Operational Capacity for Large Agent Populations: associations with the study measures

Operational capacity for large agent populations: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate your employer's ability to operate large numbers of agents in production, including monitoring and exception handling".

Distressed ratings: 379 of 798 answers (47.49%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 616): 3.58. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.87. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.90. Build-Out (n = 168): 4.55. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 4.35. Production (n = 99): 4.45. Canceled (n = 297): 2.42.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every association of the vendor's ability to operate large numbers of agents with the four core study measures held, in each of the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose vendor operated its agents better had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.68 to −0.47, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where agent operations were rated stronger (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.58 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the operations indicator, was higher as well (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated agent operations higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.61, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.53, n = 750 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 379 of the 798 answers (47.49%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

Of the 37 written responses addressing large-scale agent operations, 29 were negative. Respondents described unassigned monitoring responsibilities, failures discovered after the event, and difficulty expanding from a small number of agents to hundreds. Positive accounts described effective monitoring arrangements.

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"We had two agents provisioning at once in same tenant and nobody on our side was watching the queue, one of them looped and raised forty duplicate accounts before a colleague noticed. Took us whole shift to unwind. There is no runbook for that, we wrote one ourselves after." - Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"we were given the assist tooling and a two-hour handover call, and no operations model behind it. when an agent misfires at 2am there is nobody on our side rostered to notice, i am the escalation path, for that reason i keep my phone next to me." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"nobody from my company is watching the agent while it runs, one week it keeps closing tickets as resolved which are not resolved, we find out from angry employees and not from any dashboard. the people who trained us do not know banking either." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"We run agents on the release pipeline and there is no proper dashboard from our side, if one starts misbehaving at 2am we dont hear it first, the bank tells us." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"Two months back we had an agent loop on a sandbox endpoint over a weekend, and our own operations desk caught it on the monitoring before the client noticed, and had it stopped within the hour." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Technology engineering and operations

More negative written sentiment about agent operations was associated with higher intent to leave. Respondents' accounts identify monitoring ownership, alerting, and out-of-hours escalation as operational concerns.

"

Problem is training. two hours video on agents, nothing on credit side, my team learn early warning rules from each other. Running agents in production they do well now, monitoring is better than start. But when an alert goes wrong nobody above wants to own it"

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

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5 Talent Supply, Development, and Training

Reported talent shortages and brief or insufficiently relevant training left some delivery teams relying on a small number of experienced colleagues. Five indicators assess the supply of qualified staff, process and leadership development, training investment, practical agentic skills, and financial-industry knowledge. Together, they distinguish recruitment capacity from the development of skills within the existing workforce.

The written evidence describes brief or generic initial training, learning during live delivery, prolonged vacancies, and reliance on a small number of experienced staff.

> *"When our automation lead went on leave for two weeks there was nobody to cover, we just paused the closure rules testing till he came back. That is my only real complaint, otherwise the support from my manager is good." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 4 examines workforce experience and intent to leave, including the implications of knowledge held in personal notes or informal peer networks.

> *"There is no training on any of this, so we keep our own notes file, one page per Guidewire config we automated, what the agent gets wrong and what to check after. Every new joiner gets that file on day one. Because of that nobody asks the training team for anything now." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

5.1 Supply of Qualified Agentic Talent

INDICATOR C122 · RATE YOUR EMPLOYER'S CURRENT SUPPLY OF QUALIFIED AGENTIC AI TALENT AGAINST WHAT ITS ENGAGEMENTS NEED · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described shortages of qualified agentic AI personnel, slow replacement, and expertise concentrated in a small number of people. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 802 respondents). The mean rating of the supply of talent on canceled engagements, 2.5 (n = 304 respondents), was lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.55. Supply of Qualified Agentic Talent: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate your employer’s current supply of qualified agentic AI talent against what its engagements need”.

Distressed ratings: 382 of 802 answers (47.63%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 620): 3.57. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.01. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.61. Build-Out (n = 164): 4.53. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 241): 4.31. Production (n = 93): 4.65. Canceled (n = 304): 2.46.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Each core study measure was associated with the supply of qualified agentic talent, and every association withstood the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common where the supply of talent was rated adequate (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.68 to −0.47, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements whose vendor had a better supply of talent reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.71, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the talent indicator was closely associated with the rating (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the supply of talent higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.62, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.68 to −0.54, n = 754 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 382 of the 802 answers (47.63%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 58 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the supply of talent numbered 158, and 144 were negative. Every respondent who addressed it in naming the hardest challenges named a shortage of agentic talent. The comments on the vendor described teams staffed with people who had never performed agentic tasks, slow replacement, and knowledge held by two or three people shared across accounts.

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"We are three testers and only one of us has done agent work before ... when I need someone senior to explain why the agent behaves one way on Monday and another way on Thursday, there is nobody in the company to ask, we post in a chat group and wait two days." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"When two of our people moved off in March we waited nearly six weeks for replacements, and the ones who came dont know the queue at all, we teach them from scratch ourselves." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications

"It felt slow when two people rolled off in month two, replacements took nearly six weeks and neither had done a close before. We managed, but my lead did the training himself in the evenings, thats not a plan." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

"In March the failover config drifted on the tick capture box and we lose about two hours before somebody who actually knows that kit comes on the bridge... There are maybe three people here who know this environment properly." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"nobody they staffed had done a network certification before, me included. ... what the numbers dont show is we were reading the processors spec ourselfs at night to keep up, thats not a training program thats just people covering." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes

"Our team is full of freshers. We need senior workers with some agentic AI experience. We've had open reqs for months, and can't find anyone. I will have to tell the customer we will miss targets if we can't find them by the end of the month." -Portfolio Director, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

More negative engagement-level sentiment about talent supply was associated with higher cancellation rates. More negative respondent-level sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. Respondents identified three recurring concerns: inexperienced assignments, slow recruitment, and concentrated expertise.

5.2 Process and Leadership Development Programs

INDICATOR C118 · RATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF YOUR EMPLOYER'S PROCESS AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Process and leadership development received less favorable ratings on canceled engagements, while the small written-answer set distinguished classroom instruction from preparation for delivery. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 803 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the programs lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 306 respondents).

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Figure 2.56. Process and Leadership Development Programs: associations with the study measures

Process and leadership development programs: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate the effectiveness of your employer's process and leadership development programs".

Distressed ratings: 393 of 803 answers (48.94%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 3.55. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.95. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.68. Build-Out (n = 165): 4.48. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 238): 4.34. Production (n = 94): 4.67. Canceled (n = 306): 2.42.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the vendor's process and leadership development programs, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. More effective programs were associated with a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.69 to −0.48, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where the programs were rated more effective (r = 0.69, 95% CI 0.57 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the programs indicator, was higher too (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated the programs higher (r = −0.61, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.53, n = 753 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 393 of the 803 answers (48.94%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

Seven written responses addressed development programs. Four were negative. Negative accounts described classroom or slide-based instruction with limited application to agentic delivery. Positive accounts considered the programs adequate but identified weaknesses in accountability for agent errors. This small sample supports illustrative observations only.

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> *"The knowledge is there at the top but it does not come down to us. Leadership programme is a set of slides nobody finishes. And I learnt everything from my team lead" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"Leadership programs exist but they are classroom, not for this kind of delivery." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"We were put on this desk with two days of induction and the leadership course i was sent on was mostly slides. And nobody above me has run agents live before this." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

The structured ratings provide the broader assessment of development programs. They should not be interpreted as measuring agreement with the specific explanations offered in the seven written responses.

5.3 Adequacy of Vendor Investment in Training

INDICATOR C123 · RATE THE ADEQUACY OF YOUR EMPLOYER'S INVESTMENT IN TRAINING ITS WORKFORCE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described vendor training that was brief or insufficiently relevant to the assignment, with practical learning supplemented by colleagues during delivery. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 789 respondents). On canceled engagements the investment in training had a mean rating of 2.5 (n = 298 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.57. Adequacy of Vendor Investment in Training: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the adequacy of your employer’s investment in training its workforce”.

Distressed ratings: 388 of 789 answers (49.18%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 608): 3.52. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.97. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.77. Build-Out (n = 161): 4.47. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 230): 4.22. Production (n = 100): 4.54. Canceled (n = 298): 2.49.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The adequacy of the vendor's investment in training was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose vendor invested more adequately in training had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.57, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where the investment was rated adequate (r = 0.71, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). So was the engagement indicator mean computed without the training-investment indicator (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the investment higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.59, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.51, n = 742 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 388 of the 789 answers (49.18%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

The investment in training was the subject of 244 written responses, the most of any indicator of vendor capability, nearly all in comment on the vendor. They divided into 177 negative and 62 positive. The negative responses described training of a few hours or days, much of it slides or recordings unrelated to the engagement's business, followed by live work learned from colleagues. The positive responses described training that had improved, and some named a gap that remained in the business or in checking agent output.

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> *"We were given access to the payroll agent and a two hour session on a Friday, recorded, and that was the preparation. Nobody from the practice side sat with us for even one Cycle. My four staff learned it by running it against last quarter file and comparing what came out, mostly on their own time, and I let that happen because there was no other way to be ready." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"training was two days of slides then straight to live cases. so i made my own file. i wrote down every requirement code and what the underwriter actually wants for it, and i share it with two other new joiner on my team. it is not official, nobody ask me to make it ... we lose everything when someone resigns because it all sits in their head or in a file like mine." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"Second week they put me alone on month end attribution run, nobody to ask. Training was two days recorded video and that is all. That is what i marked down, not my manager, he is also learning same as me" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Here I get one day of induction and a link to a folder of PDFs. Nobody in my team has done valuation work before, we are all learning from the client's old models." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"i got a half day slide deck and a link to a course nobody finished." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

More negative written sentiment about training investment was associated with higher cancellation rates and higher intent to leave. Respondents' accounts suggest that informal learning supplemented training they considered brief or insufficiently relevant to their assignments.

5.4 Practical Agentic Skills Built by Vendor Training

INDICATOR C124 · RATE HOW WELL YOUR EMPLOYER'S TRAINING PROGRAMS BUILD PRACTICAL AGENTIC AI SKILLS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Written accounts distinguished practical agentic AI instruction from theoretical courses and training on tools other than those used in the engagement. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 804 respondents). On canceled engagements, the practical value of the training was rated lower than on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.5, n = 308 respondents).

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Figure 2.58. Practical Agentic Skills Built by Vendor Training: associations with the study measures

Practical agentic skills built by vendor training: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well your employer’s training programs build practical agentic AI skills”.

Distressed ratings: 380 of 804 answers (47.26%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 3.58. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.93. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.61. Build-Out (n = 160): 4.39. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 241): 4.39. Production (n = 95): 4.60. Canceled (n = 308): 2.50.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The applicable robustness checks left intact each association between the practical agentic skills built by training and the four core study measures. Training that built practical skills was associated with less cancellation (r = −0.58, 95% CI −0.68 to −0.46, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where training was rated more practical (r = 0.69, 95% CI 0.57 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the skills indicator, was closely associated with the rating (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the training's practical value higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.52, n = 755 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 380 of the 804 answers (47.26%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 59 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing practical agentic skills numbered 54, nearly all in comment on the vendor, with 42 negative and 12 positive. The negative responses described training delivered as slides and theory, training on tools other than the agent in use, and no instruction on checking agent output that varies between runs. The positive responses found the agentic courses practical and named gaps elsewhere.

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> *"The trainings we get are mostly slide decks... you cannot learn agent debugging from that." - Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"here i get access on day one and a link to a video from 2023 which is about a different tool completely. moreover nobody could tell me who to ask when the agent behave strange." - Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"But the courses are mostly slides and theory... when i sit with the live queue the first week, nothing in the course was showing me what to do when the agent stops halfway." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"The training was two weeks of slides then straight to the floor... nobody taught us how to judge a bot answer when it comes out different each time." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"What I can score is the training, which was actually decent, the agentic modules were hands on and I use that stuff daily." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Written sentiment about practical skills showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Respondents distinguished applicable, hands-on instruction from theoretical courses or training on tools other than those used in delivery.

5.5 Financial Industry Knowledge Built by Vendor Training

INDICATOR C125 · RATE HOW WELL YOUR EMPLOYER'S TRAINING PROGRAMS BUILD FINANCIAL INDUSTRY KNOWLEDGE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Financial-industry training received the highest mean rating among vendor capability indicators, although accounts also described learning from colleagues and financial institution documents. The mean rating was 3.72, the highest of the 20 indicators of vendor capability, and the median 4.0 (n = 788 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements gave industry training a mean rating of 2.6 (n = 294 respondents), lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.59. Financial Industry Knowledge Built by Vendor Training: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well your employer’s training programs build financial industry knowledge”.

Distressed ratings: 380 of 788 answers (48.22%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 607): 3.61. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.05. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.20. Build-Out (n = 162): 4.41. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 233): 4.27. Production (n = 99): 4.70. Canceled (n = 294): 2.57.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Where training built industry knowledge, all four core study measures were more favorable, and none of the applicable robustness checks reversed an association. Cancellation was less common where industry training was rated stronger (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where industry training was rated stronger (r = 0.69, 95% CI 0.56 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). Industry training was also associated with a higher engagement indicator mean computed without it (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated industry training higher (r = −0.57, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.64 to −0.49, n = 743 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 380 of the 788 answers (48.22%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 58 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing industry training numbered 82, all in comment on the vendor, with 63 negative and 19 positive. The negative responses described training that was generic and contained little or nothing on the financial business the engagement served. Staff learned the business from colleagues or from the financial institution's own documents. The positive responses described industry courses that worked and placed the gap on the agent side.

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“nobody in training explained insurance record classes to us, and the trainer himself was reading from slides. So i keep a sheet of which document type keeps which period and i share the same with two colleagues ... But the industry part we teach ourselves...” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

“Training is the one good part, the agent classes are practicle and I use them daily. But there is nothing on credit in those trainings, so that knowledge I pick up on the floor.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

“Our people finish induction knowing the platform but not the card business — dispute lifecycle, chargeback reason codes, what a provisional credit actually means to cardholder. On voice queue that gap shows inside first month, and my leads end up teaching it case by case at the desk.” -Engagement Manager, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes

“For banking knowledge we do not wait for corporate training now. I run one hour session every friday where senior reconciler walks the team through actual GL break from that week. It is not in any playbook but it works better than the modules, which are generic.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

“Half of my batch had never seen a partnership return before joining and we learn on live files.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

Written sentiment about industry training showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Respondents described both useful formal courses and reliance on colleagues, team notes, or financial institution documents to acquire business knowledge.

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“

i did the induction in my first week and after that nothing… two days of slides about agents and then straight onto the account. that is the thing no number here can show. the training is not late, it is simply not there. i learn from the senior sitting next to me and when he is on leave i learn from google, to be candid. one year on capital markets testing now and still nobody has explained to me properly what a settlement fail actually means for the cases i am writing, i had to ask a senior from another team and even he was surprised nobody told me. on top of that when i discuss about training with my lead he says budget, next quarter, same answer since March. the people here are not the problem. my colleagues help me and my lead is trying. but they keep putting people like me on agent testing with two days of slides and then ask why the cases take long to write. i dont mind hard work. i mind being sent in without the basics… anyway. i said the same thing in the last survey also and nothing came of it, so i am not sure why i am typing this one.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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6 Delivery Playbook, Quality Assurance, and Platforms

Locally developed procedures and supplementary tools were reported where vendor-wide delivery frameworks, quality assurance, or platforms did not meet engagement needs. Three indicators assess the vendor's delivery framework, quality assurance for variable agent output, and technical platforms. These capabilities concern the transition from a successful demonstration to a governed and repeatable production service.

> *"The people I have been given are capable, and the firm knows the technology in the abstract, what is missing is anything written down for a finance back office at a private capital client. We were handed a platform built for contact center work and told to make expense processing fit it, and the training that came with it was generic." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"No shared agentic playbook, every rollout reinvents the wheel" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Respondents described locally developed procedures and tools where firm-wide arrangements were considered inadequate.

6.1 Maturity of the Delivery Framework

INDICATOR C126 · RATE THE MATURITY OF YOUR EMPLOYER'S PLAYBOOK FOR TAKING AGENTIC USE CASES FROM CONCEPT TO GOVERNED PRODUCTION · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Some delivery teams reported developing their own route from concept to governed production rather than receiving an established agentic AI delivery framework. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 807 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the playbook lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 304 respondents).

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Figure 2.60. Maturity of the Delivery Framework: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the maturity of your employer’s playbook for taking agentic use cases from concept to governed production”.

Distressed ratings: 392 of 807 answers (48.57%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 626): 3.54. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.95. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.37. Build-Out (n = 166): 4.40. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 4.28. Production (n = 101): 4.69. Canceled (n = 304): 2.40.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The maturity of the vendor's delivery playbook showed an association with each of the four core study measures that survived all applicable robustness checks. Engagements run with a more mature playbook had lower observed cancellation rates (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.68 to −0.47, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements with a more mature playbook reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.58 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). Playbook maturity and the engagement indicator mean, computed without the playbook indicator, were closely associated (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower where respondents judged the playbook mature (r = −0.62, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.68 to −0.54, n = 756 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 392 of the 807 answers (48.57%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 60 of the 150 engagements.

The playbook was the subject of 200 written responses, and 186 of the 200 were negative, 145 with the strongest negative score. Every respondent who addressed it in naming the hardest challenges named the absence or immaturity of a delivery playbook. The comments on the vendor described a route from pilot to governed production that each team invented for itself, or a playbook written for staffed work.

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> *"we are selling ahead of our own playbook. The platform is good — I have no argument there, and our people know cards and payments as well as anyone in this market — but the route from a promising cardholder use case to something a bank's risk function will sign off is still being invented on each engagement rather than followed." -Portfolio Director, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"on my last account we have proper checklist for exceptions, signed off, everybody follow the same one. Here every pod invent its own for the nostro breaks ... we are short of anyone who has actually run these agents before, so we learn on the client's work" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"No agentic delivery playbook existed, so every escalation was improvised" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"No agentic playbook exists so every new ticket type starts from zero" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"the training budget is there, we are sent on the course, but nobody internally has run agents at this size before, so we build our own runbook as we go and take the platform vendor's support call every Tuesday" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

More negative written sentiment about the delivery framework was associated with cancellation and higher intent to leave. The accounts suggest that some teams developed production procedures during delivery rather than receiving an established framework before deployment.

6.2 Quality Assurance for Nondeterministic Agent Output

INDICATOR C127 · RATE YOUR EMPLOYER'S QUALITY ASSURANCE CAPABILITY FOR AGENTS WHOSE OUTPUTS ARE NOT IDENTICAL EVERY RUN · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described reliance on individual judgment when quality assurance did not provide a consistent method for checking agent outputs that varied between runs. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 794 respondents). Quality assurance was weakest on canceled engagements, where the mean rating was 2.5 (n = 302 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.61. Quality Assurance for Nondeterministic Agent Output: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate your employer’s quality assurance capability for agents whose outputs are not identical every run”.

Distressed ratings: 377 of 794 answers (47.48%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 612): 3.57. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.94. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.50. Build-Out (n = 159): 4.42. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.36. Production (n = 98): 4.66. Canceled (n = 302): 2.45.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Quality assurance for agent output that varies between runs was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and every association held through the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose vendor had stronger quality assurance had a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.68 to −0.47, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where quality assurance was rated stronger (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.58 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). The association with the engagement indicator mean, computed without the quality-assurance indicator, reached the upper end of the category's range (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated quality assurance higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.61, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.68 to −0.53, n = 745 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 377 of the 794 answers (47.48%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 61 of the 150 engagements.

Quality assurance was the subject of 151 written responses across 12 survey questions, and 126 were negative. Every respondent who addressed it in naming the hardest challenges named quality assurance for agent output. The responses to the operational questions described output that differed between runs

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on the same input, staff who would not sign it off as it stood, and checking performed by whoever handled the case.

> *“i've run the same case five times in one afternoon and gotten five different numbers back, so nothing here holds still long enough to actually sign off on, and that's the part that gets to me, not that it's wrong sometimes, but that it's never the same wrong twice, i can't even build a pattern around it.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“Same tools as when i joined, no proper course, no QA method for what the agent produce. When output come different two times for same policy, nobody has told us what to do, we decide ourselves and move on.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Client servicing and communications*

> *“My employer put me on this Engagement after two weeks classroom only. There is no proper QA guide for when the screening agent gives different result, so my team make our own checklist in a shared sheet. It works but nobody from above ask us for it. I do not mind, I learn a lot.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *“where i mark 5 is checking of output, because same request can give slighty different answer and there is no proper method for that yet. but in truth nobody in market has that method, so i do not blame my company alone for it” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“No real QA existed for an agent that gave different answers each run” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

More negative written sentiment about quality assurance was associated with higher intent to leave. Accounts of rerunning, selecting, or rewriting outputs suggest that some teams relied on individual judgment where a consistent approval method was unavailable.

6.3 Optimization of Vendor Platforms for Agentic Outsourcing

INDICATOR C129 · RATE HOW WELL THE TECHNICAL PLATFORMS YOUR EMPLOYER BUILDS OR LICENSES ARE OPTIMIZED FOR AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Vendor platforms were reported to require supplementary spreadsheets, mailboxes, or scripts when systems built for other work did not fit agentic delivery. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 794 respondents). The platforms received a mean rating of 2.5 on canceled engagements (n = 298 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.62. Optimization of Vendor Platforms for Agentic Outsourcing: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well the technical platforms your employer builds or licenses are optimized for agentic AI outsourcing".

Distressed ratings: 384 of 794 answers (48.36%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 612): 3.56. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.03. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.70. Build-Out (n = 168): 4.41. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 4.24. Production (n = 94): 4.78. Canceled (n = 298): 2.52.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

How well the vendor's platforms were built for agentic outsourcing was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common on engagements whose vendor platforms were rated better suited (r = −0.57, 95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where the platforms were rated better suited (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.57 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). A higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the platform indicator, accompanied better-suited platforms (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated the platforms higher (r = −0.59, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.66 to −0.51, n = 743 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 384 of the 794 answers (48.36%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 63 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the platforms numbered 61, nearly all in comment on the vendor, with 38 negative and 21 positive. The negative responses described platforms built for other work, such as ticket handling or contact centers, and teams that moved the engagement's tasks into spreadsheets, mailboxes, and personal scripts. The positive responses found the platform sound or improved and placed the gap elsewhere.

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> *"Our platform group still hands us tooling built for a staffed service desk, so every report counts tickets a person touched and there is no clean way to show a ticket the bot closed by itself." - Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The company can say it has platform, but what we use is a shared mailbox and one spreadsheet. Thus every category change is manual for us. i have raised this. My TL raised it also. Also the answer is always that a proper tool is coming next quarter, and next quarter comes and it is same." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The sales team pitched our dev kit we built as being optimized for AI. No one in sales checked if it was. We panicked for a couple of weeks as we validated AI compatibility after contracts were signed." -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The tooling we were given for ticket triage was built for a generic helpdesk, not for purchase orders, and i flagged that twice with no result." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"At March close we had to run reconciliation on client tooling because our platform cant hold volume of merchant transactions, and nobody flagged that before we committed to it." - Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Written sentiment about platforms showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Respondents distinguished platforms suited to their assignments from systems that required supplementary spreadsheets, mailboxes, or scripts.

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“

Two things have got better in the last year. The people coming onto this account now arrive knowing what an agent is and how to write a decent evaluation set - eighteen months ago I was teaching that myself, so the training investment is real and I have rated it accordingly. Tooling to run the agents is also there. The layer above delivery is where nothing has shifted. We still sell this account on a rate card built for bodies. When the pipeline agent absorbs work that used to take two engineers, the commercial conversation that follows is awkward and nobody at my level is given a line to take. I raise it every quarter review and get told it is being worked on. Also, we dont have anyone who really knows how a markets business runs its release calendar - we learn that from the client, which is back to front”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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7 Accountability for Agent Error

Accounts of costly agent errors differed in whether vendor managers accepted responsibility or assigned it to the analyst on duty. One indicator assesses respondents' perceptions of the vendor's willingness to accept accountability for costly agent errors. The analysis distinguishes the structured rating from accounts of how responsibility was allocated after an incident.

7.1 Allocation of Accountability for Agent Errors

INDICATOR C130 · RATE YOUR EMPLOYER'S READINESS TO TAKE ACCOUNTABILITY WHEN AN AGENT IT OPERATES MAKES A COSTLY ERROR · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of accountability for costly agent errors contrasted responsibility assigned to the analyst on duty with acceptance of responsibility by vendor managers. The mean rating was 3.7 and the median 4.0 (n = 794 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements gave the vendor's readiness a mean rating of 2.4 (n = 307 respondents), lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.63. Allocation of Accountability for Agent Errors: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate your employer's readiness to take accountability when an agent it operates makes a costly error". Distressed ratings: 373 of 794 answers (46.98%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 611): 3.52. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.03. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.71. Build-Out (n = 160): 4.56. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 4.32. Production (n = 95): 4.58. Canceled (n = 307): 2.43.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

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The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the vendor's readiness to take accountability for agent error, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Engagements whose vendor was rated more willing to accept accountability for agent errors had lower observed cancellation rates (r = −0.59, 95% CI −0.68 to −0.47, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where the vendor was rated readier to take accountability (r = 0.67, 95% CI 0.54 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). Readiness to take accountability also accompanied a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the accountability indicator (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the vendor readier to take accountability reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.62, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.54, n = 744 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 373 of the 794 answers (46.98%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 63 of the 150 engagements.

Of the 38 written responses addressing accountability, 29 were negative and 8 positive. Nearly all appeared in comments about the vendor. Negative accounts described responsibility assigned to the analyst on duty without acceptance by senior management. Positive accounts described team leaders or vendor managers accepting responsibility for agent errors.

> *“When the assistant gave a wrong leave-accrual answer to about forty new hires, nobody internally could tell me who signs off the correction or who carries it if the client asks for a credit. We escalated and it went sideways for a week.” -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“They do own their mistakes though. When the Classifier mistagged a whole batch of custody statements nobody tried to pin that on my team.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“top leadership question is pointless for me, i have never seen these people. ask instead who pays when agent breaks a release, that box is not here. my answer would be nobody, it lands on me at 2am” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *“nobody tells us who answers if an agent mis-rates a file and it goes out wrong, so my team keeps a private checklist before releasing. That worry sits on the analyst, not on the people above us” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *“In may the bot closed forty tickets as resolved which was not resolved. And i raise it same day. Two weeks nobody on our side owns it, then we just reopen them ourselves. After that nobody discuss about it again.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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More negative written sentiment about accountability was associated with higher intent to leave. The accounts illustrate differing allocations of responsibility. The structured rating measures perceived willingness to accept accountability rather than the prevalence of either specific practice.

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8 Vendor Preparedness Relative to Five Years Earlier

Respondents' retrospective assessments of vendor preparedness were less favorable on canceled engagements, without establishing measured historical change. A further question asked respondents to compare the vendor's current preparedness with its preparedness five years earlier. This retrospective assessment measures perceived change, not the transfer of capabilities observed over time.

8.1 Retrospective Assessment of Vendor Preparedness

INDICATOR C093 · COMPARED TO 5 YEARS AGO, IS MY EMPLOYER MORE OR LESS PREPARED TO MANAGE OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENTS? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Retrospective assessments of vendor preparedness relative to five years earlier were less favorable on canceled engagements than on active engagements in any measured stage. These are retrospective judgments, not longitudinal measurements of change. Its mean rating was 3.7 and its median 4.0 (n = 786 respondents). On canceled engagements, the vendor's preparedness was rated lower than on active engagements in any stage (mean 2.4, n = 293 respondents).

Figure 2.64. Retrospective Assessment of Vendor Preparedness: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Compared to 5 years ago, is my employer more or less prepared to manage outsourcing engagements?". Distressed ratings: 381 of 786 answers (48.47%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 603): 3.56. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.97. Portfolio director (n = 31): 4.87. Build-Out (n = 162): 4.63. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 4.27. Production (n = 96): 4.49. Canceled (n = 293): 2.44.

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r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The applicable robustness checks left intact each association between the vendor's preparedness against five years earlier and the four core study measures. Greater preparedness was associated with a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.56, 95% CI −0.66 to −0.44, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where preparedness was rated greater (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.52 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the preparedness indicator moved in the same direction (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the vendor better prepared reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.60, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.67 to −0.52, n = 737 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 381 of the 786 answers (48.47%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 62 of the 150 engagements.

Four written responses addressed the comparison, two positive and two negative. They identified changes in areas including hiring, solutions-team support, test environments, outcome-based pricing, and second-review procedures. These accounts are illustrative and cannot establish the prevalence or overall direction of organizational change.

> *"... not much has improved... the one thing i will say is they finally gave us proper access to sandbox this quarter, before that we were testing on live extracts which was mad. Everything else is same. No training, no playbook, we make it up per engagement and call it method" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Compared with the reconciliations programme I carried two years ago, the firm has become more willing to price an outcome rather than a headcount, and our review capability for work that does not come out identical each run is stronger, there is a functioning second-read process now which we did not have then." -Portfolio Director, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"We ran a similar recruiting program two years ago with almost no support behind it. This time we had a solutions team on the calls from week one, which is a real change. Staffing the roles still takes longer than it should." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

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AI Technology

AI technology was rated markedly higher than the three categories covering the two firms. Its 20 indicators had a mean of 4.60 across the 150 engagements, about one point higher than financial institution readiness, co-management, and vendor capability. Distressed ratings made up 5,113 of their 15,911 answers (32.14%), against about half in those categories. The rating remained under the midpoint of the scale. The indicators of the category were associated with cancellation as closely as any in the study, from r = −0.69 to r = −0.63 (n = 150 engagements each).

Table 2.6. The indicators of AI technology, from the lowest mean rating

Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share
1.1 Production Readiness Within Limits Managed by Hand	4.54	257 of 802	32.04%
5.2 Handling of Sensitive Data in Outputs, Logs, and Connected Systems	4.54	259 of 800	32.38%
2.4 End-to-End Reliability on Multi-Step Tasks	4.55	254 of 782	32.48%
2.2 Accuracy of Citations and References Against Source	4.55	265 of 791	33.50%
6.1 Agent Action Beyond Authorized Scope	4.56	253 of 789	32.07%
7.1 Testability of Agent Behavior Before Go-Live	4.56	259 of 792	32.70%
5.3 Resistance to Hostile Instructions Embedded in Content	4.56	261 of 812	32.14%
3.3 Integrity of Persistent Memory Against Contamination	4.57	257 of 806	31.89%
8.2 Explainability of Outputs to Audit Depth	4.57	262 of 800	32.75%
7.2 Stability of Tool Behavior When Nothing Changed	4.57	263 of 797	33.00%
8.3 Logs and Telemetry Insufficient to Locate Failure	4.57	255 of 796	32.04%
4.2 Efficiency of Token Use Under Retries and Loops	4.58	255 of 788	32.36%
2.3 Inconsistency of Output Across Repeated Runs	4.58	259 of 800	32.38%
5.1 Isolation of Information Between Financial Institutions and Sessions	4.58	244 of 791	30.85%

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Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share
3.1 Retention of Instructions Across Long Tasks and Sessions	4.58	252 of 796	31.66%
4.1 Predictability of Token Consumption	4.59	249 of 795	31.32%
2.1 Factual Reliability Sustained by Unrecorded Human Correction	4.59	258 of 796	32.41%
8.1 False Completion in the Tools' Reports of Their Own Success	4.60	251 of 786	31.93%
3.2 Capture of Material Facts Within Long Documents	4.61	248 of 805	30.81%
6.2 Reliability of Built-In Guardrails in Production	4.66	252 of 787	32.02%

Mean ratings in Table 2.6 are computed across respondents. The category figure of 4.60 is computed across engagements.

Respondents described human review and correction as important components of effective tool use. Staff reported correcting outputs, rerunning tasks, dividing complex workflows into shorter steps, and reviewing results before delivery. Some accounts stated that these interventions were not recorded and that corrected results were attributed to the agent. Part 5 examines the reporting implications in detail.

> *“i correct it most times we use it, seven out of ten... my Lead know, client does not. in truth none of it feel reliable enough for what this is meant to be for, KYC.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Financial crime and client onboarding*

Accounts of inaccurate completion reports, limited explanations, and incomplete logs raise questions about the evidence available for oversight. These findings concern reported experience. The study did not independently audit system behavior or institutional control records.

> *“The vendor's weekly deal-status report used the agent's self-reported completion percentage for data-room review without sampling actual output, so a data room the agent had barely parsed correctly still showed as '90 percent reviewed' heading into the client update.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

The survey invited comment on the tools, and 466 of the 850 respondents (54.82%) wrote one. Many were favorable within limits. Respondents described tools that read documents well, completed short tasks without intervention, and held their guardrails, and then named the limits they managed around by hand.

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The two on security is not about a leak… the tool pulled a client name into a working note it had no business writing to. Nothing left the building, but I had to clear it. On reliability, a six step attribution run does five steps right then quietly drops the currency effect at the end, and never says it dropped anything. Reading a long factsheet it is fine. Chaining is where it falls over”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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1 Production Readiness of the Tools

Respondents could value the AI tools while describing limitations that required shorter tasks, repeated instructions, or human review before production use. The overall production-readiness indicator provides a summary assessment of the tools as experienced on the engagement.

1.1 Perceived Production Readiness

INDICATOR C171 · RATE THE OVERALL PRODUCTION READINESS OF THE AI TOOLS FOR BANK-GRADE WORK AS EXPERIENCED ON THIS ENGAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Favorable accounts of AI production readiness were often conditional on shorter tasks, repeated instructions, additional runs, or human review. The mean rating was 4.5 and the median 5.0 (n = 802 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the tools' readiness lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 3.1, n = 305 respondents).

Figure 2.65. Perceived Production Readiness: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the overall production readiness of the AI tools for bank-grade work as experienced on this engagement”.

Distressed ratings: 257 of 802 answers (32.04%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 619): 4.40. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.92. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.35. Build-Out (n = 167): 5.49. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 5.51. Production (n = 96): 5.20. Canceled (n = 305): 3.06.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

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Production readiness of the tools showed an association with every core study measure, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned one. Engagements that rated the tools more ready had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.69, 95% CI −0.77 to −0.60, n = 150 engagements), the largest observed absolute cancellation coefficient among the 100 indicators. This descriptive ordering does not establish a significant difference between coefficients. Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where the tools were rated more ready (r = 0.64, 95% CI 0.50 to 0.74, n = 94 engagements). A higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the readiness indicator, accompanied tools rated more ready (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the tools more ready reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.67, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.61, n = 756 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 257 of the 802 answers (32.04%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 36 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing production readiness numbered 79, and 60 were positive and 15 negative. No other of the 100 indicators with 30 or more written responses had a lower share of negative responses. Respondents described tools that worked, and then named the limits they managed around. Those limits were instructions dropped on long runs, tasks reported complete that were not, results that varied between runs, and citations to the wrong source. The negative responses described correcting most of the tools' output.

> *“Tools have not been our trouble on this one, they have run a whole quarter without me thinking about them, which I did not expect going in. Only thing I would note is an agent once reached for a settlement screen it had no business in, sandbox caught it, but that is what I watch for.” - Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“Two things would have to change before I would put this in front of a client executive again. First, the same question asked twice should produce the same answer twice ... Second, the assistant reads the front of a policy document and the back of it and misses what sits in the middle, which is usually where the exceptions live. Everything else is manageable.” -Portfolio Director, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“asking me to rate production readiness on 1 to 10 is not so simple, the tool handle long access reports well and finish multi step job properly, but same job on Tuesday and Thursday do not behave same, one number cannot hold both of these” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“The tools are if I am honest fine, i have no big complaint there. It reports the run as complete when a figure in the middle of the pack is missing... so i still read every page myself. That checking is what eats my day, not the modelling.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

More negative written sentiment about production readiness was associated with cancellation and higher intent to leave. Favorable accounts were often conditional on shorter tasks, repeated instructions,

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additional runs, or human review. These conditions help explain how respondents could value the tools while identifying operational limitations.

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2 Output Reliability and Nondeterminism

Reported factual errors, unsupported references, inconsistent runs, and incomplete tasks made verification and correction recurring delivery activities. Four indicators assess factual reliability before human review, citation accuracy, consistency across repeated runs, and end-to-end reliability on multistep tasks. These dimensions distinguish whether an output is correct from whether the process producing it is consistent and complete.

> *"Nothing about the AI output is repeatable either, it flags different vendors each run, so I change the result myself and paper it afterwards, or sometimes not at all." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Respondents described verification and correction as recurring delivery activities. Part 5 examines whether manual alteration was recorded and disclosed.

2.1 Factual Reliability Before Human Review

INDICATOR C157 · RATE THE FACTUAL RELIABILITY OF THE AI TOOLS' OUTPUTS ON THIS ENGAGEMENT BEFORE ANY HUMAN REVIEW · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described correcting factual errors in AI outputs before use, with those corrections not consistently recorded or disclosed to the financial institution. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 796 respondents). Factual reliability was weakest on canceled engagements, where the mean rating was 3.1 (n = 302 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.66. Factual Reliability Before Human Review: associations with the study measures

Factual reliability before human review: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate the factual reliability of the AI tools' outputs on this engagement before any human review".

Distressed ratings: 258 of 796 answers (32.41%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 613): 4.44. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.97. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.74. Build-Out (n = 163): 5.49. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 5.55. Production (n = 96): 5.33. Canceled (n = 302): 3.13.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every association of the factual reliability of the tools' output with the four core study measures held, in each of the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose tools were rated more reliable had a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.67, 95% CI −0.75 to −0.57, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where output was rated more reliable (r = 0.65, 95% CI 0.52 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). Factual reliability also tracked the engagement indicator mean computed without it (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the output more reliable reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.70 to −0.60, n = 746 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 258 of the 796 answers (32.41%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 30 of the 150 engagements.

The indicator was the subject of 628 written responses across 14 survey questions, the largest written base of any of the 100 indicators, and 548 of the 628 were negative. In answer to the operational questions, respondents described output that staff corrected before it went on, usually because the same input gave a different result on another run. The corrections were seldom logged, and in many accounts the financial institution was not told. In comment on the tools, respondents described invented content, runs reported complete that were not, and logs that could not show why.

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> *"i keep a sheet of every generated test case we had to rewrite by hand, about sixty percent of them at this point. before any client demo i run the old regression pack myself instead of the generated one, because that one i trust. The study is not in any process document, it is only mine ... " - Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"My people stopped trusting it around month four and that is hard to walk back ... Two of my best case handlers asked to move off the queue because they felt they were doing the same job twice, once by hand and once for the tool. I lost them. That cost isnt anywhere in these questions and it was the real cost." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"one saturday it matched a 40,000 dollar break to wrong account and marked it closed. i found it monday only because the cash didnt tie. it never flagged anything, the log say completed. after that i tie the cash myself before anything is signed, kindly there is no other way." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"I correct AI output on vendor exceptions most days, team lead knows about it. ... so if I don't catch it nobody else will." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

More negative written sentiment was associated with lower satisfaction among active engagements, cancellation, and higher intent to leave. Respondents' accounts of manual correction and attribution of corrected output to agents are examined in Part 5.

2.2 Accuracy of Citations and References Against Source

INDICATOR C158 · RATE THE ACCURACY OF CITATIONS, REFERENCES, AND QUOTATIONS THE TOOLS PRODUCED AGAINST THE REAL SOURCES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Inaccurate citations, references, and quotations in AI output required respondents to check the claimed support against the actual sources. The mean rating was 4.5 and the median 5.0 (n = 791 respondents). Citation accuracy received a mean rating of 3.2 on canceled engagements (n = 301 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.67. Accuracy of Citations and References Against Source: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the accuracy of citations, references, and quotations the tools produced against the real sources”.

Distressed ratings: 265 of 791 answers (33.50%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 611): 4.42. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.90. Portfolio director (n = 29): 5.45. Build-Out (n = 163): 5.44. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 233): 5.35. Production (n = 94): 5.34. Canceled (n = 301): 3.20.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Citation accuracy was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Engagements with more accurate citations had lower observed cancellation rates (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where citations were rated more accurate (r = 0.65, 95% CI 0.52 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). Where citations were more accurate, the engagement indicator mean computed without the citation indicator was higher (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated citations more accurate (r = −0.64, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.58, n = 746 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 265 of the 791 answers (33.50%), the highest distressed share among the 20 indicators of AI technology, and the engagement mean was distressed on 32 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing citations numbered 36, nearly all in comment on the tools, and 31 of the 36 were negative. Respondents described citations to clauses, sections, and values that did not exist, and citations to real documents that did not say what the output claimed. The response was to check every reference by hand.

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> *"When the tool drafts a payment arrangement it quotes the collections guidance back at the customer, chapter and clause, and roughly one time in five that clause does not say what the tool says it says. Twice it invented a paragraph number that does not exist. On a hardship call, with a customer who is already frightened, that is not a small error, it is a compliance breach with a recording attached to it." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"every early-warning narrative the tool writes goes to an analyst with the source spreadsheet open beside it, and each figure it quotes is checked back to the filing it claims to come from. Roughly a third of the references do not survive that ... Please note none of this is in any process document, it is simply what my team have worked out between them." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"every note that comes out i have to open each source link myself, and maybe one in five is pointing to some other report or a page that do not say what it claims. so a draft that took the tool ten minutes takes me an hour to trust." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"it says the case is reviewed and complete, then i open it and two transactions it quoted are not in the file at all. So now i check every one, even the ones it gets right" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"I keep a text file of the consent Policy references and paste the right one in after, because the tool quotes clauses that don't exist." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Written sentiment about citations showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Respondents described reference checking as an additional workload, sometimes greater than the effort required to draft the material.

2.3 Inconsistency of Output Across Repeated Runs

INDICATOR C159 · RATE THE CONSISTENCY OF THE TOOLS' OUTPUTS WHEN GIVEN THE SAME INPUT AND INSTRUCTIONS MORE THAN ONCE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Repeated runs with the same input and instructions were reported to produce different outputs, requiring staff to select or correct a result before use. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 800 respondents). The mean rating of consistency on canceled engagements, 3.2 (n = 309 respondents), was lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.68. Inconsistency of Output Across Repeated Runs: associations with the study measures

Inconsistency of output across repeated runs: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate the consistency of the tools' outputs when given the same input and instructions more than once".

Distressed ratings: 259 of 800 answers (32.38%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 617): 4.46. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.90. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.42. Build-Out (n = 165): 5.38. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 230): 5.54. Production (n = 96): 5.42. Canceled (n = 309): 3.17.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The consistency of output across repeated runs showed an association with each of the four core study measures that survived all applicable robustness checks. Engagements with more consistent output had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.55, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements with more consistent output reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.52 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). Consistency was also closely associated with the engagement indicator mean computed without it (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated output more consistent reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.63, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.57, n = 750 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 259 of the 800 answers (32.38%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 33 of the 150 engagements.

The indicator was the subject of 383 written responses, and 363 of the 383 were negative. Respondents described the same input producing a different result on another run. Staff would not sign off such output as it stood. They chose among the runs, or corrected the output by hand before it went on.

> *"Our practice now is to run it all twice, sometimes three times, and only action flags that come up in both runs. Sounds wasteful and it is, but its the only way my leads trust the list." - Engagement Manager, CXM, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

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> *"One suitability review last month, the tool read a forty page advisory file and missed a risk tolerance change recorded in the middle of it, then found the same change on a second run of the same file. Instruction retention was never our problem, consistency between runs is." - Engagement Manager, CXM, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"same dispute file was run two times last week, first time it picks reason code 13.1, second time 12.5. Input was not changed. i check both against the network extract by myself." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"These question ask me to rate reliability from 1 to 10, but tool is not wrong in a steady way, one run it match everything and next run it invent a counterparty that does not exist. There is no number for that, i put 1 because 1 is the lowest you gave" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"we did not touch anything on our side for three weeks and the same role mapping request came back approved one day and flagged the next... so now I run it twice before I trust it." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Written evidence on output consistency was associated with all four study measures. Engagements with a negative response had higher cancellation rates and, among active engagements, lower customer satisfaction. More negative sentiment was also associated with cancellation and higher intent to leave. Respondents described selecting or correcting outputs when repeated runs disagreed.

2.4 End-to-End Reliability on Multistep Tasks

INDICATOR C160 · RATE THE END-TO-END RELIABILITY OF THE TOOLS ON MULTI-STEP TASKS, FROM FIRST STEP TO FINISHED OUTPUT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described tools that completed individual steps but omitted work in longer tasks and nevertheless reported the full task as complete. The mean rating was 4.5 and the median 5.0 (n = 782 respondents). On canceled engagements, multistep reliability was rated lower than on active engagements in any stage (mean 3.2, n = 297 respondents).

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Figure 2.69. End-to-End Reliability on Multistep Tasks: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the end-to-end reliability of the tools on multi-step tasks, from first step to finished output”.

Distressed ratings: 254 of 782 answers (32.48%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 602): 4.39. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.99. Portfolio director (n = 29): 5.34. Build-Out (n = 167): 5.44. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 230): 5.39. Production (n = 88): 5.35. Canceled (n = 297): 3.15.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the reliability of the tools on multistep tasks, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Cancellation was less common where multistep reliability was rated higher (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.55, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where long tasks ran reliably (r = 0.65, 95% CI 0.52 to 0.75, n = 94 engagements). Multi-step reliability was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the multistep indicator (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated multistep reliability higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.59, n = 741 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 254 of the 782 answers (32.48%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 36 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing multistep reliability numbered 51, nearly all in comment on the tools, with 36 negative and 13 positive. Respondents described tools that handled single steps well and lost a step or the thread on long chains, and then reported the run complete. Teams responded by cutting each task into single steps with a person between them.

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> *"What we do now is cut the work into single steps, because the tool cannot hold a case together end to end. It reads the alert, we stop it, an analyst checks, then it drafts the narrative, we stop it again. Nothing runs more than one hop unattended ... Every narrative is rewritten by a person anyway, so what the tool actually saves us is the first paragraph." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"On a long inquiry it will do the first two steps correctly and then lose the thread completely, and there is no way to prove beforehand which ones it will finish, consequently somebody must sit with every single case" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"We stopped letting it run a validation end to end. It goes in four pieces now, and somebody on my team signs off each piece before the next one starts, which in a bad week is slower than doing the work by hand." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"Practically it means I cannot promise my processors a finish time. A run that clears three hundred reports one night sits there the next, and because the tool reports itself as done either way, someone has to eyeball the queue before we go home, which lands on the same two people every week" -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The vendor excludes settlement runs that failed mid-cycle from the reported success rate, so the dashboard only ever shows completed cycles and never the ones agents had to abandon and hand back to a human." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

More negative written sentiment about multistep tasks was associated with higher intent to leave. Accounts described both incomplete execution and inaccurate completion reports. The latter could make incomplete work harder to detect, although the study did not compare the costs of these two failure modes.

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“

My four on the consistency question is really about one thing, which is that the same alert given twice does not always come back with the same verdict. On a phishing bundle it will call it benign in one pass and suspicious in the next, and my analysts then have to decide which pass they believe. Everything else, the multi step enrichment, the pulling of indicators from the ticket, that part works better than I expect at this stage. But the inconsistency is what my team feels, so it pulls the whole section down for me.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

“

Asking for one number on reliability doesn't work here. On a password reset the tool is near perfect; on a benefits question that spans three policies it falls apart at step four. Those are not the same product.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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3 Memory, Context, and Retention

Loss, omission, or reuse of incorrect information was reported to require repeated instructions, shorter sessions, source review, or manual correction. Three indicators assess retention of earlier instructions, retrieval of material facts from long documents, and the integrity of persistent memory. These capabilities concern different ways in which information can be omitted, lost, or incorrectly reused during agent operation.

Respondents described restating instructions, shortening sessions, dividing documents, and reviewing source material to compensate for perceived limitations.

> *"Here a joiner-mover-leaver run goes on for an hour across four systems, and somewhere in the middle the agent quietly loses the exception we set at the start, so a contractor keeps birthright access he should not have." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

3.1 Retention of Instructions Across Long Tasks and Sessions

INDICATOR C164 · RATE HOW RELIABLY THE TOOLS RETAINED INSTRUCTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS GIVEN EARLIER IN LONG TASKS AND SESSIONS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Loss of earlier instructions during long tasks or sessions led respondents to describe repeating constraints or shortening the work assigned to agents. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 796 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated retention lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 3.2, n = 306 respondents).

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Figure 2.70. Retention of Instructions Across Long Tasks and Sessions: associations with the study measures

Retention of instructions across long tasks and sessions: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: “Rate how reliably the tools retained instructions and constraints given earlier in long tasks and sessions”.

Distressed ratings: 252 of 796 answers (31.66%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 613): 4.46. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.86. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.52. Build-Out (n = 161): 5.30. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 228): 5.54. Production (n = 101): 5.54. Canceled (n = 306): 3.18.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The retention of instructions across long tasks and sessions was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose tools retained instructions better had lower observed cancellation rates (r = −0.67, 95% CI −0.75 to −0.57, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where retention was rated stronger (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.56 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the retention indicator, was higher where retention was rated stronger (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated retention higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.64, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.70 to −0.58, n = 748 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 252 of the 796 answers (31.66%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 39 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing retention numbered 66, all in comment on the tools, with 49 negative and 17 positive. Respondents described tools that lost an instruction given at the start of a long task or session, and teams that restated the instructions or cut each task short to compensate.

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> *“the tool is fine on two step and useless on six step, so what number is that ... and it forgets the rule i gave at start, everytime, by the end it does what it likes.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“My only reservation, and it is minor, is that long-running sessions do drift from constraints given early on, so the team resets context more often than I would like. That is a small price against what we had before.” -Portfolio Director, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“The mandate constraints go into a short file that the analyst pastes in again at every stage... it is not elegant but the drafting agent forgets them by the third section otherwise.” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *“it makes my week longer, not shorter. i give it the suppression rule in the morning and by evening it forget them, so i recheck every triage note myself before shift end, my team also do same” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“For a POC the bot holds up fine, it remembers what you told it earlier in long chats.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Written sentiment about instruction retention showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Respondents described repeated instructions and shorter sessions as compensating practices.

3.2 Capture of Material Facts Within Long Documents

INDICATOR C165 · RATE HOW COMPLETELY THE TOOLS CAPTURED MATERIAL FACTS LOCATED ANYWHERE IN LONG DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING MID-DOCUMENT CONTENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Some tools were reported to miss material facts in the middle of long documents, leaving staff to review the source themselves. The mean rating was 4.61 and the median 5.0 (n = 805 respondents). Capture of material facts received a mean rating of 3.2 on canceled engagements (n = 300 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.71. Capture of Material Facts Within Long Documents: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how completely the tools captured material facts located anywhere in long documents, including mid-document content".

Distressed ratings: 248 of 805 answers (30.81%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 623): 4.47. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.01. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.43. Build-Out (n = 164): 5.48. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 241): 5.45. Production (n = 100): 5.38. Canceled (n = 300): 3.21.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Complete capture of material facts in long documents accompanied more favorable results on all four core study measures, each confirmed by the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common where capture was rated more complete (r = −0.66, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where capture was rated more complete (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.53 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). Complete capture accompanied a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the capture indicator (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated capture higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.67, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.62, n = 755 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 248 of the 805 answers (30.81%), the lowest distressed share among the 20 indicators of AI technology, and the engagement mean was distressed on 35 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing long documents numbered 53, all in comment on the tools, with 35 negative and 18 positive. Respondents described tools that read the opening and the close of a long document and missed material content in between, and staff who read the source themselves to close the gap.

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> *"I don't use the summary anymore, I pull the page numbers it cites and read those myself. Anything in the middle of a long agreement it skips, so I go through the schedules by hand at the end. Takes longer than not using it." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"For this to work the tool must read whole contract, not first two page and last one. Half the vendor terms sit in middle and it miss them every time. Fix that first, then talk about autonomy." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Last month it missed a side letter clause sitting in middle of a 60 page LPA and answered the question wrong... And the answer read perfectly fine, that is what unsettles me" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Two weeks back it read a forty page trust deed and missed a clause on page twenty two about co-trustee approval, it took everything from first pages only. I only catch it because number of signatories look wrong to me." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"We changed the prompt so it must give the page number for every finding it reports. Then the reviewer can go straight to that page instead of reading the whole file again. It finds things buried in the middle of a long record very well, but on its own it will not tell you where it got them from" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

Written sentiment about long-document processing showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Accounts described omissions from the middle of documents and subsequent manual source review. They do not establish the frequency of such omissions across all tasks.

3.3 Integrity of Persistent Memory Against Contamination

INDICATOR C166 · RATE THE INTEGRITY OF THE TOOLS' PERSISTENT MEMORY AGAINST CONTAMINATION BY INCORRECT OR MALICIOUS CONTENT ENCOUNTERED DURING WORK · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The small written-answer set on persistent memory described incorrect content being stored and reused until a person identified and removed it. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 806 respondents). The integrity of memory was weakest on canceled engagements, where the mean rating was 3.1 (n = 305 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.72. Integrity of Persistent Memory Against Contamination: associations with the study measures

Integrity of persistent memory against contamination: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate the integrity of the tools' persistent memory against contamination by incorrect or malicious content encountered during work".

Distressed ratings: 257 of 806 answers (31.89%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 625): 4.45. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.90. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.30. Build-Out (n = 160): 5.49. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 242): 5.50. Production (n = 99): 5.22. Canceled (n = 305): 3.12.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Across all four core study measures, the integrity of persistent memory showed associations that survived the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose tools were rated higher for memory integrity had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.68, 95% CI −0.76 to −0.58, n = 150 engagements), the second-largest observed absolute cancellation coefficient among the 100 indicators. This is a descriptive ordering. Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where memory integrity was rated higher (r = 0.64, 95% CI 0.51 to 0.75, n = 94 engagements). Memory integrity was likewise associated with a higher engagement indicator mean computed without it (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated memory integrity higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.59, n = 760 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 257 of the 806 answers (31.89%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 32 of the 150 engagements.

Nine written responses addressed persistent memory, all in comments about the tools. Eight were negative. They described incorrect content stored and reused until a person identified and removed it. This small sample provides illustrative evidence only.

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"It reads a custodian statement with a bad line in it, and that wrong shape stays with it for the next file... we have had to clear the memory twice and nobody could tell us what else went with it." - Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

"once it learns a wrong routing it keeps repeating the same wrong routing, and it is confident every time. so my team stopped believing it and we started checking every batch by hand first thing in the morning, which is nearly two extra hours on the shift and it is not counted anywhere." - Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications

"It should forget the old sample once the cycle close. Twice it carried last month's exception rule into the new run and we did not see it" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

"I start a new session for every batch now, the old one carries wrong answers forward and repeats them." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"Only the memory part bothers me. it keeps an old answer from a previous DDQ and reuses it even when the fund is different" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

The structured ratings assess perceived memory integrity. They do not estimate the prevalence of the specific failure or remedy described in these nine accounts.

"

Half of these ask me to rate things we had no way to observe... Rate quality of logs. There were almost no logs, so is that a one or is it not applicable. Memory contamination the same, we would only learn of it when a figure came out wrong, and at that point I am looking at the figure, not at the tool. What I can answer properly is that it loses constraints given forty minutes earlier, and in submission work that is not small."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

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4 Token Consumption and Cost Predictability

Unexplained variation and limited visibility into repeated processing made token consumption difficult for some respondents to forecast or explain. Tokens are the units of text processed by the model. Two indicators assess the predictability of token consumption and the efficiency of token use after retries, loops, and reprocessing. The distinction separates the ability to forecast consumption from the amount of computational work required to complete a task.

The limited written evidence emphasizes unexplained variation and poor visibility into repeated processing. Such conditions could complicate budgeting, but the study did not measure token costs or establish their financial effect.

> *"On a news heavy day the same lead volume costs us three times what it did the week before and nobody can tell me why in advance, so I cant plan a month." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Client servicing and communications*

4.1 Predictability of Token Consumption

INDICATOR C161 · RATE THE PREDICTABILITY OF THE TOOLS' TOKEN CONSUMPTION FOR A GIVEN VOLUME OF WORK · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Variable token consumption for the same volume of work left respondents describing difficulty forecasting and explaining expenditure. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 4.0 (n = 795 respondents). On canceled engagements, the predictability of token consumption was rated lower than on active engagements in any stage (mean 3.2, n = 305 respondents).

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Figure 2.73. Predictability of Token Consumption: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the predictability of the tools' token consumption for a given volume of work".

Distressed ratings: 249 of 795 answers (31.32%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 617): 4.46. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.92. Portfolio director (n = 27): 5.63. Build-Out (n = 160): 5.51. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 231): 5.47. Production (n = 99): 5.33. Canceled (n = 305): 3.21.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the predictability of token consumption, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Engagements whose token consumption was more predictable had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where consumption was rated more predictable (r = 0.62, 95% CI 0.48 to 0.73, n = 94 engagements). Predictability and the engagement indicator mean computed without it were closely correlated (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated predictability higher (r = −0.64, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.70 to −0.58, n = 749 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 249 of the 795 answers (31.32%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 32 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing predictability numbered 30, all in comment on the tools, with 20 negative and 10 positive. Respondents described the same volume of work costing different amounts from one run to the next, with no explanation afterward and no estimate before the run.

> *"We could never say up front what a run was going to cost or how long it would sit there. Same job, same rule set, one day it burns through everything and the next day it's fine. Nobody could explain that to me and I asked twice." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

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> *"I also get asked by our own management why the spend moves week to week, and I have nothing sensible to tell them. Credit where it is due, it does find the one line buried in the middle of a forty page spec, which my people would miss." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"But the cost side is hard to plan, a job that ran cheap on Monday runs three times heavier on Thursday on the same volume. What would help is a simple estimate before the run, so we can hold it back if the number looks silly." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The caveat is only cost. Same batch of purchase orders can cost twice as much one day to the next depending how many times it loops, and nobody can tell me in advance." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Written sentiment about consumption predictability showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Respondents' concerns centered on forecasting and explaining expenditure rather than consistently describing its absolute level as excessive.

4.2 Efficiency of Token Use Under Retries and Loops

INDICATOR C162 · RATE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE TOOLS' TOKEN USE, CONSIDERING RETRIES, LOOPS, AND REPROCESSING NEEDED TO COMPLETE WORK · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Retries, loops, and reprocessing were reported to increase token use without sufficiently visible counts to explain the additional consumption. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 788 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements gave token efficiency a mean rating of 3.2 (n = 299 respondents), lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.74. Efficiency of Token Use Under Retries and Loops: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the efficiency of the tools' token use, considering retries, loops, and reprocessing needed to complete work".

Distressed ratings: 255 of 788 answers (32.36%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 605): 4.43. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.95. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.65. Build-Out (n = 159): 5.38. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 5.51. Production (n = 94): 5.32. Canceled (n = 299): 3.18.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every association of the efficiency of token use with the four core study measures held, in each of the applicable robustness checks. More efficient token use was associated with a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.66, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements whose tools used tokens more efficiently reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.67, 95% CI 0.54 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean computed without the efficiency indicator was strongly correlated with it (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated token use more efficient reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.63, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.57, n = 740 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 255 of the 788 answers (32.36%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 33 of the 150 engagements.

Of the 24 written responses addressing token efficiency, 18 were negative and 5 positive. Nearly all appeared in comments about the tools. Respondents described repeated processing without visible retry counts, limiting their ability to explain increases in consumption.

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“Every time a pipeline job failed halfway we paid for the whole run again, and we were doing that three or four times a day. i raised about this each week.” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

“For the bigger cost centre runs i break the model into three smaller passes and run them separately, otherwise it loops and burns the whole day's budget. The finance leads never see this, it is simply how we run it now” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

“one, the tool should tell us when it retried, right now a job that looped eleven times looks exactly the same as one that went through clean.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

“in week one it got through the cert checks clean. now it stalls on the same file and nobody touched anything on our side... also nine retries on one submission, whatever that costs. i dont see the bill.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes

“First the retry behaviour on long policy lookups, at present one unanswered query can spin four or five times and we only see the cost at month end.” -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

Among 13 active engagements represented in the relevant comparison, a negative written response was associated with higher customer satisfaction, contrary to the structured-rating association. This small-sample result is exploratory and does not establish that inefficient token use improves satisfaction. Other written-sentiment tests were not statistically significant.

“

For my team the issue is not accuracy, it is what checking does to the day. My processors now spend the morning reviewing confidence flags on scanned invoices instead of working exceptions. And the tool retries itself in loops, so the volume they see is bigger than volume that came in. Nobody outside delivery counts that time. But it is real hours and my people feel it at month end.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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5 Data Isolation, Sensitive Data, and Adversarial Input

Written accounts identified unintended information exposure and instructions embedded in incoming content, with staff detecting or compensating for failures. Three indicators assess separation of financial institution and session information, handling of sensitive data, and resistance to hostile instructions embedded in processed content. They address confidentiality and instruction handling at different points in the workflow.

The 63 written responses include accounts of information appearing in an unintended context, sensitive fields retained in accessible logs, and tools following instructions embedded in incoming material. These are respondent-reported incidents rather than independently verified security findings.

The accounts warrant attention to incident detection and escalation. Two respondents reported receiving no further information after raising a concern. This does not establish whether an investigation or remediation occurred.

> *"also once i saw another clients name inside my session output, i reported it, no feedbacks after."*
> *-Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

5.1 Isolation of Information Between Financial Institutions and Sessions

INDICATOR C163 · RATE HOW COMPLETELY THE TOOLS KEPT EACH CLIENT'S AND EACH SESSION'S INFORMATION ISOLATED FROM EVERY OTHER CLIENT AND SESSION · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Some written accounts described information from another financial institution or session appearing in the respondent's work, usually identified before release. Respondents answered the question "Rate how completely the tools kept each client's and each session's information isolated from every other client and session." The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 791 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated isolation lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 3.2, n = 299 respondents).

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Figure 2.75. Isolation of Information Between Financial Institutions and Sessions: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how completely the tools kept each client's and each session's information isolated from every other client and session".

Distressed ratings: 244 of 791 answers (30.85%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 608): 4.44. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.98. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.42. Build-Out (n = 160): 5.42. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 5.46. Production (n = 97): 5.36. Canceled (n = 299): 3.19.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The applicable robustness checks left intact each association between information isolation and the four core study measures. Engagements whose tools kept information isolated had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.63, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.52, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where isolation was rated more complete (r = 0.70, 95% CI 0.57 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the isolation indicator, was higher too (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated isolation higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.60, n = 745 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 244 of the 791 answers (30.85%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 33 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing isolation numbered 26, all in comment on the tools, with 18 negative, 5 positive, and 3 neutral. Respondents described information from another account, mandate, or session appearing in their work, in most cases caught by the respondent before it went out.

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> *"last month the tool pull a name from another client file into my summary, i notice only because address was wrong country... and nobody could tell me after how it got there" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"i also saw another account's details come up in a session that had nothing to do with it. i reported that one. nothing came back to me about it" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"the forecast pack came back with a cost centre in it that belongs to another client, i had to delete it myself before anyone saw. previous engagement was plain reporting and this never happen there, the tool stayed inside its own box. here i am opening every tab looking for things that should not be there" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"though it carries details over from the previous file sometimes, last week a corporate mandate note turned up on a trust case. Small thing, we catch the same before it goes out." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Data separation is the one part that never worried me, client information stayed where it should." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

Written sentiment about information isolation showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Accounts described staff detecting unexpected information and adopting compensating work practices. They do not establish the adequacy of all technical confidentiality controls.

5.2 Handling of Sensitive Data in Outputs, Logs, and Connected Systems

INDICATOR C169 · RATE HOW SAFELY THE TOOLS HANDLED SENSITIVE DATA, WITH NO EXPOSURE THROUGH OUTPUTS, LOGS, OR CONNECTED SYSTEMS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described sensitive data appearing in accessible logs or unintended outputs and manual removal of fields before processing as a compensating practice. The mean rating was 4.5 and the median 4.0 (n = 800 respondents). Sensitive-data handling on canceled engagements had a mean rating of 3.1 (n = 303 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.76. Handling of Sensitive Data in Outputs, Logs, and Connected Systems: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how safely the tools handled sensitive data, with no exposure through outputs, logs, or connected systems”.

Distressed ratings: 259 of 800 answers (32.38%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 619): 4.38. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.02. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.33. Build-Out (n = 165): 5.57. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 5.41. Production (n = 96): 5.29. Canceled (n = 303): 3.06.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The safe handling of sensitive data was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common where sensitive data was handled more safely (r = −0.67, 95% CI −0.75 to −0.57, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where handling was rated more secure (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.53 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). Safe handling of sensitive data accompanied a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the handling indicator (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated the handling more secure (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.59, n = 751 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 259 of the 800 answers (32.38%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 37 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing sensitive data numbered 28, all but one in comment on the tools, with 22 negative and 6 positive. Respondents described sensitive data written into logs that others could open, and data appearing in outputs where it did not belong, found by people and not by the guardrails. Teams responded by stripping sensitive fields before anything reached the tool.

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> *"when i opened the log to see what it matched, the log has account numbers in full, unmasked, sitting in a folder half the floor can open. i raised both, thus the cost one got fixed" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Unpublished branch numbers and staff cost lines go into the prompt and sit in the log afterwards, anyone with access can read them. That is why i mark it lowest" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Uneasy is the word. An offboarding summary came out with another employee's benefits line in it, wrong person entirely... I caught it before it went to the HRBP. Nothing in the logs showed where that record came from, I could not even show my lead what happened" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Last month we ask the agent to make test datas for the pricing screen. It writes real investor account numbers into the sample file because it picks them from a UAT extract it should not touch. Nothing goes outside, we catch it in review same day and raise a ticket. But the guardrail is supposed to stop this and it does not." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

More negative written sentiment about sensitive-data handling was associated with higher intent to leave. The accounts identified accessible logs and information drawn from an unintended record as potential exposure pathways.

5.3 Resistance to Hostile Instructions Embedded in Content

INDICATOR C167 · RATE THE TOOLS' RESISTANCE TO HOSTILE INSTRUCTIONS EMBEDDED IN THE CONTENT THEY READ AND PROCESS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The small written-answer set on hostile instructions described agents acting on instructions embedded in the documents, messages, or files they processed. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 812 respondents). Resistance to hostile instructions received a mean rating of 3.2 on canceled engagements (n = 307 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.77. Resistance to Hostile Instructions Embedded in Content: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the tools’ resistance to hostile instructions embedded in the content they read and process”.

Distressed ratings: 261 of 812 answers (32.14%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 630): 4.44. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.87. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.40. Build-Out (n = 170): 5.46. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 239): 5.47. Production (n = 96): 5.21. Canceled (n = 307): 3.16.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

On each of the four core study measures, engagements whose tools resisted hostile instructions showed more favorable results, and the applicable robustness checks confirmed every association. Their cancellation rate was lower (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.55, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements whose tools resisted such instructions reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.53 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). A higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the resistance indicator, was found where resistance was rated stronger (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated resistance higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.64, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.58, n = 767 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 261 of the 812 answers (32.14%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 34 of the 150 engagements.

Nine written responses addressed hostile instructions, all in comments about the tools, and all were negative. Several described an agent acting on an instruction embedded in a document, message, or file. Three also described insufficient explanatory logs. These accounts provide illustrative evidence only.

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“A remittance narrative on an incoming file contained a line of text addressed, in effect, to the reader, instructing that the payment be treated as previously cleared. The tool obliged, and it recorded the case as closed with high confidence in its own log, which is the part that troubled me most: not that it was fooled, but that its account of what it had done was confident and wrong, and our reviewer had no way to see the instruction that caused it.” -Portfolio Director, KPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

“In May a user pasted a supplier's automated mail into a ticket and the body of it carried an instruction to close the ticket and mark it resolved, which the agent duly did. Nobody was harmed, it was a printer. But it took our engineers most of a day to show me why it had happened, because the trace stops at the action and does not keep what the agent had read.” -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

“Investor packs come as pdf from all over, and once there is text inside a scanned letter that tell the agent to mark the party as low risk. It follow it. We catch in review but nobody expect a document to give instruction like that.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

“on my earlier project we only summarised documents, thus nobody worried about what is written inside them. here the agent reads client emails and follows whatever is in there.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

“Agent read a config file with instruction inside it and act on that instruction, nobody asked it to. Logs show nothing useful after.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

The reported combination of unintended action and limited traceability identifies a potential control concern for payments and onboarding. The nine accounts do not establish its prevalence or demonstrate that the same vulnerability exists across the tools studied.

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“In fairness to the tools, they were the part of this that mostly worked. They held on to the scoping instructions across a long test cycle, and we never once saw one client's material turn up in another's session, which we did check for. My only real complaint is that when a control test failed it still reported itself complete, so the run log could not be taken at face value.”

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KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

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6 Authorized Action and Guardrails

Reported actions beyond intended scope and safeguards that failed to prevent errors identified separate limits on control of agent behavior. Two indicators assess whether agents acted within their intended authority and whether built-in safeguards operated reliably. Authorized scope and technical safeguards are related but distinct: a control can function as configured while the underlying permissions remain too broad.

Section 2.4, “Authority to Stop a Misbehaving Agent,” under “Co-Management” examines the corresponding governance question of who may suspend an agent's operation.

> *“The incident worth recording is that an agent pulled statements from a second custodian account it had no business touching, because the instruction was loose rather than because a control failed. No harm done, but it should not have been possible.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“AI invented a husband for a widow on her loan application. I looked at the processing logs. I don't know why it thought this was important, or how it created this new person.” -Portfolio Director, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

6.1 Agent Action Beyond Authorized Scope

INDICATOR C168 · RATE HOW CONSISTENTLY THE AGENTS TOOK ONLY INTENDED AND AUTHORIZED ACTIONS WHEN OPERATING CONNECTED TOOLS AND SYSTEMS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of actions beyond authorized scope also identified uncertainty about who could stop an agent, connecting technical permissions with operational ownership. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 789 respondents). Agents on canceled engagements were judged to stay within their authority less consistently (mean 3.2, n = 296 respondents) than agents on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.78. Agent Action Beyond Authorized Scope: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how consistently the agents took only intended and authorized actions when operating connected tools and systems”.

Distressed ratings: 253 of 789 answers (32.07%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 608): 4.44. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.83. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.53. Build-Out (n = 165): 5.41. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 233): 5.43. Production (n = 95): 5.32. Canceled (n = 296): 3.15.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with whether agents kept to authorized actions, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Engagements whose agents kept to authorized actions had a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.66, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where agents stayed within scope (r = 0.65, 95% CI 0.51 to 0.75, n = 94 engagements). Engagements with agents that stayed in scope also scored higher on the engagement indicator mean, computed without this indicator (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower where respondents judged the agents to stay in scope (r = −0.64, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.58, n = 740 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 253 of the 789 answers (32.07%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 37 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing authorized action numbered 64, from eight survey questions, with 48 negative and 16 positive. Respondents described agents that closed tickets and alerts, changed records, and reached into systems they had not been asked to touch, in some cases across dozens of records in one night. Eleven of the responses came from the comments on co-management. Those placed part of

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the problem in the operating model between the two firms, where neither firm could say who was allowed to stop the agent.

> *"In June an agent auto-closed a batch of low severity alerts overnight, we found it next morning, their security lead only heard it from us at stand up. We could stop the thing quickly enough, that part works. What does not work is nobody agreed beforehand it was allowed to close anything, and there is still no joint check on what it closes" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"A password reset agent started closing Tickets by itself and it took us four days to find who on their side could switch it off. Nobody could." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I am tired more than annoyed. agent touch supplier records nobody ask it to, and my team spend Thursday putting them back. Is always us who find it, never Desk" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"last month the agent removed access for a contractor who was still working, nobody catch it until he rings the service desk. But their team fixed it same hour." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The vendor's access-review dashboard reported the agent's own provisioning actions as completed reviews, effectively letting the agent certify its own IAM changes, which masked the over-provisioning until an external audit caught it." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Written sentiment about authorized action showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Accounts described both actions beyond intended scope and uncertainty over authority to stop an agent. These observations suggest a potential interaction between technical permissions and operational ownership, without establishing its causal effect.

6.2 Reliability of Built-In Guardrails in Production

INDICATOR C170 · RATE HOW RELIABLY THE TOOLS' BUILT-IN GUARDRAILS AND SAFETY CONTROLS HELD DURING PRODUCTION USE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Built-in guardrails received the highest mean rating among AI technology indicators, while negative accounts described failures detected by staff after safeguards had not prevented them. The mean rating was 4.66, the highest of the 20 indicators of AI technology, and the median 5.0 (n = 787 respondents). The guardrails, too, were rated lower on canceled engagements than on active engagements in any stage (mean 3.2, n = 292 respondents).

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Figure 2.79. Reliability of Built-In Guardrails in Production: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how reliably the tools’ built-in guardrails and safety controls held during production use”.

Distressed ratings: 252 of 787 answers (32.02%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 606): 4.57. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.86. Portfolio director (n = 29): 5.45. Build-Out (n = 160): 5.52. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 238): 5.64. Production (n = 97): 5.32. Canceled (n = 292): 3.16.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The reliability of the built-in guardrails was associated with all four core study measures, and no robustness check overturned an association. Engagements whose guardrails held more reliably had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.66, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements with more reliable guardrails reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.65, 95% CI 0.52 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the guardrail indicator, was higher as well (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated the guardrails reliable (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.60, n = 742 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 252 of the 787 answers (32.02%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 32 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the guardrails numbered 17, with 10 positive and 7 negative, the reverse of the balance for most of the 100 indicators. Most positive responses said the guardrails had held and placed the respondent's concern elsewhere. The negative responses described guardrails that let through exposed data, prohibited wording, or actions on accounts that required a second review.

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> *"The Bot put an employees home address into a public ticket note in March. Ticket was for a laptop swap. It got scrubbed same day. Guardrails caught nothing, we caught it." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"What is better than I expected is that it holds the guardrails given to it when a long session opens. We told it never to touch the policy admin cluster and it has not, a month now." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Guardrails held throughout and the failure messages were accurate." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"On a straight arrangement it holds up fine, on a hardship case the guardrails let through wording we are not allowed to say to a debtor." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

Written sentiment about safeguards showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. The 17 written responses were more favorable than the structured ratings overall, but their small, self-selected sample is not directly comparable with the full rating sample. Negative accounts described situations in which staff detected failures that safeguards had not prevented.

> *Compared to where we were at go live, the tool now holds the screening instructions across a whole case without being reminded, which was the main complaint from my analysts in the first quarter. Guardrails have held, we have not had an agent act outside its lane once in production. What has not moved is the audit trail. When compliance asks why a particular investor was escalated we can show the flag and the source document, but not the reasoning in the form the auditors want, and on a long multi step case the final step is still the one we check by hand."*
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> BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

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7 Testability and Behavioral Stability

Respondents described defects discovered during live work and changes in output without a known engagement-side change, distinguishing preparation for deployment from stability during operation. Two indicators assess support for testing before deployment and behavioral stability during operation. Testing concerns evidence about expected performance. Stability concerns whether that performance persists as the service operates.

Respondents described both dedicated testing arrangements and reliance on production work to reveal defects. They also reported changes in output despite no known change on the engagement side. Such reports do not rule out changes in provider systems, inputs, configurations, or other unobserved conditions.

> *"governance forum meets monthly and we work daily, process assumes change a month but we make several a day, and the AI answer drifts on its own even though nothing changed, so i rewrite output myself" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 examines respondents' accounts of manual adjustments and whether those adjustments were reflected in performance reporting.

7.1 Testing of Agent Behavior Before Deployment

INDICATOR C174 · RATE HOW WELL THE TOOLS SUPPORTED RELIABLE TESTING, MEANING CORRECT BEHAVIOR COULD BE PROVEN BEFORE WORK WENT LIVE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described defects discovered during live work when predeployment testing or a separate test environment had been unavailable. The item asks whether correct behavior could be demonstrated before live work. A favorable rating does not establish correctness under all operating conditions. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 792 respondents). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.1 (n = 307 respondents), below the means for active engagements in each stage.

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Figure 2.80. Testing of Agent Behavior Before Deployment: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well the tools supported reliable testing, meaning correct behavior could be proven before work went live”.

Distressed ratings: 259 of 792 answers (32.70%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 610): 4.41. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.96. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.57. Build-Out (n = 162): 5.51. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 225): 5.43. Production (n = 98): 5.48. Canceled (n = 307): 3.12.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Testability before go-live was associated with all four core study measures, and every association survived the applicable robustness checks. Testable tools accompanied a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.67, 95% CI −0.75 to −0.57, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements with more testable tools reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.53 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without this indicator, was higher on engagements with more testable tools (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated testability higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.61, n = 741 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 259 of the 792 answers (32.70%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 32 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing testability numbered 38, nearly all in comment on the tools, with 26 negative and 10 positive. Respondents said correct behavior could not be proven before work went live, in several cases because no test environment had been provided. Errors then surfaced on live runs and real cases.

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> *"No test environment was provided. Changes were validated in live, on real employee tickets, during business hours. Logs were retained seven days, raised in month two, not changed. Two incidents involved payroll details appearing in a transcript visible to the wrong queue. Both were reported. Neither was closed before the account ended." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"There is no proper test environment for this. And we cannot prove closure logic is right before it goes on live tickets, we only check after." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"the anomaly flags are better than month one, i will accept that. but nothing can be tested before it goes live, as such we find the problem in the submission file itself, that is too late for regulatory work" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"What we do is run same schedule two time and put both in excel side by side, then my senior decide which one goes out. Nobody test anything before it is built, there is no test environment given to us... so all the checking happen after, by hand, on the same file that is going to the client" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"here is the part no one puts on a form... somebody has to build the test cases and there is no set of them for workplace tickets, so before anything goes live one of us sits and writes fake employee requests for a day. the tool is fine. proving it is fine is the slow bit" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

More negative written sentiment about testability was associated with cancellation and higher intent to leave. The 38 responses include accounts of defects discovered during live work when no separate test environment was available.

7.2 Stability Without Known Engagement-Side Changes

INDICATOR C175 · RATE THE STABILITY OF THE TOOLS' BEHAVIOR OVER THE ENGAGEMENT WHEN NOTHING CHANGED ON THE ENGAGEMENT SIDE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Changes in output without a known engagement-side change were reported to require manual correction or selection, sometimes without a recorded intervention. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 797 respondents). Stability was judged weaker on canceled engagements (mean 3.1, n = 300 respondents) than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.81. Stability Without Known Engagement-Side Changes: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the stability of the tools' behavior over the engagement when nothing changed on the engagement side".

Distressed ratings: 263 of 797 answers (33.00%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 614): 4.41. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.99. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.48. Build-Out (n = 163): 5.43. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 5.50. Production (n = 98): 5.30. Canceled (n = 300): 3.14.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Stable behavior was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, each association holding under the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was rarer on engagements whose tools behaved stably (r = −0.67, 95% CI −0.75 to −0.57, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where behavior was rated more stable (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.53 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). Stability accompanied a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the stability indicator (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who saw the tools behave consistently over time (r = −0.64, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.58, n = 754 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 263 of the 797 answers (33.00%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 36 of the 150 engagements.

Of 71 written responses addressing stability, 57 were negative and 14 positive. Negative accounts described variation across runs or over time without a known engagement-side change. More than half came from questions about altering AI outputs or institutional data. Respondents described manual correction, sometimes unrecorded. Run-to-run variability is also examined in section 2.3. Neither form of report establishes the mechanism producing the variation.

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> *“Result drifts without anything changing on the model side, so i cannot hand over one clean forecast, i rerun it and take whichever output looks stable” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“this tool has been steady. six months, same behaviour, nothing drifted when we left it alone. people expect these things to wander, ours has not ... boring is what you want here.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“the tools have surprised me in a good way for month one, but they do not behave in week four the way they behaved in week one, even when we changed nothing on our side. So we built a small routine around it. Every Monday one analyst re-runs the previous week's sample of supplier records and compares the output line by line into a shared sheet.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *“This happen maybe once or twice a week, result just drift for no reason. I dont worry too much, I fix the wording and move to next case, team lead already know about it” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *“The tools have got steadier since the spring, we no longer see the odd behaviour after a quiet week, and cost per release is roughly where we forecast now.” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

More negative written sentiment about stability was associated with cancellation and higher intent to leave. Respondents described manual correction or selection of outputs when results changed, sometimes without recording the intervention. The accounts establish perceived changes in behavior, not their underlying technical cause.

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8 Observability of Agent Work

Inaccurate completion reports and incomplete explanations or logs were reported to limit verification and reconstruction of agent work. Three indicators assess completion-report accuracy, output explainability, and diagnostic logs and telemetry. Together, they concern the evidence available to determine what an agent did and whether it completed the intended work.

Respondents described limitations in each form of evidence. Inaccurate status reports could mislead downstream monitoring. Missing explanations and incomplete logs could make review more difficult.

Part 5 examines the additional reporting implications when performance measures rely on agent-generated completion records.

> *"The vendor's diligence tracker logged extraction confidence scores generated by the agent itself as the quality metric, with no independent check, so a batch of misread financials still showed a high confidence average because the agent was scoring its own work." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

8.1 Accuracy of Completion Reports

INDICATOR C172 · RATE HOW ACCURATELY THE TOOLS' OWN REPORTS OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE MATCHED THE ACTUAL OUTCOMES OF THEIR WORK · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Agents were reported to mark work as complete when it remained unfinished, requiring staff to count, sample, and reopen outputs manually. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 786 respondents). The accuracy of the tools' self-reports was weakest on canceled engagements, where the mean rating was 3.3 (n = 296 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.82. Accuracy of Completion Reports: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how accurately the tools’ own reports of success or failure matched the actual outcomes of their work”.

Distressed ratings: 251 of 786 answers (31.93%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 603): 4.47. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.93. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.39. Build-Out (n = 164): 5.46. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 230): 5.39. Production (n = 96): 5.36. Canceled (n = 296): 3.26.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The accuracy of the tools' reports of their own success was associated with all four core study measures, and each association held under the applicable robustness checks. Accurate self-reporting was associated with less cancellation (r = −0.66, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where self-reports were rated accurate (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.53 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). A higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the self-report indicator, accompanied accurate self-reports (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the self-reports accurate reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.63, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.68 to −0.57, n = 739 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 251 of the 786 answers (31.93%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 35 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing false completion numbered 73, with 63 negative and 10 positive. Respondents described tools that reported runs, cases, and checks as complete when they were not, and teams that counted, sampled, and reopened the output by hand.

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> *"We had taken a forecast pack into that meeting on the strength of the tool's own run report, which recorded every step as completed successfully. The director's own analyst then asked where one of the deposit growth assumptions had come from, and the source cited in the pack did not say what the pack said it said ... We had to withdraw the pack in the room. What concerned me afterwards was less the error than the run report: the tool told us it had succeeded and there was nothing in front of my team that would have said otherwise." -Portfolio Director, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"On monday the run finish and report all clear, but nine alerts were never opened at all. That is the whole reason my marks here are low." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"the archive portal added an extra login step in march and nobody told us. the agent kept reporting success with zero documents pulled for two days, we only noticed when the counts were low. the notice went to a mailbox my Lead does not check" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Every surveillance rule it drafted had to be read line by line by an engineer, and it told us each time that it had finished cleanly. After a few weeks of that nobody trusted anything it produced, and i couldn't argue with them." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"The tool is solid most days, but it will tell you it logged the call summary when it didnt. Had a whole batch last month that showed green on my screen and half of them never made it into the ticket, we only found out when the desk owner asked for the notes" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

More negative written sentiment about inaccurate completion reports was associated with cancellation and higher intent to leave. Such reports can propagate errors into downstream monitoring if accepted without verification. Respondents described manual counting, sampling, and reopening of outputs as compensating practices.

8.2 Explainability of Outputs to Audit Depth

INDICATOR C173 · RATE THE TOOLS' ABILITY TO EXPLAIN AND EVIDENCE HOW EACH OUTPUT WAS PRODUCED, AT THE DEPTH AN AUDIT REQUIRES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Limited explanation of how outputs were produced left respondents describing manual reconstruction of supporting sources and reasoning for audit and other review. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 800 respondents). Explainability on canceled engagements averaged 3.2 (n = 302 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.83. Explainability of Outputs to Audit Depth: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the tools' ability to explain and evidence how each output was produced, at the depth an audit requires".

Distressed ratings: 262 of 800 answers (32.75%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 619): 4.43. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.01. Portfolio director (n = 29): 5.21. Build-Out (n = 168): 5.48. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 229): 5.45. Production (n = 101): 5.29. Canceled (n = 302): 3.16.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with the explainability of outputs to audit depth, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Cancellation was less common where outputs could be explained (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where explainability was rated stronger (r = 0.67, 95% CI 0.54 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). Explainability and the engagement indicator mean computed without it were closely related (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.84 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated explainability higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.70 to −0.59, n = 754 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 262 of the 800 answers (32.75%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 33 of the 150 engagements.

Explainability was the subject of 163 written responses, the largest written base in the observability section, and 145 of the 163 (88.96%) were negative, 84 with the strongest negative score. Respondents described tools that could produce an answer but not the reasoning or the source behind it. Teams could not answer auditors, compliance, human resources, or finance, and rebuilt the trail by hand.

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"My concern was not that the tools were wrong. On the exceptions I saw, the outputs were mostly defensible and the guardrails held. The difficulty was that when the client's own audit people asked us how a particular vendor record had been decided, we could not show them. There was no trail we could put in front of them, only the result. In this industry that is not a small matter ... " -Portfolio Director, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

"Compliance ask how a return got into a composite and there is no trail, only the number. So we rebuild it by hand in a sheet to answer them." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

"Where the tool cannot show its working to the standard our audit people want, we simply keep our own record — every supplier decision the agent makes is saved with the source documents attached, by hand, at the end of each day." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

"in March it flagged a business sale as a liquidity event, the source it gave was a news piece about a different company with similar name... i went back through the working and there is no trail showing where it picked that up, only the final line." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Client servicing and communications

"The audit side surprised us. Evidence behind a memo is now better than what a junior would have assembled by hand, we can show every source, every position taken." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

More negative written sentiment about explainability was associated with cancellation and higher intent to leave. Respondents described difficulties reconstructing the basis for outputs when responding to audit or other review requests. Some also described traces accepted by auditors, indicating variation in the adequacy of the evidence available.

8.3 Diagnostic Value of Logs and Telemetry

INDICATOR C176 · RATE THE QUALITY OF THE TOOLS' LOGS, TRACES, AND USAGE TELEMETRY FOR DETECTING AND DIAGNOSING FAILURES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Logs that recorded only a start, finish, or result were reported to provide insufficient detail to reconstruct intermediate actions and diagnose failures. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 796 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements judged the logs less adequate (mean 3.2, n = 304 respondents) than respondents on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.84. Diagnostic Value of Logs and Telemetry: associations with the study measures

Diagnostic value of logs and telemetry: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: “Rate the quality of the tools’ logs, traces, and usage telemetry for detecting and diagnosing failures”.

Distressed ratings: 255 of 796 answers (32.04%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 615): 4.46. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.83. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.53. Build-Out (n = 165): 5.45. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 5.43. Production (n = 95): 5.39. Canceled (n = 304): 3.19.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The quality of logs and telemetry showed associations with all four core study measures, none overturned by the applicable robustness checks. Engagements with better logs had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.55, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where logs were rated better (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.52 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the logging indicator, was higher too (r = 0.85, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated the logs higher (r = −0.63, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.57, n = 749 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 255 of the 796 answers (32.04%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 36 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing logs and telemetry numbered 101, with 82 negative and 18 positive. Respondents described logs that showed a start and a finish, or a result, and nothing of the steps between. Failures had to be reconstructed by hand.

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“ask it to do the full chain, split, classify, index, apply retention, and it drops in the middle. we cannot see where from the logs, there is only a start and a finish and no informations between. so we run it in small batches and check by hand, which is not what was promised but it works” - Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

“Last month the recertification run says complete, 400 accounts. We check, about 30 the entitlment is still sitting there, it raised the ticket only, never revoked. Nothing in the log tells which step failed. Audit asked us to show why one account keep manager role, we could not produce it, so we rebuild the reasoning by hand from the tickets.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

“when the agent calls a sandbox endpoint and gets a 429 the trace does not show which key it used, so i have to reproduce the same by hand to find out.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations

“But when we go to check the logs after, there is almost nothing to see” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

“the logs are the best part of my week now. when something goes sideways i can pull the trace and see exactly which step went wrong instead of guessing for two days like we used to. that alone took a lot of stress off my team” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

Negative written responses and more negative engagement-level sentiment about logging were associated with higher cancellation rates. More negative respondent-level sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. Accounts of endpoint-only logs illustrate limitations in reconstructing intermediate actions and diagnosing failures.

“

Sessions do stay separate now, that part is fine, we never saw one client's data in another place. But logs tell you nothing when provisioning step fails... you only see it succeeded. And it quotes policy documents that do not exist, hence every output must be checked line by line before anyone touches an account.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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Two of the sanctions screening providers changed their output format without telling anyone. We found out because the run failed on a Monday. What we need is a proper notice list, somebody on our side who gets the release notes and tells the team before it lands, not after. Then also half of these systems have no api at all, we are still driving screens”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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Third-Party Ecosystem

The third-party ecosystem was the highest-rated of the five failure categories. Its 20 indicators had a mean of 4.64 across the 150 engagements, and 5,062 of their 15,947 answers (31.74%) were distressed. The category covers the outside providers on which the agents depended. They include the model and cloud providers, the data feeds, the providers of market and reference data, and the systems of other firms that the agents had to use. Like every other category, it remained under the midpoint of the scale, and each of its indicators was associated with all four core study measures.

Table 2.7. The indicators of the third-party ecosystem, from the lowest mean rating

Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share
7.4 Replacement of Informal Human Corrections With Explicit Checks	4.58	267 of 796	33.54%
1.2 Routing of Change Notices to the Operators of Affected Agents	4.58	255 of 798	31.95%
6.2 Dependence on a Small Number of Model and Cloud Providers	4.59	257 of 802	32.04%
5.3 Third-Party Rate Limits Under Agent Volume	4.60	265 of 805	32.92%
4.2 Third-Party Licensing of Work Performed by Agents	4.61	255 of 799	31.91%
7.3 Knowledge of Where Staff Informally Corrected Third-Party Problems	4.61	262 of 792	33.08%
8.2 Dependence on Gated External Rails	4.61	245 of 794	30.86%
7.1 Fallback Readiness for Critical Third-Party Failure	4.61	257 of 802	32.04%
5.1 Availability of Machine Interfaces Across Third-Party Systems	4.63	239 of 802	29.80%
2.1 Protection of Agents Against Silent Breakage	4.63	249 of 781	31.88%
6.3 Continuity Through a Switch of Primary Model or Cloud Provider	4.63	255 of 811	31.44%
3.2 Absorption of Forced Model Retirements	4.63	255 of 793	32.16%
6.1 Security Posture of Third-Party Tools and Sub-Processors	4.63	251 of 788	31.85%
8.1 Mapping of Third- and Fourth-Party Dependencies	4.63	252 of 791	31.86%

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Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed share
5.2 Quality of Third-Party Feed Data Cleaned by Hand	4.64	249 of 795	31.32%
2.2 Monitoring for Unannounced Third-Party Change	4.64	251 of 794	31.61%
1.1 Advance Notice From Third-Party Providers	4.65	250 of 801	31.21%
7.2 Retention of the Ability to Perform Manual Workarounds	4.66	249 of 808	30.82%
3.1 Stability of Third-Party Interfaces and Data Structures	4.66	243 of 796	30.53%
4.1 Third-Party Contracts and Agent-Breaking Provider Change	4.66	256 of 799	32.04%

Mean ratings in Table 2.7 are computed across respondents. The category figure of 4.64 is computed across engagements.

Respondents described difficulties at interfaces with systems outside the engagement's direct control. Accounts included changes to provider formats or models, systems lacking machine interfaces, uncertainty about licenses for agent use, and divided contractual responsibilities. These findings concern the coordination of dependencies as well as the underlying technology.

> *"we dont control any of the things that break us. the market data service, the ticket system, the code repo, the model itself, all of it belongs to somebody else. none of them tell us before they change something ... when that screen moves one field, the agent carries on regardless and produces something that looks correct. that is the part that worries me." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Half the network portals have no api, the agent has to work the screen like a person and it breaks when they move a button. Licences are counted per named user and nobody updated that for an agent." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

Respondents identified practices they considered useful, including assigned responsibility for provider notices, routine test cases, and dependency inventories. The study did not measure their implementation costs or independently evaluate their effectiveness. Part 5 examines third-party tasks performed manually, described in 91 written answers from 87 respondents on 63 engagements.

The category also addresses fallback capability and the retention of knowledge previously applied during manual work. The survey invited comments on the third-party ecosystem. 440 of 850 respondents (51.76%) provided one.

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“what we lost is the small checks the senior people used to do on returns before it goes to composite, nobody wrote those down when the agent take over, that is our side not theirs” - Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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1 Notice of Provider Change

Provider notice could be inadequate at its source or fail during internal routing before reaching the operators of affected agents. Two indicators distinguish the advance notice supplied by third-party providers from the routing of that notice to affected operators. A provider can communicate a change without the information reaching the people responsible for adapting the engagement.

1.1 Advance Notice From Third-Party Providers

INDICATOR C181 · RATE THE QUALITY OF ADVANCE NOTICE THIRD-PARTY PROVIDERS GIVE BEFORE CHANGES THAT CAN AFFECT THE AGENTS ON THIS ENGAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of provider change distinguished inadequate advance notice from notices that had been supplied but failed to reach the people operating affected agents. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 801 respondents). Advance notice was rated at a mean of 3.1 on canceled engagements (n = 302 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.85. Advance Notice From Third-Party Providers: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the quality of advance notice third-party providers give before changes that can affect the agents on this engagement”.

Distressed ratings: 250 of 801 answers (31.21%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 620): 4.48. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.02. Portfolio director (n = 29): 6.21. Build-Out (n = 169): 5.46. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 238): 5.78. Production (n = 92): 5.39. Canceled (n = 302): 3.08.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

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The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Associations between the quality of advance notice and all four core study measures survived each of the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was rarer where providers gave better notice (r = −0.66, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where notice was rated better (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.55 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). With the notice indicator removed, the engagement indicator mean was still closely associated with the rating (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated advance notice higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.68, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.73 to −0.62, n = 753 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 250 of the 801 answers (31.21%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 36 of the 150 engagements.

Advance notice was the subject of 160 written responses, nearly all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 108 negative and 48 positive. Every negative response described a change by a provider that reached the team without notice, or with too little to absorb, and was found when a run failed or output went wrong. Several positive responses said the providers did give notice and that it failed to reach the people running the agents.

> *“In March one custodian shifted two columns in their statement file and told nobody at all. The agents carried on and matched breaks against the wrong field for a day and a half before a junior spots it. Five years back we had four people who would catch that within the hour. Now there is one, and she was on leave that week.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“the custodian feed changed format last month and no one flagged it. i found out because my file wouldnt load at 6am ... we eat every one of these ourselves. my team is three people and two of us are looking for something else.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“the e-sign vendor changed something over the weekend and my team spend monday re-checking every file by hand... nobody sent any informations before that” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“last month the scanner vendor changed their api response and nobody tell us, our release notes agent starts putting wrong build ids in and we only catch it at deploy gate. we fix same day, still nobody from that side told us anything” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“What i can tell you is the scanning vendor changed something in june and the header fields came out shifted for a week, nobody warned us.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

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Written sentiment on advance notice was associated with the outcomes in its own right. Engagements with a negative written response on notice had a higher cancellation rate, and so did engagements with a more negative mean of written sentiment. Respondents who wrote more negatively about notice reported higher intent to leave. For the financial institution, the failures surfaced in reconciliations, screening, payroll, and service availability.

1.2 Routing of Change Notices to the Operators of Affected Agents

INDICATOR C182 · RATE HOW RELIABLY WORD OF AN UPCOMING THIRD-PARTY CHANGE REACHES THE PEOPLE WHO OPERATE THE AFFECTED AGENTS IN TIME TO ACT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Third-party change notices were reported to stop at individual inboxes or other teams before reaching the personnel who needed to act. The mean rating was 4.58, among the two lowest of the 20 indicators of the category, and the median 5.0 (n = 798 respondents). On canceled engagements, notices were judged to reach operators less reliably (mean 3.1, n = 304 respondents) than on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.86. Routing of Change Notices to the Operators of Affected Agents: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how reliably word of an upcoming third-party change reaches the people who operate the affected agents in time to act”.

Distressed ratings: 255 of 798 answers (31.95%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 616): 4.44. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.90. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.80. Build-Out (n = 161): 5.35. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 5.59. Production (n = 97): 5.44. Canceled (n = 304): 3.12.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

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The routing of change notices to the operators of affected agents held its association with every core study measure through the applicable robustness checks. Engagements where notices reached operators reliably had lower observed cancellation rates (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements with reliable routing reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.55 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). Reliable routing accompanied a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the routing indicator (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who said notices reached them in time (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 751 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 255 of the 798 answers (31.95%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 37 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the routing of notices numbered 56, nearly all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 42 negative and 14 positive. Respondents placed the gap chiefly inside the engagement. Providers sent notice, and it stopped at an inbox, a single person, or another team before it reached the people running the agents. Where word did arrive in time, it came in several accounts through one person acting on their own initiative.

> *“We went looking for who receives the provider notices, and they do arrive, into a mailbox our platform group owns, and nobody forwards them to the people running the configuration jobs. What would have to change is simple enough, one named person on each side reads them weekly and tells the affected job owners directly … ” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

> *“The supplier screening feed changed its schema in March, it was written in their release note, and we simply had nobody reading those notes, so the exception classifier failed quietly for a fortnight and we blamed our own tooling first … Still ours to catch.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“We put one person on the provider release notes each Monday. Nobody asked us to, we simply do it, because word of a change tends to reach the account team a good fortnight before it reaches whoever is actually running the agents. Ten minutes of reading saves us a bad Tuesday.” -Engagement Manager, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *“One of my seniors reads the provider release notes every Friday morning and puts deprecation dates in our own calendar, because the notice never reaches us through proper channel. For rate limits we simply queue agent runs overnight in two batches. Both are manual and both depend on that one person.” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“The list provider changed the format of their delta file over a weekend, we found it on Monday in a mail nobody had circulated, and screening ran late that day.” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

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More negative engagement-level sentiment about notice routing was associated with cancellation. More negative respondent-level sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. Accounts identified internal distribution as a separate weakness from the adequacy of the provider's original notice.

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2 Detection of Unannounced Change

Some third-party changes were detected only after failures, while others left agents producing incorrect results without an immediate error signal. Two indicators assess protection against undetected failures and monitoring for unannounced changes. They distinguish the resilience of agent operation from the engagement's capacity to identify changes in its dependencies.

Respondents distinguished interruptions that immediately revealed a problem from continued operation that produced incorrect results. They also described test cases and feed-structure alerts intended to identify changes. The evidence does not establish comparative detection times or implementation costs across engagements.

2.1 Protection Against Undetected Failures

INDICATOR C178 · RATE HOW WELL THE AGENTS ON THIS ENGAGEMENT ARE PROTECTED FROM BREAKING SILENTLY WHEN A THIRD PARTY CHANGES SOMETHING WITHOUT WARNING · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Some unannounced third-party changes were reported to leave agents processing incorrect or empty outputs without an error signal. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 781 respondents). Protection was weakest on canceled engagements (mean 3.1, n = 293 respondents), well short of the level reported on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.87. Protection Against Undetected Failures: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well the agents on this engagement are protected from breaking silently when a third party changes something without warning".

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Distressed ratings: 249 of 781 answers (31.88%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 599): 4.48. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.88. Portfolio director (n = 30): 6.20. Build-Out (n = 161): 5.42. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 5.61. Production (n = 92): 5.45. Canceled (n = 293): 3.15.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Protection against silent breakage was associated with every core study measure, and each association withstood the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common where agents were better protected (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, better protection accompanied higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.55 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the protection indicator, was closely associated with the rating (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.84 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower where respondents saw the agents as protected (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.59, n = 733 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 249 of the 781 answers (31.88%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 36 of the 150 engagements.

Protection against silent breakage was the subject of 136 written responses, most in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 100 negative and 34 positive. Respondents described agents that kept running when a provider changed something and produced wrong or empty output without an error, with no monitoring to catch the change and nothing to fall back on.

> *"In the second month the HR feed provider altered the layout of the leavers file over a weekend, no notice reached anyone here, and the deprovisioning agents processed nothing for four days without raising a thing. We found it because a line manager asked about somebody who had left and still had access. Previously a person would have opened that file on the Monday and seen it looked wrong. That habit was never turned into a check." -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Two weeks back the speech vendor pushed a update and the transcription started dropping the last few seconds of every call... we only saw it because arrangement amounts came out short. No notice came to us. They fixed it same day to be fair, but nobody was watching for it." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"network changed their file layout in april, no notice to anyone, agent kept reading old columns and produced empty cases for two days. one of my team spotted it, not the system." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

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> *"What we do is keep a copy of last months bureau file. When the feed changes shape we get no notice, we find out when the load fails on Monday. So I run the model on the old file first, then re-key the new one by hand if the counts are far apart. It is never down, but somebody is always doing that check" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

Negative written responses and more negative engagement-level sentiment about undetected failures were associated with higher cancellation rates. More negative respondent-level sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. Accounts described incorrect outputs reaching institutional processes before staff identified the underlying change.

2.2 Monitoring for Unannounced Third-Party Change

INDICATOR C183 · RATE THE ENGAGEMENT'S MONITORING FOR UNANNOUNCED CHANGES IN THE THIRD-PARTY APIS, DATA FEEDS, AND MODELS ITS AGENTS DEPEND ON · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of monitoring for unannounced third-party changes ranged from rapid detection through test cases or alerts to discovery only after a failure. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 794 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements reported weaker monitoring (mean 3.2, n = 299 respondents) than respondents on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.88. Monitoring for Unannounced Third-Party Change: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the engagement's monitoring for unannounced changes in the third-party APIs, data feeds, and models its agents depend on".

Distressed ratings: 251 of 794 answers (31.61%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 611): 4.50. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.94. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.81. Build-Out (n = 163): 5.37. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 231): 5.64. Production (n = 101): 5.50. Canceled (n = 299): 3.17.

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r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.
The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Every core study measure was associated with monitoring for unannounced change, and none of the applicable robustness checks reversed an association. Engagements that monitored their third-party inputs had a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.63, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements that watched their third-party inputs recorded higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.56 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). Where monitoring was stronger, the engagement indicator mean computed without it was higher (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated monitoring higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.58, n = 744 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 251 of the 794 answers (31.61%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 37 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing monitoring numbered 46, all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 30 negative and 16 positive. The negative responses said that the engagement did not watch its third-party inputs for change. Changes were found when something failed. The positive responses described monitoring that worked, or informal checks the team had built for itself.

> *"Main thing is nobody watches the outside feeds for changes. The repair estimate service changed a field name in june and we didnt know until claims started coming through with the estimate blank, we only figured it out because somebody on my team opened one up and looked. There is no backup for that feed either, if it goes down we type it in off the pdf." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"If the feed from the endpoint tool stops we can work the queue by hand, we did it for two days in June and nothing was missed. The gap is we do not watch for changes at the other end. And when a field changed name last month we found it from failed tickets, not from any notice." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"What we do is keep our own list. Every morning one of us puts three test accounts through before the queue opens, one in arrears, one with a broken arrangement, one clean. If the offer wording comes back different from yesterday we put it in team chat and everybody works from that, in addition we keep last weeks version saved so there is something to compare against. Nobody asked us to do it, its just quicker than waiting to be told." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"We keep our own copy of vendor library from last known good version, and run both side by side every monday morning. If numbers split we know they changed something without telling us. Not official, just what team does" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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> *“When their side patched the directory the sync stopped and nothing alerted us, we found it next morning from the queue count.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Written sentiment about monitoring showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Some respondents described rapid detection through test cases or alerts. Others reported delayed discovery. These accounts illustrate possible monitoring benefits without establishing a measured cost-benefit relationship.

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3 Interface Stability and Model Retirement

Provider releases and model retirements were reported to require remapping, manual processing, or transition preparation that was not consistently available. Two indicators assess interface stability across provider releases and the engagement's ability to accommodate model retirement. Both concern changes originating outside the engagement, but they require different preparation and transition arrangements.

3.1 Stability of Third-Party Interfaces and Data Structures

INDICATOR C187 · RATE THE STABILITY OF THE THIRD-PARTY APIS AND DATA STRUCTURES THE AGENTS DEPEND ON, FROM ONE PROVIDER RELEASE TO THE NEXT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Changes to third-party interfaces and data structures were reported to require manual remapping or data entry after provider releases. The mean rating was 4.7 and the median 5.0 (n = 796 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements described less stable interfaces (mean 3.1, n = 297 respondents) than respondents on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.89. Stability of Third-Party Interfaces and Data Structures: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the stability of the third-party APIs and data structures the agents depend on, from one provider release to the next".

Distressed ratings: 243 of 796 answers (30.53%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 613): 4.51. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.03. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.90. Build-Out (n = 167): 5.50. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 237): 5.66. Production (n = 95): 5.48. Canceled (n = 297): 3.13.

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r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.
The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Interface stability showed associations with all four core study measures that each of the applicable robustness checks upheld. More stable interfaces accompanied a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where interfaces were rated more stable (r = 0.65, 95% CI 0.52 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements). Interface stability and the engagement indicator mean computed without it were associated as well (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements). Where interfaces held steady, respondents reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.58, n = 747 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 243 of the 796 answers (30.53%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 36 of the 150 engagements.

Interface stability was the subject of 106 written responses, nearly all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 90 negative and 15 positive. Every negative response described a provider changing a file layout, field, interface, page, or model version that the agents depended on. Several said it happened with each release or each cycle, leaving the team to remap or re-enter the data by hand.

> *"One morning the ratings feed renamed a field and every account in that run came back unrated... nobody told us beforehand, we found it from the exception list. My team rebuilt the mapping by hand that day, then again the next week when the provider put the old name back." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"on my last posting we only had one internal Feed and it never move, here it is four external ones and every release something shift, i revert back to checking column order by hand before i load anything. nobody discuss about it until something break." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"In April the Benchmark provider changed their file layout, extra column in middle, and the agent read every field one place shifted. Nobody told us. We found it because sector weights did not sum. Their system has no proper interface also, we log in to a screen and download manually" - Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Written sentiment about interface stability showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Negative accounts described manual remapping or data entry following changes. Some positive accounts described interfaces that had remained stable for a year or more.

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3.2 Management of Provider-Initiated Model Retirement

INDICATOR C185 · RATE HOW WELL THE ENGAGEMENT ABSORBS MODEL VERSION DEPRECATIONS AND RETIREMENTS FORCED BY MODEL PROVIDERS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described more manageable model retirements where advance notice, dependency information, and a way to compare replacement versions were available. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 793 respondents). Model retirements were absorbed less well on canceled engagements (mean 3.1, n = 299 respondents) than on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.90. Management of Provider-Initiated Model Retirement: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well the engagement absorbs model version deprecations and retirements forced by model providers”.

Distressed ratings: 255 of 793 answers (32.16%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 610): 4.49. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.91. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.81. Build-Out (n = 162): 5.46. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 5.53. Production (n = 98): 5.66. Canceled (n = 299): 3.14.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

How well the engagement absorbed forced model retirements was associated with every core study measure, and each association held through the applicable robustness checks. Engagements that absorbed retirements well had a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where retirements were absorbed well (r = 0.71, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). Absorbing retirements well also

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accompanied a higher engagement indicator mean computed without this indicator (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the absorption of retirements higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 748 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 255 of the 793 answers (32.16%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 37 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing model retirement numbered 39, all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 24 negative and 15 positive. The accounts divided on notice and preparation. Engagements with a month's notice and a way to compare the old and new versions absorbed retirements without breakage. Engagements with short notice, no second model, and no list of what depended on the old version lost days of work.

> *“In June the model version is retired with two weeks notice and every valuation template we build stop working. Nobody know which templates depend on it, we go through them one by one for a week.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“When the model version was retired we lost a week, my team worked two saturdays rebuilding prompts, nobody above counts that as work” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“what they did was retire the model version we had all our tax prompts built on, and the notice reached us the week it happened. We find out on a Monday when the memos start coming back in a different format, headings gone, the position summary at the bottom instead of the top. It took us maybe three days to get back to normal.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *“in all honesty this part is the easy one. We had two weeks notice on the model version retirement, and i just run the old prompt set against the new one for a day and compare shortlist before we switch” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“Earlier a model version change used to break our runs, now we get a proper notice window and the last switch was painless... that part has improved.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Written sentiment about model retirement showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Respondents associated manageable transitions with notice, dependency information, and comparison of replacement models, but the study did not isolate the effect of those preparations.

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“

i raised this in stand up many times, nothing change. What must change is simple. Somebody has to tell us before the Processor changes their api. We got no notice at all, not once. One morning the sandbox key stop working and i spend whole day finding out why. Nobody in my team knew, and person who knows is not in our Meeting anyway. Second, model version. They retire the version we build on and give us two weeks. Two weeks for pipeline that took two months. i had to revert back and rewrite the prompts, also half the parsing broke. This is not in any plan. Third, network access. We never got proper access to payment network sandbox, so we are testing on sample file somebody exported in march. Sample file is not real traffic. Everything we validated is on old data. So, notice before change, longer window on version retire, real access. That is all. Nothing here is complicated, it just needs somebody to own it. Nobody owns it. That is why it went the way it did.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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4 Contractual and Licensing Coverage of Agent Work

Respondents reported gaps in contractual responsibility for disruptive provider changes and uncertainty about licenses written for named human users. Two indicators assess contractual coverage of provider changes and licensing coverage of work performed by agents. The analysis concerns respondents' assessments of these arrangements, not a legal review of the agreements.

Accounts described divided responsibilities among the financial institution, delivery vendor, and third-party provider. Respondents also raised uncertainty about applying licenses for named human users to automated activity.

4.1 Contractual Coverage of Disruptive Provider Changes

INDICATOR C184 · RATE HOW WELL THE CONTRACTS WITH THIRD-PARTY PROVIDERS DEAL WITH PROVIDER CHANGES THAT CAN BREAK THE AGENTS ON THIS ENGAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of third-party contracts identified gaps between the firm holding the contract and the vendor operating agents affected by provider changes. The mean rating was 4.7 and the median 5.0 (n = 799 respondents). The contracts were rated lower on canceled engagements (mean 3.2, n = 307 respondents) than on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.91. Contractual Coverage of Disruptive Provider Changes: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well the contracts with third-party providers deal with provider changes that can break the agents on this engagement".

Distressed ratings: 256 of 799 answers (32.04%).

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Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 619): 4.52. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.01. Portfolio director (n = 28): 5.89. Build-Out (n = 166): 5.51. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 229): 5.77. Production (n = 97): 5.38. Canceled (n = 307): 3.15.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The handling of provider changes that disrupt agent operation in third-party contracts was associated with all four core study measures, and every one of the applicable robustness checks upheld the associations. Engagements whose contracts dealt better with such change had a lower observed cancellation rate (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where the contracts were rated stronger (r = 0.67, 95% CI 0.54 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). Stronger contracts also accompanied a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the contract indicator (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the contracts higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.59, n = 747 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 256 of the 799 answers (32.04%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 41 of the 150 engagements.

Few written responses addressed the contracts, 21, most in comment on the third-party ecosystem, and 14 of the 21 were negative. The negative responses said that the contracts were silent on notice of change and on remedy when a change broke the agents. Others said the delivery team held no contract with the third-party provider at all. The positive responses described clauses on change and notice added during the engagement.

> *"we were never the customer of any of these providers. We depend on nine custodian and counterparty feeds, and not one of them has any obligation to us, they have it to the bank, and i have never seen what that arrangement says ... In week six one of them redesigned the login page and the agent simply stopped collecting. The breaks went to zero on the dashboard overnight ... " -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"What I marked down sits on our paper rather than on theirs. The contracts carry no remedy where a provider changes something that breaks the agents, and that is a gap we and the client left in the drafting between us, not a failing of the provider." -Portfolio Director, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"What the numbers miss is that our own people hear about a provider change before any contract obliges anybody to tell us. Word travels, the paperwork does not. The contracts say nothing useful about a feed changing its format on a Tuesday," -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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> *"Contracts side has improved a great deal since last year, our legal put change clauses in with both feed providers and that has already saved us once." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

More negative written sentiment about contracts was associated with higher intent to leave. With only 21 responses, this association is exploratory. Accounts described perceived gaps between the party holding the third-party contract and the vendor operating the affected agents.

4.2 Third-Party Licensing of Work Performed by Agents

INDICATOR C195 · RATE HOW WELL THIRD-PARTY LICENSES ON THIS ENGAGEMENT COVER WORK DONE BY AGENTS RATHER THAN NAMED HUMAN USERS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Licenses written for named human users left respondents uncertain about permission and charges for work performed by agents. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 799 respondents). Licenses were judged to cover agent work less well on canceled engagements (mean 3.2, n = 302 respondents) than on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.92. Third-Party Licensing of Work Performed by Agents: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well third-party licenses on this engagement cover work done by agents rather than named human users".

Distressed ratings: 255 of 799 answers (31.91%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 617): 4.45. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.97. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.94. Build-Out (n = 167): 5.40. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 231): 5.54. Production (n = 99): 5.49. Canceled (n = 302): 3.17.

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r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.
The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

License coverage of agent work was associated with every core study measure, and each association survived the applicable robustness checks. Engagements with licenses that covered agent work had lower observed cancellation rates (r = −0.63, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements whose licenses covered agent work reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.69, 95% CI 0.57 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the licensing indicator, tracked license coverage closely (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.84 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated license coverage higher (r = −0.64, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.70 to −0.58, n = 752 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 255 of the 799 answers (31.91%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 34 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing licensing numbered 36, all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, and 30 of the 36 were negative. Respondents described licenses written per named human user, agents run under one person's seat, and a question about what an agent owed that was raised and never answered.

> *"The HR platform and the ticketing tool are both licensed per named user, and neither contract was written with a machine identity in mind. We have been running the assistant under a service account that is, strictly speaking, a person's seat — legal on our side has looked at it, the client's procurement has not, and nobody has wanted to be the one to open that conversation while the renewal is being discussed." -Portfolio Director, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"almost every license in that architecture is written per named human user, and nobody on either side had a clear answer on what an agent counts as. We asked. We got a shrug from procurement and a maybe from the provider. On a cancelled engagement it does not matter. On one that scales it is a bill nobody has modeled." -Portfolio Director, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"the problem is licences. our matching tool is licensed per named user, and the agent runs under a colleague login, so when the custodian statement volume went up we were told to buy more seats before another queue could be added." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Nothing here covers licensing of the agents themselves. Our market data licence is written per named user, and whether an agent counts as one has never been settled. We raised it with procurement and are still waiting to discuss about it properly." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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Written sentiment about licensing showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Respondents identified uncertainty about permissions and potential charges. These accounts do not establish an actual liability. A few described renegotiated arrangements that resolved their concerns.

> *Half the third party consent sources have no API at all, so we screen scrape them. Literally someone on my team has a script that clicks through the provider's web console every night and dumps it to csv. If they change a button we find out in the morning when the file is empty. And nobody has ever asked whether we're allowed to do that, or whether their licence covers a Bot logging in. We just do it, because otherwise nothing loads."*
>
> **INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR**
> ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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5 Machine Interfaces, Feed Data, and Rate Limits

Unavailable machine access, unusable feed data, and processing limits were reported to require supplementary manual work. Three indicators assess the availability of machine interfaces, the usability of incoming feed data, and the adequacy of rate limits and quotas. These capabilities affect whether agents can use third-party systems at the required volume without supplementary manual processing.

Respondents described manual data transfer, feed preparation, and intervention when processing limits were reached. Part 5 examines whether this work was reflected in reported performance.

> *"Half the sources we need were never built for a machine to read, they are screens for a human researcher, and no vendor ever promised us otherwise, we assumed it." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Client servicing and communications*

5.1 Availability of Machine Interfaces Across Third-Party Systems

INDICATOR C186 · RATE THE AVAILABILITY OF TRUE MACHINE INTERFACES, RATHER THAN SCREENS BUILT FOR HUMANS, ACROSS THE THIRD-PARTY SYSTEMS THE AGENTS MUST USE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Unavailable machine interfaces, meaning programmatic access to third-party systems, left some engagements relying on interfaces designed for people or manual data transfer. The survey described these as "true machine interfaces." The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 802 respondents). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.1 (n = 299 respondents), below those for active engagements in each stage.

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Figure 2.93. Availability of Machine Interfaces Across Third-Party Systems: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate the availability of true machine interfaces, rather than screens built for humans, across the third-party systems the agents must use”.

Distressed ratings: 239 of 802 answers (29.80%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 619): 4.48. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.95. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.87. Build-Out (n = 166): 5.47. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 237): 5.52. Production (n = 100): 5.55. Canceled (n = 299): 3.14.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The availability of machine interfaces was associated with all four core study measures, and none of the applicable robustness checks overturned an association. Cancellation was less common where third-party systems offered machine interfaces (r = −0.63, 95% CI −0.71 to −0.52, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where such interfaces were available (r = 0.71, 95% CI 0.60 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). Interface availability was also associated with a higher engagement indicator mean computed without it (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.84 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated interface availability higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.60, n = 754 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 239 of the 802 answers (29.80%), the lowest observed distressed share among the 100 rated indicators, and the engagement mean was distressed on 40 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing machine interfaces numbered 60, nearly all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, and 49 of the 60 were negative, 36 with the strongest negative score. Every negative response described a third-party system with no machine interface. The agent operated web pages built for human users, or a staff member transferred the data manually.

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> *"Their certification portal is a set of screens built for a person with a token in their hand, so every run needed one of my engineers sitting there anyway, and nothing on this form has a place for that." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"half the tools we use have only a screen, no proper interface, so the agent was clicking through a portal built for a person. what we needed was a written api commitment from each provider and thirty days notice of any change. we got neither ... " -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"They give us a bureau screen with no proper interface, so my team copy counterparty rating by hand into The study before agent can use it... That is two hour of my evening, every day. Nobody count this work anywhere, my team stay late and the queue still look fine on their side" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"The screen scraping is what costs my team their evenings. Fund admin portal has no proper interface so the agent clicks through pages like a person, and when the portal is slow at month end we sit and watch it and re-run the failed ones by hand." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"the medical records portal has no api, agent works it through the screen like a person. when they moved the buttons last month it just stopped, no warning. we find out from the backlog. also nobody left here still knows how to pull those records the manual way" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

Negative written responses and more negative engagement-level sentiment about machine interfaces were associated with cancellation. More negative respondent-level sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. Accounts described both agent interaction with human-oriented interfaces and manual transfer of data where machine access was unavailable.

5.2 Usability of Third-Party Feed Data

INDICATOR C188 · RATE THE QUALITY OF THE DATA ARRIVING FROM THIRD-PARTY FEEDS, JUDGED BY WHETHER AGENTS CAN USE IT WITHOUT HUMAN CLEANUP · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Some third-party feed data required manual correction before agent use, with the intervention not consistently logged or reflected in reporting. Its mean rating was 4.6 and its median 5.0 (n = 795 respondents). Canceled engagements were marked by poor feed data, with a mean rating of 3.1 (n = 301 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.94. Usability of Third-Party Feed Data: associations with the study measures

Usability of third-party feed data: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate the quality of the data arriving from third-party feeds, judged by whether agents can use it without human cleanup".

Distressed ratings: 249 of 795 answers (31.32%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 613): 4.49. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.85. Portfolio director (n = 31): 6.35. Build-Out (n = 162): 5.38. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 5.70. Production (n = 98): 5.50. Canceled (n = 301): 3.13.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The usability of third-party feed data without cleanup showed associations with every core study measure, each upheld by the applicable robustness checks. Engagements receiving cleaner feeds had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where feeds arrived usable (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.55 to 0.77, n = 94 engagements). Cleaner feeds accompanied a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the feed indicator (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who received usable feeds (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.58, n = 748 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 249 of the 795 answers (31.32%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 35 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing feed data numbered 89, with 64 negative and 25 positive. The comments on the third-party ecosystem divided between feeds that arrived clean and feeds that needed a person to clean them first. The responses to the questions on altering data described correcting the data by hand, in many accounts every cycle and in several cases without logging the correction.

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> *“The test data we pulled from the wealth platform's sandbox arrived in a shape the agents could not use without a person tidying it first, every single day, and nobody had counted that person's time anywhere.” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“The one that still costs my people evenings is the counterparty file, it comes in dirty and somebody sits and cleans it before the model runs. That is a person, every month end, and it does not appear in any plan.” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *“What we do now is run everything from the rating vendor through a check sheet first, before it ever hits the config. My team built it ourselves off the errors we kept seeing, it's maybe forty fields. Takes ten minutes a load. If a value looks off we hold it and go back to the source file insted of letting the agent take it. No one asked us to do that, it just became the way we work.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

> *“last week the comparables feed came with two different issuer names for same entity, one with the old ticker. we keep our own mapping file for this, it is just a list of isin against the name we use, and one of the junior updates it every morning before the deal team asks for anything. if we dont do that the agent picks wrong comparable and the pricing page is nonsence. nobody asked us to build it, we just did it and now everybody depends on it” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“formats change between one delivery and the next practically every month, moreover nobody on their side tells us in advance when a column gets renamed or a field gets dropped, so I fix the file myself before it break anything downstream in the ledger.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

More negative written sentiment about feed data was associated with higher intent to leave. Some accounts described quality measures applied after manual cleaning and corrections known principally to the staff performing them. These reporting practices are examined in Part 5.

5.3 Third-Party Rate Limits Under Agent Volume

INDICATOR C189 · RATE HOW WELL THIRD-PARTY RATE LIMITS AND QUOTAS HOLD UP UNDER THE VOLUME THE AGENTS ON THIS ENGAGEMENT GENERATE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described third-party rate limits interrupting agent runs and staff completing work outside normal hours when planned volumes exceeded available capacity. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 805 respondents). Rate limits on canceled engagements were rated lower (mean 3.2, n = 302 respondents) than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.95. Third-Party Rate Limits Under Agent Volume: associations with the study measures

Third-party rate limits under agent volume: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well third-party rate limits and quotas hold up under the volume the agents on this engagement generate".

Distressed ratings: 265 of 805 answers (32.92%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 624): 4.45. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.96. Portfolio director (n = 29): 5.97. Build-Out (n = 165): 5.32. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 237): 5.56. Production (n = 101): 5.54. Canceled (n = 302): 3.16.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Ratings of the adequacy of third-party quotas for agent workloads were associated with all four core measures under the applicable robustness checks. Higher ratings were associated with lower cancellation (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements), higher active-engagement customer satisfaction (r = 0.66, 95% CI 0.53 to 0.76, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean excluding this item (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Higher respondent ratings were associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.63, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.69 to −0.55, n = 756 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 265 of the 805 answers (32.92%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 36 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing rate limits numbered 42, all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 32 negative and 8 positive. Respondents described agents cut off by daily caps and throttles at predictable peaks, and staff who watched or finished the runs late at night. Several placed the responsibility on the engagement side, in volumes the engagement had neither sized nor reported to the third-party provider.

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“In week six we tried to refresh about four thousand supplier records against the external registry feed in one run. It cut us off after eleven hundred, and there was no way to see that from our side until the tickets started failing. We ended up doing the rest in batches overnight for a week.” - Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

“We keep two log in from the research database and rotate them, because the tool hit the limit by eleven in the morning and then everything just stop ... No one ask us for this, it is simply what we do now” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

“Rate limits are the part that lands on us personally. When the provider throttles at month end the queue does not stop, it simply waits for us, and two of my engineers sit until eleven at night watching a bar they cannot influence. I have lost one good person partly for that reason. It is not a large technical problem, but it falls on the same four people every month.” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

“Their Portal throttles us after around two hundred pulls and the agent just stops, no error, we find out when case aging report looks wrong next day.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

“the hr feed gets blamed for everything here, if I am honest it is not their fault. nobody informed them we are pulling every hour now, and their limits are published anyway, we simply ignore it. so i do not put it all on them.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

Written sentiment about rate limits showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Accounts suggest gaps in capacity planning and communication of expected volumes. They do not establish that all interruptions were predictable or that responsibility was universally unassigned.

“

Compared with the payments engagement I governed before this one, the third-party position here is considerably more comfortable; there we sat behind a single screening vendor with no realistic alternative, whereas here the list providers can be swapped and the volumes have never troubled anyone's limits. What is less comfortable, and I did not appreciate it until we ran the transition, is how much of the old quality came from two long-serving analysts who simply knew which feed to distrust on a Monday.”

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR
KPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

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6 Security Posture and Provider Concentration

Incomplete dependency visibility and reliance on a small number of model or cloud providers raised concerns about security assessment and continuity. Three indicators assess third-party security, management of dependence on a small number of model and cloud providers, and continuity during a provider switch. The concentration indicator measures how well dependence is managed, not the number of providers or the degree of concentration itself.

The 46 written responses describe incomplete dependency inventories, concentrated provision, and limited evidence of tested alternatives. These accounts provide context for the ratings but do not constitute an independent security or resilience assessment.

6.1 Security of Third-Party Tools and Subprocessors

INDICATOR C180 · RATE THE SECURITY POSTURE OF THE THIRD-PARTY TOOLS, PLATFORMS, AND SUB-PROCESSORS THE ENGAGEMENT'S AGENTS CONNECT TO · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The small written-answer set on third-party security identified incomplete dependency inventories and reviews limited to direct providers. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 788 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements regarded the security of third-party tools less favorably (mean 3.1, n = 303 respondents) than respondents on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.96. Security of Third-Party Tools and Subprocessors: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the security posture of the third-party tools, platforms, and sub-processors the engagement's agents connect to".

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Distressed ratings: 251 of 788 answers (31.85%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 607): 4.48. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.96. Portfolio director (n = 30): 6.00. Build-Out (n = 164): 5.49. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 231): 5.67. Production (n = 90): 5.50. Canceled (n = 303): 3.11.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The security posture of third-party tools and sub-processors was associated with all four core study measures, and the associations held under the applicable robustness checks. Engagements whose third-party tools were judged more secure had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.55, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where security posture was rated stronger (r = 0.64, 95% CI 0.51 to 0.75, n = 94 engagements). A stronger security posture accompanied a higher engagement indicator mean, computed without the security indicator (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated security posture higher (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.59, n = 742 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 251 of the 788 answers (31.85%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 36 of the 150 engagements.

Nine written responses addressed security posture: four negative, three positive, and two neutral. Several described incomplete inventories or reviews limited to the first layer of providers. This small sample supports illustrative observations only.

> *"nobody has one list of what the desk agent actually connects to... i count four tools just for endpoint patching and the remote session, and the security review only covers two of them." - Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The benefits provider gives one login and we all share it, that is what I would flag... nobody checks who touched what. In addition no one here can tell me the full list of outside systems that touch our payroll informations ... " -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"What has not moved is the chain behind them. We know our direct suppliers. Ask who their sub-processors are and nobody can tell us, and the security review stopped at the first layer." - Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"My 5 on security is only about one market data provider, i never see their sub processor list, the rest i had no issue with" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

The accounts identify dependency visibility as a potential limitation on security assessment. They do not establish that every unlisted provider had escaped review through other processes.

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6.2 Management of Provider Concentration

INDICATOR C193 · RATE HOW WELL THE ENGAGEMENT MANAGES ITS DEPENDENCE ON A SMALL NUMBER OF MODEL AND CLOUD PROVIDERS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of provider concentration described dependence on a small number of model or cloud providers without a configured alternative or tested outage plan. The mean rating was 4.59, among the three lowest in the category, and the median 5.0 (n = 802 respondents). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.1 (n = 308 respondents), below the means for active engagements in each stage. Lower scores indicate weaker management of dependence, not necessarily greater concentration.

Figure 2.97. Management of Provider Concentration: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well the engagement manages its dependence on a small number of model and cloud providers”. Distressed ratings: 257 of 802 answers (32.04%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 619): 4.43. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.89. Portfolio director (n = 31): 6.10. Build-Out (n = 166): 5.34. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 230): 5.55. Production (n = 98): 5.71. Canceled (n = 308): 3.11.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The management-of-dependence rating was associated with all four core study measures, with the associations retained under the applicable robustness checks. Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements), higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.64, 95% CI 0.50 to 0.74, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean excluding this item (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements).

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Higher respondent ratings were associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.64, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.70 to −0.58, n = 755 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 257 of the 802 answers (32.04%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 41 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing provider concentration numbered 26, nearly all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 19 negative and 4 positive. Respondents described agents that depended on one model provider, one cloud, or one region with no second path configured and no tested plan for an outage.

> *"if the model provider go down one morning we are finished, there is no second one set up, we would be closing tickets on paper. Nobody has ever tested that." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The concentration is our own doing. We built everything on one model and one region because that is what could be approved quickly, and now moving is a project nobody will fund at POC stage." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"One issue only. Every agent we run sits on one model provider and one cloud tenancy, with no second path. Three weeks ago that region degraded for about two hours and the provisioning queue simply stopped, we cleared it by hand. There is no plan on paper for an outage that lasts longer." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

More negative written sentiment about concentration was associated with cancellation and higher intent to leave. These findings are exploratory because the qualitative sample contains 26 responses. Accounts described concentrated provision retained after initial approval and reliance on manual processing as a fallback.

6.3 Continuity Through a Switch of Primary Model or Cloud Provider

INDICATOR C194 · RATE HOW WELL THIS ENGAGEMENT COULD KEEP OPERATING IF IT HAD TO SWITCH ITS PRIMARY MODEL OR CLOUD PROVIDER · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Written accounts of continuity through a model or cloud provider switch expressed expectations rather than describing a tested transition. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 811 respondents). Continuity through a provider switch averaged 3.1 on canceled engagements (n = 301 respondents), lower than on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.98. Continuity Through a Switch of Primary Model or Cloud Provider: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how well this engagement could keep operating if it had to switch its primary model or cloud provider”.

Distressed ratings: 255 of 811 answers (31.44%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 628): 4.51. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.84. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.97. Build-Out (n = 172): 5.40. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 241): 5.58. Production (n = 97): 5.66. Canceled (n = 301): 3.10.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The ability to continue through a switch of primary provider showed associations with every core study measure that held under the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common where continuity was rated stronger (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Active engagements with stronger continuity reported higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.68, 95% CI 0.56 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the continuity indicator, was closely associated with the rating (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated continuity higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.60, n = 759 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 255 of the 811 answers (31.44%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 42 of the 150 engagements.

Eleven written responses addressed continuity, all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with eight negative and three positive. The negative responses said the engagement could not move off its model provider quickly and had no plan to. The positive responses asserted that a move would be manageable without describing one. No response described a switch of provider that had been tested.

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"We had nowhere to move to. Everything the agents do sits on that one provider and there was no discussion about an alternative because there is not one configured. we spent nine days re-testing the same onboarding cases against the new version, and the weekly pack still showed green." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Financial crime and client onboarding

"If we have to move to another model provider we are stuck, that needs a proper plan" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"what i would change is we are pinned to a single model provider and nobody has ever tried standing the workflows up on a second one. not saying it would break. saying nobody knows, and finding out during an outage is a bad time to learn" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"I scored this section high and I want to be clear about why, because it is not sophistication. Our recruiting volume is small enough that if the scheduling API or the model went away tomorrow, four coordinators could run the calendar manually for a week, the same as we did before this program existed. That is the whole reason. We have not tested a provider switch, we have never had to, and I would not want the high marks read as evidence that we could." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

Written sentiment about continuity showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. The 11 responses described expectations of continuity rather than documented tests of a provider switch.

"

the one thing here is the watchlist file, when provider add new format column nothing shout about it, the screening just start passing name it should stop. we catch it in monitoring after two days that time. rest of this section is fine, we can move provider if we have to"

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding

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7 Fallback Capacity and Retention of Operational Knowledge

Accounts of third-party failure distinguished retained manual capability from knowledge lost through staff departures or undocumented corrections. Four indicators assess fallback readiness, retention of manual capability, knowledge of previously informal corrections, and replacement of those corrections with explicit controls. They address whether automation preserves the operational knowledge needed when a dependency fails.

Respondents described manual processes as a fallback for unavailable feeds or models. Some accounts also described the loss of experienced staff or undocumented corrections after automation. These observations suggest a possible resilience gap. They do not establish that agent deployment itself caused the loss of knowledge.

> *"For years my seniors carried the quirks of the custodian files in their heads -- one custodian sends the fee accrual a day late, another restates a month after the fact, and the person who knew that simply corrected it on the Monday. When the agents came in, none of that was written down anywhere, it was lost, and the two people who held most of it have since left." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Half the people who used to patch these files by hand are not on the account anymore." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

7.1 Fallback Readiness for Critical Third-Party Failure

INDICATOR C179 · RATE THE QUALITY OF THE FALLBACK THE ENGAGEMENT HAS READY WHEN A CRITICAL THIRD-PARTY FEED, PLATFORM, OR MODEL STOPS WORKING · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Accounts of critical third-party service failure distinguished work that stopped from continuity supported by saved data, manual procedures, or alternative sources. Its mean rating was 4.6 and its median 5.0 (n = 802 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements gave fallback readiness its lowest ratings, a mean of 3.1 (n = 301 respondents) against higher means on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.99. Fallback Readiness for Critical Third-Party Failure: associations with the study measures

Fallback readiness for critical third-party failure: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: “Rate the quality of the fallback the engagement has ready when a critical third-party feed, platform, or model stops working”.

Distressed ratings: 257 of 802 answers (32.04%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 620): 4.45. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.02. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.84. Build-Out (n = 169): 5.42. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 231): 5.63. Production (n = 101): 5.52. Canceled (n = 301): 3.07.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Each of the four core study measures was associated with fallback readiness, and no association failed a robustness check. Cancellation was rarer on engagements with a ready fallback (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where a fallback was ready (r = 0.69, 95% CI 0.57 to 0.79, n = 94 engagements). Fallback readiness and the engagement indicator mean computed without it rose together (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated fallback readiness higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.72 to −0.59, n = 753 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 257 of the 802 answers (32.04%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 39 of the 150 engagements.

Fallback readiness was the subject of 80 written responses, all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 57 negative and 21 positive. In 25 responses, respondents said there was nothing behind a critical feed or model. The engagement's tasks stopped and waited. The positive responses described fallbacks the teams had built for themselves, usually a saved copy or a manual route, and a few described tested secondary sources.

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“we now have a tested fallback that routes tickets to the queue if the model endpoint drops - it has fired twice this quarter and no employee noticed.” -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

“only worry i have is we run everything on one provider, if that provider go down for a day i do not know what we do, nobody has shown me a second option. but that is our own planning gap, not their fault.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

“On my last team when a feed went down somebody just pulled the file manually and we kept going. Here there is no backup, the bureau feed stopped for two days in June and the whole validaton queue just sat there. Nobody could tell me who to call” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

“last month the vendor of our knowledge search changed their api and our policy lookups came back empty for two days. no notice came to us, we found it from tickets piling up. and there was no fallback, we answered by hand from pdfs” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

“We keep a manual channel open on the payment file, one person still knows how to submit it the old way and we run that once a week just to keep the muscle. Same with vendor master pulls, we take a copy every Monday so if the feed goes quiet we are working from something. Not elegant. But it has saved us twice this year.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

More negative written sentiment about fallback arrangements was associated with higher intent to leave. Respondents described saved data, practiced manual procedures, and alternative sources as ways to maintain operations during an outage.

7.2 Retention of the Ability to Perform Manual Workarounds

INDICATOR C190 · RATE THE ENGAGEMENT’S ABILITY TO STILL PERFORM BY HAND THE MANUAL WORKAROUNDS THAT ONCE ABSORBED THIRD-PARTY QUIRKS AND BREAKAGE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described both retained capacity to work by hand and gaps following the departure of experienced staff or insufficient training of newer staff. The mean rating was 4.66, among the highest of the 20 indicators of the category, and the median 5.0 (n = 808 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements judged their ability to work by hand weaker (mean 3.2, n = 311 respondents) than respondents on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.100. Retention of the Ability to Perform Manual Workarounds: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate the engagement's ability to still perform by hand the manual workarounds that once absorbed third-party quirks and breakage".

Distressed ratings: 249 of 808 answers (30.82%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 627): 4.52. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.98. Portfolio director (n = 29): 5.86. Build-Out (n = 160): 5.49. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 238): 5.60. Production (n = 99): 5.75. Canceled (n = 311): 3.17.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

The retention of manual capability held its association with all four core study measures across the applicable robustness checks. Engagements that kept the ability to work by hand had lower observed cancellation rates (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where manual capability was retained (r = 0.72, 95% CI 0.60 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). The engagement indicator mean, computed without the manual-capability indicator, was strongly correlated with the rating (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.84 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who said manual capability had been kept (r = −0.67, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.73 to −0.62, n = 757 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 249 of the 808 answers (30.82%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 38 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing manual capability numbered 43, all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, and they divided evenly, with 22 negative and 21 positive. The negative responses said the people who knew the manual methods had left without writing them down, and newer staff had never learned them. The positive responses described outages worked through by hand, some with the caveat that this held only at low volume or while the staff who had performed the tasks before the agents remained.

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> *"The client released its own service desk staff in month three, on the basis that the bot would carry the volume. When the platform was down for most of a Tuesday in July, there was nobody left who knew how to open an IT ticket manually — we had my agents doing it from memory. You cannot un-remove those people. That is the risk nobody priced." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"We are two months in with a team that has never triaged without the agent in front of them, so if the enrichment feed drops I am not sure we could work the queue by hand at volume." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Written sentiment about manual capability showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. Accounts described both retained skills and gaps associated with staff departures or inadequate training. Positive accounts suggest that deliberate practice may support continuity, although its effect was not tested.

7.3 Knowledge of Informal Third-Party Corrections

INDICATOR C191 · RATE HOW COMPLETELY THE ENGAGEMENT KNOWS WHERE HUMANS USED TO QUIETLY FIX THIRD-PARTY DATA AND INTERFACE PROBLEMS BEFORE AGENTS TOOK OVER · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Undocumented informal corrections to third-party problems were reported to be rediscovered after failures when experienced staff had left. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 792 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements knew less about the informal corrections (mean 3.1, n = 305 respondents) than respondents on active engagements in any stage.

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Figure 2.101. Knowledge of Informal Third-Party Corrections: associations with the study measures

Knowledge of informal third-party corrections: higher ratings accompanied more favorable outcomes



Note: Survey question: "Rate how completely the engagement knows where humans used to quietly fix third-party data and interface problems before agents took over".

Distressed ratings: 262 of 792 answers (33.08%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 610): 4.44. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.98. Portfolio director (n = 30): 6.03. Build-Out (n = 157): 5.45. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 233): 5.68. Production (n = 97): 5.43. Canceled (n = 305): 3.10.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Knowledge of the informal corrections was associated with cancellation, customer satisfaction, the engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, and all applicable robustness checks upheld the associations. Engagements that knew where the informal corrections had been made had lower observed cancellation rates (r = −0.66, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where this knowledge was rated better (r = 0.61, 95% CI 0.47 to 0.73, n = 94 engagements). Where the informal corrections were known, the engagement indicator mean computed without this indicator was higher (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who knew where the fixes had been made (r = −0.66, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.60, n = 746 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 262 of the 792 answers (33.08%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 39 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the informal corrections numbered 21, all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, and 20 of the 21 were negative. Respondents said the manual fixes that had once absorbed third-party problems had never been written down, that the people who made them had left, and that each fix was rediscovered when something broke.

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"If we knew where those fixes sat, they would not have been quiet, and we would have written them into the process years ago. The honest position is that we discover each one at the moment it breaks a valuation, and from then on it is no longer unknown." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

"nobody wrote down what the old workplace team used to fix by hand before the agent took the queue, so when something looks wrong we are guessing at what normal was." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"The small manual corrections our engineers used to make on reference data were never written down anywhere before the agent took that job over" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

"Also there is no record of who fixed the supplier addresses before the agents came, those persons are gone." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"What we have not done is capture the little fixes our floor supervisors used to make before any of this." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes

Written sentiment about informal corrections showed no statistically significant association with the study measures. The 21 responses describe knowledge that had not been documented before changes in staffing or task allocation.

7.4 Replacement of Informal Corrections With Explicit Controls

INDICATOR C192 · RATE HOW DELIBERATELY THE QUIET HUMAN FIXES FOR THIRD-PARTY QUIRKS WERE REPLACED WITH EXPLICIT CHECKS WHEN AGENTS TOOK OVER THE WORK · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Replacement of informal human corrections with explicit checks received the lowest mean rating among third-party ecosystem indicators. The mean rating was 4.58, the lowest of the 20 indicators of the third-party ecosystem, and the median 5.0 (n = 796 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the replacement of informal corrections lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 3.1, n = 302 respondents).

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Figure 2.102. Replacement of Informal Corrections With Explicit Controls: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how deliberately the quiet human fixes for third-party quirks were replaced with explicit checks when agents took over the work”.

Distressed ratings: 267 of 796 answers (33.54%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 614): 4.43. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.88. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.90. Build-Out (n = 160): 5.36. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 237): 5.64. Production (n = 97): 5.36. Canceled (n = 302): 3.07.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Whether informal corrections had been turned into explicit controls was associated with each core study measure, and every association survived the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common where the informal corrections had been replaced (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where the replacement was rated more complete (r = 0.71, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). With this indicator excluded, the engagement indicator mean was closely associated with the rating (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.84 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Respondents who rated the replacement higher reported lower intent to leave (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.59, n = 748 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 267 of the 796 answers (33.54%), the highest distressed share in the category, and the engagement mean was distressed on 40 of the 150 engagements.

Nine written responses addressed the replacement of informal corrections: seven negative, one positive, and one neutral. Negative accounts described corrections that had not been incorporated into explicit checks when agents assumed the task. One account linked a missed correction to access remaining available after an employee’s departure. These observations are illustrative only.

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> *"Before, when the credit bureau file came with the old company identifiers, somebody on my team just knew and swapped them over. It is not written anywhere, it sits in his head. Now the agent takes the file exactly as it arrives. Nobody sat down and turned that knowledge into a check... we assumed it would not matter. It has not caused a problem yet. But he is on leave next month." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"Hard to blame the feed vendors... they send what they always sent. We aimed an agent at it and never set out what a clean file looks like. Whoever used to catch this by hand has gone" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"You ask whether the quiet human fixes were deliberately replaced with checks, but nobody ever wrote down what those fixes were, so the honest answer is that we cannot know, and a four is me guessing." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

The structured ratings assess respondents' perceptions of control replacement. They do not measure the frequency of the specific incidents described in the nine written responses.

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8 The Dependency Chain and Gated External Rails

Incomplete dependency inventories and restricted external access were reported to leave delivery teams without a full view of required systems or a fully automated route through them. Two indicators assess dependency mapping and the management of restricted-access external infrastructure, including payment networks, regulatory filing systems, and market utilities. The latter are described in the survey as gated external rails.

Dependency information can support notification, monitoring, security review, and fallback planning. The analysis also considers external systems whose access conditions require certification, fixed submission windows, or human participation.

8.1 Mapping of Third- and Fourth-Party Dependencies

INDICATOR C196 · RATE HOW COMPLETELY THE ENGAGEMENT HAS MAPPED EVERY THIRD AND FOURTH PARTY ITS AGENTS DEPEND ON, DOWN THE FULL CHAIN · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Some reported dependency inventories stopped at direct third-party providers or omitted the systems on which agents relied. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 791 respondents). The dependency map was rated less complete on canceled engagements (mean 3.1, n = 302 respondents) than on active engagements in any stage.

Figure 2.103. Mapping of Third- and Fourth-Party Dependencies: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Rate how completely the engagement has mapped every third and fourth party its agents depend on, down the full chain”.

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Distressed ratings: 252 of 791 answers (31.86%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 608): 4.49. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.90. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.97. Build-Out (n = 162): 5.47. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 231): 5.64. Production (n = 96): 5.53. Canceled (n = 302): 3.13.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

Mapping of third- and fourth-party dependencies was associated with all four core study measures, each association upheld by the applicable robustness checks. Cancellation was less common where dependencies had been mapped (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.53, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction was higher where the map was rated fuller (r = 0.71, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements). A fuller map accompanied a higher engagement indicator mean computed without the mapping indicator (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated the map fuller (r = −0.68, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.73 to −0.62, n = 741 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 252 of the 791 answers (31.86%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 36 of the 150 engagements.

The written responses addressing the dependency map numbered 44, all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 35 negative and 8 positive. The negative responses said there was no list of what the agents depended on, or that the list stopped at the direct providers, and several had asked for one without receiving an answer. One respondent whose team had built such a list put its cost at two weekends of analysts' time.

> *"we went into a procurement desk without a list of what the agents would be leaning on beneath the obvious platform, and no view at all of what sits beneath that again. On the one occasion a supplier feed changed shape we found out because the queue stopped, not because anyone told us. Whether we could have moved off the model provider is academic; we would not have known what to move." -Portfolio Director, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"somebody needs to own the dependency map past the first tier; we know our directs, we do not really know who they depend on, and that gap would matter a great deal on the day one of them has an outage ... Neither is expensive. Both need a name against them and a date, or they stay in the deck." -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"the problem is the Rates feed changed its field names on a wednesday and nobody told us. every model that pulled from it came back blank and we lost two days keying rates in manually. i asked who owns that supplier, nobody could say. there is no list anywhere" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"how am i to rate advance notice from providers when nobody tells us which providers sit behind the screening service." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

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> *"Monitoring for unannounced provider changes is in place and it works, which is why those marks are high. We have the dependency chain mapped to the fourth party." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Negative written responses and more negative engagement-level sentiment about dependency mapping were associated with higher cancellation rates. More negative respondent-level sentiment was associated with higher intent to leave. Accounts suggest that incomplete inventories complicated coordination of other third-party controls.

8.2 Dependence on Gated External Rails

INDICATOR C197 · RATE HOW WELL THE ENGAGEMENT MANAGES AGENT DEPENDENCE ON GATED EXTERNAL RAILS SUCH AS PAYMENT NETWORKS AND REGULATORY SUBMISSION SYSTEMS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Restricted-access external networks, regulators, and utilities were reported to retain steps that people had to perform, even where agentic delivery depended on them. The mean rating was 4.6 and the median 5.0 (n = 794 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements rated the handling of gated rails lower than respondents on active engagements in any stage (mean 3.1, n = 296 respondents).

Figure 2.104. Dependence on Gated External Rails: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "Rate how well the engagement manages agent dependence on gated external rails such as payment networks and regulatory submission systems".

Distressed ratings: 245 of 794 answers (30.86%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 612): 4.45. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.01. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.77. Build-Out (n = 162): 5.46. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 238): 5.52. Production (n = 98): 5.49. Canceled (n = 296): 3.13.

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r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.
The engagement indicator mean excludes the tested indicator.

All four core study measures were associated with how well the engagement handled gated external rails, and the applicable robustness checks left the associations intact. Engagements that handled the rails better had a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.63, 95% CI −0.72 to −0.52, n = 150 engagements). Customer satisfaction among active engagements was higher where the rails were handled better (r = 0.69, 95% CI 0.56 to 0.78, n = 94 engagements). Handling of the rails was also associated with a higher engagement indicator mean computed without it (r = 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). Intent to leave was lower among respondents who rated the handling of the rails higher (r = −0.65, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.58, n = 744 respondents). Distressed ratings came from 245 of the 794 answers (30.86%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 38 of the 150 engagements.

Fifteen written responses addressed the gated rails, nearly all in comment on the third-party ecosystem, with 13 negative and 2 positive. Respondents placed the weakness in certification portals and regulatory submission systems built for a person, fixed submission windows and call limits, and sandbox access that never arrived in full. In several engagements notice of provider change had improved while access to the rails had not.

> *"the tax authority portals dont care that were an agent. submission windows close at a fixed hour and if the model version changes the week of a deadline we have no route to push it. Feeds themselves are excellent, no complaint there. its the last mile into the filing systems thats out of our hands" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"Feed providers do warn us now before they change something, that got better since January. What did not get better is the regulator portal, agent still cant file anything there, one of us does it by hand every week" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"Same with statutory submission portal, it takes only so many a day." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

More negative written sentiment about restricted-access infrastructure was associated with higher intent to leave. This result is exploratory because the qualitative sample contains 15 responses. Accounts described staff completing steps that external systems required a person to perform.

Across the 100 indicators, respondents rated financial institution readiness, co-management, and vendor capability less favorably than AI technology and the third-party ecosystem. The indicators were correlated with one another and associated with all four study measures. These relationships do not identify separate causes of failure. Part 3 synthesizes the governance implications. Part 5 examines the manual interventions described by delivery team members.

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Notice from the major providers has improved markedly over the last year, to the point where we now plan around deprecations rather than react to them, and our handling of the gated rails, the payroll rails in particular, is as good as I have seen on any account. What has not moved is our answer to the concentration question. If we had to move providers, I could not tell a client with a straight face how long that would take, and we have been saying that for three quarters now."

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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About the Author

Phil Hatch is an outsourcing and workforce-development executive with more than 30 years of experience. He previously led the global outsourcing business of ManpowerGroup/Experis. His work includes service delivery, workforce strategy, and organizational development across industries and countries.

Hatch has also advised governments on labor and economic development, including workforce strategies intended to support investment and employment.

Following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Hatch was asked by the U.S. Department of State and USAID to advise Ukraine on workforce and economic development. His work has addressed technology, outsourcing, skills development, and international investment in support of economic recovery.

Through Akholi, Hatch advises organizations and governments on outsourcing and the implications of AI for work and service delivery.

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About Akholi

Akholi, established in 2003, is a research and advisory firm focused on outsourcing, service delivery, and global capability centers. Its work includes the 2026 study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements described in this report.

The study examines relationships among financial institution readiness, co-management, vendor capability, AI technology, the third-party ecosystem, and reported engagement outcomes. Its findings are observational and do not establish that any one category is the sole or primary cause of those outcomes.

Akholi applies this research through advisory and educational work with institutional leaders. Recommendations derived from the study require assessment against the circumstances and evidence of each engagement.

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Formats change between one delivery and the next, handoffs between their teams are undefined, we ask kindly for the same clarification and nothing comes back… so I make my own call on routing.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
CXM, Technology engineering and operations

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PART 2

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

The Five Failure Categories

A study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements, drawn from the accounts of 850 members of the vendors' delivery teams

PUBLICATION DATE	November 1, 2026
VERSION	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
FIGSHARE DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890

READ THE FULL STUDY AND ITS DATA akholi.com/outsourcing-2026-agentic-ai-tier-1-banks

02

03

PART 3

Governance, Oversight, and Control

IN THIS PART

Reported Governance Weaknesses Across All 150 Engagements

Co-Management and Governance Across the Other Four Categories

Financial Institution Readiness and the Governance of Agentic Work

Vendor Preparation and Accountability in the Control Environment

Technical Controls and Governance Across the Engagement

Third-Party Dependencies and the Limits of Internal Control

Understanding Governing Obligations and the Control Environment

The Fit Between Governance Processes and the Pace of Agent Work

Manual Alteration and the Operation and Visibility of Controls

Practices Adopted in Place of Controls

REPORT INFORMATION

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Full Study Report

Author	Phil Hatch
Publication date	November 1, 2026
Version	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
Figshare DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890
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SUGGESTED CITATION

Hatch, Phil. 2026. *Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions: Full Study Report*. Version 1.8.2. Akholi. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559.

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USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Artificial intelligence tools were used to prepare this report. Appendix G discloses how they were used.

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Governance, Oversight, and Control

The delivery workforce reported governance and control weaknesses across all 150 engagements. The central problem was the operation of controls in shared agentic work: authority, change management, human review, and evidence did not consistently provide the assurance their formal arrangements implied. The governance, oversight, and control score combines 47 related indicator ratings. Lower scores were associated with cancellation, manual correction, and limited visibility of that work. The mean score was 2.58 on canceled engagements and 4.86 on active engagements. These findings connect operational control with engagement performance, while leaving causal direction unresolved.

Part 3 examines how indicators, engagement characteristics, and reported practices relate to governance, oversight, and control. It draws on 37,472 ratings of 47 governance-related indicators from 850 respondents, together with reporting and obligations items and written accounts. The 3,330 written instances classified as governance weaknesses occur among 6,862 answers concerning respondents' own engagements. They identify reported deficiencies and bypassed controls, not independently verified failure of every engagement. The analysis considers both broad patterns in the score and specific control gaps that a composite mean may not sharply distinguish.

The evidence principally records the vendor delivery workforce's experience at one observation. It cannot establish the sequence of events or identify causal effects. The 56 canceled engagements had already been canceled when respondents answered, making comparisons with the 94 active engagements retrospective. Two customer management executives are included among the 850 respondents, but they do not provide a corresponding evidence base from financial institution staff. Relationships among measures from the same respondents also share that source limitation.

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“What we did was stop using the change board for anything that mattered. It met fortnightly and the agents moved faster than that, so we built a parallel list, one sheet, updated every evening, of every case where the model had done something we had not agreed to and what we had done about it. Their underwriting lead and I read it at nine each morning and cleared it between us, and whatever survived that went to the formal forum a fortnight later as a note rather than a decision. It worked, in the sense that files kept moving. It also means the actual governance of this engagement was two people and a spreadsheet. Nobody asked us to do it and nobody stopped us, which I think tells you where the accountability sat.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

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Reported Governance Weaknesses Across All 150 Engagements

Reported control weaknesses were widespread, but their depth varied. Ratings of 3 or below occurred on 145 of the 150 engagements, while written accounts classified as governance weaknesses occurred on all 150. Only 50 engagements had a mean governance, oversight, and control score of 3 or below. These are different findings: the presence of one reported weakness is not equivalent to a low composite mean or independently established overall governance failure. The canceled-versus-active contrast was substantial, whereas structural group comparisons were less conclusive.

The governance, oversight, and control score is the mean of the 47 governance-related indicator ratings available for each respondent. Respondent means are averaged within engagements, and engagement means are then averaged across the study. Low-rating counts report ratings of 3 or below separately from the score. Written instances count answers classified negative on a governance indicator or describing one of the 26 forms in Table 3.1. These measures describe different aspects of reported control weakness. Numeric score bands are descriptive and do not represent validated stages of control development.

The measures were strongly related across the 150 engagements. Correlation, denoted r, expresses the direction and strength of a linear association on a scale from −1 to +1. The score correlated at −0.97 with low ratings per respondent and at −0.78 with written instances per respondent. These are complementary descriptions from shared respondents and source material, rather than independent validation. The five engagements with no low governance rating were active and in the highest indicator quintile, the highest fifth ranked by the mean of all 100 engagement indicators. Their scores ranged from 6.62 to 7.38, yet each had 5–15 written instances of weakness. The median engagement had 21.50 such instances, within a range of 5–44.

Table 3.1. The 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working in the written answers

Form	Definition	Written answers	Respondents	Engagements
Financial institution explicitly not informed	The respondent stated that the financial institution was not told of the manual alteration.	178	139	73
Manual alteration disclosed to no party	The manual alteration was disclosed to no party.	59	55	39
Manual alteration not logged or only partly logged	The manual alteration did not enter a record, or only part of it did.	143	118	72

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Form	Definition	Written answers	Respondents	Engagements
Instructed not to raise the problem	The respondent was told to make the work succeed without escalating, or that raising the problem would be penalized.	20	15	12
Raising problems seen as futile	The respondent had stopped raising the problem, since nothing changed or raising it cost more than correcting it.	149	122	81
Problems raised with no response	The respondent raised the problem and received no response.	326	255	119
Effort absent from reported figures	The work performed appeared in no reported measure.	71	64	54
Human work presented as agentic	A person performed work that was reported or structured as work performed by an agent.	6	6	5
Habit in place of a control	The compensating practice was undocumented and depended on one person.	91	87	69
Failures removed from the base of a reported rate	Failures or exceptions were excluded from the denominator of a reported rate.	50	50	39
Measures restricted to the parseable subset	A measure covered only the easy or machine-readable part of the work.	38	38	32
Human-corrected work counted as agent work	Work corrected by people, run in a test environment, or overridden was counted as production work completed by agents.	52	52	45
Accuracy reported on a selected validation set	Accuracy was reported on a set chosen to exclude the hardest cases.	18	18	16
Elapsed-time measures restarted on rework	The measurement of elapsed time restarted on rework, so delay never accumulated.	4	4	3
Activity counted in place of outcome	A count of activity stood in for a measure of outcome.	112	111	78
Exceptions omitted from reports	An exception recorded internally was omitted from what the financial institution received.	23	23	20
Readiness or completion reported falsely	A readiness or completion status was reported falsely, allowing a gate to pass.	20	20	14
Suppressed aging of open items	Open items were pooled into a category that did not age, so their duration never appeared.	3	3	3
Schema or format changed without notice	A layout, field name, or column order changed between deliveries without notice.	61	60	51

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Form	Definition	Written answers	Respondents	Engagements
No validation by the financial institution before handover	The financial institution performed no check before handing data or documents over.	50	47	37
Undefined handoffs between the financial institution's teams	Responsibility between the financial institution's own teams was not defined.	41	39	35
Output that cannot be signed off	Output that did not reproduce could not be attributed or approved.	29	27	23
Unclear liability or regulatory accountability	The respondent could not say who was legally or regulatorily answerable for the work or for an agent's error.	83	80	57
Regulatory or compliance exposure	The respondent linked a practice, gap, or incident to a breach, or the risk of a breach, of a legal, regulatory, or compliance obligation.	16	14	12
Change discovered only through failure	A change or outage was discovered when something downstream failed, never through notice.	157	150	93
No escalation path outside working hours	No route existed for an agent failure outside normal working hours.	14	14	14

Note: A written answer may describe more than one form. The forms are counted on the written answers that addressed the respondent's own engagement.

Respondent role, engagement status, expected cancellation, and the four study measures showed relationships with the reported control environment. The structural group comparisons did not detect adjusted differences on the stated measures. Team size and age use continuous analysis and an equivalence margin, the largest association treated as sufficiently small under the study's criterion. Table 3.2 summarizes those results. Nonsignificance does not establish identical governance, and equivalence concerns only the specified range of associations.

Table 3.2. Segments and study measures against the three measures of reported governance weakness

Segment or study measure	Unit	Score	Distressed governance ratings	Written instances
Financial institution type	engagement	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)
Outsourcing model	engagement	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)

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Segment or study measure	Unit	Score	Distressed governance ratings	Written instances
Process family	engagement	No detected association (Holm p = 0.874)	No detected association (Holm p = 0.484)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)
Vendor type	engagement	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)
Delivery location	engagement	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)
Class of work	engagement	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)	No detected association (Holm p = 1.00)
Respondent role	respondent	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)
Engagement status and lifecycle stage	engagement	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)
Expected cancellation	engagement	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)
Intent to leave	respondent	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)	Associated (Holm p < 0.001)
Delivery team size	engagement	Within ±0.30 (r = −0.11)	Within ±0.30 (r = 0.09)	Within ±0.30 (r = 0.06)
Engagement age	engagement	Within ±0.30 (r = 0.07)	Within ±0.30 (r = −0.06)	Within ±0.30 (r = −0.14)
Cancellation	engagement	Associated (r = −0.72)	Associated (r = 0.76)	Associated (r = 0.64)
Customer satisfaction, active engagements	engagement	Associated (r = 0.80)	Associated (r = −0.74)	Associated (r = −0.55)
Engagement indicator mean without the 47	engagement	Associated (r = 0.94)	Associated (r = −0.91)	Associated (r = −0.77)

Note: Holm adjustment controls multiple comparisons within the stated categorical family, covering its three measures and five category means. Welch tests compare means without assuming equal variances. A p value describes evidence against the test's null under its assumptions, not practical importance. Correlations use engagement-level paired bases, normally 150 engagements and 94 for customer satisfaction. CI denotes a confidence interval. The recorded equivalence margin is r = ±0.30. Equivalence tests whether an association lies within that range. The approximate detectable correlation of 0.23 at n = 150 is a different quantity. A nonsignificant conventional test does not establish equivalence. Omega squared, ω^2, estimates the share of variation associated with a group distinction. AUC is the area under a receiver operating characteristic curve, describing discrimination between canceled and active engagements in this sample. Partial r is the correlation after accounting for a specified comparison variable. Here that variable is the mean of the 53 indicators outside the score. Nominal p values are uncorrected for multiple testing. Cluster-robust inference allows standard errors to reflect dependence among respondents on the same engagement.

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Data governance gaps in the source feeds were logged by the vendor as agent exceptions rather than data issues, which made the bot look like the problem when the feed was the actual cause."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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1 The Governance, Oversight, and Control Score

The score and low-rating counts identify different levels of weakness. Mean scores were 3 or below for 283 of 850 respondents and 50 of 150 engagements, while at least one low governance rating was recorded by 743 respondents. The composite includes controls from all five failure categories, with unequal category representation. That composition must be considered when an individual item is compared with the wider control environment.

1.1 Composition of the Governance, Oversight, and Control Score

Definition · The governance, oversight, and control score · Analyzed only in Part 3

The governance, oversight, and control score places joint control between the financial institution and vendor at the center of its measurement. Co-management supplies 20 of the 47 indicators, compared with seven for financial institution readiness, two for vendor capability, eight for AI technology, and ten for the third-party ecosystem. This composition makes cross-category comparison necessary when asking whether an individual control is associated with governance elsewhere. It also means that the composite is not an equal-weight comparison of the five categories.

Figure 3.1. The 47 governance indicators, by failure category

The governance, oversight, and control score places joint control between the financial institution and vendor at the center of its measurement.



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The 47 indicators divide by failure category into co-management with 20, the third-party ecosystem with 10, AI technology with 8, financial institution readiness with 7, and vendor capability with 2. Co-management carries 42.55% of the measure. The 19 governance indicators listed in Appendix C are a subset of the 47.

Each rating entered the measure on its favorable end. The ratings were averaged for each respondent, the respondent values were averaged within each engagement, and the engagement values were averaged across the 150 engagements. Where the indicator under test was one of the 47, it was removed from the score before the comparison, so no indicator was tested against a measure that contained it.

Excluding an item from the score removes its direct contribution but leaves other related items, including 19 co-management items when a co-management indicator is tested. The cross-category comparison instead removes that entire category. Adjustment then accounts for one variable, the mean of the 53 indicators outside the score. These specifications ask different conditional questions. Neither isolates an independently established causal effect.

Table 3.3. The 47 governance indicators, by failure category

Failure category	Indicator	Part 2 section
Co-management	Co-Management of the Engagement	1.1
Co-management	Decision Rights Over Agent Action Without Human Approval	1.2
Co-management	Ownership of Each Workflow Step	1.3
Co-management	Accountability for Problems Arising From an Agent's Action	1.4
Co-management	A Single Shared View of Agent Risk	2.1
Co-management	Co-Management of Issues Arising From Agent Work	2.2
Co-management	Resolution Speed Against the Spread of Agent-Caused Problems	2.3
Co-management	Speed of Stopping a Misbehaving Agent in Live Operations	2.4
Co-management	Joint Change Control Against the Speed of Agent Behavior Change	3.1
Co-management	Visibility of Agent Updates to the Other Firm Before They Take Effect	3.2
Co-management	Joint Governance of Agent Behavior Change Between Formal Releases	3.3

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Failure category	Indicator	Part 2 section
Co-management	Placement of Human Review Points	4.1
Co-management	Human Review Capacity Against Agent Output Volume	4.2
Co-management	Genuine Scrutiny at Human Review Points	4.3
Co-management	Reliability of the Joint Quality Assurance Loop	4.4
Co-management	Quality Measures That Capture Agent Errors	4.5
Co-management	Each Firm's Visibility of the Other Firm's Agent Actions	5.1
Co-management	Joint Decision Speed Against Agent Speed	5.2
Co-management	Fit of the Joint Governance Model to Work Performed by Agents	5.3
Co-management	Readiness of the Co-Management Model for Expected Agent Autonomy	5.4
Financial institution readiness	Maturity of the Financial Institution's Data Governance	1.4
Financial institution readiness	Effectiveness of the Financial Institution's Management of Its Side	5.1
Financial institution readiness	Speed of the Financial Institution's Response to Issues Raised	5.2
Financial institution readiness	Assignment of Ownership and Accountability for AI	6.1
Financial institution readiness	Capacity to Govern and Oversee Agent Risk	6.2
Financial institution readiness	Change Control for the Changes the Engagement Requires	6.3
Financial institution readiness	Ability to Provision Access and Identities for Agents	7.1
Vendor capability	Maturity of the Playbook From Concept to Governed Production	6.1
Vendor capability	Readiness to Take Accountability for a Costly Agent Error	7.1
AI technology	Resistance to Hostile Embedded Instructions	5.3
AI technology	Safe Handling of Sensitive Data	5.2
AI technology	Consistency of Intended and Authorized Agent Action	6.1
AI technology	Reliability of Built-In Guardrails in Production	6.2

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Failure category	Indicator	Part 2 section
AI technology	Proof of Correct Behavior Before Work Goes Live	7.1
AI technology	Accuracy of the Tools' Own Success and Failure Reports	8.1
AI technology	Explanation and Evidence of Outputs at Audit Depth	8.2
AI technology	Quality of Logs, Traces, and Usage Telemetry	8.3
Third-party ecosystem	Quality of Advance Notice From Third-Party Providers	1.1
Third-party ecosystem	Delivery of Change Notices to the Operators of Affected Agents	1.2
Third-party ecosystem	Protection of Agents From Silent Failure	2.1
Third-party ecosystem	Monitoring for Unannounced Third-Party Change	2.2
Third-party ecosystem	Contractual Coverage of Disruptive Provider Change	4.1
Third-party ecosystem	Security Posture of Third-Party Tools and Sub-Processors	6.1
Third-party ecosystem	Management of Dependence on a Small Number of Model and Cloud Providers	6.2
Third-party ecosystem	Replacement of Informal Human Fixes With Explicit Checks	7.4
Third-party ecosystem	Mapping of Third- and Fourth-Party Dependencies	8.1
Third-party ecosystem	Management of Dependence on Gated External Rails	8.2

1.2 The Score Across Respondents and Engagements

Definition · The governance, oversight, and control score across respondents and engagements · Analyzed only in Part 3

Low ratings were more widespread than low composite means. A respondent could report a serious weakness in one control while giving other controls higher ratings, so the mean alone does not describe the reach of reported deficiencies. The distinction matters for oversight: isolated weaknesses and a broadly low assessment of controls are different findings. Both remain visible through separate reporting of low individual ratings, respondent means, and engagement means.

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Figure 3.2. Share of engagements, by numeric score band

Low ratings were more widespread than low composite means.



Of the 37,472 ratings given to the 47 indicators, 16,074 (42.90%) were distressed, and they came from 743 respondents on 145 engagements. The score stood at 3.99 across respondents (n = 850) and at 4.01 across engagements (n = 150). Its distressed range held 283 respondents (33.29%) and 50 engagements (33.33%).

Favorable indicator ratings usually coincided with composite scores above 3. Among respondents rating a governance indicator at 8–10, none had a score of 3 or below after that item was omitted, with one exception among the 60 rating tool-report accuracy at 8–10. Composite scores were at 3 or below for 35.83% of individual contributors, 28.00% of engagement managers, and 6.45% of portfolio directors. The mean score was 2.58 on canceled engagements, compared with 4.69–4.94 across the active stages.

Written instances reached further than either measure. They numbered 3,330 of the 6,862 written answers that addressed the respondent's own engagement (48.53%), from 838 of the 850 respondents on all 150 engagements. The five engagements without a distressed governance rating carried between 5 and 15 written instances each. On one of them, an individual contributor reported correcting almost every batch without raising a ticket, the correction accepted by the team as part of the job. On another, an individual contributor reported that the ownership of a case taken over midway by an agent had never been written down.

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"This happens on almost every batch, because of that i do not raise ticket for each one, only when it affects release, for that reason most of correcting stays with me and team just accepts it as part of job" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

"Happy enough with this one in truth. But one thing is missing here... when merchant raises chargeback dispute and agent picks it up halfway, nobody has written down who owns case after that point. My team decides between ourselves, usually works out. And nobody has ever asked us how we decide it" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes

Figure 3.3. Engagements by the score, 150 engagements

Low ratings were more widespread than low composite means.



Note: Amber identifies the 50 engagements with a mean governance, oversight, and control score of 3 or below. The threshold is descriptive and is not a validated diagnosis of overall governance failure.

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2 Governance Indicators Across the Five Failure Categories

The five categories showed related governance concerns at different levels of low-rating prevalence. Readiness, co-management, and vendor capability had larger low-rating shares than the technology and third-party categories. This comparison concerns pooled ratings rather than unique respondents. The cross-category analysis asks a further question: whether an individual control is associated with the wider score after accounting for the other-indicator mean. Its interpretation depends on category composition and test-family choice.

Figure 3.4. Share of governance ratings in the distressed range, by failure category

The five categories showed related governance concerns at different levels of low-rating prevalence.



Low indicator ratings and a low composite mean are different quantities. Among respondents rating a technology control at 1–3, 74.90%–78.54% had a score of 3 or below after the tested indicator was omitted. The corresponding range was 73.41%–80.41% for third-party controls, 61.19%–65.21% for co-management, and 54.26%–57.31% for readiness. These conditional shares are not the prevalence of low indicator ratings. Table 3.4 reports the separate cross-category associations under the specified model.

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Table 3.4. The five failure categories against governance in the other four categories

Failure category	Indicators	A score of 3 or below among respondents rating an indicator 1 to 3	r with the score without the indicator	r with the other four categories	Adjusted partial r	Indicators at nominal p < 0.05
Financial institution readiness	7	54.26% to 57.31%	0.75 to 0.80	0.72 to 0.76	−0.18 to 0.22	2 of 7
Co-management	20	61.19% to 65.21%	0.90 to 0.93	0.75 to 0.80	0.21 to 0.31	20 of 20
Vendor capability	2	59.18% to 64.34%	0.78 to 0.79	0.78 to 0.78	−0.46 to −0.38	2 of 2
AI technology	8	74.90% to 78.54%	0.82 to 0.86	0.77 to 0.81	−0.09 to 0.08	0 of 8
Third-party ecosystem	10	73.41% to 80.41%	0.83 to 0.85	0.75 to 0.78	−0.14 to −0.04	0 of 10

Note: Correlations use 150 engagements. For an item-to-score comparison, the score excludes that item. For a cross-category comparison, it excludes the item's entire failure category. Partial r is the correlation after accounting for one comparison measure, the mean of the 53 indicators outside the score. It does not estimate 53 separate adjustment coefficients. Cross-category p values are nominal unless an adjustment is expressly identified. Statistical significance at nominal $p < 0.05$ should not be confused with a family-adjusted conclusion. Category composition differs in both the score and the comparison mean.

2.1 Financial Institution Readiness

Failure category · 7 governance indicators · Full analysis of each indicator in Part 2, Financial Institution Readiness

Financial institution readiness had the largest share of low governance-related ratings. This places the institution's own data, access, management, and control responsibilities within the governance problem rather than treating governance as a vendor-only obligation. The adjusted comparisons provide more qualified evidence about relationships with the other categories. They cannot establish that the institution's individual controls matter only through its overall readiness.

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Figure 3.5. Financial Institution Readiness: ranges of unadjusted and adjusted cross-category associations.

Financial institution readiness associations weakened after adjustment



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

The score excludes the tested category. Adjustment uses the mean of the other 53 indicators. Ranges describe estimates across items, not confidence intervals. Category-mean bands are 3 or below: 60 of 150 (40.00%). Above 3 to 7: 86 of 150 (57.33%). Above 7: 4 of 150 (2.67%).

The seven readiness indicators were distressed in 2,858 of 5,597 ratings (51.06%), the highest share of the five categories, and their means ran from 3.47 to 3.61. The category mean was distressed on 60 of the 150 engagements (40.00%).

Each readiness indicator was associated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.72 to 0.76 (n = 150 engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r ran from −0.18 to 0.22, and two of the seven associations were significant. The governance of the financial institution's data carried the one positive tie (partial r = 0.22). The speed of the financial institution's response to issues raised carried a small inverse result (partial r = −0.18) that reversed to 0.13 once the institution's other readiness indicators were omitted from the comparison mean.

The association of each indicator with the score computed without it, measured across respondents, held within the canceled engagements at r = 0.54 to 0.62, the lowest of the five categories. It held within each active stage, at 0.58 to 0.69 in Build-Out, 0.71 to 0.79 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.64 to 0.76 in Production. Within role, it ran from 0.74 to 0.78 among individual contributors and from 0.51 to 0.75 among the 31 portfolio directors.

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Among respondents who rated a readiness indicator 1 to 3, 54.26% to 57.31% had a score of 3 or below, the lowest range of the five categories. Across the seven indicators, ratings of 8 to 10 numbered 126, and none came from a respondent with a score of 3 or below. The 1,479 written answers on the readiness indicators held 1,323 negative answers, and 381 of the negative answers described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working.

Part 2 (Financial Institution Readiness) analyzes each indicator in full, and Financial Institution Readiness and the Governance of Agentic Work reads each against reported governance weakness.

2.2 Co-Management

Failure category · 20 governance indicators · Full analysis of each indicator in Part 2, Co-Management

Co-management showed consistently positive associations with governance in the other four categories, including after the specified composite adjustment. The substantive concern is coordination across firms: decision rights, change control, review, and incident management must operate across the same work. The consistency of the 20 estimates supports examining that shared operating arrangement. Its apparent statistical distinctiveness remains conditional on score composition, comparison-measure composition, and the stated family of tests.

Figure 3.6. Co-Management: ranges of unadjusted and adjusted cross-category associations.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

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The score excludes the tested category. Adjustment uses the mean of the other 53 indicators. Ranges describe estimates across items, not confidence intervals. Category-mean bands are 3 or below: 63 of 150 (42.00%). Above 3 to 7: 83 of 150 (55.33%). Above 7: 4 of 150 (2.67%).

Each of its 20 indicators was associated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.75 to 0.80 (n = 150 engagements). After that adjustment, the partial r ran from 0.21 to 0.31, and all 20 associations were significant. No indicator outside co-management carried a significant positive adjusted association except the governance of the financial institution's data.

The 20 indicators were distressed in 7,866 of 15,968 ratings (49.26%), the second-highest share of the five categories, and their means ran from 3.60 to 3.73. The category mean was distressed on 63 of the 150 engagements (42.00%), more than in any other category.

The association of each indicator with the score computed without it held within the canceled engagements at r = 0.74 to 0.82, the highest of the five categories. Within the active stages it ran from 0.75 to 0.83 in Build-Out, 0.80 to 0.86 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.82 to 0.89 in Production. Within role, it ran from 0.86 to 0.88 among individual contributors and from 0.76 to 0.90 among portfolio directors.

Among respondents who rated a co-management indicator 1 to 3, 61.19% to 65.21% had a score of 3 or below. Across the 20 indicators, ratings of 8 to 10 numbered 605, and none came from a respondent with a score of 3 or below. The 1,146 written answers on the co-management indicators held 903 negative answers, and 199 of the negative answers described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working.

Part 2 (Co-Management) analyzes each indicator in full, and Co-Management and Governance Across the Other Four Categories reads each against reported governance weakness.

2.3 Vendor Capability

Failure category · 2 governance indicators · Full analysis of each indicator in Part 2, Vendor Capability

The vendor's playbook and readiness to accept accountability were associated with the wider control environment, but their adjusted coefficients changed sharply with the comparison measure. For governance, these indicators concern whether the vendor has a defined route into controlled production and accepts responsibility when agent work causes loss. The results support examining those responsibilities. They do not show that weak vendor controls improve governance or that their relationship is exhausted by general capability.

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Figure 3.7. Vendor Capability: ranges of unadjusted and adjusted cross-category associations.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

The score excludes the tested category. Adjustment uses the mean of the other 53 indicators. Ranges describe estimates across items, not confidence intervals. Category-mean bands are 3 or below: 58 of 150 (38.67%). Above 3 to 7: 88 of 150 (58.67%). Above 7: 4 of 150 (2.67%).

The two indicators were distressed in 765 of 1,601 ratings (47.78%), and their means were 3.65 and 3.67. The category mean was distressed on 58 of the 150 engagements (38.67%).

The two vendor indicators correlated with governance in the other four categories at approximately r = 0.78. Their adjusted partial correlations were −0.38 for the playbook and −0.46 for accountability, both nominally significant. The comparison mean contains the vendor's 18 other capability indicators. Removing those items changed the estimates to 0.04 and −0.03. This sensitivity demonstrates dependence on the adjustment measure and limits an interpretation of the negative coefficients as distinct effects of these controls.

The association of each indicator with the score computed without it held within the canceled engagements at r = 0.66 to 0.69. Within the active stages it ran from 0.70 to 0.71 in Build-Out, 0.65 to 0.66 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.77 to 0.81 in Production. Within role, it ran from 0.78 to 0.79 among individual contributors and stood at 0.68 for each indicator among portfolio directors.

Among respondents who rated a vendor capability indicator 1 to 3, 59.18% and 64.34% had a score of 3 or below. Ratings of 8 to 10 numbered 44 across the two indicators, and none came from a respondent

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with a score of 3 or below. The 238 written answers on the two indicators held 215 negative answers, and 25 of the negative answers described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working.

Part 2 (Vendor Capability) analyzes each indicator in full, and Vendor Preparation and Accountability in the Control Environment reads both against reported governance weakness.

2.4 AI Technology

Failure category · 8 governance indicators · Full analysis of each indicator in Part 2, AI Technology

Low technology-control ratings were associated with low composite scores, connecting the operation of technical safeguards to the broader control environment. The eight indicators concern whether agent actions remain authorized, observable, testable, and subject to effective safeguards. The main adjusted model did not detect positive cross-category associations for these controls. That conditional result limits a claim of statistical independence, while leaving their substantive control functions and strong observed associations intact.

Figure 3.8. AI Technology: ranges of unadjusted and adjusted cross-category associations.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

The score excludes the tested category. Adjustment uses the mean of the other 53 indicators. Ranges describe estimates across items, not confidence intervals. Category-mean bands are 3 or below: 30 of 150 (20.00%). Above 3 to 7: 104 of 150 (69.33%). Above 7: 16 of 150 (10.67%).

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The eight technology indicators were distressed in 2,052 of 6,362 ratings (32.25%), and their means ran from 4.54 to 4.66. The category mean was distressed on 30 of the 150 engagements (20.00%).

Among respondents who rated a technology control 1 to 3, 74.90% to 78.54% had a score of 3 or below. Across the eight indicators, ratings of 8 to 10 numbered 551, and one came from a respondent with a score of 3 or below.

The technology indicators correlated with the other four categories at r = 0.77–0.81. In the main adjusted model, partial r ranged from −0.09 to 0.08 and none met nominal $p < 0.05$. This is a conditional result. For authorized action, removing the other 12 AI technology items from the comparison mean changed partial r from −0.03 ($p = 0.745$) to 0.29 ($p < 0.001$). The sensitivity qualifies any conclusion that technology controls have no relationship of their own.

Associations between each technology indicator and the score excluding it ranged from 0.65 to 0.70 in Build-Out, 0.71 to 0.77 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.78 to 0.82 in Production. Within canceled engagements they ranged from 0.66 to 0.72. The stage ordering is descriptive and is not a test that associations strengthened over time. Within role, correlations ranged from 0.79 to 0.82 among individual contributors and from 0.61 to 0.87 among portfolio directors.

The 493 written answers on the technology indicators held 402 negative answers, and 42 of the negative answers described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working.

Part 2 (AI Technology) analyzes each indicator in full, and Technical Controls and Governance Across the Engagement reads each against reported governance weakness.

2.5 Third-Party Ecosystem

Failure category · 10 governance indicators · Full analysis of each indicator in Part 2, Third-Party Ecosystem

Third-party control ratings connected external dependencies with the broader governance environment. Advance notice, monitoring, contractual coverage, and dependency management concern work that the financial institution and vendor cannot govern through internal procedures alone. Low ratings in this category commonly accompanied low composite scores. The adjusted results did not establish a separate positive relationship under the specified model, and they do not demonstrate that external controls have no distinct operational importance.

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Figure 3.9. Third-Party Ecosystem: ranges of unadjusted and adjusted cross-category associations.

Third-party control ratings connected external dependencies with the broader governance environment.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

The score excludes the tested category. Adjustment uses the mean of the other 53 indicators. Ranges describe estimates across items, not confidence intervals. Category-mean bands are 3 or below: 34 of 150 (22.67%). Above 3 to 7: 100 of 150 (66.67%). Above 7: 16 of 150 (10.67%).

The ten third-party indicators were distressed in 2,533 of 7,944 ratings (31.89%), the lowest share of the five categories, and their means ran from 4.58 to 4.66. The category mean was distressed on 34 of the 150 engagements (22.67%).

Among respondents who rated a third-party control 1 to 3, 73.41% to 80.41% had a score of 3 or below, and the upper end of the range was the highest share of the 47 governance indicators. Across the ten indicators, ratings of 8 to 10 numbered 764, and none came from a respondent with a score of 3 or below.

Each third-party indicator was associated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.75 to 0.78 (n = 150 engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r ran from −0.14 to −0.04, and none of the ten was significant.

Within canceled engagements, third-party indicator associations with the score excluding the item ranged from 0.65 to 0.73. Across active stages, the ranges were 0.70–0.79 in Build-Out, 0.69–0.77 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.72–0.81 in Production. These comparisons do not establish a change over time. Within role, correlations ranged from 0.79 to 0.82 among individual contributors and from 0.70 to 0.84 among portfolio directors.

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The 522 written answers on the third-party indicators held 372 negative answers, and 233 of the negative answers described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, the highest proportion of the five categories.

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem) analyzes each indicator in full, and Third-Party Dependencies and the Limits of Internal Control reads each against reported governance weakness.

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3 Governance Across the Segments of the Study

Structural classifications did not clearly distinguish governance depth after the stated adjustment, whereas respondent role did. Reported weaknesses extended across financial institution types, outsourcing models, process families, vendor types, locations, and classes of work. This pattern gives limited support to a simple structural explanation of the score variation. It also directs attention to the operation of controls within engagements, without establishing equality between the structural groups.

Table 3.5. The score, distressed governance ratings, and written instances of governance weakness, by segment

Segment	Engagements	Score	Distressed governance ratings per engagement	Written instances per engagement
Financial institution type				
Asset management	24	3.85	111.33	21.88
Wealth management and private banking	23	4.07	114.22	23.30
Investment banking (advisory and capital-markets origination)	19	3.34	134.42	22.58
Insurance (life, property and casualty, health)	14	3.95	96.86	22.00
Commercial and business banking	13	4.38	100.54	21.54
Payments and merchant acquiring (networks, acquiring, processing)	13	4.28	96.23	20.54
Credit card and payments issuing	12	3.81	125.42	25.00
Retail and consumer banking	12	4.40	97.83	23.25
Markets and trading (sales and trading, global markets)	11	4.38	82.55	23.00
Private equity and private capital	9			
Outsourcing model				
CXM	42	4.28	90.71	21.07
ITO	40	4.07	108.45	24.57

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Segment	Engagements	Score	Distressed governance ratings per engagement	Written instances per engagement
BPO	37	3.64	122.22	22.70
KPO	31	3.98	109.81	20.06
Vendor type				
IT services major	59	4.09	99.03	21.36
BPO specialist	37	3.68	126.81	23.08
Consulting firm	23	4.28	101.26	21.30
Boutique or specialist provider	17	4.06	100.59	23.88
Pure-play agentic AI firm	14	4.02	107.14	22.86
Delivery location				
India	92	4.03	108.07	22.46
United States	19	3.79	113.89	23.21
All other locations	39	4.07	101.74	21.10
Class of work				
LOB Operational	76	3.93	117.26	22.86
Corporate Functional	74	4.08	96.78	21.53
Engagement status and lifecycle stage				
Build-Out	31	4.85	57.39	18.55
Transition/Cut-Over	43	4.94	62.37	19.47
Production	20	4.69	65.95	17.25
Canceled	56	2.58	183.82	28.09
Cancellation risk				

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Segment	Engagements	Score	Distressed governance ratings per engagement	Written instances per engagement
High risk	19	3.91	97.16	21.05
Moderate risk	39	4.63	70.69	19.21
Below moderate risk	36	5.61	32.69	16.89
Canceled	56	2.58	183.82	28.09
Indicator quintile				
Quintile 1	30	2.13	201.63	29.27
Quintile 2	30	2.90	167.17	26.10
Quintile 3	30	3.79	109.80	21.47
Quintile 4	30	4.97	45.17	19.87
Quintile 5	30	6.24	12.03	14.30

Note: Levels with fewer than 10 engagements are reported as counts only. Tests between levels ran at the engagement level. For financial institution type, the score differed with Welch p = 0.425 (Holm p = 1.00), and written instances with Welch p = 0.618 (Holm p = 1.00). For outsourcing model, the score differed with Welch p = 0.311 (Holm p = 1.00), and written instances with Welch p = 0.614 (Holm p = 1.00). For vendor type, the score differed with Welch p = 0.645 (Holm p = 1.00), and written instances with Welch p = 0.784 (Holm p = 1.00). For delivery location, the score differed with Welch p = 0.749 (Holm p = 1.00), and written instances with Welch p = 0.956 (Holm p = 1.00). For class of work, the score differed with Welch p = 0.534 (Holm p = 1.00), and written instances with Welch p = 0.542 (Holm p = 1.00). For engagement status and lifecycle stage, the score differed with Welch p < 0.001 (Holm p < 0.001), and written instances with Welch p < 0.001 (Holm p < 0.001). For cancellation risk, the score differed with Welch p < 0.001 (Holm p < 0.001), and written instances with Welch p < 0.001 (Holm p < 0.001). For indicator quintile, the score differed with Welch p < 0.001 (Holm p < 0.001), and written instances with Welch p < 0.001 (Holm p < 0.001). Omega squared (ω^2) is an estimate of the proportion of variation associated with a group distinction. Cluster-robust inference allows respondent errors to be dependent within the same engagement. Nonsignificance is not equivalence.

3.1 Financial Institution Type

Segment · 10 financial institution types · Full analysis in Part 1, Structural Attributes and Outcome Associations, section 1.1

Reported governance weaknesses extended across the financial institution types examined. The adjusted comparisons did not detect differences in the three measures of depth, while lower scores on canceled engagements appeared within the larger type groups. The evidence gives limited support for attributing the governance pattern to financial institution type. It does not establish that the types have identical control arrangements or identical levels of risk.

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Figure 3.10. The score by institution type, engagements with 10 or more

Reported governance weaknesses extended across the financial institution types examined.

Across the nine types with 10 or more engagements, the score ranged from 3.34 in investment banking (n = 19 engagements) to 4.40 in retail and consumer banking (n = 12), with Holm p = 1.00. Distressed governance ratings per respondent ranged from 15.50 to 23.94, and written instances per respondent from 3.42 to 4.41, each with Holm p = 1.00.

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The five failure categories showed no clearly detected adjusted differences. Co-management ran from 2.83 in investment banking to 4.15 in payments and merchant acquiring, and the third-party ecosystem from 3.64 in investment banking to 5.39 in retail and consumer banking. Each of the five category means carried Holm p = 1.00, including financial institution readiness at 3.14 to 4.00.

Within each type, the score was associated with cancellation, from r = −0.56 in payments and merchant acquiring (n = 13 engagements) to r = −0.85 in retail and consumer banking (n = 12). Private equity and private capital, with 9 engagements and a score of 4.08, is reported as a count only.

3.2 Outsourcing Model

Segment · 4 outsourcing models · Full analysis in Part 1, Structural Attributes and Outcome Associations, section 3.1

The governance pattern extended across all four outsourcing models. Each included lower-scoring canceled engagements and reported weaknesses across the five categories, without a detected adjusted difference between models. For the paper's central question, the model label alone does not account for the observed variation in control assessments. Differences in operating arrangements within a model remain possible and should not be dismissed by a nonsignificant group comparison.

Figure 3.11. The score by outsourcing model, engagements with 10 or more

The governance pattern extended across all four outsourcing models.



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The score stood at 4.28 under CXM (n = 42 engagements), 4.07 under ITO (n = 40), 3.98 under KPO (n = 31), and 3.64 under BPO (n = 37), with Holm p = 1.00. Distressed governance ratings per respondent ran from 16.81 under CXM to 21.87 under BPO, and written instances per respondent from 3.74 under KPO to 4.05 under BPO, each with Holm p = 1.00.

BPO engagements stood lowest in all five failure categories without differing from the other models in any of them. Co-management ran from 3.21 under BPO to 4.02 under CXM, and AI technology from 4.20 under BPO to 4.77 under ITO, each with Holm p = 1.00.

Within each model, the score was associated with cancellation at r = −0.72 under CXM and ITO, −0.71 under KPO, and −0.78 under BPO, on 12 to 15 canceled engagements per model.

3.3 Process Family

Segment · 8 process families · Full analysis in Part 1, Structural Attributes and Outcome Associations, section 3.3

The process-family comparisons did not identify a clear adjusted difference in governance depth. This broadens the reported control concern beyond a single type of financial institution work. It also limits the explanation that the paper's overall pattern arises principally from the mix of processes sampled. The comparisons describe the families with sufficient engagement bases, with smaller groups retained descriptively.

Figure 3.12. The score by process family, engagements with 10 or more

The process-family comparisons did not identify a clear adjusted difference in governance depth.



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Across the five families with 10 or more engagements, the score ranged from 3.39 in trade, settlement and reconciliation (n = 15 engagements) to 4.41 in payments, cards and disputes (n = 12), with Holm p = 0.874. Distressed governance ratings per respondent ranged from 14.37 to 24.93 (Holm p = 0.484), and written instances per respondent from 3.46 to 4.19 (Holm p = 1.00).

Co-management came closest to a difference among the eight measures. It stood at 2.76 in trade, settlement and reconciliation against 4.20 in payments, cards and disputes, a difference that reached p = 0.019 before adjustment and did not survive it (Holm p = 0.148). The share of respondents with a score of 3 or below also differed by family before adjustment (Monte Carlo p = 0.026), while the means did not.

Within each family, the score was associated with cancellation, from r = −0.63 in payments, cards and disputes to r = −0.77 in client servicing and communications. Credit, underwriting and suitability (9 engagements, the score 4.75), regulatory, audit, tax and legal (9, 3.70), and financial crime and client onboarding (7, 3.29) fall below the threshold of 10 engagements and are reported as counts in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6. The score and written instances of governance weakness, by process family

Process family	Engagements	Respondents	Score	Respondents with a score of 3 or below	Written instances per engagement
Corporate and back-office functions	47	248	3.97	87 (35.08%)	21.45
Technology engineering and operations	35	204	4.38	46 (22.55%)	22.06
Client servicing and communications	16	94	3.63	41 (43.62%)	24.50
Trade, settlement and reconciliation	15	80	3.39	40 (50.00%)	20.80
Payments, cards and disputes	12	73	4.41	14 (19.18%)	21.25
Credit, underwriting and suitability	9	57			
Regulatory, audit, tax and legal	9	51			
Financial crime and client onboarding	7	43			

Note: Process families with fewer than 10 engagements are retained descriptively. The governance, oversight, and control score is the engagement-level mean. Respondent score bands refer to the respondent's mean and are descriptive. A mean or rating of 3 or below is not independently verified overall governance failure.

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3.4 Vendor Type

Segment · 5 vendor types · Full analysis in Part 1, Structural Attributes and Outcome Associations, section 5.1

Vendor type did not clearly distinguish engagement-level governance assessments after adjustment. The nominal respondent-level difference also did not survive the reported multiplicity correction. Governance weaknesses appeared across the vendor types represented, rather than being confined to one provider model. These comparisons concern vendor classifications, not an independently measured test of each vendor's control effectiveness.

Figure 3.13. The score by vendor type (engagement), engagements with 10 or more

Vendor type did not clearly distinguish engagement-level governance assessments after adjustment.



The score ranged from 3.68 for BPO specialists (n = 37 engagements) to 4.28 for consulting firms (n = 23), with Holm p = 1.00. At the respondent level the difference reached p = 0.017 before adjustment and did not survive it (Holm p = 0.136).

Vendor capability, the category that measures the vendor itself, ran from 3.47 for BPO specialists to 4.07 for pure-play agentic AI firms, with Holm p = 1.00. BPO specialists stood lowest in all five categories, and none of the five differences survived adjustment. Distressed governance ratings per respondent ranged from 17.49 to 22.03, and written instances per respondent from 3.74 to 4.17, each with Holm p = 1.00.

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Within each vendor type, the score was associated with cancellation, from r = −0.68 for BPO specialists and pure-play agentic AI firms to r = −0.83 for boutique or specialist providers. The pure-play agentic AI firms carried the fewest canceled engagements, 5 of 14.

3.5 Delivery Location

Segment · 3 delivery locations · Full analysis in Part 1, Structural Attributes and Outcome Associations, section 3.4

Delivery location did not clearly distinguish the reported governance measures after adjustment. Lower scores on canceled engagements appeared within India, the United States, and the combined group of other locations. The finding directs attention to control arrangements within engagements rather than a simple geographic explanation. The combined other-location group should be understood as the reported aggregate, with no inference that every location within it is equivalent.

Figure 3.14. The score by delivery location, engagements with 10 or more

Delivery location did not clearly distinguish the reported governance measures after adjustment.



Engagements delivered from India recorded a score of 4.03 (n = 92 engagements), those delivered from the United States 3.79 (n = 19), and those delivered from all other locations 4.07 (n = 39), with Holm p = 1.00. Distressed governance ratings per respondent stood at 18.77, 19.71, and 18.67, and written instances per respondent at 3.90, 3.98, and 3.91, each with Holm p = 1.00.

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The category means varied within narrow ranges. Co-management ran only from 3.58 to 3.69 across the three locations, and the widest range, in the third-party ecosystem, ran from 4.20 in the United States to 4.93 elsewhere, with Holm p = 1.00 for every category.

Within each location, the score was associated with cancellation at r = −0.70 in India, −0.78 in the United States, and −0.74 elsewhere.

3.6 Class of Work

Segment · 2 classes of work · Full analysis in Part 1, Structural Attributes and Outcome Associations, section 3.2

The two classes of work showed no clearly detected adjusted difference in governance depth. Reported control weaknesses thus extended to both line-of-business operations and corporate functions. This comparison concerns the broad class of work, while the governance analysis continues to examine the specific responsibilities, evidence, and review arrangements within each engagement.

Figure 3.15. The score by class of work, engagements with 10 or more

The two classes of work showed no clearly detected adjusted difference in governance depth.



LOB Operational engagements recorded a score of 3.93 (n = 76 engagements) and Corporate Functional engagements 4.08 (n = 74), with Holm p = 1.00. Distressed governance ratings per respondent stood at 19.79 and 17.91, and written instances per respondent at 3.85 and 3.97, each with Holm p = 1.00.

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The two classes differed by less than half a point in every failure category. The widest gap lay in AI technology, at 4.42 for LOB Operational against 4.77 for Corporate Functional engagements, and financial institution readiness stood at 3.55 and 3.57, each with Holm p = 1.00.

Within each class, the score was associated with cancellation at r = −0.69 on LOB Operational engagements, 30 of them canceled, and at r = −0.75 on Corporate Functional engagements, 26 of them canceled.

3.7 Delivery Team Size

Segment · Delivery team size, current headcount · Full analysis in Part 1, Structural Attributes and Outcome Associations, section 6.1

Delivery team headcount had a small negative observed association with the score, and the conventional correlation test did not detect a clear relationship. The finding provides little support for a simple explanation in which larger teams systematically govern better or worse. Equivalence is a separate question: the study's test uses a correlation margin of ±0.30. The bounded conclusion applies to that margin and this sample.

Figure 3.16. The score by third of delivery team size (current headcount), engagement level

Delivery team headcount had a small negative observed association with the score, and the conventional correlation test did not detect a clear relationship.



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The team-size correlation with the score was r = −0.11 (95% CI −0.26 to 0.06, p = 0.199, n = 150 engagements). The equivalence p value was 0.007 under the study's ±0.30 margin. This bounds the association under that criterion rather than demonstrating identical governance at every team size. Correlations with low-rating counts and written instances per respondent were 0.09 (p = 0.250) and 0.06 (p = 0.461).

3.8 Respondent Role

Segment · 3 respondent roles · Full analysis in Part 4, Composition and Experience of the Delivery Workforce, section 1

Governance assessments differed by respondent role, with individual contributors reporting lower scores than engagement managers and portfolio directors. The difference matters because the staff performing agent-related work may see control limitations that higher-level assessments capture less strongly. That explanation remains interpretive. The study compares reported perspectives and does not independently verify which role provides the most accurate assessment.

Figure 3.17. The score by respondent role, respondents with 10 or more

Governance assessments differed by respondent role, with individual contributors reporting lower scores than engagement managers and portfolio directors.



Note: n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Individual contributors recorded a score of 3.86 (n = 667 respondents), with 35.83% in the distressed range. Engagement managers recorded 4.29 (n = 150), with 28.00% distressed, and portfolio directors

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5.19 (n = 31), with 6.45% distressed (Holm $p < 0.001$). The size of the difference was small, with ω^2 of 0.025.

Distressed governance ratings followed the same order, at 19.73 per individual contributor, 17.56 per engagement manager, and 9.03 per portfolio director (Holm $p < 0.001$). Written instances numbered 4.09, 3.33, and 3.26 per respondent (Holm $p < 0.001$). Every failure category stood lowest among individual contributors and highest among portfolio directors, with co-management at 3.52 against 4.98 and financial institution readiness at 3.41 against 4.66, and the differences held after Holm adjustment for all eight measures (Holm p of 0.002 or less).

The roles differed in the depth of failure they reported, while every governance indicator associated with the score within every role. Each of the 47 governance indicators was associated with the score computed without it within each role, at $r = 0.74$ to 0.88 among individual contributors, 0.71 to 0.89 among engagement managers, and 0.51 to 0.90 among portfolio directors. The lowest value, 0.51, belonged to the governance of the financial institution's data among the 31 portfolio directors.

The role gradient reached manual alteration. Individual contributors were 418 of the 421 respondents who altered financial-institution-provided data, 481 of the 490 who altered processes, and 276 of the 278 who altered AI outputs, while reporting alteration reached 86 of the 150 engagement managers. Within each role, the score was associated with cancellation at $r = -0.64$ among individual contributors, −0.63 among engagement managers, and −0.57 among portfolio directors. The two customer management executives are reported as a count only. One individual contributor on a reconciliation engagement reported that the breaks the contributor cleared went unreviewed above the role.

> *“these ask about the two firms together, on my side it is only me and the custodian file. thus i mark low, nobody above me looks at the breaks i clear” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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4 Governance by Lifecycle Stage, Engagement Age, and Expected Cancellation

Lower scores were associated with canceled engagements and with greater expected cancellation among active engagements. The three active lifecycle stages showed relatively similar mean scores, and engagement age did not show a clear conventional linear association. Together, these comparisons distinguish engagement state from elapsed time. They do not establish a trajectory in which the same engagement's governance improves or deteriorates as it moves between stages.

4.1 Lifecycle Stage

Segment · 3 active lifecycle stages and canceled engagements · Full analysis in Part 1, The Immaturity of Agentic AI Outsourcing, section 1.1

Active engagements at all three lifecycle stages had higher mean scores than canceled engagements. The active-stage means were relatively close, while low ratings remained present in Build-Out, Transition/Cut-Over, and Production. This indicates that reported control weaknesses were not confined to early implementation. The comparison is cross-sectional and does not show that a given engagement improved, deteriorated, or changed when it was canceled.

Figure 3.18. The score by engagement status and lifecycle stage, engagements with 10 or more

Active engagements at all three lifecycle stages had higher mean scores than canceled engagements.



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The score stood at 4.85 in Build-Out (n = 31 engagements), 4.94 in Transition/Cut-Over (n = 43), and 4.69 in Production (n = 20), against 2.58 on the 56 canceled engagements. Distressed governance ratings rose slightly across the active stages, from 57.39 per engagement in Build-Out to 62.37 in Transition/Cut-Over and 65.95 in Production, and stood at 183.82 per canceled engagement.

Per respondent, distressed governance ratings numbered 10.37, 10.67, and 12.47 across the active stages and 32.14 on canceled engagements. Written instances numbered 3.29, 3.35, and 3.33 per respondent across the active stages, and 4.90 on canceled engagements. The differences across the four levels held after Holm adjustment for all eight measures (Holm $p < 0.001$), while the three active stages stood within 0.25 of one another on the score.

Every failure category stood lowest on the canceled engagements. Co-management fell to 2.19 there against 4.05 to 4.66 in the active stages, and the third-party ecosystem to 3.07 against 5.42 to 5.66. The association of the technology controls to the score varied across the active stages, a pattern set out under AI Technology. An engagement manager on a production engagement reported that neither firm could say who owned a model that gave two figures on two runs, while stopping it quickly worked.

> *"Last month attrition model re-runs twice and gives two different figures. And nobody on either side can say who owns that. We can stop it quickly, that part works." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

4.2 Engagement Age

Segment · Engagement age in months · Full analysis in Part 1, The Immaturity of Agentic AI Outsourcing, section 1.2

Engagement age had a small observed association with the score and no clearly detected linear relationship in the conventional correlation test. The age comparison offers limited evidence that time in operation alone distinguishes the reported control environment. The recorded equivalence result concerns the specified correlation margin. Neither result measures how the same engagement's governance developed over time.

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Figure 3.19. The score by third of engagement age (months), engagement level

Engagement age had a small observed association with the score and no clearly detected linear relationship in the conventional correlation test.



Engagement age correlated with the score at r = 0.07 (95% CI −0.09 to 0.23, p = 0.373, n = 150 engagements). The equivalence p value under the recorded ±0.30 margin is 0.002. Correlations with low ratings and written instances per respondent were −0.06 (p = 0.450) and −0.14 (p = 0.085). The findings concern differences among engagements of different ages. They do not show whether governance matured or deteriorated within an engagement.

4.3 Expected Cancellation

Segment · 3 bands of cancellation likelihood and canceled engagements · Full analysis in Part 1, Cancellation and the Risk of Cancellation, section 2.1

Among active engagements, higher expected cancellation was associated with lower mean scores. The pattern connects perceived engagement instability with reported governance weakness before observed cancellation is used as a separate comparison. Expected cancellation is a delivery-team assessment, so its association may reflect shared perceptions of the engagement. It is not a validated forecast or evidence that the controls caused the anticipated outcome.

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Figure 3.20. The score by cancellation risk band, engagements with 10 or more

Among active engagements, higher expected cancellation was associated with lower mean scores.



The score stood at 5.61 on the 36 active engagements below moderate risk, 4.63 on the 39 at moderate risk, and 3.91 on the 19 at high risk, against 2.58 on the 56 canceled engagements (Holm $p < 0.001$).

Distressed governance ratings numbered 5.67 per respondent below moderate risk, 12.19 at moderate risk, and 18.42 at high risk, or 32.69, 70.69, and 97.16 per engagement. Written instances numbered 2.99, 3.34, and 3.92 per respondent, or 16.89, 19.21, and 21.05 per engagement. Each measure differed across the bands after Holm adjustment (Holm $p < 0.001$).

The gradient ran through all five failure categories. From the high-risk band to the band below moderate risk, co-management rose from 3.59 to 5.32, financial institution readiness from 3.24 to 4.92, vendor capability from 3.48 to 5.01, AI technology from 4.71 to 6.07, and the third-party ecosystem from 4.48 to 6.38, each with Holm $p < 0.001$. The high-risk engagements had not been canceled, yet their governance stood closer to the canceled engagements than to the active engagements below moderate risk.

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5 Governance Against the Four Study Measures

The score was strongly related to several broader assessments of the engagement. Canceled engagements and respondents intending to leave had lower scores, while customer satisfaction and the mean of the other indicators were positively associated with it. These relationships connect the reported control environment with performance and workforce experience. Their common source, retrospective design, and model dependence limit claims about an independent causal contribution.

Table 3.7. The three measures of reported governance weakness against the four study measures

Study measure	The score, r (95% CI)	After adjustment for the comparison mean (p)	Distressed governance ratings, r	After adjustment for the comparison mean (p)	Written instances, r	After adjustment for the comparison mean (p)
Cancellation, 150 engagements	−0.72 (−0.79 to −0.63)	−0.25 (p = 0.002)	0.76	0.43 (p < 0.001)	0.64	0.22 (p = 0.007)
Customer satisfaction, 94 active engagements	0.80 (0.71 to 0.86)	0.19 (p = 0.069)	−0.74	−0.16 (p = 0.130)	−0.55	−0.07 (p = 0.516)
Engagement indicator mean without the 47, 150 engagements	0.94 (0.92 to 0.95)	Not tested	−0.91	Not tested	−0.77	Not tested
Intent to leave, 150 engagements	−0.84 (−0.88 to −0.79)	Not tested	0.83	Not tested	0.70	Not tested

Note: Correlations are at the engagement level, with the paired base stated for each result. The adjusted comparison uses the mean of the 53 indicators outside the governance, oversight, and control score. It does not apply when that comparison mean is itself the variable being examined, and no adjusted intent-to-leave test is reported here. All cancellation discrimination is retrospective and within sample. AUC ranges from 0.5 for chance ordering to 1 for complete ordering in the stated score direction. It is not evidence of validated prospective prediction.

5.1 Cancellation

Study measure · Cancellation · Full analysis in Part 1, Cancellation and the Risk of Cancellation, section 1.1

Already canceled engagements had substantially lower mean scores than active engagements, and a negative association remained after adjustment for the other-indicator mean. This makes cancellation an important descriptive contrast for understanding the reported control environment. It does not establish whether governance weaknesses preceded cancellation, followed it, or were assessed differently after it. The discrimination result describes separation within this sample.

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Figure 3.21. Share of engagements canceled, by numeric score band

Cancellation was concentrated among engagements with low scores



The 56 canceled engagements recorded a score of 2.58, against 4.86 on the 94 active engagements (Welch $p < 0.001$), and the score separated the two with an area under the curve of 0.95. It was associated with cancellation at $r = -0.72$ (95% CI −0.79 to −0.63, n = 150 engagements). After adjustment for the comparison mean, the association remained at partial $r = -0.25$ ($p = 0.002$).

The two counts kept larger ties than the score. Distressed governance ratings numbered 32.14 per respondent on canceled engagements against 10.95 on active ones, an association with cancellation of $r = 0.76$ that remained at partial $r = 0.43$ after that adjustment ($p < 0.001$). Written instances numbered 4.90 per respondent against 3.33, an association of $r = 0.64$ that remained at partial $r = 0.22$ ($p = 0.007$).

Every failure category carried the gap. On canceled engagements co-management stood at 2.19 against 4.05 to 4.66 across the active stages, financial institution readiness at 2.38 against 4.19 to 4.36, vendor capability at 2.44 against 4.25 to 4.76, AI technology at 3.14 against 5.37 to 5.54, and the third-party ecosystem at 3.07 against 5.42 to 5.66. Within each role, the score was associated with cancellation at $r = -0.64$ among individual contributors, −0.63 among engagement managers, and −0.57 among portfolio directors.

The 56 canceled engagements had been canceled when their delivery teams answered, so the contrast is descriptive. On one canceled engagement, an audit-readiness report marked a reporting rule as documented whenever any version of the rule existed, and the gap surfaced only when the auditor asked.

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"The vendor's audit-readiness dashboard marked a reporting rule as fully documented once any version of the rule existed in the knowledge base, without checking whether that version matched the rule the agent was actually executing, so undocumented rule changes never surfaced as a gap until the auditor asked directly." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

5.2 Customer Satisfaction

Study measure · Customer satisfaction · Full analysis in Part 1, Customer Satisfaction, Delivery Performance, and Measured Return, section 1.1

Higher scores were strongly associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements. Much of that association was shared with the engagement's standing on the other indicators, and the adjusted estimate was smaller and did not meet the nominal significance threshold. The finding connects reported control quality with the institution's assessment of delivery while limiting a claim that governance contributes a statistically distinct relationship under this model.

Figure 3.22. Customer satisfaction, mean percent, by numeric score band, 94 active engagements

Higher scores were strongly associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements.



Note: partial r of the score with customer satisfaction, after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators: 0.19 (p = 0.069, against r = 0.80 before the control, 94 active engagements).

Among the 94 active engagements, the score correlated with customer satisfaction at r = 0.80 (95% CI 0.71–0.86). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, partial r was 0.19 (p = 0.069). The

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smaller estimate did not meet the nominal threshold, with no inference that the true adjusted association is zero.

Low-rating counts and written-instance counts also correlated with customer satisfaction. The respective raw correlations were −0.74 and −0.55, falling to partial r = −0.16 (p = 0.130) and −0.07 (p = 0.516) after adjustment. Neither adjusted comparison met the nominal threshold. Restriction to active engagements removes the already-canceled group, but the remaining shared-source and conditional-model limitations still apply.

5.3 Engagement Indicator Mean and Indicator Quintile

Study measure · Engagement indicator mean and indicator quintile · Full analysis in Part 1, The Engagement Indicator Mean and the Interdependence of the Four Measures, section 1

The score was strongly correlated with the mean of the 53 indicators outside it. This connects reported governance quality with the wider assessment of engagement performance and capability. The two measures use disjoint indicator sets, so the association is empirical rather than a literal overlap of items. Adjustment asks whether a relationship remains after accounting for that wider standing, with the limitations of the composite comparison stated explicitly.

Figure 3.23. The score by engagement indicator mean quintile, engagements with 10 or more

The score was strongly correlated with the mean of the 53 indicators outside it.



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The score correlated with the mean of the other 53 indicators at r = 0.94 (95% CI 0.92–0.95, n = 150 engagements). The strong empirical relationship explains why the adjusted comparisons are informative but also difficult to interpret. Accounting for a related composite can substantially alter a coefficient, and category composition affects what the adjustment removes.

Written instances fell from 29.27 per engagement in the lowest indicator quintile to 26.10, 21.47, 19.87, and 14.30 in the four quintiles above it, each quintile holding 30 engagements (Welch F = 57.16, Holm p < 0.001). Distressed governance ratings fell more steeply, from 201.63 per engagement in the lowest quintile to 167.17, 109.80, 45.17, and 12.03 (Welch F = 550.56, Holm p < 0.001). The highest quintile still carried written instances on all 30 of its engagements.

5.4 Intent to Leave

Study measure · Intent to leave · Full analysis in Part 4, Intent to Leave, section 1.1

Respondents reporting stronger intent to leave also reported substantially lower scores. This connects the control environment with the experience of the delivery workforce, particularly where staff describe manual correction, unresolved issues, and work that remains poorly visible to oversight. The comparison concerns stated intention, not subsequent departure. It also shares a respondent source with the score and does not identify the direction of the relationship.

Figure 3.24. The score by intent to leave, respondents with 10 or more

Respondents reporting stronger intent to leave also reported substantially lower scores.



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Scores were 3 or below for 59.53% of the higher-intention group and 2.99% of the lower-intention group. The 430 respondents who rated their intent to leave at 7 or above stood at 2.86, the 368 below 7 at 5.35, and the 52 who gave no answer at 3.79 (Holm $p < 0.001$). Distressed governance ratings numbered 29.15 per respondent at 7 or above against 6.77 below 7, and written instances 4.71 against 2.99 (Holm $p < 0.001$).

Every failure category followed the same order. Co-management stood at 2.48 among respondents intending to leave against 5.04 among the rest, and the third-party ecosystem at 3.39 against 6.06. At the engagement level, the score was associated with intent to leave at $r = -0.84$ (95% CI −0.88 to −0.79, $n = 150$ engagements), and at the respondent level at $r = -0.78$ (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$, $n = 798$ respondents).

Intent to leave did not mark the lowest the score of the study. The canceled engagements stood lower, at 2.58, and so did the respondents who rated their own understanding of the governing obligations 1 to 3, at 2.41. Among the challenges that reduced their job satisfaction, respondents at intent to leave 7 or above named reported governance weaknesss directly. One individual contributor on a canceled engagement, who rated intent to leave at 10, named three.

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Co-Management and Governance Across the Other Four Categories

Co-management ratings consistently connected shared operating arrangements with governance in the other four categories. The 20 indicators concern authority, review, change, evidence, and response across the financial institution and vendor. Their low-rating share was 49.26%, based on 7,866 of 15,968 ratings. The governance, oversight, and control score provides a common outcome for examining these responsibilities, while the adjusted analysis remains conditional on its unequal category composition.

All 20 co-management indicators were strongly associated with the score after the tested indicator was omitted, with engagement-level r = 0.90–0.93. Correlations with the other four categories were 0.75–0.80. Under the main adjustment, partial r ranged from 0.21 to 0.31. All 20 met nominal $p < 0.05$ and survived Holm adjustment when considered as one 20-test family. The inference changes with the family: only two of the 20 survive Holm adjustment across all 47 cross-category tests. Subgroup results reuse overlapping respondents and engagements and are not independent replications.

The adjusted comparison has an important asymmetry. All 20 co-management indicators are in the score and none is in the 53-item comparison mean. That mean instead contains 18 other vendor capability indicators, 13 readiness indicators, 12 AI technology indicators, and 10 third-party indicators. Removing an item's category from the score also leaves different numbers of items in the outcome. The results identify associations conditional on this construction. They do not establish that co-management uniquely causes weaknesses in the other categories.

Among respondents who rated a co-management indicator 1 to 3, 61.19% to 65.21% had a score of 3 or below, against 2.65% to 5.30% among those who rated it 4 to 7. None of the respondents who rated a co-management indicator 8 to 10 had a score of 3 or below. Table 3.8 sets out the 20 indicators against these measures.

Table 3.8. The 20 co-management indicators against reported governance weakness across the engagement

Indicator	A score of 3 or below among respondents rating it 1 to 3	r with score excluding item (95% CI)	r with the other four categories	Adjusted partial r (p)	Negative written answers
Co-Management of the Engagement	249 of 385 (64.68%)	0.91 (0.88 to 0.93)	0.76	0.21 (p = 0.010)	127 of 209
Decision Rights Over Agent Action Without Human Approval	257 of 406 (63.30%)	0.91 (0.88 to 0.94)	0.77	0.25 (p = 0.002)	34 of 48
Ownership of Each Workflow Step	253 of 388 (65.21%)	0.92 (0.89 to 0.94)	0.78	0.25 (p = 0.003)	70 of 82

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Indicator	A score of 3 or below among respondents rating it 1 to 3	r with score excluding item (95% CI)	r with the other four categories	Adjusted partial r (p)	Negative written answers
Accountability for Problems Arising From an Agent's Action	246 of 402 (61.19%)	0.93 (0.90 to 0.95)	0.80	0.22 (p = 0.007)	45 of 51
A Single Shared View of Agent Risk	245 of 383 (63.97%)	0.92 (0.89 to 0.94)	0.78	0.25 (p = 0.002)	19 of 26
Co-Management of Issues Arising From Agent Work	249 of 391 (63.68%)	0.92 (0.89 to 0.94)	0.78	0.26 (p = 0.001)	39 of 54
Resolution Speed Against the Spread of Agent-Caused Problems	248 of 400 (62.00%)	0.91 (0.88 to 0.94)	0.77	0.25 (p = 0.002)	16 of 18
Speed of Stopping a Misbehaving Agent in Live Operations	261 of 406 (64.29%)	0.92 (0.89 to 0.94)	0.79	0.26 (p = 0.001)	59 of 73
Joint Change Control Against the Speed of Agent Behavior Change	249 of 399 (62.41%)	0.92 (0.89 to 0.94)	0.79	0.31 (p < 0.001)	57 of 71
Visibility of Agent Updates to the Other Firm Before They Take Effect	250 of 394 (63.45%)	0.91 (0.88 to 0.94)	0.77	0.25 (p = 0.002)	38 of 48
Joint Governance of Agent Behavior Change Between Formal Releases	253 of 388 (65.21%)	0.90 (0.87 to 0.93)	0.76	0.23 (p = 0.004)	12 of 14
Placement of Human Review Points	253 of 393 (64.38%)	0.91 (0.88 to 0.94)	0.77	0.23 (p = 0.004)	75 of 105
Human Review Capacity Against Agent Output Volume	244 of 381 (64.04%)	0.90 (0.86 to 0.92)	0.75	0.25 (p = 0.003)	134 of 145
Genuine Scrutiny at Human Review Points	251 of 393 (63.87%)	0.92 (0.89 to 0.94)	0.78	0.25 (p = 0.002)	59 of 66
Reliability of the Joint Quality Assurance Loop	244 of 377 (64.72%)	0.91 (0.88 to 0.94)	0.77	0.21 (p = 0.012)	22 of 29
Quality Measures That Capture Agent Errors	250 of 405 (61.73%)	0.93 (0.90 to 0.95)	0.79	0.26 (p = 0.002)	11 of 14
Each Firm's Visibility of the Other Firm's Agent Actions	245 of 392 (62.50%)	0.92 (0.89 to 0.94)	0.79	0.22 (p = 0.007)	62 of 66
Joint Decision Speed Against Agent Speed	245 of 381 (64.30%)	0.92 (0.89 to 0.94)	0.79	0.23 (p = 0.005)	13 of 14
Fit of the Joint Governance Model to Work Performed by Agents	251 of 395 (63.54%)	0.92 (0.89 to 0.94)	0.78	0.26 (p = 0.001)	9 of 10
Readiness of the Co-Management Model for Expected Agent Autonomy	254 of 407 (62.41%)	0.93 (0.90 to 0.95)	0.80	0.22 (p = 0.008)	2 of 3

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Note: The score in the rating-band and item-to-score comparisons excludes the tested indicator. Cross-category correlations exclude its entire category and use 150 engagements. The partial correlation accounts for the mean of the 53 indicators outside the score. Cross-category p values are nominal. All 20 pass Holm within a family of 20, whereas two pass within a family of all 47 cross-category comparisons. Chi-square compares rating-band counts, and Cramér's V summarizes the strength of that categorical association from 0 to 1. The ordinary respondent-level chi-square calculations do not adjust for dependence within engagements. Cluster-robust mean tests account for that dependence in their standard errors. Zero observations in a small band are not proof of no risk. Monte Carlo calculation approximates a contingency-test p value through repeated simulated tables when expected counts are sparse. It does not correct engagement clustering.

> *What a number cannot carry is that the two governance structures never met. We had our review, they had theirs, and no forum existed where the two were reconciled and someone could say who owned a step when an agent had performed it."*

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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1 Joint Governance and Decision Rights

Co-management, decision rights, step ownership, and accountability each had strong observed relationships with the wider score. Together they define who can decide, who must act, and who owns the response when agent work goes wrong. Their similar statistical patterns support a common concern about shared authority, while each indicator addresses a distinct responsibility boundary. The evidence does not establish that a formal assignment alone makes that authority effective.

> *"These questions assume somebody actually decides. From where I sit nothing is decided, it is only carried to next weeks call and then the one after. Cannot put number of 1 to 10 on a thing that never happens" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

1.1 Co-Management of the Engagement

Indicator C136 · Rate how effectively the customer and vendor jointly manage this engagement now that agents perform part of the work · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.6 · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak co-management was associated with lower scores beyond the tested indicator. Co-management needs to coordinate the resolution of the same operational problem across the two firms. Written accounts describe forums that existed but did not settle decisions, alongside accounts of more effective joint working. That contrast makes the operation of coordination, rather than the number of negative comments, the central finding.

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Figure 3.25. Co-Management of the Engagement: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak co-management was associated with lower scores beyond the tested indicator.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Scores were 3 or below for 249 of 385 (64.68%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 12 of 371 (3.23%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 33 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 339.21, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.66.

Co-management was associated with the score at $r = 0.91$ (95% CI 0.88 to 0.93, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.76$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.21$ ($p = 0.010$), the second-weakest adjusted association of the 20.

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.78$ and across the active stages at 0.80 to 0.84, and it held after Holm adjustment in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors, 0.85 among engagement managers, and 0.87 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 66.88% (206 of 308) of those who rated co-management 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.71 (n = 385), against 5.23 (n = 404) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Co-management drew 209 written answers from 199 respondents on 115 engagements, the most of the 20 indicators, and 94 of them came from canceled engagements. Of the 127 negative answers, 83 came from canceled and 44 from active engagements, and 28 (22.05%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (17), change discovered

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only through failure (6), and raising problems seen as futile (5). The negative answers described joint forums that existed on paper and decided nothing. The answers that were not negative described working forums beside a control that still failed, most often the authority to let an agent act without review.

> *"I want to be fair, the score is low because of one thing, escalation. We have a weekly joint call and it is polite and nothing gets decided in it. When the agent started pulling market share numbers from the wrong vintage of a report, I raised it on that call, their side logged it in their tracker, we logged it in ours, and for three weeks each side thought the other one was fixing it. My own management told me to keep it at working level and not put it in the client summary. So there are two versions of the issue list and neither one is complete. That is what the 1s are, not the people." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Where I felt genuine progress is in the joint forum itself. In the first month the two sides came to it with separate issue logs, and we spent most of the hour reconciling numbers rather than deciding anything; that is behind us now, there is one list, both parties own it, and the weekly escalation call rarely runs over. Where there has been no movement is the question of who may authorise an agent to close an alert without a human looking at it. That has been open since the design workshops, it has been discussed about at every steering committee, and each time it is deferred to the next one, largely because neither side wishes to be the party whose name sits against that decision if a hit is missed. Review capacity is the same story in a different form." - Portfolio Director, KPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 1.1) reports the association of co-management with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.6) its association with manual alteration.

1.2 Decision Rights Over Agent Action Without Human Approval

Indicator C137 · Rate how clearly the two firms have settled who decides what agents may do without human approval · Full statistical analysis ›

Unclear authority for agent action was associated with a weaker reported control environment. Decision rights determine which actions require human approval and which the two firms permit an agent to take independently. Where that boundary remains unsettled, a formal management structure may leave operational authority ambiguous. The ratings establish an association with the score, while the study does not directly observe every authorization decision or unauthorized action.

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Figure 3.26. Decision Rights Over Agent Action Without Human Approval: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Unclear authority for agent action was associated with a weaker reported control environment.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

The 406 respondents who rated decision rights 1 to 3 included 257 with a score of 3 or below. Among the 375 who rated them 4 to 7, 12 (3.20%) had a score of 3 or below, and none of the 27 who rated them 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 331.00, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.64).

Decision rights were associated with the score at $r = 0.91$ (95% CI 0.88 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.77$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.25$ ($p = 0.002$), the sixth-strongest of the 20.

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.77$ and across the active stages at 0.80 to 0.84, and after Holm adjustment it held in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors, 0.85 among engagement managers, and 0.86 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 65.24% (214 of 328) of those who rated decision rights 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated them distressed recorded a score of 2.74 (n = 406), against 5.30 (n = 402) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Forty-eight respondents on 42 engagements wrote about the limit of agent autonomy, one answer each, and 34 of the answers were negative, 13 from canceled and 21 from active engagements. Five of the 34 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, three of them problems raised with no response. Respondents described reviewers who approved agent work on trust in the absence of a written limit, and edge cases that reached a manager every evening. One individual contributor on a

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reconciliation engagement set out the missing control in three parts, a named approver on each side, one shared list, and a written limit on what the agent could clear alone. An engagement manager on another reconciliation engagement described what the missing limit cost the team.

> *"i will use this box properly since nobody asked before. what would have to change is one name. one person on their side and one on ours who can say yes to a break over a certain amount, that is all. right now a break comes up, i put it in the shared tracker, their ops person says it needs their treasury, treasury says the custodian must confirm, custodian says ask the client. ten days gone. also by then the next cycle is on top of it and the same break is now three breaks. so second thing, the tracker itself. we have ours and they have theirs and the numbers dont agree, and so half of every call is spent agreeing which list is correct instead of clearing anything. one list. it doesnt need a system, a spreadsheet would do. third, and this is the real one, somebody has to write down what the agent is allowed to clear on its own. under five hundred, matched to the statement line, clear it. we never got that number. so everything comes to a human, and the humans are waiting on each other. i said this in month two, kindly nothing came of it. which is why i am not hopeful, but you asked what would change it and that is what" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"What this costs us is people. My analysts are checking machine output at nine at night, work a tool was supposed to remove, because neither side will put a name against what the agent may clear on its own. Two of my better ones have asked to move. I have nothing to offer them to stay." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 1.2) reports the association of decision rights with the four study measures.

1.3 Ownership of Each Workflow Step

Indicator C138 · Rate how clearly ownership of each workflow step is assigned when agents, vendor staff, and customer staff work in the same process · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.7 · Full statistical analysis ›

Unclear ownership of workflow steps was associated with low scores. This concerns the point at which agents, delivery team members, and financial institution staff share a process but responsibility for a particular step is not settled. The governance issue is the assignment of responsibility across the workflow, distinct from accountability after an error. Similar score relationships across these controls do not make those responsibilities interchangeable.

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Figure 3.27. Ownership of Each Workflow Step: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Unclear ownership of workflow steps was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 388 respondents who rated step ownership 1 to 3, 253 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 392 who rated it 4 to 7, 15 (3.83%) had a score of 3 or below, and none of the 28 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 345.81, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.65).

Step ownership was associated with the score at $r = 0.92$ (95% CI 0.89 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.78$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.25$ ($p = 0.003$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.74$, the joint weakest of the 20 together with genuine scrutiny at review points, and it ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.80 in Build-Out to 0.85 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors, 0.86 among engagement managers, and 0.82 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 66.67% (212 of 318) of those who rated step ownership 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.68 (n = 388), against 5.22 (n = 420) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Step ownership drew 82 written answers from 81 respondents on 58 engagements, and 70 of them were negative, 39 from canceled and 31 from active engagements. Of the 70, 21 (30.00%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (11), change discovered only through failure (6), and raising problems seen as futile (4). Respondents described errors

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that passed between the two firms with each assuming the other had checked, and decisions that waited for weeks while each firm assigned them to the other. On one canceled engagement the team spent an hour on a call establishing which firm owned an error and then corrected it itself.

> *"the position is like this. there is no single owner of the allocation steps. my team prepares the expense split, the tool proposes the allocation, our lead looks at it, then it goes across to the fund controller side, and nowhere is it written which of those is the decision. so in practice the last person to touch the file is the decision. second thing, the tool behaves differently after an update and there is no joint forum where that is tabled. we find out because the output looks different that morning. i mention it in the daily call, that is the whole of the process. third, nobody has told us what the tool is permitted to do without a person approving. so i assume nothing, and i open each line myself, do note this roughly doubles the time on close days. the review on their side is a sign off and not a review. they sign what we send, and i am not saying they are wrong for that, they cannot check what they cannot see from their end. and when a query does come back it is three weeks later and the person who did the work is on another fund by then. one more, when we change something on our side there is no way for them to see it before it takes effect, and the same in reverse. that is the picture from where i sit" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"honestly my team is losing patience. when something go wrong nobody say which side own it, so we sit in call for hour and then still we fix it ourself. two of my colleague already ask for transfer" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 1.3) reports the association of step ownership with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.7) its association with manual alteration.

1.4 Accountability for Problems Arising From an Agent's Action

Indicator C139 · Rate how clearly accountability lands on one firm when an agent's action causes a problem in this engagement · Full statistical analysis ›

Accountability for agent error was strongly associated with the wider score. Its control function is to establish which firm owns the response when an agent's action causes a problem. This differs from assigning routine workflow steps: an engagement may have detailed task ownership and still leave remediation responsibility unresolved. The overall association and the low-score share within a rating band describe different aspects of that relationship.

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Figure 3.28. Accountability for Problems Arising From an Agent's Action: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Accountability for agent error was strongly associated with the wider score.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

The indicator was associated with the score at r = 0.93 (95% CI 0.90 to 0.95, n = 150 engagements), second among the 47 governance indicators to the readiness of the joint model for expected agent autonomy. Scores were 3 or below for 246 of 402 (61.19%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 12 of 364 (3.30%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 33 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 309.30, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.62.

The strong overall association and the conditional low-score share answer different questions. Accountability correlated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.80. After adjustment for the comparison mean, partial r was 0.22 (nominal p = 0.007). These results support a model-qualified relationship with the wider control environment, without a tested ranking of accountability's importance against other controls.

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.76 and across the active stages at 0.82 to 0.88, and after Holm adjustment it held in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors, 0.88 among engagement managers, and 0.89 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 62.58% (204 of 326) of those who rated accountability 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.76 (n = 402), against 5.35 (n = 397) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

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Accountability drew 51 written answers from 50 respondents on 37 engagements, and 45 were negative, 20 from canceled and 25 from active engagements. Of the 45, 11 (24.44%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often unclear liability or regulatory accountability (5), change discovered only through failure (3), and problems raised with no response (2). Respondents described errors that passed through three parties, each of which had done what was asked. An engagement manager on a payments engagement where an agent could be stopped within minutes asked for one line, settled in advance, naming the firm that owned remediation.

> *"I want to spend the whole of this box on one point, because the rest of it is ordinary. Ownership of a fee correction is, I would say, still unassigned. The agent proposes the adjustment, our analyst validates it, the bank's billing supervisor approves it, and on paper that is three clean steps. In practice, when a correction is wrong, all three of those parties can point at the other two and each of them is correct. I have run four engagements in this space and this is the first where I could not tell you, in a sentence, who owns the number that reaches the client statement. We discuss about it at every steering call and it never lands." -Portfolio Director, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"We can stop an agent in minutes, that part is solved and both sides know the number to call. What is not solved is who pays when it has already sent two hundred wrong merchant replies before we stopped it. i would want one line in the operating manual saying which firm owns remediation, decided in advance and not argued after. Also give us a shared change window, right now their release calendar and ours are separate documents." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 1.4) reports the association of accountability with the four study measures.

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2 Shared Risk and Issue Management

Shared risk and issue management were associated with the broader control environment. A single view of risk, one working issue process, timely resolution, and the ability to stop an agent address different parts of the same operational response. The findings concern how respondents assessed those functions, not simply whether each firm had a documented process. Their association supports examining coordination across the boundary between firms.

> *"Review capacity has improved, I will say that. We have the hands now to check what the agents throw out each morning. What has not moved is stopping. If an agent starts matching breaks wrongly nobody can tell me who on either side is permitted to switch it off... we would still be mailing at noon." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

2.1 A Single Shared View of Agent Risk

Indicator C140 · Rate how well the two firms maintain a single shared view of the risks that agent work introduces · Full statistical analysis ›

A weak shared view of agent risk was associated with low scores. Separate risk records can leave the firms evaluating different parts of the same exposure, even where each maintains a formal risk process. The indicator concerns whether those views are brought together for joint oversight. The written accounts provide limited illustration of that arrangement, while the principal evidence comes from the ratings and their association with the broader score.

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Figure 3.29. A Single Shared View of Agent Risk: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

A weak shared view of agent risk was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 383 respondents who rated the shared view of agent risk 1 to 3, 245 (63.97%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 384 who rated it 4 to 7, 13 (3.39%) had a score of 3 or below, and none of the 26 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 333.60, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.65).

The shared view of risk was associated with the score at $r = 0.92$ (95% CI 0.89 to 0.94, $n = 150$ engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.78$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.25$ ($p = 0.002$).

The association ranged across the active-stage groups, from 0.79 in Build-Out to 0.86 in Transition/Cut-Over and 0.89 in Production, and held within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.75$. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors, 0.89 among engagement managers, and 0.83 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 64.76% (204 of 315) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.71 ($n = 383$), against 5.24 ($n = 410$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The written base was thin. Twenty-six respondents on 24 engagements wrote about a shared view of agent risk, 19 of the answers were negative, and 4 of the 19 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. The answers described two risk logs that met once a month, an exposure that remained on one side for a full cycle, and the same issue raised in two meetings and resolved in neither.

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> *"The 6 on the shared risk view is narrower than it looks. We keep our risk log, they keep theirs, and the two only meet at the monthly forum, so a latency exposure we raised in week one sat on our side alone until the next cycle came round. The rest of the joint model holds. Who may restart what without asking us was settled early and has not caused an argument since." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"my 1s here look harsh, mostly it is one thing... nobody keep a single risk list, so same issue get raise in two different meetings and fixed in neither. the people are polite, the process just does not exist" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 2.1) reports the association of the shared view of risk with the four study measures.

2.2 Co-Management of Issues Arising From Agent Work

Indicator C141 · Rate how effectively the two firms manage issues arising from agent work as one team rather than through two separate processes · Full statistical analysis ›

Fragmented issue management was associated with a weaker reported control environment. The relevant distinction is whether the two firms manage an agent-related problem together or pass it between separate processes. Shared management affects who can see the issue, assign action, and confirm resolution. The reported associations appear within both active and canceled groups, without establishing a change in this relationship over an engagement's life.

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Figure 3.30. Co-Management of Issues Arising From Agent Work: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Fragmented issue management was associated with a weaker reported control environment.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Within canceled engagements, r was 0.80. Only the visibility of each firm's agent actions to the other stood higher, at 0.82. Across the active stages the association ran at 0.82 in Build-Out and Transition/Cut-Over and 0.89 in Production, and after Holm adjustment it held in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested.

Scores were 3 or below for 249 of 391 (63.68%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 12 of 374 (3.21%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 34 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 335.06, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.65. The indicator was associated with the score at r = 0.92 (95% CI 0.89 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.78. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial r = 0.26 (p = 0.001), the second-strongest adjusted association of the 20.

Within role the association stood at 0.87 among individual contributors and at 0.88 among both engagement managers and portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 64.58% (206 of 319) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.71 (n = 391), against 5.30 (n = 408) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Fifty-four respondents on 50 engagements wrote about joint issue management, one answer each, and 39 of the answers were negative, 16 from canceled and 23 from active engagements. Of the 39, 11 (28.21%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (5). Respondents described two issue logs that agreed on perhaps half of their entries,

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merged queues agreed and never built, and alerts closed manually that appeared in no count. An engagement manager described two issue logs in which neither firm could see the other's agent actions, so each dispute became an argument over whose log was right.

> *"Two issue logs, theirs and ours. Neither side can see what the other's agents did. Every dispute becomes a discussion about whose record is right." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"we keep our own issue tracker and the bank compliance side keep theirs. When i log a false positive pattern it stays on our side, i have never once seen one cross over. And nobody has ever asked how many alerts we dispose by hand in a day, that number is written nowhere." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 2.2) reports the association of joint issue management with the four study measures.

2.3 Resolution Speed Against the Spread of Agent-Caused Problems

Indicator C142 · Rate how well the speed of joint issue resolution matches the speed at which agent-caused problems can spread · Full statistical analysis ›

Low ratings of joint resolution speed were associated with low scores. For governance, the important comparison is between the time required to resolve an issue and the speed at which an agent-related problem can spread. The study measures respondents' assessment of that fit rather than elapsed incident-resolution times. The result supports examining operational response capacity while leaving the sequence and consequences of individual incidents unmeasured.

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Figure 3.31. Resolution Speed Against the Spread of Agent-Caused Problems: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Low ratings of joint resolution speed were associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Among respondents rating resolution speed at 4–7, 18 of 380 (4.74%) had a score of 3 or below. This was the second-highest share among the 20 co-management indicators, after human review capacity at 5.30%. Of the 400 respondents who rated resolution speed 1 to 3, 248 (62.00%) had a score of 3 or below, and none of the 29 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 304.28, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.61).

Resolution speed was associated with the score at $r = 0.91$ (95% CI 0.88 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.77$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.25$ ($p = 0.002$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.78$ and across the active stages at 0.79 to 0.82, and after Holm adjustment it held in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.86 among both individual contributors and engagement managers and at 0.79 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 63.38% (206 of 325) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.73 (n = 400), against 5.26 (n = 409) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The written base was thin. Eighteen respondents on 17 engagements wrote about resolution speed, and 16 of the answers were negative, 7 from canceled and 9 from active engagements. Three of the 16 described problems raised with no response. On one canceled engagement, 11 days passed before the two firms established whose change board owned an error, while three monthly attribution packs went

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to the financial institution's investment committee. On an active engagement the joint review met weekly, so a bad run was four days old before it was discussed, and the team kept a private list of the agent's changes in its place.

> *"In February the agents began handling the interaction effect differently after a platform update on our side — nobody had asked for that. It took eleven days to establish whose change board owned the question, by which time three monthly attribution packs had gone to the client's investment committee. Neither firm could show the other what had actually been done in that window. We closed it by recalculating the quarter by hand." -Portfolio Director, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"the joint review is once a week and by then a bad run is four days old, so we run a private list of what the agent changed and revert back on chat when it looks off. that sheet is the real control, not the meeting" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 2.3) reports the association of resolution speed with the four study measures.

2.4 Speed of Stopping a Misbehaving Agent in Live Operations

Indicator C143 · Rate how quickly the two firms together can stop an agent that is behaving badly in live operations · Full statistical analysis ›

Limited ability to stop a misbehaving agent was associated with low scores, including a positive cross-category relationship under the adjusted model. This indicator concerns immediate operational control: the firms must be able to interrupt agent activity when a problem is recognized. It is distinct from routine approval, decision speed, and later remediation. The association does not estimate the causal benefit of a particular stop mechanism.

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Figure 3.32. Speed of Stopping a Misbehaving Agent in Live Operations: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Limited ability to stop a misbehaving agent was associated with low scores, including a positive cross-category relationship under the adjusted model.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

The adjusted cross-category estimate was partial r = 0.26 (nominal p = 0.001). The speed of stopping was associated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.79, and its adjusted association (p = 0.001) was the third-strongest of the 20. It was associated with the score at r = 0.92 (95% CI 0.89 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements).

Scores were 3 or below for 261 of 406 (64.29%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 13 of 374 (3.48%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 24 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 333.22, p < 0.001, Cramér's V = 0.64. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.70 (n = 406), against 5.28 (n = 398) among the rest (cluster-robust p < 0.001).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.78 and across the active stages at 0.81 to 0.87, and after Holm adjustment it held in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors, 0.88 among engagement managers, and 0.82 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 66.07% (220 of 333) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

The speed of stopping drew 73 written answers from 71 respondents on 51 engagements, and 59 were negative, 21 from canceled and 38 from active engagements. Of the 59, 13 (22.03%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (8) and the absence of an escalation path outside working hours (4). Respondents described three different names

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given for the person who could switch an agent off, and overnight shifts without a person authorized to pause one.

> *"the thing the numbers don't show is nobody could actually switch the thing off. i asked who does that and got three different names" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"problem is at night no one over there can authorise stopping the triage bot, i have to raise ticket and wait for morning shift. one named person each side per shift with authority to pause the same, that is all it needs. the alerts it auto closes are the risk, not the ones it leaves open." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 2.4) reports the association of the speed of stopping with the four study measures.

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3 Joint Change Control

The three change-control indicators connect the pace and visibility of agent change with the wider score. They distinguish a joint process that can keep pace, notice that reaches the other firm before effect, and governance of behavior between formal releases. These are complementary control functions. A strong association for one does not establish that the others can be treated as substitutes or that their relative coefficients rank causal importance.

> *"What we do now is we keep a group chat and that is the real record. Anything that needs a decision goes there, somebody screenshots it, and that becomes the approval. Nobody signed anything. If you ask me who owns the rule change from last month I will show you a chat message from a Tuesday, that is all there is. On paper there is a joint forum every two weeks. Half the time it is cancelled, the other half they send somebody who takes notes and says he will come back to us. He does not come back. So we made our own list, three of us keep it, we tick items off and if nobody objects in two days we go ahead. That is not governance, I know that, but the work has to move and no one else will move it. The other thing is the review. It is me reviewing my teammate and him reviewing mine, we are both tired and we both want to go home, so the second look is not really a second look. I raise this, feedbacks go up, nothing come down. Then when something breaks the question is always why did nobody check, and I do not have a good answer for that anymore." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

3.1 Joint Change Control Against the Speed of Agent Behavior Change

Indicator C144 · Rate how well the joint change control process keeps pace with the speed of agent behavior changes · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.8 · Full statistical analysis ›

Joint change-control ratings retained a positive cross-category association under the specified adjustment. The operational concern is whether the two firms can govern changes at the pace at which agent behavior changes, rather than relying on a formal process whose cycle is too slow for the work. The observed coefficient is among the largest positive estimates in this comparison. Its ordering does not establish that this control has the largest causal effect.

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Figure 3.33. Joint Change Control Against the Speed of Agent Behavior Change: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Joint change-control ratings retained a positive cross-category association under the specified adjustment.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Change control was associated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.79, and after that adjustment the association remained at partial r = 0.31 ($p < 0.001$). It was associated with the score at r = 0.92 (95% CI 0.89 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements), and after Holm adjustment the association held in 87 of the 87 segment levels tested.

Scores were 3 or below for 249 of 399 (62.41%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 15 of 360 (4.17%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 39 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 310.22, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.62. Its 1 to 3 band share was among the lowest of the 20 co-management indicators, while its adjusted association was the highest. These comparisons answer different questions. The rating bands describe the distribution of low governance, oversight, and control scores. The adjusted association describes the relationship remaining after accounting for the comparison mean. Their rankings do not provide a common scale of practical importance.

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.79, the third-strongest of the 20, and ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.79 in Build-Out to 0.87 in Production. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors, 0.89 among engagement managers, and 0.78 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 63.41% (208 of 328) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.74 (n = 399), against 5.25 (n = 399) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

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Joint change control drew 71 written answers from 70 respondents on 53 engagements, and 57 were negative, 25 from canceled and 32 from active engagements. Of the 57, 14 (24.56%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often change discovered only through failure (8) and problems raised with no response (5). Respondents described a change request that waited five weeks while the agent kept working on the old rule, and changes that waited for a joint decision and then had to be made in haste.

> *"In march we change the tone rule for one client segment. i put in a change request. It sit for five week. In that time the tool send out maybe forty letters on the old rule and nobody flag it. When the request finally come back approved, the rule is already changed by somebody else, a different way. Nobody tell me. i find out from another analyst. There is no one risk list, both side keep their own" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"they never decide anything together. a mid-term change sit two weeks and then we are told to fix it fast" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Client servicing and communications*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 3.1) reports the association of joint change control with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.8) its association with manual alteration.

3.2 Visibility of Agent Updates to the Other Firm Before They Take Effect

Indicator C145 · Rate how well agent updates made by one firm become visible to the other firm before they take effect · Full statistical analysis ›

Poor advance visibility of agent updates was associated with low scores. The control concerns whether one firm's change becomes known to the other before it affects shared work. Notification after a change takes effect serves a different purpose from an opportunity to assess and prepare for it. The findings connect reported update visibility with the wider control environment without directly measuring every update or response.

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Figure 3.34. Visibility of Agent Updates to the Other Firm Before They Take Effect: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Poor advance visibility of agent updates was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 394 respondents who rated the visibility of agent updates 1 to 3, 250 (63.45%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 376 who rated it 4 to 7, 16 (4.26%) had a score of 3 or below, and none of the 33 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 321.39, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.63).

The visibility of updates was associated with the score at $r = 0.91$ (95% CI 0.88 to 0.94, $n = 150$ engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.77$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.25$ ($p = 0.002$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.78$, the fifth-strongest of the 20, and across the active stages at 0.82 to 0.84. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors, 0.88 among engagement managers, and 0.80 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 64.51% (209 of 324) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.72 ($n = 394$), against 5.23 ($n = 409$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Forty-eight respondents on 44 engagements wrote about the visibility of updates, one answer each, and 38 of the answers were negative, 12 from canceled and 26 from active engagements. Of the 38, 17 (44.74%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, the highest proportion among the co-management indicators with 30 or more answers, and 14 of the 17 described change

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discovered only through failure. Respondents learned of the other firm's updates from failed cases and from figures that moved. A portfolio director reported that decision rights had been written down while updates still went live before the financial institution's conduct team knew of them.

> *"one point only. when they change something on the agent side we find out from the output, not from anybody telling us" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"The joint forum has come a long way since the spring - decision rights on which alerts the agents may close without a reviewer are now written down and both sides work to the same list, and that argument used to take two weeks each time it came up. What has not moved is visibility of changes. Twice this quarter a tuning change on our side went live before the bank's conduct team knew of it, and while neither was harmful, we would have no fast way to pull an agent back mid-shift if one ever were. Kindly note that is a build neither side has funded." -Portfolio Director, CXM, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 3.2) reports the association of the visibility of updates with the four study measures.

3.3 Joint Governance of Agent Behavior Change Between Formal Releases

Indicator C146 · Rate how well the two firms jointly govern changes agents make to their own behavior between formal releases · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak joint governance of behavior changes between releases was associated with low scores. This extends the change-control question beyond formally scheduled updates to behavior that changes while the system remains in operation. A release process can be well defined while this intervening responsibility remains unclear. The indicator adds a distinct control question even though its statistical pattern resembles those of other co-management indicators.

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Figure 3.35. Joint Governance of Agent Behavior Change Between Formal Releases: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak joint governance of behavior changes between releases was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 388 respondents who rated it 1 to 3, 253 had a score of 3 or below, the same count and share as for step ownership. Among the 382 who rated it 4 to 7, 15 (3.93%) had a score of 3 or below, and none of the 36 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 344.45, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.65).

The governance of change between releases was associated with the score at $r = 0.90$ (95% CI 0.87 to 0.93, n = 150 engagements), the joint weakest of the 20, and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.76$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.23$ ($p = 0.004$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.75$ and across the active stages at 0.80 to 0.84, and after Holm adjustment it held in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.86 among individual contributors and portfolio directors and at 0.85 among engagement managers. Among individual contributors alone, 67.20% (211 of 314) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.70 (n = 388), against 5.22 (n = 418) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Fourteen respondents on 14 engagements wrote about change between releases, and 12 of the answers were negative, 4 from canceled and 8 from active engagements. Three of the 12 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. Respondents described agent behavior that drifted between

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releases with no forum quick enough to rule on whether a drift was a fix or a defect, so that the delivery team decided and informed both firms afterward. An individual contributor reported change control faster than on earlier work and no agreed definition of a defect when a configuration retuned itself.

> *"The scale does not really capture timing. On paper the joint model works — shared risk log, weekly review, both sides turn up prepared, and the quality checks do catch the errors the agents actually make. What it cannot show is that agent behavior drifts a little between releases and there is no forum that meets fast enough to rule on whether a drift is a fix or a defect. We end up deciding on the desk and telling both sides afterward." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"Both sides turn up when a Feed goes bad, the reviewing keeps pace with what the agents produce, moreover change control is faster here than what i saw before. Where it slips is we dont have an agreed definition of a defect when the self healing config retunes itself, so it sits in two trackers and each side thinks the other one has it" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 3.3) reports the association of the governance of change between releases with the four study measures.

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4 Human Review and the Joint Quality Assurance Loop

Human review was associated with the wider score across placement, capacity, scrutiny, error capture, and measurement. These indicators distinguish a formal review point from a review system that can examine the relevant volume of work and identify consequential errors. Their common pattern supports examining the operation of the whole review arrangement. Each indicator remains necessary because a weakness in one dimension is not described by the others alone.

> *"the problem is review is only a signature now. risk register did get better, we go through it together every fortnight and both sides see same list. but on code review two people tick it in ten minutes and nobody checks what the agent actually changed" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

4.1 Placement of Human Review Points

Indicator C147 · Rate how well human review points are placed across the two firms at the moments where agent errors would matter most · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.2 · Full statistical analysis ›

Poor placement of human review points was associated with low scores. Review contributes to control only if it occurs where an error can still be identified and addressed before its consequences matter. This indicator concerns that placement, rather than the number of reviewers or the scrutiny they apply. Its rating-band comparisons describe the reported relationship and do not validate a boundary between working and failed governance.

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Figure 3.36. Placement of Human Review Points: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Poor placement of human review points was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Scores were 3 or below for 253 of 393 (64.38%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 10 of 378 (2.65%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 26 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 345.33, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.66.

Placement was associated with the score at $r = 0.91$ (95% CI 0.88 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.77$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.23$ ($p = 0.004$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.78$ and ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.77 in Build-Out to 0.85 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.86 among individual contributors and engagement managers and at 0.88 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 65.83% (210 of 319) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.72 (n = 393), against 5.28 (n = 404) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Placement tracked the manual alteration of AI outputs across its rating bands. Of the respondents who rated placement 1 to 3, 52.65% (199 of 378) altered AI outputs, against 13.98% (52 of 372) at ratings of 4 to 7 and 3 of 25 at ratings of 8 to 10 (chi-square $p < 0.001$). Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.2) holds the crossing of placement with manual alteration in full.

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Placement drew 105 written answers from 103 respondents on 75 engagements, and 75 were negative, 30 from canceled and 45 from active engagements. Of the 75, 14 (18.67%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (9) and change discovered only through failure (4). Respondents described review that sat after validation or after the output had left, tickets that closed with neither firm checking them, and an agent that rewrote consent flags on nine thousand records overnight without approval.

> *"Neither side checks a ticket before it closes. Thats all." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"In March the agent rewrites consent flags on nine thousand records overnight. You are asking me about accuracy and memory, but the thing that mattered was it acted at all, without anyone aproving it." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 4.1) reports the association of placement with the four study measures.

4.2 Human Review Capacity Against Agent Output Volume

Indicator C148 · Rate how well joint human review capacity keeps up with the volume of output the agents produce · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.3 · Full statistical analysis ›

Insufficient human review capacity was associated with low scores. The control issue is whether the volume of agent output can be reviewed by the people assigned to oversee it. Capacity differs from review placement and from genuine scrutiny: a correctly placed review point may still be overwhelmed. The written accounts and ratings address that operational mismatch, while the score association does not identify a sufficient staffing level.

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Figure 3.37. Human Review Capacity Against Agent Output Volume: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Insufficient human review capacity was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 396 respondents who rated review capacity 4 to 7, 21 (5.30%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 381 who rated it 1 to 3, 244 (64.04%) had a score of 3 or below, and none of the 28 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 317.63, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.63).

Review capacity was associated with the score at $r = 0.90$ (95% CI 0.86 to 0.92, n = 150 engagements), the joint weakest of the 20, and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.75$, the weakest of the 20. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.25$ ($p = 0.003$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.76$ and ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.75 in Build-Out to 0.82 in Transition/Cut-Over and Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.86 among individual contributors and 0.83 among engagement managers and portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 66.03% (206 of 312) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.71 (n = 381), against 5.18 (n = 424) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Review capacity tracked human rework. Of the respondents who rated capacity 1 to 3, 43.57% (166 of 381) described human rework absorbing agent failure, against 14.90% (59 of 396) at ratings of 4 to 7 and 1 of 28 at ratings of 8 to 10 (chi-square $p < 0.001$). The written pattern of review overrun by agent volume

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is analyzed with the other reasons for reported governance weakness under The Fit Between Governance Processes and the Pace of Agent Work.

Review capacity drew 145 written answers from 135 respondents on 89 engagements, and 134 of them were negative, 42 from canceled and 92 from active engagements. Of the 134, 17 (12.69%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often unclear liability or regulatory accountability (6). Respondents described review that grew shorter as volume grew, a formal quality sample of about two percent, and one or two people as the whole of review across several workstreams.

> *"I edit the suggested response before the Agent sends it, it still guesses wrong on routing a lot. And QA on this is basically me reading things. There is a formal QA step, it samples about two percent, which means ninety eight percent of what goes out has had exactly one set of eyes on it and those eyes are mine and I am also handling my own queue. That is the honest picture. Nobody is hiding it, its just that nobody has added it up. The agent handles the easy ones well, genuinely, and for the routine balance and payment questions its better than we were. Its the edge cases where it confidently gets it wrong, and confidently is the part that matters, because it does not flag uncertainty, it just answers. So you have to read all of them to find the few. And the productivity numbers we report do not account for the reading. I have brought this up with my supervisor twice. Both times the response was that the sampling rate would be reviewed. I do not think anyone is being" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"one reviewer for forty provisioning outputs in a day, she cant" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 4.2) reports the association of review capacity with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.3) its association with manual alteration.

4.3 Genuine Scrutiny at Human Review Points

Indicator C149 · Rate how much genuine scrutiny agent outputs receive at human review points rather than routine approval · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.4 · Full statistical analysis ›

Routine approval without substantial scrutiny was associated with a weaker reported control environment. The indicator asks whether human review operates as an examination of agent work or primarily as a procedural sign-off. It gives the governance analysis a quality dimension that review placement and capacity do not capture alone. Differences among subgroup correlations remain descriptive and do not establish that scrutiny deteriorated on cancellation.

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Figure 3.38. Genuine Scrutiny at Human Review Points: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Routine approval without substantial scrutiny was associated with a weaker reported control environment.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Within canceled engagements, the correlation was 0.74, jointly the lowest of the 20 with step ownership, while across the active stages it ran at 0.81 in Build-Out, 0.83 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.86 in Production.

Scores were 3 or below for 251 of 393 (63.87%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 15 of 370 (4.05%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 31 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 322.30, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.64. Scrutiny was associated with the score at $r = 0.92$ (95% CI 0.89 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.78$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.25$ ($p = 0.002$).

After Holm adjustment the association held in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors, 0.86 among engagement managers, and 0.83 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 65.62% (208 of 317) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.71 (n = 393), against 5.27 (n = 401) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Genuine scrutiny drew 66 written answers from 63 respondents on 50 engagements, and 59 were negative, 30 from canceled and 29 from active engagements. Of the 59, 11 (18.64%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often activity counted in place of outcome (4),

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change discovered only through failure (3), and problems raised with no response (3). Respondents described releases approved without reading, approval by the same person who had prepared the case, and a queue of forty offers from which thirty-eight were released.

> *"One issue dominates and I will leave the others alone. The human review point on arrangement offers has quietly become an approval step rather than a scrutiny step. The reviewer opens a queue of forty and releases thirty-eight, which is not review in any sense a supervisor would accept. That is a capacity design problem and not a people problem. The governance we jointly operate was drawn up for a world in which a person made each offer and could be asked afterwards why, and it does not sit comfortably over work of this shape, however well both sides chair the meetings." -Portfolio Director, CXM, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"Nobody asked this one, the person who approve our HR cases is the same person who prepare them, so the review is only a click. Please note also when they change the routing rules nobody tell us, we find out from the failed cases" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 4.3) reports the association of scrutiny with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.4) its association with manual alteration.

4.4 Reliability of the Joint Quality Assurance Loop

Indicator C150 · Rate how reliably the joint quality assurance loop catches agent errors before they reach live operations · Full statistical analysis ›

A less reliable joint quality assurance loop was associated with low scores. This concerns whether the combined process catches agent errors before they reach live operations, connecting review activity with its reported operational result. It differs from the existence of a review step or a formal quality policy. The adjusted association remains conditional on the comparison measure, with no inference that its relative ranking measures the control's practical importance.

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Figure 3.39. Reliability of the Joint Quality Assurance Loop: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

A less reliable joint quality assurance loop was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

The quality loop was associated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.77, and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the association remained at partial r = 0.21 (p = 0.012). It was associated with the score at r = 0.91 (95% CI 0.88 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements).

The weak adjusted association sat beside one of the sharpest band crossings of the 20. Scores were 3 or below for 244 of 377 (64.72%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 13 of 381 (3.41%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 29 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 338.49, p < 0.001, Cramér's V = 0.66.

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.77 and ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.78 in Build-Out to 0.86 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.86 among individual contributors and engagement managers and at 0.76 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 67.55% (204 of 302) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.71 (n = 377), against 5.22 (n = 410) among the rest (cluster-robust p < 0.001).

The written base was thin. Twenty-nine respondents on 28 engagements wrote about the quality loop, and 22 of the answers were negative, 11 from canceled and 11 from active engagements. Of the 22, 7 (31.82%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often change

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discovered only through failure (3) and problems raised with no response (3). Respondents described errors found only once they were live, and drafts that went out wrong without anyone stopping them.

> *"I give 1 for one reason, no one ever stop a draft going out wrong" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"My 4 is only for the QA bit, the errors we find are allready live by then" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 4.4) reports the association of the quality loop with the four study measures.

4.5 Quality Measures That Capture Agent Errors

Indicator C151 · Rate how well the quality measures both firms use capture the kinds of errors agents actually make · Full statistical analysis ›

Quality measures that inadequately captured agent errors were associated with low scores. The measures used by both firms need to capture the errors agents actually make. Counts of completed work or cleared exceptions can be informative while leaving incorrect completions poorly represented. The limited written accounts illustrate that distinction, without establishing an exhaustive inventory of errors or the independent accuracy of the measures.

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Figure 3.40. Quality Measures That Capture Agent Errors: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Quality measures that inadequately captured agent errors were associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

The indicator was associated with the score at r = 0.93 (95% CI 0.90 to 0.95, n = 150 engagements), third among the 47 governance indicators. It was associated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.79, and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the association remained at partial r = 0.26 (p = 0.002), the fifth-strongest of the 20.

Scores were 3 or below for 250 of 405 (61.73%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 12 of 357 (3.36%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 30 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 307.41, p < 0.001, Cramér's V = 0.62. The 1 to 3 band share was the second-lowest of the 20, the pattern seen for accountability, where a close tie across the whole range sat beside low ratings spread more widely across engagements.

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.77 and across the active stages at 0.81 to 0.85, and after Holm adjustment it held in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors, 0.88 among engagement managers, and 0.86 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 63.53% (209 of 329) of those who rated them 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated them distressed recorded a score of 2.73 (n = 405), against 5.33 (n = 387) among the rest (cluster-robust p < 0.001).

Fourteen respondents on 14 engagements wrote about quality measures, and 11 of the answers were negative, 6 from canceled and 5 from active engagements. Five of the 11 described one of the 26 forms

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of a control bypassed or not working, most often change discovered only through failure (3). The answers placed the failure in measures designed for the errors people make. Those measures counted an exception cleared as a pass whether or not it had been cleared correctly. An individual contributor noticed an unannounced change to an audit sampling rule only when the exception count halved overnight.

> *"There was a sampling rule that changed on a continuous audit run and nobody on either side told us, i only noticed because exception count dropped by half overnight and that is not normal for that control. When i asked, neither side would say who approved it. Their audit lead said it is vendor change, my lead said it is their side, and i am still not knowing which is true. On my previous engagement, which was reconciliation work, this was different. Not perfect but there was one change log and both firms wrote into it, so if something moved you could at least see who moved it and when. Here there is nothing like the same. Changes just appear. And second thing is the qa checklist, it is written for a human tester. It asks did you check the sample, did you sign it, it does not ask did the tool behave the way it behaved last week, because nobody thought to put that question in. So we tick boxes that mean nothing and the real problem goes straight through. Kindly note i did raise this with my lead in Janurary. Nothing came back. Previous engagement was a small team and a decision took a day, here a decision needs three names and it takes a month or it never comes at all, and then we just decide ourself and carry on, which everybody knows and nobody writes down." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 4.5) reports the association of quality measures with the four study measures.

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5 The Shift From Managing People to Managing Agents

The fit between co-management and agent-performed work was associated with the wider score. Cross-firm visibility, decision speed, present operating-model fit, and readiness for expected autonomy describe different demands on that management arrangement. The evidence connects those reported demands with governance quality, while the future-autonomy item remains an expectation rather than observed future capability.

5.1 Each Firm's Visibility of the Other Firm's Agent Actions

Indicator C152 · Rate how fully each firm can see what the other firm's agents actually did when questions arise · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.7 · Full statistical analysis ›

Limited visibility of the other firm's agent actions was associated with low scores. Oversight requires an account of what occurred across the shared workflow when a question or incident arises. This indicator concerns cross-firm access to that account, beyond whether a tool generates logs internally. The association was observed within active and canceled groups, with no direct test of how visibility changed over time.

Figure 3.41. Each Firm's Visibility of the Other Firm's Agent Actions: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Limited visibility of the other firm's agent actions was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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The association within the canceled engagements matched the association across the active stages, at 0.82 in Build-Out, 0.84 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.83 in Production, with no direct test of change over time. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested.

Scores were 3 or below for 245 of 392 (62.50%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 11 of 362 (3.04%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 26 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 314.93, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.64. Visibility was associated with the score at $r = 0.92$ (95% CI 0.89 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.79$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.22$ ($p = 0.007$).

Within role the association stood at 0.88 among individual contributors, 0.87 among engagement managers, and 0.85 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 64.86% (203 of 313) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.74 (n = 392), against 5.35 (n = 388) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Visibility drew 66 written answers from 64 respondents on 49 engagements, and 62 of them were negative, 23 from canceled and 39 from active engagements, the most uniformly negative testimony among the co-management indicators. Of the 62, 9 (14.52%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often unclear liability or regulatory accountability (3) and exceptions omitted from the reports the financial institution received (2). Respondents described agent actions reconstructed from logs after the event and answers that were, by the time they were given, partly guessed.

> *“I will say this for the joint side, when we do get their AML lead in a room the decisions are quick and they hold, and their reviewers keep up with the volume we send, which I did not expect. The failure is not the people, it is that neither firm has sight of the other side's agent actions. They ask me on Tuesday why an alert closed on Sunday and I reconstruct it from logs, and by then the answer is half a guess. Nobody designed for that question.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *“When something the agent did needs explaining i cant see there side of it, so i rebuild the break from the custodian statement myself and work back from that. Takes a morning. My team does the same. Nobody reviews the volume that comes out, we just spot check the big ones” - Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 5.1) reports the association of visibility with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.7) its association with manual alteration.

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5.2 Joint Decision Speed Against Agent Speed

Indicator C153 · Rate how closely the speed of joint decision making matches the speed at which the agents act · Full statistical analysis ›

Joint decisions that did not keep pace with agent action were associated with low scores. The governance issue is the time available to decide when operational work continues faster than the two firms can reach agreement. This differs from deciding who has authority in principle. The evidence describes reported decision speed and its relationship with the broader score, not a measured delay for every decision.

Figure 3.42. Joint Decision Speed Against Agent Speed: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Joint decisions that did not keep pace with agent action were associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 381 respondents who rated joint decision speed 1 to 3, 245 (64.30%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 379 who rated it 4 to 7, 12 (3.17%) had a score of 3 or below, and none of the 26 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 335.79, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.65).

Decision speed was associated with the score at $r = 0.92$ (95% CI 0.89 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.79$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.23$ ($p = 0.005$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.76$ and ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.82 in Build-Out and Transition/Cut-Over to 0.87 in Production. After Holm

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adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 86 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors and engagement managers and at 0.90 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 66.67% (202 of 303) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.69 (n = 381), against 5.28 (n = 405) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Fourteen respondents on 13 engagements wrote about decision speed, and 13 of the answers were negative, 7 from canceled and 6 from active engagements. Three of the 13 described problems raised with no response. The answers set the hour in which an agent acted against the days that two people took to agree on what it had done, and a weekly meeting against a queue the agent worked every hour.

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 5.2) reports the association of decision speed with the four study measures. The pace of governance against the pace of the agents is analyzed as a reason for reported governance weakness under The Fit Between Governance Processes and the Pace of Agent Work.

5.3 Fit of the Joint Governance Model to Work Performed by Agents

Indicator C154 · Rate how well today's joint governance model fits work performed by agents rather than work performed by people · Full statistical analysis ›

A joint model poorly fitted to agent-performed work was associated with low scores. The concern is whether authority, review, and issue management are designed for the work now being performed, rather than carried over without adaptation from people-based delivery. The small written base illustrates reported gaps in authority. It does not establish that all arrangements inherited from earlier work are ineffective.

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Figure 3.43. Fit of the Joint Governance Model to Work Performed by Agents: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

A joint model poorly fitted to agent-performed work was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 395 respondents who rated the fit of the joint model to agent work 1 to 3, 251 (63.54%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 369 who rated it 4 to 7, 13 (3.52%) had a score of 3 or below, and none of the 39 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 331.52, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.64).

The fit of the model was associated with the score at $r = 0.92$ (95% CI 0.89 to 0.94, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.78$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association remained at partial $r = 0.26$ ($p = 0.001$), the fourth-strongest of the 20.

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.77$ and across the active stages at 0.81 to 0.85, and after Holm adjustment it held in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.87 among individual contributors and engagement managers and at 0.80 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 65.83% (210 of 319) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.73 (n = 395), against 5.24 (n = 408) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

Ten respondents on 9 engagements wrote about the fit of the model, and 9 of the answers were negative, 5 from canceled and 4 from active engagements. Three of the 9 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. The answers described leads on both sides who held no authority to decide, and a model that worked issues as one team while keeping no joint record of what the agents had changed.

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> *"To be fair to the leads on both sides, none of them were given any power to decide. They sit in the same queue we do... every exception we raise goes up and stops somewhere above them. I don't think they wanted it this way, they simply had nothing to work with." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Issues do get worked as one team, that part functions. The rest is built for people doing the work. There is no joint record of what the agents changed between reviews, so when a forecast number moves we cannot say which side moved it. It gets discussed and then it repeats next cycle" - Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 5.3) reports the association of the fit of the joint model with the four study measures. The inheritance of governance functions designed for people is analyzed as a reason for reported governance weakness under The Fit Between Governance Processes and the Pace of Agent Work.

5.4 Readiness of the Co-Management Model for Expected Agent Autonomy

Indicator C155 · Rate how ready the joint management model is for the level of agent autonomy you expect in this engagement within two years · Full statistical analysis ›

Reported readiness for expected agent autonomy was strongly associated with the wider score. This places the anticipated expansion of autonomous work within the governance question: the joint model must be assessed against the authority agents are expected to exercise. The measure concerns respondents' expectations within two years, not observed future performance. Its high correlation is evidence of aligned assessments, not proof that future autonomy will be governed successfully.

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Figure 3.44. Readiness of the Co-Management Model for Expected Agent Autonomy: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Reported readiness for expected agent autonomy was strongly associated with the wider score.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

The association with the score stood at r = 0.93 (95% CI 0.90 to 0.95, n = 150 engagements). Readiness was associated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.80, the highest of the 20, and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the association remained at partial r = 0.22 (p = 0.008).

Scores were 3 or below for 254 of 407 (62.41%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 14 of 373 (3.75%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 28 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 316.46, p < 0.001, Cramér's V = 0.63. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.70 (n = 407), against 5.30 (n = 401) among the rest (cluster-robust p < 0.001).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.76 and ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.83 in Build-Out to 0.88 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.88 among individual contributors, 0.87 among engagement managers, and 0.82 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 63.20% (213 of 337) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Three respondents on 3 active engagements wrote about readiness for expected autonomy, and two of the answers were negative. Neither negative answer described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. One individual contributor judged that the joint model would not hold at the autonomy

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expected within two years, and a portfolio director on another engagement reported that the conversation on which alert types an agent might close alone had been deferred twice.

Part 2 (Co-Management, section 5.4) reports the association of readiness with the four study measures.

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“

The vendor's incident log classified access errors as customer-caused whenever the underlying policy data came from the customer's systems, even when the agent's own logic misapplied that policy.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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Financial Institution Readiness and the Governance of Agentic Work

Financial institution readiness was closely associated with the reported control environment. Low ratings were common across the institution's data governance, management, access, accountability, and oversight responsibilities. The governance, oversight, and control score links those responsibilities with controls elsewhere in the engagement. Conditional cross-category results were less consistent, with sign changes under alternative comparison means. These qualifications limit distinct-effect claims without removing the institution's substantive responsibilities from the analysis.

Readiness indicators correlated with the score excluding the tested indicator at r = 0.75–0.80, and with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.72–0.76 (n = 150). Five adjusted cross-category estimates were small, negative, and nonsignificant, from −0.15 to −0.11. Response speed was negative and nominally significant in the main model but sensitive to category removal. Data governance had a positive estimate of 0.22. Within canceled engagements, item-to-score correlations were 0.54–0.62. These subgroup comparisons do not establish a change caused by cancellation.

The readiness ratings separated failed from higher composite scores less sharply than the management ratings of the two firms. Among respondents who rated a readiness indicator 1 to 3, 54.26% to 57.31% had a score of 3 or below. Among those who rated one 4 to 7, 7.99% to 10.00% still did, against 2.65% to 5.30% for the co-management indicators. Table 3.9 sets out the seven indicators against these measures.

Table 3.9. The seven financial institution readiness indicators against reported governance weakness across the engagement

Indicator	A score of 3 or below among respondents rating it 1 to 3	r with score excluding item (95% CI)	r with the other four categories	Adjusted partial r (p)	Negative written answers
Maturity of the Financial Institution's Data Governance	229 of 401 (57.11%)	0.75 (0.67 to 0.82)	0.74	0.22 (p = 0.006)	152 of 172
Effectiveness of the Financial Institution's Management of Its Side	227 of 398 (57.04%)	0.78 (0.71 to 0.84)	0.73	−0.13 (p = 0.119)	184 of 196
Speed of the Financial Institution's Response to Issues Raised	229 of 404 (56.68%)	0.79 (0.72 to 0.84)	0.75	−0.18 (p = 0.033)	437 of 498
Assignment of Ownership and Accountability for AI	232 of 417 (55.64%)	0.78 (0.71 to 0.83)	0.73	−0.11 (p = 0.201)	41 of 46

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Indicator	A score of 3 or below among respondents rating it 1 to 3	r with score excluding item (95% CI)	r with the other four categories	Adjusted partial r (p)	Negative written answers
Capacity to Govern and Oversee Agent Risk	239 of 417 (57.31%)	0.79 (0.72 to 0.84)	0.74	−0.15 (p = 0.068)	37 of 45
Change Control for the Changes the Engagement Requires	223 of 411 (54.26%)	0.80 (0.74 to 0.85)	0.76	−0.14 (p = 0.088)	69 of 85
Ability to Provision Access and Identities for Agents	232 of 410 (56.59%)	0.77 (0.69 to 0.83)	0.72	−0.12 (p = 0.133)	403 of 437

Note: Rating-band and item-to-score results use the score excluding the tested indicator. Cross-category results exclude its entire category and use 150 engagements. Partial r accounts for the mean of the 53 indicators outside the score. Adjusted-correlation p values are nominal. The ordinary respondent-level band tests do not account for clustering within engagements, including where Monte Carlo calculation handles sparse cells. Their fractions remain descriptive. Zero observations are not proof of no risk.

> *What the scale does not capture is that the finance team we were given had no mandate. Their data itself was, I would say, in reasonable order; it was the absence of anyone on their side empowered to decide that ended this."*

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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1 Financial-Institution-Provided Data

Financial-institution-provided data connect governance of inputs with manual correction inside delivery. The rated data-governance indicator and written accounts of absent validation answer related but different questions. One describes perceived capability, while the other identifies reported occasions when input checks were missing before handover. Reading them together clarifies the control boundary without treating the accounts as an independently verified input-error rate.

1.1 Maturity of the Financial Institution's Data Governance

Indicator C097 · Rate the maturity of the customer's data governance over the data this engagement uses · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 1.3 · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak data-governance ratings were associated with a weaker wider control environment, with a positive adjusted cross-category estimate in the main model. The financial institution's control over the data used by the engagement provides the substantive connection. Data definitions, accountability, and preparation are part of the conditions under which the shared work operates. The adjusted estimate is model dependent and its significance must be read under the stated test family.

Figure 3.45. Maturity of the Financial Institution's Data Governance: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak data-governance ratings were associated with a weaker wider control environment, with a positive adjusted cross-category estimate in the main model.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Data governance was associated with the score computed without it at r = 0.75 (95% CI 0.67 to 0.82, n = 150 engagements), the lowest of the 47 governance indicators. It was associated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.74, and after that adjustment the association remained at partial r = 0.22 (p = 0.006).

Of the 401 respondents who rated data governance 1 to 3, 229 (57.11%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 377 who rated it 4 to 7, 33 (8.75%) still had a score of 3 or below, and none of the 19 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 215.42, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.52). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.89 (n = 401), against 5.11 (n = 396) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was the weakest of the 47 within the canceled engagements, at r = 0.54, against 0.64 to 0.71 across the active stages. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 84 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.74 among individual contributors and 0.71 among engagement managers and fell to 0.51 among the 31 portfolio directors, the lowest within-role value of any governance indicator. Among individual contributors alone, 59.38% (193 of 325) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Data governance tracked the manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data across its rating bands. Of the respondents who rated data governance 1 to 3, 75.19% (300 of 399) altered the data, against 24.39% (90 of 369) at ratings of 4 to 7 and 1 of 19 at ratings of 8 to 10 (chi-square $p < 0.001$). Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 1.3) reports that comparison in full.

Data governance drew 172 written answers from 155 respondents on 99 engagements, and 152 were negative, 77 from canceled and 75 from active engagements. Of the 152, 57 (37.50%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, and 50 of the 57 described data handed over with no validation by the financial institution. Respondents described fields with no owner of their meaning, classifications that changed from month to month with no approver, and governance rules written after the work had gone live.

> *“vendor master made me angry from first week... same supplier written three different ways in three systems, legal name in one, short name in other. nobody owns which is correct” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 2 (Financial Institution Readiness, section 1.4) reports the association of data governance with the four study measures.

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1.2 Absence of Validation by the Financial Institution Before Handover

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 50 answers from 47 respondents on 37 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 1.4

Accounts of data handed over without validation came from respondents with lower mean scores. This connects a specific input-control gap with the broader assessment of governance. The operational concern is that checking and correction may occur after handover through the delivery workforce, with responsibilities less visible than a validated input process would make them. The written pattern identifies reported experience, not the incidence of all unvalidated data deliveries.

Figure 3.46. Absence of Validation by the Financial Institution Before Handover: descriptive mean score comparison.

Accounts of data handed over without validation came from respondents with lower mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 47 respondents who described it recorded a score of 2.88, against 4.06 among the other 803 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 47 who described it recorded 2.88 against 3.94 among the other 620 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The engagement share describing unvalidated data correlated with the score at $r = -0.24$ ($p = 0.004$, $n = 150$). After adjustment for the comparison mean, partial r was 0.01 (nominal $p = 0.922$). The adjusted analysis did not detect a separate association. It does not establish that absent validation has no operational relationship with governance.

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The pattern differed across engagement status and gathered where the composite score was low. It was described by 2.86% of respondents in Build-Out, 4.00% in Transition/Cut-Over, 6.80% in Production, and 7.76% on canceled engagements, and by 9.09% in the lowest indicator quintile against 1.88% in the highest. By the score, it was described by 9.19% (26 of 283) of respondents at 3 or below, 3.98% (21 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. All 47 who described it were individual contributors.

The share describing the pattern differed after Holm adjustment by management's understanding of the governing obligations, by the financial institution's discussion of them, by the manual alteration methods used, by disclosure to the financial institution, and by intent to leave. It differed by none of the structural attributes of the engagement.

The 50 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 26 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 reports the same 50 answers from the same 47 respondents on 37 engagements, 49 of them answers on the manual alteration of data, so the two counts describe one body of testimony. Respondents described correcting the data on every file before the agent could run, tickets to the financial institution that went unanswered, and a delivery team that had become the only validation the data received.

> *“the problem is nothing is validated on their side before it reaches us, so i fix data myself every time, further raising ticket does nothing at all, nobody replies to it” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *“I never raise this with anyone above me, just sort duplicate myself and move on... And this happens on most files now, on top of that source system clearly has no dedup on their side, we are the dedup” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 1.4) analyzes the pattern as a factor in manual alteration.

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2 Management of the Financial Institution's Side of the Engagement

Management of the financial institution's own work and its response to issues were associated with the wider control environment. These responsibilities concern actions that the vendor cannot complete solely through its own delivery process. The adjustment results show model dependence, particularly for response speed. The operational interpretation rests on the reported responsibilities and evidence, rather than a claim that the coefficients isolate their causal effects.

2.1 Effectiveness of the Financial Institution's Management of Its Side

Indicator C105 · Rate the effectiveness of the customer's management of its side of this engagement · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.2 · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak management of the financial institution's side was associated with low composite scores, while the adjusted cross-category analysis did not detect a clear association. This indicator concerns the institution's ability to perform its own engagement responsibilities. It extends the governance question beyond vendor delivery, because shared work also depends on decisions and actions inside the institution. The conditional result does not establish that those responsibilities have no distinct operational role.

Figure 3.47. Effectiveness of the Financial Institution's Management of Its Side: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak financial institution management was associated with low scores



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Of the 398 respondents who rated it 1 to 3, 227 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 390 who rated it 4 to 7, 39 (10.00%) still did, the highest share at those ratings of the seven readiness indicators, and none of the 23 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 209.26, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.51).

The indicator was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.78$ (95% CI 0.71 to 0.84, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.73$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.13 and was not significant ($p = 0.119$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.87 (n = 398), against 5.09 (n = 413) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.58$ and across the active stages at 0.68 to 0.79, and after Holm adjustment it held in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.77 among individual contributors, 0.73 among engagement managers, and 0.75 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 59.44% (192 of 323) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

The indicator drew 196 written answers from 173 respondents on 104 engagements, and 184 of them were negative, the most uniformly negative testimony among the governance indicators with 100 or more answers. Of the 184 negative answers, 105 came from canceled and 79 from active engagements, and 48 (26.09%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (21), undefined handoffs between the financial institution's teams (14), and raising problems seen as futile (9). Respondents described a financial institution with no single owner of the agent work, questions that passed among three functions, and staff who held no authority to approve anything.

> *“My honest frustration — and it is the only one worth writing down — is that there is no single owner on their side for the agent work. Procurement operations, their vendor risk function and the technology group each hold a piece, so a question about whether an agent may close a supplier onboarding case without a human goes round all three and comes back a fortnight later, usually unanswered. Everything else about them is genuinely solid.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“The worst of it is nobody over there is actually running their end. I can't get into the Custodian portal half the time and break files land in three different layouts. But their people know the tech fine. They just aren't set up to run this.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 2 (Financial Institution Readiness, section 5.1) reports the association of the indicator with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.2) its association with manual alteration.

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2.2 Speed of the Financial Institution's Response to Issues Raised

Indicator C109 · Rate how quickly the customer responds when this engagement raises issues that need customer action · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.1 · Full statistical analysis ›

The financial institution's response to issues was closely associated with the wider control environment and drew extensive written discussion. Issues requiring financial institution action need to be resolved while work continues. Its adjusted coefficient changed sign when the institution's other readiness indicators were removed from the comparison mean. That sensitivity limits a distinct-effect interpretation and gives the operating accounts more explanatory value than a ranking of comment volume.

Figure 3.48. Speed of the Financial Institution's Response to Issues Raised: observed association and adjustment sensitivity.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

Correlations use 150 engagements. The alternative mean removes the stated category items. Estimates are descriptive model comparisons, with nominal inference in the text.

Accounts of response speed included unresolved decisions while delivery continued, linking the indicator to the availability of timely financial institution action. It was addressed in 498 written answers from 382 respondents on 142 engagements, more than any other governance indicator.

The indicator was associated with the score computed without it at r = 0.79 (95% CI 0.72 to 0.84, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.75. After adjustment for the mean

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of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.18 (p = 0.033), the one nominally significant inverse association among the readiness indicators. The 53 include the financial institution's other readiness indicators. Leaving them out of the control moved the partial r to 0.13 (p = 0.111), while leaving out the vendor capability block left it at −0.35 (p < 0.001), the AI technology block at −0.04 (p = 0.594), and the third-party block at −0.15 (p = 0.065). These alternative specifications show sensitivity to the comparison measure. They do not establish that response speed has no relationship of its own.

Scores were 3 or below for 229 of 404 (56.68%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 30 of 367 (8.17%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 18 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 214.22, p < 0.001, Cramér's V = 0.52. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.91 (n = 404), against 5.18 (n = 385) among the rest (cluster-robust p < 0.001).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.61, the second-strongest of the seven readiness indicators, and across the active stages at 0.65 to 0.76. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.77 among individual contributors, 0.73 among engagement managers, and 0.63 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 57.82% (196 of 339) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Of the 498 written answers, 437 were negative, 217 from canceled and 220 from active engagements. Of the 437, 181 (41.42%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (120), raising problems seen as futile (35), and undefined handoffs between the financial institution's teams (21). Respondents described requests for a supplier list that went unanswered for weeks, and exceptions held open late into the evening while the financial institution did not say which record was correct.

> *“i felt like i was working for nobody. we asked for the vendor master and the supplier list for weeks, no reply. two months on that desk and their side never turned up once” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“This is not my job but I am the one doing it. Their side does not answer... I sit with PO exceptions until late and nobody says which record is correct. My team is tired, two already left. Then they ask why the queue is old” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 2 (Financial Institution Readiness, section 5.2) reports the association of response speed with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.1) its association with the manual alteration of processes.

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3 Governance of Agentic AI Within the Financial Institution

Internal ownership, oversight capacity, and change control each connect the financial institution's organization with governance of agent work. The indicators distinguish naming responsibility, having the capacity to exercise it, and handling required changes. Their similar score relationships should not obscure those separate functions. The adjusted results qualify a claim of a distinct statistical association for each control.

3.1 Assignment of Ownership and Accountability for AI

Indicator C112 · Rate how clearly ownership and accountability for AI are assigned inside the customer organization · Full statistical analysis ›

Unclear assignment of AI ownership and accountability inside the financial institution was associated with low scores. The indicator addresses an internal responsibility boundary that joint vendor-institution procedures cannot settle by themselves. It asks whether the institution has identified who owns AI-related decisions and consequences within its organization. The findings concern reported clarity, with no independent organizational audit of those assignments.

Figure 3.49. Assignment of Ownership and Accountability for AI: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Unclear assignment of AI ownership and accountability inside the financial institution was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Of the 417 respondents who rated ownership 1 to 3, 232 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 371 who rated it 4 to 7, 34 (9.16%) still did, and none of the 14 who rated it 8 to 10 did (Monte Carlo chi-square = 198.34, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.50).

Ownership was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.78$ (95% CI 0.71 to 0.83, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.73$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.11 and was not significant ($p = 0.201$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.95 (n = 417), against 5.12 (n = 385) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.56$ and across the active stages at 0.67 to 0.74, and after Holm adjustment it held in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.76 among individual contributors, 0.74 among engagement managers, and 0.65 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 57.60% (197 of 342) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Forty-six respondents on 40 engagements wrote about ownership of AI, one answer each, and 41 of the answers were negative, 18 from canceled and 23 from active engagements. Of the 41, 10 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (7) and undefined handoffs between the financial institution's teams (5). Those five answers described ownership divided among functions rather than absent, with risk, technology, and operations teams each assigning the agent to another.

> *"There was no named owner on the bank side for the screening model. Compliance, IT and the AML operations team each said it belonged to the other." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"We spent most of the POC working around a surveillance stack that predates all of us, and their engineers are as frustrated with it as we are. The harder part is that no one on their side owns the AI decisions, so approvals wander" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

Part 2 (Financial Institution Readiness, section 6.1) reports the association of ownership with the four study measures.

3.2 Capacity to Govern and Oversee Agent Risk

Indicator C111 · Rate the customer's capacity to govern and oversee the risks of AI agents doing this work · Full statistical analysis ›

Limited capacity to oversee agent risk was associated with low scores. This concerns whether the financial institution can examine and govern the risks introduced by agent work, in addition to meeting its ordinary management responsibilities. The main adjusted model did not detect a clear cross-category

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association. That result qualifies the statistical claim while preserving the distinction between nominal responsibility and reported capacity to exercise oversight.

Figure 3.50. Capacity to Govern and Oversee Agent Risk: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Limited capacity to oversee agent risk was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 417 respondents who rated oversight capacity 1 to 3, 239 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 363 who rated it 4 to 7, 29 (7.99%) still did, the lowest such share of the seven, and none of the 17 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 220.35, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.53).

Oversight capacity was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.79$ (95% CI 0.72 to 0.84, $n = 150$ engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.74$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.15 and was not significant ($p = 0.068$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.95 ($n = 417$), against 5.16 ($n = 380$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was weakest in Build-Out, at $r = 0.60$, against 0.79 in Transition/Cut-Over and 0.73 in Production, and held within the canceled engagements at 0.62, the strongest of the seven. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 84 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.78 among individual contributors, 0.74 among engagement managers, and 0.71 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 60.00% (201 of 335) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

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Forty-five respondents on 38 engagements wrote about oversight capacity, and 37 of the answers were negative, 19 from canceled and 18 from active engagements. Only 3 of the 37 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. Respondents described audit frameworks that did not exist for the agents and model-risk governance built after launch. A portfolio director on a canceled payments engagement reported that the financial institution's AI oversight forum had been in place before the vendor arrived, while ownership of the data it oversaw never settled.

> *"The client was not an unserious counterparty. On governance they were ahead of most acquirers we have dealt with - their AI oversight forum was standing before we arrived, which was not true of two other payments accounts I have been near - and their process documentation was usable, which is rarer still. What did not move in three months was ownership of the transaction data itself. Nobody on their side could tell us definitively who signs off a change to a merchant reference field, and so the change went to a forum that met when it met. Data governance is the item I marked hardest and I would mark it the same today. The rest of it, access and formats, is ordinary and fixable inside a quarter. That one is not." -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Financial Institution Readiness, section 6.2) reports the association of oversight capacity with the four study measures.

3.3 Change Control for the Changes the Engagement Requires

Indicator C110 · Rate how well the customer's change control process handles the changes this engagement requires · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.4 · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak financial institution change-control ratings were associated with a weaker reported control environment. This concerns changes the institution must handle on its own side, distinct from the joint process used between the firms. The main adjusted cross-category estimate was negative and not clearly distinguishable from zero. The substantive interpretation remains a reported readiness constraint, without treating the coefficient as evidence that better change control worsens governance.

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Figure 3.51. Change Control for the Changes the Engagement Requires: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak financial institution change-control ratings were associated with a weaker reported control environment.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Change control was associated with the score computed without it at r = 0.80 (95% CI 0.74 to 0.85, n = 150 engagements), the highest of the seven. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.14 and was not significant (p = 0.088).

Of the 411 respondents who rated change control 1 to 3, 223 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 369 who rated it 4 to 7, 34 (9.21%) still did, and none of the 20 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 190.63, p < 0.001, Cramér's V = 0.49, the smallest conditional share of the 47). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.93 (n = 411), against 5.16 (n = 389) among the rest (cluster-robust p < 0.001).

The association fell further on cancellation than for any other readiness indicator, from 0.63 to 0.77 across the active stages to 0.55 within the canceled engagements. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.77 among individual contributors, 0.76 among engagement managers, and 0.72 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 56.63% (188 of 332) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Change control drew 85 written answers from 80 respondents on 64 engagements, and 69 were negative, 33 from canceled and 36 from active engagements. Of the 69, 15 (21.74%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (7) and habit in place of a control (3). Respondents described a change board that sat on fixed days or once a month against

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agents that changed continuously, and a form to add one benefit code that was still open while the payroll cycle ran on.

> *"Their change board sits once a month. Nothing gets approved between... And they want same desk process as before, only with agent doing it." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Question about change control assumes there is change control to rate. For payroll there is none we can point to. We raised a form in March for adding one benefit code and it is still open, and meanwhile the Cycle runs anyway. Same for data question, score of 1 does not separate file that is late from file that is wrong, and we get both, from hris and from the tax side, with definitions that do not agree between them. Their people who own AI are at least named, that part is clear enough. For the rest the scale is too narrow." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 2 (Financial Institution Readiness, section 6.3) reports the association of change control with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.4) its association with manual alteration.

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4 Provisioning of System Access and Agent Identities

Provisioning system access and agent identities was associated with the wider control environment and was repeatedly described in accounts of manual work. This responsibility connects authorized access with the ability to operate the intended workflow. The finding concerns reported provisioning capability and does not independently verify permissions, identity security, or the reason for each manual intervention.

4.1 Ability to Provision Access and Identities for Agents

Indicator C108 · Rate the customer's ability to provision the system access and identities that AI agents require · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 2.1 · Full statistical analysis ›

Difficulty provisioning agent access and identities was associated with low scores. Access is a governance issue as well as a delivery dependency, because the institution must supply the identities and permissions through which agent work is performed. The written accounts connect this responsibility with manual handling of work. The findings describe reported ability and experience, without verifying the security or appropriateness of each identity and permission.

Figure 3.52. Ability to Provision Access and Identities for Agents: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Difficulty provisioning agent access and identities was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Of the 410 respondents who rated provisioning 1 to 3, 232 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 376 who rated it 4 to 7, 32 (8.51%) still did, and none of the 15 who rated it 8 to 10 did (Monte Carlo chi-square = 212.66, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.52).

Provisioning was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.77$ (95% CI 0.69 to 0.83, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.72$, the lowest of the seven. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.12 and was not significant ($p = 0.133$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.90 (n = 410), against 5.14 (n = 391) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was weakest in Build-Out, at $r = 0.58$, against 0.77 in Transition/Cut-Over and 0.74 in Production, and it held within the canceled engagements at 0.57. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.76 among individual contributors, 0.74 among engagement managers, and 0.62 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 59.88% (197 of 329) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Provisioning drew 437 written answers from 348 respondents on 135 engagements, the second-largest written base of the 47 governance indicators, and 403 were negative, 181 from canceled and 222 from active engagements. Of the 403, 67 (16.63%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (29), raising problems seen as futile (13), and unclear liability or regulatory accountability (9). The answers recorded the control used outside its design. Agents ran under shared service accounts or under the credentials of named people, credentials lapsed with no person assigned to renew them, and access management treated an agent identity as a new joiner with a line manager and a leaver date.

> *“The difficulty, and it is the only one I would put in front of their leadership, is identity... Every agent we place on the trust administration work needs its own credential on the client's core, and their access management still treats a credential as a person, with a joiner form, a line manager and a leaver date. We have waited eleven weeks for one service account. Everything else on this account I would call reasonable, the process documentation in particular is better than I usually see... but access is the item that quietly sets our timeline.” -Portfolio Director, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“Their merchant settlement files arrive in three formats from three platforms, and two of them still come as an SFTP drop with no schema attached. Agent identities were requested in March and half were still pending in July, so the agents run under a shared service account, which their own risk people have flagged. Their managers are reasonable to deal with. The estate underneath them is not.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“Problem is only access. Agent still dont have own login on core servicing platform so we run half the account amendments under my team id, then audit come back and ask who did it. Data itself is fine mostly” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

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Part 2 (Financial Institution Readiness, section 7.1) reports the association of provisioning with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 2.1) its association with manual alteration.

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“training was two recorded sessions and a quiz, so my team keep our own note file, the composite rules and the checks that catch bad output are all in it. i wrote most of it. accordingly nobody ask the training team for anything now.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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Vendor Preparation and Accountability in the Control Environment

The vendor's playbook and accountability ratings were associated with governance across the engagement. Both concern the vendor's ability to make agent work governable, through a route into controlled production and responsibility for costly errors. The governance, oversight, and control score summarizes the wider reported environment. Negative adjusted coefficients changed markedly when other vendor capability indicators were removed from the comparison mean, making model sensitivity central to interpretation.

Each indicator was associated with the score computed without it at r = 0.78 and 0.79 and with governance in the other four failure categories at r = 0.78 (n = 150 engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the two ties turned inverse and significant, at partial r = −0.38 and −0.46, the second-strongest and strongest inverse results of the 47 governance indicators. The 53 include the vendor's other 18 capability indicators. With that block omitted from the comparison mean, the two partial r moved to 0.04 and −0.03, while leaving out any other category's block left them between −0.41 and −0.29. The change in estimates shows sensitivity to the vendor capability ratings in the comparison mean. It limits a distinct-effect interpretation of the negative coefficients. Table 3.10 sets out both indicators against these measures.

Table 3.10. The two vendor governance indicators against reported governance weakness across the engagement

Indicator	A score of 3 or below among respondents rating it 1 to 3	r with score excluding item (95% CI)	r with the other four categories	Adjusted partial r (p)	Negative written answers
Maturity of the Playbook From Concept to Governed Production	232 of 392 (59.18%)	0.78 (0.71 to 0.84)	0.78	−0.38 (p < 0.001)	186 of 200
Readiness to Take Accountability for a Costly Agent Error	240 of 373 (64.34%)	0.79 (0.72 to 0.84)	0.78	−0.46 (p < 0.001)	29 of 38

Note: Rating-band and item-to-score results use the score excluding the tested indicator. Cross-category results exclude its entire category and use 150 engagements. Partial r accounts for the mean of the 53 indicators outside the score. Adjusted-correlation p values are nominal. The ordinary respondent-level band tests do not account for clustering within engagements, including where Monte Carlo calculation handles sparse cells. Their fractions remain descriptive. Zero observations are not proof of no risk.

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We were so busy fixing pre-prod issues that we never thought about how to do the actual work."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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1 Delivery Playbook, Quality Assurance, and Platforms

The playbook rating connects preparation for governed production with the wider score. Its observed relationship was positive, while the main adjusted result was negative and became near zero under the category-removal comparison. The substantive question remains whether the vendor has a usable process for establishing controls before and during live operation. The sensitivity precludes interpreting the negative coefficient as a benefit of weaker preparation.

1.1 Maturity of the Playbook From Concept to Governed Production

Indicator C126 · Rate the maturity of your employer's playbook for taking agentic use cases from concept to governed production · Full statistical analysis ›

A less mature vendor playbook was associated with low scores, but its adjusted relationship depended strongly on the comparison measure. The substantive question is how the vendor takes agentic work from concept into governed production. A defined playbook can connect preparation, testing, responsibility, and ongoing operation. The negative conditional coefficient cannot be read as evidence that an immature playbook improves control, given the sensitivity to other vendor capability items.

Figure 3.53. Maturity of the Playbook From Concept to Governed Production: observed association and adjustment sensitivity.

A less mature vendor playbook was associated with low scores, but its adjusted relationship depended strongly on the comparison measure.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

Correlations use 150 engagements. The alternative mean removes the stated category items. Estimates are descriptive model comparisons, with nominal inference in the text.

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Of the 392 respondents who rated the playbook 1 to 3, 232 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 396 who rated it 4 to 7, 34 (8.59%) still did, and none of the 19 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 237.80, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.54).

The playbook was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.78$ (95% CI 0.71 to 0.84, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.78$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.38 ($p < 0.001$). The result held when the financial institution readiness block was omitted from the comparison mean (−0.30, $p < 0.001$), when the AI technology block left it (−0.34, $p < 0.001$), and when the third-party block left it (−0.29, $p < 0.001$). It disappeared only when the vendor capability block was omitted from the comparison mean, at 0.04 ($p = 0.660$). Respondents who rated the playbook distressed recorded a score of 2.87 (n = 392), against 5.09 (n = 415) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.66$ and across the active stages at 0.70 in Build-Out, 0.65 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.81 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.78 among individual contributors, 0.75 among engagement managers, and 0.68 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 61.25% (196 of 320) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

The playbook drew 200 written answers from 184 respondents on 110 engagements, and 186 were negative, 75 from canceled and 111 from active engagements. Of the 186, only 14 (7.53%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often unclear liability or regulatory accountability (7). The answers described a framework that was absent rather than bypassed. Teams were placed on live work with a deck and two days of training, wrote runbooks at night while backlogs grew, and governed the work through habits learned by watching the agents.

> *"There was no playbook. I got two days of training and a deck. And when the fails queue went wrong it came back on me, not on anyone who built it." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"What we have settled into, rather than waiting for the tooling to improve, is a set of habits. Long submissions, and a loss run of forty pages is not unusual, are split into sections before anything is read, because material facts sitting in the middle of a document were being passed over often enough that we stopped trusting a single pass. Each account is worked in its own workspace, opened fresh and closed at the end of the day, so that nothing from one carrier's file can find its way into another's. And where an agent has to touch a system that writes rather than reads, one of my seniors approves the action by hand. None of this is in the playbook. It is what four months of watching the thing has taught us, and hence my middling scores rather than poor ones." - Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

Part 2 (Vendor Capability, section 6.1) reports the association of the playbook with the four study measures.

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2 Accountability for Agent Error

Vendor accountability for agent error was associated with the wider score, but its conditional estimate depended on the adjustment measure. This control concerns responsibility for the consequences of agent action, beyond routine task completion. The evidence supports examining that responsibility while resisting a causal interpretation of the negative adjusted coefficient.

2.1 Readiness to Take Accountability for a Costly Agent Error

Indicator C130 · Rate your employer's readiness to take accountability when an agent it operates makes a costly error · Full statistical analysis ›

Limited vendor readiness to accept accountability for a costly agent error was associated with low scores. This concerns responsibility when the vendor-operated agent causes a material problem, beyond the existence of a delivery process. The observed positive association and the negative adjusted coefficient answer different questions. The latter largely disappeared when the other vendor capability items were removed from the comparison mean, limiting a separate-effect interpretation.

Figure 3.54. Readiness to Take Accountability for a Costly Agent Error: observed association and adjustment sensitivity.

Limited vendor readiness to accept accountability for a costly agent error was associated with low scores.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

Correlations use 150 engagements. The alternative mean removes the stated category items. Estimates are descriptive model comparisons, with nominal inference in the text.

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Of the 373 respondents who rated the vendor's readiness 1 to 3, 240 had a score of 3 or below, a share within the co-management range. Among the 396 who rated it 4 to 7, 32 (8.08%) still did, and none of the 25 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 283.42, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.60).

The indicator was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.79$ (95% CI 0.72 to 0.84, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.78$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.46 ($p < 0.001$). It stayed inverse with the financial institution readiness block omitted from the comparison mean (−0.41), with the AI technology block left out (−0.38), and with the third-party block left out (−0.32), each at $p < 0.001$. With the vendor capability block left out it stood at −0.03 ($p = 0.696$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.75 (n = 373), against 5.05 (n = 421) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.69$ and across the active stages at 0.71 in Build-Out, 0.66 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.77 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.79 among individual contributors, 0.75 among engagement managers, and 0.68 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 65.06% (203 of 312) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Thirty-eight respondents on 32 engagements wrote about the vendor's readiness to take accountability, one answer each, and 29 of the answers were negative, 9 from canceled and 20 from active engagements. Of the 29, 11 (37.93%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often unclear liability or regulatory accountability (7) and problems raised with no response (6). The answers described leadership that fell silent after an error and responsibility that came to rest on the individual contributor on shift.

> *“Playbook for taking a use case into production does exist, and it is better than what we had two years ago; training on payments and card scheme rules is genuinely useful. Where I could not defend them is accountability. When model produced a summary that missed an indemnity cap and client raised it, our leadership went quiet for the better part of two weeks. That silence did more damage than the error.” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *“Two of us have covered nights since day one because tier 2 doesnt pick up. And when the agent closed out a real intrusion alert as noise, nobody upstairs put their name on it. That falls on the analyst who was on shift. Thats me some weeks. I dont sleep great” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Vendor Capability, section 7.1) reports the association of the vendor's readiness to take accountability with the four study measures.

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Technical Controls and Governance Across the Engagement

Technical safeguards were associated with the broader control environment, even though their low-rating share was smaller than in the management categories. The eight technology indicators had 2,052 low ratings among 6,362 ratings. The governance, oversight, and control score relates those assessments to controls elsewhere in the engagement. The main adjusted model did not detect a separate positive cross-category relationship, with sensitivity to the composition of the comparison measure.

Each technology indicator correlated with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.77–0.81 (n = 150). Under the main adjustment, partial r ranged from −0.09 to 0.08 and none met nominal $p < 0.05$. Item-to-score correlations were 0.65–0.70 in Build-Out and 0.78–0.82 in Production. This cross-sectional ordering is descriptive and does not establish a stronger relationship once the same agents enter live operation.

A distressed technology rating was rarer than a distressed management rating and associated with a larger conditional low-score share. Between 251 and 262 respondents rated a technology control 1 to 3, against 377 to 407 for each co-management indicator, and 74.90% to 78.54% of them had a score of 3 or below. Ratings of 4 to 7 still carried a score of 3 or below for 13.21% to 16.42% of respondents, against 2.65% to 5.30% for the co-management indicators. Table 3.11 sets out the eight indicators against these measures.

Table 3.11. The eight AI technology indicators against reported governance weakness across the engagement

Indicator	A score of 3 or below among respondents rating it 1 to 3	r with score excluding item (95% CI)	r with the other four categories	Adjusted partial r (p)	Negative written answers
Resistance to Hostile Embedded Instructions	205 of 261 (78.54%)	0.86 (0.81 to 0.90)	0.81	0.08 (p = 0.310)	9 of 9
Safe Handling of Sensitive Data	194 of 259 (74.90%)	0.84 (0.79 to 0.88)	0.79	−0.09 (p = 0.295)	22 of 28
Consistency of Intended and Authorized Agent Action	192 of 253 (75.89%)	0.83 (0.77 to 0.87)	0.78	−0.03 (p = 0.745)	48 of 64
Reliability of Built-In Guardrails in Production	193 of 252 (76.59%)	0.85 (0.79 to 0.89)	0.80	0.06 (p = 0.488)	7 of 17
Proof of Correct Behavior Before Work Goes Live	195 of 259 (75.29%)	0.85 (0.80 to 0.89)	0.80	0.05 (p = 0.527)	26 of 38
Accuracy of the Tools' Own Success and Failure Reports	189 of 251 (75.30%)	0.84 (0.79 to 0.88)	0.79	−0.04 (p = 0.623)	63 of 73

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Indicator	A score of 3 or below among respondents rating it 1 to 3	r with score excluding item (95% CI)	r with the other four categories	Adjusted partial r (p)	Negative written answers
Explanation and Evidence of Outputs at Audit Depth	197 of 262 (75.19%)	0.86 (0.81 to 0.89)	0.81	0.03 (p = 0.739)	145 of 163
Quality of Logs, Traces, and Usage Telemetry	191 of 255 (74.90%)	0.82 (0.76 to 0.87)	0.77	−0.03 (p = 0.702)	82 of 101

Note: Rating-band and item-to-score results use the score excluding the tested indicator. Cross-category results exclude its entire category and use 150 engagements. Partial r accounts for the mean of the 53 indicators outside the score. Adjusted-correlation p values are nominal. The ordinary respondent-level band tests do not account for clustering within engagements, including where Monte Carlo calculation handles sparse cells. Their fractions remain descriptive. Zero observations are not proof of no risk.

In April we took a batch of eighty investigations to the bank's financial crime committee and the tool's own run summary said all eighty had completed cleanly. Six had not, they had stopped part way and reported success. Nothing came of it because our own reviewers caught it first, but i had to explain to their head of compliance why a machine's account of its own work is not evidence it did the work. That conversation set the programme back a month."

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR

BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

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1 Data Isolation, Sensitive Data, and Adversarial Input

Resistance to hostile input and safe handling of sensitive data connect technical boundaries with governance of agent action. Both were associated with the wider score, while the main adjusted estimates were not clearly different from zero. These results concern reported tool properties. They do not independently establish security performance or remove the need to explain how the controls operated in the engagement.

1.1 Resistance to Hostile Embedded Instructions

Indicator C167 · Rate the tools' resistance to hostile instructions embedded in the content they read and process · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak resistance to hostile embedded instructions was associated with low scores. The control concerns instructions placed inside content an agent reads, which may divert behavior from the authorized task. That mechanism connects a technical property with the governance boundary over agent action. The study records respondents' assessments of resistance, rather than results from an independent security test, and the adjusted comparison did not detect a clear separate association.

Figure 3.55. Resistance to Hostile Embedded Instructions: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak resistance to hostile embedded instructions was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Of the 261 respondents who rated resistance 1 to 3, 205 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 477 who rated it 4 to 7, 63 (13.21%) did, the lowest such share of the eight, and none of the 74 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 365.79, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.67, the largest conditional share of the 47 governance indicators).

Resistance was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.86$ (95% CI 0.81 to 0.90, $n = 150$ engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.81$, the joint highest of the eight. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was 0.08 and was not significant ($p = 0.310$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.29 ($n = 261$), against 4.79 ($n = 551$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.69 in Build-Out to 0.74 in Transition/Cut-Over and 0.81 in Production, and held within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.72$, the strongest of the eight. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 84 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.81 among individual contributors, 0.83 among engagement managers, and 0.77 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 80.18% (174 of 217) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Nine respondents on 9 engagements wrote about hostile instructions, 8 of them on active engagements, and all nine answers were negative. None described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, and each described the technical control itself failing. Respondents reported instructions embedded in a remittance narrative, a scanned letter, the footnotes of a circular, and the text of a ticket that the tools obeyed, in one case recording the case as closed with high confidence.

> *"Last month a circular we fed in had instruction lines in the footnotes, tool followed the same. Logs are good otherwise, I could see exactly what it ran" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"need the Tool to read runbook from one locked source... it pick up any text in ticket and follow it." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (AI Technology, section 5.3) reports the association of resistance with the four study measures.

1.2 Safe Handling of Sensitive Data

Indicator C169 · Rate how safely the tools handled sensitive data, with no exposure through outputs, logs, or connected systems · Full statistical analysis ›

Low ratings for safe handling of sensitive data were associated with low scores. The indicator concerns exposure through outputs, logs, or connected systems, bringing the evidence generated by agent work within the control boundary. Its associations vary with the score and adjustment used. The nonsignificant

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estimates do not establish either a distinct effect or the absence of an operational data-protection problem.

Figure 3.56. Safe Handling of Sensitive Data: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Low ratings for safe handling of sensitive data were associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

For the score excluding the sensitive-data item, the adjusted estimate was partial r = 0.11 (p = 0.179). Against governance in the other four categories, its partial r after that adjustment was −0.09 (p = 0.295), the lowest of the eight. Scores were 3 or below for 194 of 259 (74.90%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 71 of 471 (15.07%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 70 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 308.02, p < 0.001, Cramér's V = 0.62.

The indicator was associated with the score computed without it at r = 0.84 (95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.79. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.35 (n = 259), against 4.76 (n = 541) among the rest (cluster-robust p < 0.001).

The association ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.68 in Build-Out to 0.82 in Production and held within the canceled engagements at r = 0.70. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.81 among individual contributors, 0.84 among engagement managers, and 0.73 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 75.69% (165 of 218) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Twenty-eight respondents on 27 engagements wrote about sensitive data, and 22 of the answers were negative, 13 from canceled and 9 from active engagements. Three of the 22 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, two of them problems raised with no response. Respondents

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described account numbers and salary lines written in full into logs that much of the delivery team could open, and records from one account file that appeared in a summary of another.

> *“the tool put client salary lines into a log i could read... that should not be possible.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*
>
> *“it needs to stop pulling account numbers into the chat log for a start. and nobody should be letting it touch a live settlement without me reading it first” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 2 (AI Technology, section 5.2) reports the association of sensitive data handling with the four study measures.

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2 Authorized Action and Guardrails

Authorized action and production guardrails were associated with the wider score. The first concerns the scope of delegated action, while the second concerns whether restrictions held during use. Their adjusted estimates did not establish distinct relationships under the main comparison mean. Sensitivity of the authorized-action result illustrates why a conditional null should not become a conclusion that technical controls have no role of their own.

2.1 Consistency of Intended and Authorized Agent Action

Indicator C168 · Rate how consistently the agents took only intended and authorized actions when operating connected tools and systems · Full statistical analysis ›

Inconsistent restriction of agent activity to intended and authorized actions was associated with low scores. The control function is the boundary between delegated work and action outside the delegation. The adjusted cross-category estimate was near zero under the main comparison mean, but positive in the category-removal sensitivity check. This model dependence limits a claim that authorization has no relationship of its own, without establishing a causal effect.

Figure 3.57. Consistency of Intended and Authorized Agent Action: observed association and adjustment sensitivity.

Inconsistent restriction of agent activity to intended and authorized actions was associated with low scores.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

Correlations use 150 engagements. The alternative mean removes the stated category items. Estimates are descriptive model comparisons, with nominal inference in the text.

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Of the 253 respondents who rated authorized action 1 to 3, 192 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 474 who rated it 4 to 7, 69 (14.56%) did, and none of the 62 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 313.56, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.63).

Authorized action was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.83$ (95% CI 0.77 to 0.87, $n = 150$ engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.78$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.03 ($p = 0.745$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.31 ($n = 253$), against 4.78 ($n = 536$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Removing the other 12 AI technology items from the comparison mean changed partial r to 0.29 (nominal $p < 0.001$), illustrating model sensitivity.

The descriptive stage correlations ranged from 0.65 in Build-Out to 0.71 in Transition/Cut-Over and 0.78 in Production and held within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.71$. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.81 among individual contributors, 0.75 among engagement managers, and 0.70 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 78.20% (165 of 211) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Authorized action tracked the manual alteration of AI outputs. Of the respondents who rated it 1 to 3, 66.39% (158 of 238) altered AI outputs, against 18.76% (88 of 469) at ratings of 4 to 7 and 8.06% (5 of 62) at ratings of 8 to 10 (chi-square $p < 0.001$).

Authorized action drew 64 written answers from 62 respondents on 50 engagements, and 48 were negative, 19 from canceled and 29 from active engagements. Of the 48, 7 (14.58%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often problems raised with no response (3). Respondents described agents that pulled records outside the batch they were given, touched queues and accounts beyond their scope, and in one account did so through a loose instruction rather than a failed control.

> *“it hit the corporate card feed and pulled transactions for a cardholder that was not in the batch. nobody told it to. that happened twice in january. on cost, it will loop on the same receipt eight or nine times before it gives up, and there is no counter anywhere that shows that. i found it by watching the runtime go up. logs show it finished. thats all they show” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“it gives same answer more often than before, that part improved. but it still touches queues it has no business touching, and nothing is logged.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (AI Technology, section 6.1) reports the association of authorized action with the four study measures.

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2.2 Reliability of Built-In Guardrails in Production

Indicator C170 · Rate how reliably the tools' built-in guardrails and safety controls held during production use · Full statistical analysis ›

Less reliable built-in guardrails were associated with low scores. The indicator concerns whether safeguards held during production use, linking designed restrictions with reported operation. Its findings should be distinguished from the presence of a documented safety policy and from authorized-action ratings. The main adjusted comparison did not detect a clear separate association, and the relatively less negative written answers do not independently verify guardrail effectiveness.

Figure 3.58. Reliability of Built-In Guardrails in Production: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Less reliable built-in guardrails were associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 252 respondents who rated guardrails 1 to 3, 193 had a score of 3 or below, the second-highest share of the eight. Among the 454 who rated them 4 to 7, 69 (15.20%) did, and none of the 81 who rated them 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 320.05, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.64).

Guardrails were associated with the score computed without them at $r = 0.85$ (95% CI 0.79 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.80$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was 0.06 ($p = 0.488$). Respondents who rated them distressed recorded a score of 2.35 (n = 252), against 4.78 (n = 535) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

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The association ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.66 in Build-Out to 0.80 in Production and held within the canceled engagements at r = 0.71. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.82 among individual contributors and 0.79 among engagement managers and portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 78.74% (163 of 207) of those who rated them 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Seventeen respondents on 14 engagements wrote about guardrails, and 7 of the answers were negative, all from active engagements. One of the 7 linked the failure to regulatory or compliance exposure. Respondents reported guardrails that now held while the tool lost instructions within a flow, and guardrails that stayed the weak point of a tool whose matching had improved.

> *"Guardrails hold, thats better than it was. The fnol flow still loses what I told it two steps back." - Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"the matching itself got much better over the six months, it runs a full statement end to end now and when it says it cleared the break it really did clear it. the guardrails are the weak part still, it will happily action something on a client cash account that i would want a second pair of eyes on" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 2 (AI Technology, section 6.2) reports the association of guardrails with the four study measures.

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3 Testability and Behavioral Stability

Testability connects assurance before live work with the broader score. The indicator asks whether correct behavior can be established through testing, while the later output-consistency analysis concerns variation during repeated work. Together they distinguish prospective assurance from observed stability. A favorable rating remains a report about capability, not evidence that all relevant behavior was tested successfully.

3.1 Proof of Correct Behavior Before Work Goes Live

Indicator C174 · Rate how well the tools supported reliable testing, meaning correct behavior could be proven before work went live · Full statistical analysis ›

Limited support for testing correct behavior before live operation was associated with low scores. This connects the ability to examine agent work before deployment with the wider reported control environment. A favorable rating describes perceived testability, not proof that all relevant behavior was tested or that correctness was established. The adjusted result qualifies the association without resolving that operational assurance question.

Figure 3.59. Proof of Correct Behavior Before Work Goes Live: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Limited support for testing correct behavior before live operation was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Of the 259 respondents who rated testability 1 to 3, 195 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 466 who rated it 4 to 7, 74 (15.88%) did, and none of the 67 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 299.62, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.62).

Testability was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.85$ (95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, $n = 150$ engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.80$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was 0.05 ($p = 0.527$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.34 ($n = 259$), against 4.75 ($n = 533$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.67 in Build-Out to 0.73 in Transition/Cut-Over and 0.80 in Production and held within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.71$. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.81 among individual contributors and engagement managers and 0.74 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 76.82% (169 of 220) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Thirty-eight respondents on 33 engagements wrote about testability, and 26 of the answers were negative, 12 from canceled and 14 from active engagements. Three of the 26 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. Respondents described the absence of any test environment, validation performed on live cases, and a reviewer's own reading as the only proof that an agent's work was correct.

> *“Whoever reads this, the main thing is we cannot prove anything works before it goes live, there is no real test here, only my eyes” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *“there was no way to test properly before going live. we found the misses later from the false positive report. i would ask you to note that is the main thing here” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

Part 2 (AI Technology, section 7.1) reports the association of testability with the four study measures.

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4 Observability of Agent Work

Observability connects agent work with the evidence available to oversee it. Tool reports, output explanations, and logs were associated with the wider score, while tool-reported success also correlated with the accuracy of reporting supplied to the financial institution. These measures concern different parts of the evidence chain. Their alignment does not independently verify the completeness or truth of the underlying record.

> *"Main thing is it report success when it has not done the thing. Pipeline log say green, the artefact is not in the repo... that is the one that cost us most" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

4.1 Accuracy of the Tools' Own Success and Failure Reports

Indicator C172 · Rate how accurately the tools' own reports of success or failure matched the actual outcomes of their work · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.8 · Full statistical analysis ›

Inaccurate tool reports of success and failure were associated with low scores. This creates a governance concern because oversight depends on evidence that corresponds to the work performed. A system can report successful completion while producing an incorrect or absent result. The relationship with reporting provided to the financial institution links this technical evidence problem with the information used to oversee delivery.

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Figure 3.60. Accuracy of the Tools' Own Success and Failure Reports: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Inaccurate tool reports of success and failure were associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Among the 251 respondents rating tool-report accuracy at 1–3, 189 had a score of 3 or below (75.30%). The corresponding counts were 78 of 475 at ratings 4–7 (16.42%) and one of 60 at ratings 8–10. The ordinary band test was chi-square = 283.75 ($p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.60), subject to the stated clustering limitation. The reporting-accuracy correlation of 0.68 addresses a separate relationship.

The tools' reports were associated with the score computed without them at $r = 0.84$ (95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.79$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.04 ($p = 0.623$). Respondents who rated them distressed recorded a score of 2.30 (n = 251), against 4.74 (n = 535) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.67 in Build-Out to 0.81 in Production and held within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.69$. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.79 among individual contributors, 0.81 among engagement managers, and 0.78 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 77.25% (163 of 211) of those who rated them 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

The tools' own reports tracked reporting alteration. Of the respondents who rated them 1 to 3, 82.87% (208 of 251) described reporting alteration, against 46.32% (220 of 475) at ratings of 4 to 7 and 15.00% (9 of 60) at ratings of 8 to 10 (chi-square $p < 0.001$).

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The indicator drew 73 written answers from 73 respondents on 58 engagements, and 63 were negative, 27 from canceled and 36 from active engagements. Of the 63, 10 (15.87%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often change discovered only through failure (5) and problems raised with no response (4). Respondents described runs reported as complete in which items had never been processed, and teams that stopped trusting the status and counted the output themselves.

> *"The job status is the main issue. Tool reports the load as completed, then we check the target table and half the rows are not there. This happened on four occasions in my time here. Logs do not show anything useful, only that the step finished. So we stopped trusting the status and started counting rows ourselves each morning" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"To be fair, by month six the behaviour had settled -- it stopped drifting week to week, and a composite run today looks much like the same run last month. What never improved is the reporting it does on itself. It would finish a batch of disclosures and mark it complete when three of the composites had not been built at all, and the logs give you nothing to work back from. We only found those by hand, on the day the pack was due." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 2 (AI Technology, section 8.1) reports the association of the tools' reports with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.8) their association with manual alteration.

4.2 Explanation and Evidence of Outputs at Audit Depth

Indicator C173 · Rate the tools' ability to explain and evidence how each output was produced, at the depth an audit requires · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.5 · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak explanation and evidence of how outputs were produced were associated with low scores. The indicator concerns whether agent work can be reconstructed at the depth an audit requires. This is distinct from whether an output appears correct or a dashboard reports success. The ratings describe perceived auditability, with no independent finding that an audit standard or legal obligation was met or breached.

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Figure 3.61. Explanation and Evidence of Outputs at Audit Depth: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak explanation and evidence of how outputs were produced were associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 262 respondents who rated explanation 1 to 3, 197 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 476 who rated it 4 to 7, 66 (13.87%) did, and none of the 62 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 320.91, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.63).

Explanation was associated with the score computed without it at r = 0.86 (95% CI 0.81 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.81. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was 0.03 ($p = 0.739$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.34 (n = 262), against 4.79 (n = 538) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.70 in Build-Out to 0.77 in Transition/Cut-Over and 0.81 in Production and held within the canceled engagements at r = 0.71. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.82 among individual contributors, 0.80 among engagement managers, and 0.87 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 76.82% (169 of 220) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Explanation drew 163 written answers from 152 respondents on 90 engagements, and 145 were negative, 65 from canceled and 80 from active engagements. Only 9 of the 145 (6.21%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, so the answers recorded a control that the tools could not supply rather than one the delivery team set aside. Respondents described compliance and audit

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questions answered by rebuilding the trail manually, outputs that could be corrected and not explained, and citations to clauses that did not exist.

> *"It cannot show where a number came from... i asked for the working and got a summary only. On a long custodian statement it skips whatever sits in the middle pages" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Checked our exception log before answering. There is no rating for this, when it files document to wrong class we cannot show why afterwards. We can correct it, we cannot explain it, and for records work explaining is half the job." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 2 (AI Technology, section 8.2) reports the association of explanation with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.5) its association with manual alteration.

4.3 Quality of Logs, Traces, and Usage Telemetry

Indicator C176 · Rate the quality of the tools' logs, traces, and usage telemetry for detecting and diagnosing failures · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.6 · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak logs, traces, and usage telemetry were associated with low scores. These records provide the evidence needed to detect a problem and examine what an agent did. Their governance significance lies in observability and diagnosis, rather than the volume of records generated. The separate joint comparison with output consistency examines how two reported limitations occur together and does not establish that one causes or amplifies the other.

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Figure 3.62. Quality of Logs, Traces, and Usage Telemetry: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak logs, traces, and usage telemetry were associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 255 respondents who rated logs and telemetry 1 to 3, 191 had a score of 3 or below, the same share as for sensitive data handling. Among the 466 who rated them 4 to 7, 75 (16.09%) did, and none of the 75 who rated them 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 297.73, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.61).

Logs were associated with the score computed without them at $r = 0.82$ (95% CI 0.76 to 0.87, $n = 150$ engagements), the lowest of the eight, and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.77$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.03 ($p = 0.702$). Respondents who rated them distressed recorded a score of 2.36 ($n = 255$), against 4.76 ($n = 541$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.66 in Build-Out to 0.72 in Transition/Cut-Over and 0.79 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.80 among individual contributors and 0.76 among engagement managers and fell to 0.61 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 77.93% (166 of 213) of those who rated them 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Logs and output-consistency ratings were strongly correlated across engagements ($r = 0.94$, $n = 150$). Their joint comparison, reported under The Fit Between Governance Processes and the Pace of Agent Work, uses only respondents with both numeric answers. It describes the coincidence of reported limitations and does not establish that either caused the other.

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Logs drew 101 written answers from 97 respondents on 73 engagements, and 82 were negative, 47 from canceled and 35 from active engagements. Of the 82, 9 (10.98%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. Respondents described logs that recorded a start and a finish and nothing between, and failures whose point of origin could not be found.

> *"report job runs, fails halfway, runs again from start. Same job three times in one morning is normal here, furthermore nobody can tell me why because there is no trace, only a status of failed. Logs from Platform show start time and end time and nothing between. When it does finish, numbers are mostly right, ill give it that. But i cant prove anything to my lead, i can only re-run it and show him the third one." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Last month I gave it the recertification batch, two hundred accounts. Around ninety it forgot the rule on contractors and started passing them through... and nothing in the logs tells me where it turned" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (AI Technology, section 8.3) reports the association of logs with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.6) their association with manual alteration.

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“In fairness to the providers, these are proper machine interfaces, not screens we scrape, and the claims feeds arrive clean enough that the agents can work them without us in the middle. Where we are genuinely thin is our own fallback. If a model provider went dark on a Tuesday morning we would be running claim status by hand, and half the desk has never worked that way.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Client servicing and communications

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Third-Party Dependencies and the Limits of Internal Control

External dependencies were associated with the broader control environment through notice, monitoring, contractual coverage, security, and operational knowledge. The ten third-party governance indicators had 2,533 low ratings among 7,944 ratings. The governance, oversight, and control score relates these dependencies to the engagement's other controls. Written accounts of change discovered through failure add a specific detection concern, while adjusted associations remain conditional and less conclusive.

Among respondents who rated a third-party control 1 to 3, 73.41% to 80.41% had a score of 3 or below, the highest range of the five categories. Ratings of 4 to 7 still carried a score of 3 or below for 14.14% to 17.03% of respondents, and the upper end of that range was the highest of the 47 governance indicators. Each indicator was associated with governance in the other four failure categories at r = 0.75 to 0.78 (n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the partial r ran from −0.14 to −0.04, with none of the ten significant.

Written accounts of change discovered through failure occurred on 93 of the 150 engagements and included six of the 39 respondents above score 7. Respondent mean scores were not clearly different between those describing that pattern and those not describing it. Unannounced schema and format changes similarly showed no clearly detected mean contrast. These results preserve a specific detection concern across the observed score range, without demonstrating equal incidence. Table 3.12 reports the ten controls and two written patterns.

Table 3.12. The ten third-party ecosystem indicators and two written patterns against reported governance weakness across the engagement

Indicator	A score of 3 or below among respondents rating it 1 to 3	r with score excluding item (95% CI)	r with the other four categories	Adjusted partial r (p)	Negative written answers
Quality of Advance Notice From Third-Party Providers	192 of 250 (76.80%)	0.85 (0.80 to 0.89)	0.77	−0.09 (p = 0.277)	108 of 160
Delivery of Change Notices to the Operators of Affected Agents	188 of 255 (73.73%)	0.83 (0.78 to 0.88)	0.75	−0.11 (p = 0.168)	42 of 56
Protection of Agents From Silent Failure	186 of 249 (74.70%)	0.85 (0.80 to 0.89)	0.78	−0.06 (p = 0.457)	100 of 136
Monitoring for Unannounced Third-Party Change	188 of 251 (74.90%)	0.84 (0.79 to 0.88)	0.76	−0.12 (p = 0.136)	30 of 46

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Indicator	A score of 3 or below among respondents rating it 1 to 3	r with score excluding item (95% CI)	r with the other four categories	Adjusted partial r (p)	Negative written answers
Contractual Coverage of Disruptive Provider Change	199 of 256 (77.73%)	0.84 (0.79 to 0.88)	0.76	−0.07 (p = 0.406)	14 of 21
Security Posture of Third-Party Tools and Sub-Processors	192 of 251 (76.49%)	0.84 (0.78 to 0.88)	0.76	−0.14 (p = 0.083)	4 of 9
Management of Dependence on a Small Number of Model and Cloud Providers	199 of 257 (77.43%)	0.84 (0.79 to 0.88)	0.76	−0.04 (p = 0.646)	19 of 26
Replacement of Informal Human Fixes With Explicit Checks	201 of 267 (75.28%)	0.85 (0.80 to 0.89)	0.77	−0.11 (p = 0.183)	7 of 9
Mapping of Third- and Fourth-Party Dependencies	185 of 252 (73.41%)	0.84 (0.79 to 0.88)	0.76	−0.13 (p = 0.105)	35 of 44
Management of Dependence on Gated External Rails	197 of 245 (80.41%)	0.84 (0.78 to 0.88)	0.76	−0.08 (p = 0.333)	13 of 15
Change discovered only through failure	3.82 against 4.03 (describing against the rest)	−0.17 (engagement share)		−0.04 (p = 0.657)	157 answers
Schema or format changed without notice	3.70 against 4.01 (describing against the rest)	−0.16 (engagement share)		−0.06 (p = 0.478)	61 answers

Note: Rated controls use the score excluding the tested indicator for rating-band and item-to-score comparisons. Cross-category comparisons exclude the entire third-party category and use 150 engagements. Partial r accounts for the mean of the other 53 indicators, with nominal p values. Written-pattern contrasts compare respondents describing the pattern with those not describing it, rather than a verified nonincident group. Ordinary band tests do not account for engagement clustering.

“

On my last job the network sent a bulletin six weeks before a mandate change and you planned around it. Here we found out from a failed auth response. Same networks. The difference is nobody set up the notifications.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR

ITO, Payments, cards and disputes

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1 Notice of Provider Change

Provider notice and delivery of that notice to operators were associated with the wider score. They are separate control steps: a provider may communicate a change without the people running the affected agents receiving or acting on it. The written accounts place part of the notice problem within the engagement's own arrangements. This distinction gives operational meaning to the ratings beyond a simple measure of provider communication quality.

1.1 Quality of Advance Notice From Third-Party Providers

Indicator C181 · Rate the quality of advance notice third-party providers give before changes that can affect the agents on this engagement · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.4 · Full statistical analysis ›

Poor advance notice of provider change was associated with low scores. This places an external dependency inside the governance analysis: the financial institution and vendor need time to assess a change that can affect their agents. Notice quality is distinct from whether the message reaches operators and from whether the engagement acts on it. The indicator measures reported notice rather than every provider change event.

Figure 3.63. Quality of Advance Notice From Third-Party Providers: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Poor advance notice of provider change was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Of the 250 respondents who rated advance notice 1 to 3, 192 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 466 who rated it 4 to 7, 70 (15.02%) did, and none of the 85 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 328.36, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.64).

Advance notice was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.85$ (95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.77$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.09 ($p = 0.277$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.33 (n = 250), against 4.76 (n = 551) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.72$ and across the active stages at 0.73 in Build-Out, 0.69 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.78 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.82 among individual contributors, 0.77 among engagement managers, and 0.76 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 77.93% (166 of 213) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Advance notice drew 160 written answers from 159 respondents on 96 engagements, and 108 were negative, 53 from canceled and 55 from active engagements. Of the 108, 83 (76.85%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often change discovered only through failure (60) and schema or format changed without notice (41). Among the 52 answers that were not negative, several credited the providers with notice and placed the failure on the engagement's own side, where no person was assigned to read the notices that arrived.

> *“to be fair the screening provider does send notice when their list format change. nobody on our side is given the job of reading it, and so we find out when a batch fail. that part is not on them” - Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *“To be fair to the providers they do send the deprecation notices well in advance, we just had nobody free to action them. The bigger problem is half their systems only have a screen, no proper api, so the agent has to click like a person” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem, section 1.1) reports the association of advance notice with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.4) its association with manual alteration.

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1.2 Delivery of Change Notices to the Operators of Affected Agents

Indicator C182 · Rate how reliably word of an upcoming third-party change reaches the people who operate the affected agents in time to act · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.8 · Full statistical analysis ›

Failure to deliver change notices to affected operators was associated with low scores. This identifies a control step inside the engagement even when a third-party provider gives notice. Information must reach people who can assess the effect on agent work before the change takes effect. The finding separates the existence of communication from its timely operational use.

Figure 3.64. Delivery of Change Notices to the Operators of Affected Agents: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Failure to deliver change notices to affected operators was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Within canceled engagements, the correlation was 0.65, below its value in each active stage, at 0.78 in Build-Out, 0.70 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.74 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested.

Scores were 3 or below for 188 of 255 (73.73%) at indicator ratings 1–3. The corresponding counts were 78 of 467 (16.70%) at indicator ratings 4–7 and 0 of 76 (0.00%) at indicator ratings 8–10. The reported band results were chi-square = 283.34, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.60. The indicator was associated with the score computed without it at r = 0.83 (95% CI 0.78 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at r = 0.75, the lowest of the ten. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.11 (p = 0.168).

Within role the association stood at 0.79 among individual contributors, 0.80 among engagement managers, and 0.84 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 76.44% (159 of 208)

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of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.37 (n = 255), against 4.72 (n = 543) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The indicator drew 56 written answers from 55 respondents on 47 engagements, and 42 were negative, 22 from canceled and 20 from active engagements. Of the 42, 24 (57.14%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often change discovered only through failure (18). Respondents described notices that the providers sent and that never reached the team operating the agents, and a delivery team that learned of a change from its own logs.

> *"Last release the market data vendor changed a price field type and our pricing module threw errors all morning. notice was sent apparently, it just never reached my team, we found it from the logs ourself" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The API people are not the villains here. They publish their changes, it is our own side that never passes it down to the floor... not their fault." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem, section 1.2) reports the association of the delivery of notices with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.8) its association with manual alteration.

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2 Detection of Unannounced Change

Protection and monitoring were associated with the wider score, while written descriptions identified changes discovered only after failure. This brings detection into the governance question. Advance notice cannot account for changes that arrive without warning, so the engagement's ability to identify disruption remains a separate responsibility. The written comparisons do not establish that late discovery was equally prevalent across score levels.

2.1 Protection of Agents From Silent Failure

Indicator C178 · Rate how well the agents on this engagement are protected from breaking silently when a third party changes something without warning · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.5 · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak protection against silent breakage was associated with low scores. The governance issue is whether external change can disrupt agent work without timely detection. This differs from advance notice, because protection is still needed when providers do not warn the engagement. The rating concerns perceived protection and does not count all silent failures or establish their independently observed frequency.

Figure 3.65. Protection of Agents From Silent Failure: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak protection against silent breakage was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Of the 249 respondents who rated protection 1 to 3, 186 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 456 who rated it 4 to 7, 74 (16.23%) did, and none of the 76 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 289.95, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.61).

Protection was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.85$ (95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, $n = 150$ engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.78$, the highest of the ten. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.06 ($p = 0.457$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.40 ($n = 249$), against 4.76 ($n = 532$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.70$ and across the active stages at 0.74 to 0.77, and after Holm adjustment it held in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.82 among individual contributors, 0.81 among engagement managers, and 0.78 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 74.64% (156 of 209) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Protection drew 136 written answers from 134 respondents on 81 engagements, and 100 were negative, 50 from canceled and 50 from active engagements. Of the 100, 74 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, and 66 of them described change discovered only through failure. Respondents described provider releases over a weekend that left agents processing nothing, or processing wrongly, until a person noticed on the next working day.

> *"the ticketing tool pushed a new api version on a saturday. our agent kept closing change tickets that were never raised, and nobody noticed till monday cutover. the old release guy used to catch that by eye" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The OCR vendor pushed a version change over a weekend and no one told us... we found it Monday when half the scans came back with blank fields." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem, section 2.1) reports the association of protection with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.5) its association with manual alteration.

2.2 Monitoring for Unannounced Third-Party Change

Indicator C183 · Rate the engagement's monitoring for unannounced changes in the third-party APIs, data feeds, and models its agents depend on · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.12 · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak monitoring for unannounced provider change was associated with low scores. This control asks whether the engagement can detect changes in the interfaces, data feeds, and models on which agents

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depend. It extends oversight beyond a reliance on release notices. The adjusted model did not detect a clear separate cross-category association, while the written accounts supply context about how changes become visible.

Figure 3.66. Monitoring for Unannounced Third-Party Change: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak monitoring for unannounced provider change was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 251 respondents who rated monitoring 1 to 3, 188 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 465 who rated it 4 to 7, 75 (16.13%) did, and none of the 78 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 297.02, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.61).

Monitoring was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.84$ (95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.76$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.12 ($p = 0.136$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.40 (n = 251), against 4.72 (n = 543) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.69$ and across the active stages at 0.71 to 0.75, and after Holm adjustment it held in 84 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.81 among individual contributors, 0.76 among engagement managers, and 0.75 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 77.56% (159 of 205) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

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Forty-six respondents on 39 engagements wrote about monitoring, and 30 of the answers were negative, 12 from canceled and 18 from active engagements. Of the 30, 22 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, 21 of them change discovered only through failure. Respondents described no alarm on the third-party side, so that employees reported a failure before any system did. Where monitoring had been built, it caught a change within the hour and left the work it disrupted to be done manually.

> *"Ask anyone here, the third party side has no alarm on it, we find out when the bot start failing, employees tell us before any system do" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Our transcription provider changed its speaker labelling format in June without telling anyone, and our own monitoring caught it inside forty minutes, which is why this block scores well from me. What ratings do not show is what came after, two analysts labelled calls by hand for a day and a half while mapping was corrected, and if volume had been three times larger we simply could not have done it. Monitoring here is genuinely strong, contracts with these providers are much weaker, none of them owes us notice of anything." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem, section 2.2) reports the association of monitoring with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.12) its association with manual alteration.

2.3 Changes Discovered Only Through Failure

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 157 answers from 150 respondents on 93 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.7

Discovering provider change through failure was reported across a range of scores. Detection only after disruption leaves the engagement responding after a provider change has affected operations. Its written reach and the score comparisons describe different questions, so the number of engagements mentioning the pattern cannot establish its full incidence. The lack of a clear adjusted association does not make late discovery an adequate control arrangement.

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Figure 3.67. Changes Discovered Only Through Failure: descriptive mean score comparison.

Discovering provider change through failure was reported across a range of scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 150 respondents who described it stood at 3.82 and the other 700 at 4.03 (cluster-robust p = 0.207). Among individual contributors alone, the 113 who described it stood at 3.73 against 3.89 among the other 554 (cluster-robust p = 0.369).

At the engagement level, the share of respondents describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.17 (p = 0.042, n = 150 engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the association fell to partial r = −0.04 (p = 0.657). The adjusted comparison did not detect a clear association beyond the comparison mean.

The pattern reached every numeric score band. It was described by 20.14% (57 of 283) of respondents at 3 or below, 16.48% (87 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 6 of the 39 above 7. It was described by 15.43% of respondents in Build-Out, 14.80% in Transition/Cut-Over, 13.59% in Production, and 22.36% on canceled engagements, and by 22.42% in the lowest indicator quintile against 17.50% in the highest. Individual contributors described it at 16.94% (113 of 667), engagement managers at 20.67% (31 of 150), and portfolio directors at 6 of 31, with no clearly detected difference by role after Holm adjustment. No segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 157 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 76 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 counts 26 answers from 25 respondents on 22 engagements for the same pattern, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone, so the two counts rest on

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different bases. Respondents described runs that failed on a Monday after a weekend release and queues that went quiet. On the highest-scoring engagement of the study, a respondent reported that the providers' change notes arrived by email and went unread until something broke.

> *"The rate limit is the thing people complain about but it is not really the providers fault, we send the whole book in one go at month end instead of spreading it, any provider will throttle that. Their change notes come by email every release also, we simply do not read them until something break. On the licence question i put 7 but that is because nobody has asked them yet, not because they refused" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"On my previous account the feed providers sent change notices weeks ahead. Here we normally find out because a tick handler has already stopped" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.7) analyzes the pattern as a factor in manual alteration.

2.4 Schema and Format Changes Without Notice

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 61 answers from 60 respondents on 51 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.6

Unannounced schema and format changes were described without a clearly detected difference in respondent mean scores. This identifies a specific external-change problem that a broad composite may not sharply distinguish. The governance question concerns preparation for changes to the structure agents expect, separate from general provider notice. The evidence remains a set of written descriptions, with no verified nonincident group among those who did not mention it.

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Figure 3.68. Schema and Format Changes Without Notice: descriptive mean score comparison.

Unannounced schema and format changes were described without a clearly detected difference in respondent mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 60 respondents who described it stood at 3.70 and the other 790 at 4.01 (cluster-robust p = 0.187). Among individual contributors alone, the 51 who described it stood at 3.72 against 3.88 among the other 616 (cluster-robust p = 0.554).

At the engagement level, the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.16 (p = 0.045, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the association fell to partial r = −0.06 (p = 0.478).

The pattern was described by 8.13% (23 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 6.63% (35 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 2 of the 39 above 7. It was described by 5.71% of respondents in Build-Out, 5.20% in Transition/Cut-Over, 6.80% in Production, and 9.32% on canceled engagements, and by 8.48% in the lowest indicator quintile against 6.25% in the highest. Individual contributors described it at 7.65% (51 of 667), engagement managers at 4.00% (6 of 150), and portfolio directors at 3 of 31, with no clearly detected difference by role after Holm adjustment. No segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 61 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 31 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 counts 27 answers from 26 respondents on 24 engagements, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone, so the two counts rest on different bases. Respondents described a renamed column, a changed date format, or an inserted field that failed every downstream mapping at once and surfaced only at reconciliation.

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> *"Fund administrator change their file layout in June, no notice given. We found it when reconciliation failed... Nobody monitor for this, we just see it break." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"supplier risk feed changed the date format one week... nobody tell us anything. agents dropped every record and i only notice because count was too low. no email, no note, we find out ourselves" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.6) analyzes the pattern as a factor in manual alteration.

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3 Contractual and Licensing Coverage of Agent Work

Contractual coverage of disruptive provider change was associated with the wider score. This addresses a formal boundary over external dependency, while the notice and monitoring indicators address operation. The adjusted association was not clearly detected. The findings should distinguish reported contract coverage from evidence that contractual terms delivered effective operational protection.

3.1 Contractual Coverage of Disruptive Provider Change

Indicator C184 · Rate how well the contracts with third-party providers deal with provider changes that can break the agents on this engagement · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.9 · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak contractual coverage of disruptive provider change was associated with low scores. Contracts define an external responsibility boundary, but their reported coverage does not by itself show that operational notice, monitoring, or response works. The relatively higher mean rating and the large low-score share among low indicator ratings concern different quantities. Both should inform a restrained assessment of contractual control.

Figure 3.69. Contractual Coverage of Disruptive Provider Change: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak contractual coverage of disruptive provider change was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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The mean rating stood at 4.66, level with the reliability of guardrails. Of the 256 respondents who rated contractual coverage 1 to 3, 199 had a score of 3 or below, the second-highest share of the ten. Among the 463 who rated it 4 to 7, 71 (15.33%) did, and none of the 80 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 332.27, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.64).

Contractual coverage was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.84$ (95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, $n = 150$ engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.76$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.07 ($p = 0.406$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.27 ($n = 256$), against 4.77 ($n = 543$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.71$ and across the active stages at 0.71 to 0.76, and after Holm adjustment it held in all 86 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.82 among individual contributors, 0.78 among engagement managers, and 0.70 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 78.87% (168 of 213) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Twenty-one respondents on 21 engagements wrote about contracts, and 14 of the answers were negative, 6 from canceled and 8 from active engagements. Four of the 14 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. Respondents described a delivery team that held no contract with the providers its agents depended on, and contract terms that did not oblige a provider to give notice of change.

> *“We do not hold the contract with the HR feed provider, that is the part a score cannot show. Their directory sync breaks, leavers stay active, and all we can do is tell the bank and wait.” - Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“Dependencies are the source control platform, the artefact registry, the ticketing system and one model provider. Licensing was checked at contract stage and covers agent use, so no exposure there. Contract terms with the registry vendor do not oblige them to notify us of API changes. There is no fallback registry configured. If it goes down, releases stop until it returns; we have not tested how long that would take. Nothing to add on the rest.” -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem, section 4.1) reports the association of contractual coverage with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.9) its association with manual alteration.

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4 Security Posture and Provider Concentration

Third-party security posture and provider concentration were associated with the wider score. They concern different exposures: the condition of participating services and dependence on a limited set of providers. The written base is smaller than the rating base. Security posture concerns the condition of participating services, while concentration concerns the resilience of dependence on a limited set of providers. Comment counts do not measure their relative importance.

4.1 Security Posture of Third-Party Tools and Sub-Processors

Indicator C180 · Rate the security posture of the third-party tools, platforms, and sub-processors the engagement's agents connect to · Full statistical analysis ›

Poor reported security posture of third-party tools and sub-processors was associated with low scores. The indicator extends governance to parties whose systems or services participate in the agent workflow. Its written evidence is small and cannot establish the extent of security exposure. The stronger quantitative base remains respondents' ratings, which should not be represented as an independent security assessment.

Figure 3.70. Security Posture of Third-Party Tools and Sub-Processors: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Poor reported security posture of third-party tools and sub-processors was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Of the 251 respondents who rated security posture 1 to 3, 192 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 462 who rated it 4 to 7, 74 (16.02%) did, and none of the 75 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 308.25, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.63).

Security posture was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.84$ (95% CI 0.78 to 0.88, $n = 150$ engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.76$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.14 and was not significant ($p = 0.083$), the most negative of the ten. Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.35 ($n = 251$), against 4.72 ($n = 537$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.73$, the strongest of the ten, and across the active stages at 0.69 to 0.76. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in all 86 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.81 among individual contributors and 0.80 among engagement managers and portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 76.67% (161 of 210) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Nine respondents on 8 engagements wrote about security posture, and four of the answers were negative. Three of the four described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, two of them problems raised with no response. The answers described a provider login shared by a whole team with no record of who used it, and a security review that stopped at the first layer of suppliers. An individual contributor added that the list of dependencies requested in the first month had never been written.

> *“Truthfully nobody sat down and wrote a list of what we depend on. I asked for it in month one and there is still no list. That is not really a third party fault though, they publish their notes, the problem is on our end that nobody reads them or tells us. The card scheme side actually gave notice about the sandbox refresh, it was in an email somewhere, only it went to a person who left. So I would not say the providers are bad. The security posture of the smaller tools we plugged in, that one I do worry about, we connected two or three things without anyone checking them properly and I raised it and got no answer. Also the licences, I do not think anyone thought about an agent making calls instead of a person, that came up when the quota looked strange and we had to discuss about it for days. But to be fair to everyone this account was only three months and half the access never came through, so there was never a moment where somebody could stop and map it all out. You cannot map what you have not been given. I think if we had another six months it would have been fine, or at least better... hard to say now.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem, section 6.1) reports the association of security posture with the four study measures.

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4.2 Management of Dependence on a Small Number of Model and Cloud Providers

Indicator C193 · Rate how well the engagement manages its dependence on a small number of model and cloud providers · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak management of dependence on a small number of model and cloud providers was associated with low scores. This concerns concentration of operational dependency, distinct from knowing which providers exist in the chain. The control question is whether that dependence is managed within the engagement's governance arrangements. The findings do not establish the probability or consequences of a provider disruption.

Figure 3.71. Management of Dependence on a Small Number of Model and Cloud Providers: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak management of dependence on a small number of model and cloud providers was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 257 respondents who rated the management of concentration 1 to 3, 199 had a score of 3 or below, the third-highest share of the ten. Among the 474 who rated it 4 to 7, 67 (14.14%) did, the lowest such share of the ten, and none of the 71 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 339.86, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.65).

The indicator was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.84$ (95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.76$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.04 ($p = 0.646$), the nearest to zero of the ten. Respondents

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who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.32 (n = 257), against 4.78 (n = 545) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.72$ and ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.73 in Build-Out to 0.77 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.81 among individual contributors and engagement managers and 0.80 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 77.83% (165 of 212) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Twenty-six respondents on 24 engagements wrote about provider concentration, and 19 of the answers were negative, 7 from canceled and 12 from active engagements. Four of the 19 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. Respondents described a single model provider with no second path, and a retirement notice that the engagement detected in time and could not act on.

> *"Only real worry is we are on one cloud provider for everything, if that region goes we have nothing, rest of the feeds have been steady enough" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"When our model provider retired a version this spring, we had thirty days' notice and the reclassification of the client's scanned document types had to be revalidated inside it. Nothing broke, but we have one provider and no second path if that window ever gets shorter." -Portfolio Director, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem, section 6.2) reports the association of the management of concentration with the four study measures.

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5 Fallback Capacity and Retention of Operational Knowledge

Converting informal human fixes into explicit checks was associated with the wider score. This connects operational knowledge with the visibility and repeatability of control after agent work is introduced. The separately coded habit pattern was not clearly associated with the rating. That result qualifies the measurement relationship without demonstrating that personal knowledge or fallback arrangements were adequate.

5.1 Replacement of Informal Human Fixes With Explicit Checks

Indicator C192 · Rate how deliberately the quiet human fixes for third-party quirks were replaced with explicit checks when agents took over the work · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.16 · Full statistical analysis ›

Failure to convert informal human fixes into explicit checks was associated with low scores. The indicator concerns whether knowledge previously carried by people becomes a visible and repeatable part of agent-era control. The separately coded habit pattern was not clearly associated with the rating. That comparison raises a measurement and interpretation question but does not formally demonstrate that the indicator cannot detect the practice.

Figure 3.72. Replacement of Informal Human Fixes With Explicit Checks: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Failure to convert informal human fixes into explicit checks was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Of the 267 respondents who rated the replacement of informal fixes 1 to 3, 201 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 459 who rated it 4 to 7, 68 (14.81%) did, and none of the 70 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 315.03, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.63).

The indicator was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.85$ (95% CI 0.80 to 0.89, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.77$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.11 ($p = 0.183$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.37 (n = 267), against 4.76 (n = 529) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.72$ and ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.70 in Build-Out to 0.81 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.82 among individual contributors, 0.80 among engagement managers, and 0.76 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 78.34% (170 of 217) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Habit in place of a control did not follow the rating. It was described by 10.11% (27 of 267) of respondents who rated the replacement of informal fixes 1 to 3, 10.24% (47 of 459) of those who rated it 4 to 7, and 14.29% (10 of 70) of those who rated it 8 to 10 (chi-square $p = 0.567$). Informal fixes persisted as habit on engagements where respondents judged them to have been replaced.

Nine respondents on 9 engagements wrote about informal fixes, and 7 of the answers were negative. Four of the 7 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, two of them habit in place of a control. Respondents described manual checks that had never been written down when the agents took over, and an engagement manager observed that payroll corrections had lived in one supervisor's memory for eleven years.

> *“directory sync and the ticketing api have been steady, no complaint from me. one thing not asked, the small manual checks we used to do on stale accounts is not written anywhere, so when agent take over that step nobody know it existed” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“The question about where people used to quietly fix things assumes somebody wrote it down. Nobody did. Payroll deduction corrections lived in one supervisors head for eleven years. You cant score that from one to ten. You can only find out after she leaves.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem, section 7.4) reports the association of the indicator with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.16) its association with manual alteration.

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6 The Dependency Chain and Gated External Rails

Dependency mapping and management of gated external rails were associated with the wider score. Mapping concerns knowledge of the full chain, while gated rails concern constraints imposed by systems such as payment networks and regulatory submissions. The distinction matters for governance because knowing a dependency does not establish authority to change it. Conditional percentage rankings do not measure the comparative importance of those responsibilities.

6.1 Mapping of Third- and Fourth-Party Dependencies

Indicator C196 · Rate how completely the engagement has mapped every third and fourth party its agents depend on, down the full chain · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.13 · Full statistical analysis ›

Incomplete mapping of third- and fourth-party dependencies was associated with low scores. Oversight requires visibility through the full chain of services on which agents depend. Mapping is a condition for understanding the chain, distinct from the ability to control every party within it. The adjusted comparison did not detect a clear separate association, and the conditional percentage ranking does not establish relative control importance.

Figure 3.73. Mapping of Third- and Fourth-Party Dependencies: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Incomplete mapping of third- and fourth-party dependencies was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Of the 252 respondents who rated dependency mapping 1 to 3, 185 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 464 who rated it 4 to 7, 79 (17.03%) did, the highest share at those ratings of the 47 governance indicators, and none of the 75 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 275.01, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.59).

Dependency mapping was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.84$ (95% CI 0.79 to 0.88, n = 150 engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.76$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.13 ($p = 0.105$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.43 (n = 252), against 4.72 (n = 539) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.66$ and ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.71 in Build-Out to 0.78 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.81 among individual contributors and 0.78 among engagement managers and portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 76.59% (157 of 205) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Forty-four respondents on 37 engagements wrote about dependency mapping, and 35 of the answers were negative, 21 from canceled and 14 from active engagements. Of the 35, 13 described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often change discovered only through failure (7). Respondents described engagements that knew their direct providers and no list beyond the first tier, including engagements where contracts had been tightened and the map had not been drawn.

> *“Two months in, contracts with the market data providers have been reviewed and they now carry notice terms for interface changes, we did not have that at kickoff. What has not been done is the dependency map. We know our direct providers, we dont know who sits behind them, and nobody has looked at whether our licences cover machine users at all.” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“The full list of our dependencies has never been written down. I know our own test tools and the model behind them, but under that there are libraries and one data service the client environment calls, and I could not tell you who owns those. Last month a licence expired on a plug-in and the whole nightly run failed, nobody knew until morning.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem, section 8.1) reports the association of dependency mapping with the four study measures, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 7.13) its association with manual alteration.

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6.2 Management of Dependence on Gated External Rails

Indicator C197 · Rate how well the engagement manages agent dependence on gated external rails such as payment networks and regulatory submission systems · Full statistical analysis ›

Weak management of dependence on gated external rails was associated with low scores. Payment networks and regulatory submission systems can impose boundaries that the two firms cannot change through internal agent design. The governance question is how the engagement recognizes and manages those constraints. A large low-score share among low ratings is a descriptive association, not a validated measure of diagnostic reliability.

Figure 3.74. Management of Dependence on Gated External Rails: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Weak management of dependence on gated external rails was associated with low scores.



Note: The score excludes this indicator. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the 245 respondents who rated the management of gated rails 1 to 3, 197 had a score of 3 or below. Among the 471 who rated it 4 to 7, 71 (15.07%) did, and none of the 78 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 351.73, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.67).

The indicator was associated with the score computed without it at $r = 0.84$ (95% CI 0.78 to 0.88, $n = 150$ engagements) and with governance in the other four categories at $r = 0.76$. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.08 ($p = 0.333$). Respondents who rated it distressed recorded a score of 2.27 ($n = 245$), against 4.76 ($n = 549$) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

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The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.69 and across the active stages at 0.79 in Build-Out, 0.72 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.78 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 86 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.82 among individual contributors, 0.78 among engagement managers, and 0.71 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 81.68% (165 of 202) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below, the highest such share of the 47.

Fourteen respondents on 12 engagements wrote 15 answers about gated rails, and 13 were negative, 8 from canceled and 5 from active engagements. Two of the 13 described problems raised with no response. Respondents described certification and filing portals built for a person holding a token, a matching utility that opened twice a day, and engagements where notice from the providers had improved while access to the rails had not.

> *“My low marks are really about matching utility... it opens for us twice a day only, and if we miss window there is nothing else, whole batch waits till tomorrow” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“Weakest point here is that some of what our agents must touch is still a screen designed for a person, particularly on the network side, and that is the one place I marked down. But I would not lay that at the provider's door as a failing. Card networks carry twenty years of member banks built around those screens, and an interface change there is not a release, it is a migration for several thousand institutions. They have given us honest notice of every change that mattered so far, in one case three months of it, which is more than we manage internally between our own teams. The fragility people speak about in this area is mostly ours, not theirs. We built agents on top of somebody else's roadmap and then treat the roadmap as a risk. I would rather we planned for their calendar than complained about it.” -Portfolio Director, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 2 (Third-Party Ecosystem, section 8.2) reports the association of the management of gated rails with the four study measures.

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Understanding Governing Obligations and the Control Environment

Reported understanding and discussion of governing obligations were associated with higher governance, oversight, and control scores. Merely naming a law did not clearly distinguish the score, and training's adjusted association was sensitive to the comparison measure. These findings separate recognition of an obligation, perceived understanding, operational discussion, and preparation to apply it. They concern reported knowledge and practice, without an independent test of legal compliance.

The respondent's own understanding of the obligations retained an association with the score after adjustment for the comparison mean outside it at partial r = 0.27, management's understanding at 0.25, and the financial institution's discussion of the obligations at 0.20. Regulatory training had a negative adjusted coefficient of −0.35 that changed sign when the vendor capability items were omitted from the comparison mean. Respondents who named at least one governing law or regulation recorded a score of 4.06 (n = 548), against 3.90 among the 247 who answered that they did not know. Written references to a regulation, a regulator, or an audit obligation were rare, at 16 answers from 14 respondents on 12 engagements. Table 3.13 sets out the four rated items by rating band.

Table 3.13. The score by rating of the four items on the governing obligations

Regulatory item	Mean rating (n)	Distressed ratings	The score, rating 1 to 3 (n)	Rating 4 to 7 (n)	Rating 8 to 10 (n)	r with the score
Respondent understanding of the obligations	4.81 (800)	228 of 800 (28.50%)	2.41 (228)	4.31 (484)	6.21 (88)	0.76
Management understanding of the obligations	4.93 (516)	149 of 516 (28.88%)	2.42 (149)	4.40 (297)	6.16 (70)	0.71
Discussion of the obligations by the financial institution's team	4.78 (801)	231 of 801 (28.84%)	2.39 (231)	4.35 (481)	6.23 (89)	0.79
Regulatory training	3.58 (798)	385 of 798 (48.25%)	2.74 (385)	5.03 (402)	7.12 (11)	0.81

Note: The fifth item, the laws and regulations respondents named as governing the engagement, is a written answer and carries no rating. Respondents who named at least one law or regulation recorded a score of 4.06 (n = 548), against 3.90 among the 247 who answered I do not know. The 265 respondents who answered I do not know on management understanding are excluded from its bands. Regulatory items are not among the 47 governance indicators. The score is computed in full. These items measure reported understanding, discussion, and training, not independently established compliance. Ordinary respondent-level band-test p values do not account for engagement clustering. Adjusted-correlation p values are nominal.

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1 Knowledge of the Governing Obligations

The obligations items distinguish recognition, understanding, and reported exposure. Self-assessed understanding was associated with the score, whereas naming a law did not clearly distinguish it. The few written exposure accounts came from lower-scoring respondents. Together these findings connect knowledge with the reported control environment while limiting any inference that a named obligation or favorable understanding rating establishes compliance.

1.1 Governing Laws and Regulations Named by Respondents

Item C056 · The laws and regulations that govern the engagement, named in writing · 548 of 795 respondents named at least one

Naming a governing law or regulation did not clearly distinguish the reported control environment. The ability to name an obligation is different from understanding its operational implications or applying an effective control. The role pattern is also material, because all respondents answering that they did not know were individual contributors. The result does not establish equivalent legal knowledge or compliance among the groups.

Figure 3.75. The score of respondents who named a governing law or regulation and of those who did not know

Naming a governing law or regulation did not clearly distinguish the reported control environment.



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Of the 795 respondents who answered, 548 (68.93%) named at least one law or regulation, on all 150 engagements. They recorded a score of 4.06, against 3.90 among the 247 who answered that they did not know (cluster-robust p = 0.198).

At the engagement level, the share naming a law was associated with the score at r = 0.07 (p = 0.403, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the partial r was 0.00 (p = 0.983).

The difference that existed lay in role. All 150 engagement managers, all 29 portfolio directors who answered, and the one customer management executive who answered named a law, while 368 of the 615 individual contributors did, so every answer of I do not know came from an individual contributor. Among individual contributors alone, those who named a law recorded a score of 3.87, against 3.90 among those who did not (cluster-robust p = 0.836). The share naming a law moved within a narrow range across the indicator quintiles, from 97 of 153 respondents in the lowest to 109 of 158 in the highest, and across engagement status, from 117 of 164 respondents in Build-Out to 197 of 297 on canceled engagements.

Knowledge of the governing law sat beside failed controls in the written answers. An individual contributor on a regulatory return described entity codes that arrived inconsistent from two systems and were normalized by the delivery team without anyone asking.

> *"Happens most weeks, i do not always discuss about it with lead, just fix and revert back if they ask. And to be fair nobody has ever asked. The regulatory return data comes across with the entity codes inconsistent between the two systems they extract from, and if you load it straight the aggregation is wrong at the entity level. Which for a regulatory return is not a small thing. So we normalise it first. We have been normalising it first since the second month of the engagement. It is in nobody's process document. I have assumed my lead has passed it up because he is diligent about that sort of thing, though i do not actually know. What i do know is the returns that go out are right, and they are right because somebody here noticed the codes did not line up. Also if that person moves on, the next person may not notice, and the return would still go out, just wrong. That is the thing that i think about occasionally. Not the work itself, the work is fine, it is more that the" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

1.2 Respondent Understanding of the Governing Obligations

Survey item C057 · I fully understand how these laws, regulations, and similar affect the outsourcing engagement · Rated item analyzed only in Part 3

Greater self-reported understanding of governing obligations was associated with higher scores, including under the main adjustment. This connects awareness of the obligations with the reported control environment rather than treating a named law as evidence of governance. The measure remains

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a self-assessment. It does not independently test knowledge or demonstrate that the engagement complied with the obligations respondents had in mind.

Figure 3.76. Respondent Understanding of the Governing Obligations: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Greater self-reported understanding of governing obligations was associated with higher scores, including under the main adjustment.



Note: The score uses all 47 governance indicators. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Understanding was associated with the score at r = 0.76 (95% CI 0.68 to 0.82, n = 150 engagements), and after that adjustment the association remained at partial r = 0.27 ($p < 0.001$), the strongest positive adjusted association of the four rated items.

Respondents who rated their understanding distressed recorded a score of 2.41 (n = 228), against 4.60 (n = 572) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Of the 228, 168 (73.68%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 484 who rated their understanding 4 to 7, 101 (20.87%) did, and none of the 88 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 243.81, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.55).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.61 and across the active stages at 0.64 to 0.71, and after Holm adjustment it held in 84 of the 86 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.75 among individual contributors, 0.73 among engagement managers, and 0.66 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 73.44% (141 of 192) of those who rated their understanding 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Eight respondents on 6 engagements wrote about their understanding of the obligations, and only one of the answers was negative. Six of the seven favorable answers came from canceled engagements and

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named regulatory understanding among what the respondent took from an engagement that failed. One individual contributor on a canceled engagement listed the regulatory accountability question, learned in depth, among what the engagement had given.

1.3 Management Understanding of the Governing Obligations

Survey item C058 · My management team fully understands these laws, regulations, and similar, and how they affect the engagement · Rated item analyzed only in Part 3

Respondents' assessments of management understanding were associated with the score, while many respondents could not provide a numeric assessment. This distinguishes management's reported knowledge from the workforce's visibility into that knowledge. Unknown answers identify uncertainty about management understanding and are excluded from the numeric rating comparison. They do not establish that management had low knowledge.

Figure 3.77. Management Understanding of the Governing Obligations: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Respondents' assessments of management understanding were associated with the score, while many respondents could not provide a numeric assessment.



Note: The score uses all 47 governance indicators. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Of the respondents who answered, 265 answered that they did not know, and they recorded a score of 3.83. Among the respondents who gave a rating, management's understanding was associated with the score at r = 0.71 (95% CI 0.62 to 0.78, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the association remained at partial r = 0.25 (p = 0.002).

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Respondents who rated management's understanding distressed recorded a score of 2.42 (n = 149), against 4.73 (n = 367) among the rest (cluster-robust p < 0.001). Of the 149, 113 (75.84%) had a score of 3 or below, the highest such share of the four items. Among the 297 who rated it 4 to 7, 54 (18.18%) did, and none of the 70 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 189.44, p < 0.001, Cramér's V = 0.61).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.63 and across the active stages at 0.66 to 0.69, and after Holm adjustment it held in 81 of the 84 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.74 among individual contributors, 0.75 among engagement managers, and 0.71 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 79.09% (87 of 110) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

No written answer addressed management's understanding of the obligations, and 265 respondents could not rate it, so the study holds no testimony on how management came to understand the obligations or failed to.

1.4 Regulatory or Compliance Exposure Reported by Respondents

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 16 answers from 14 respondents on 12 engagements · Counted in Part 5, Experience, Pressure and Intent of the Delivery Workforce, section 10.2

The small group describing regulatory or compliance exposure had lower mean scores. These accounts connect perceived exposure with the control environment, but they do not establish a legal breach or an exposure rate for the study population. The engagement-level association was not clearly detected. The appropriate interpretation preserves the concern described and the limits of the small written base.

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Figure 3.78. Regulatory or Compliance Exposure Reported by Respondents: descriptive mean score comparison.

The small group describing regulatory or compliance exposure had lower mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

Mean scores were 2.83 for the 14 respondents describing exposure and 4.01 for the other 836 (cluster-robust p = 0.005). Among individual contributors alone, the 10 who described exposure stood at 2.65, against 3.88 among the other 657 (cluster-robust p = 0.008).

At the engagement level, the share describing exposure was associated with the score at r = −0.14 (p = 0.099, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the partial r was −0.08 (p = 0.309). The 12 engagements were too few for the exposure to separate engagements by their governance.

Exposure was described by 8 of the 283 respondents with a score of 3 or below, 6 of the 528 above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It appeared on canceled engagements and in every stage except Transition/Cut-Over, and it reached 10 of the 667 individual contributors and 4 of the 150 engagement managers, with no clearly detected difference by role after Holm adjustment. No segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 16 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 9 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 counts 20 answers on 14 engagements that referred to a regulation, a regulator, or an audit obligation, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone, so the two counts rest on different bases. Respondents described a regulatory deadline that would not wait

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for a rerun, a tool that misquoted regulatory guidance to a borrower in hardship, and compliance reports that cleared a non-compliant letter.

> *"The vendor rolled the non-compliant investor letter into a monthly 'draft accuracy' composite score that averaged it against hundreds of routine internal messages, so the single high-risk failure barely moved the number the client saw." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"the problem is same case, same data, different result next run, so i correct it manually before it goes to QA, this happen more than i like to admit on dispute side, you rerun same chargeback case and get different recommendation back, no warning, no explanation, and dispute case cannot have mistake in it because Reg E deadline does not care that model changed its mind, so i sit there and go through informations again myself before submitting, i raise it with my lead every time truthfully, we dont log it separate though, its just treated as part of normal QA now, feels like nobody upstream really want to hear about it anymore, i said it enough time already, card network side is no better, evidence file come in miscoded half the time and we wait weeks for any answer while deadline get closer and closer, so between that and model flipping on same case i end up doing double work most day, im tired of explaining same problem over and over to be honest, feedbacks from client escalation channel is slow too so even when we do flag something upstream nothing move fast, i just check output twice now before i trust it and if the two run disagree i take whichever one match what i already know about the case, its not ideal but dispute deadline dont move for anyone so" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 5 (Experience, Pressure and Intent of the Delivery Workforce, section 10.2) reports the regulatory references in the answers on manual alteration.

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2 Discussion and Training on the Governing Obligations

Discussion and training concern how obligations enter day-to-day governance. Reported discussion by the financial institution was positively associated with the score under the main adjustment. Training effectiveness showed a more model-dependent result. Their distinct patterns support separate treatment of communication and preparation, rather than a single conclusion about legal awareness.

2.1 Discussion of the Obligations by the Financial Institution's Team

Survey item C059 · The customer's team actively discusses these laws, regulations, and similar with our team · Rated item analyzed only in Part 3

More active discussion of governing obligations by the financial institution's team was associated with higher scores. The indicator concerns whether obligations enter the joint operational conversation, beyond whether respondents can name or understand them individually. The positive adjusted estimate supports a conditional association with the control environment. Discussion itself remains distinct from evidence that the required controls were implemented effectively.

Figure 3.79. Discussion of the Obligations by the Financial Institution's Team: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

More active discussion of governing obligations by the financial institution's team was associated with higher scores.



Note: The score uses all 47 governance indicators. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

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Discussion was associated with the score at r = 0.79 (95% CI 0.72 to 0.84, n = 150 engagements), and after that adjustment the association remained at partial r = 0.20 (p = 0.017).

Respondents who rated the financial institution's discussion distressed recorded a score of 2.39 (n = 231), against 4.64 (n = 570) among the rest (cluster-robust p < 0.001). Of the 231, 168 (72.73%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 481 who rated it 4 to 7, 100 (20.79%) did, and none of the 89 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 239.42, p < 0.001, Cramér's V = 0.55).

The association held after Holm adjustment in all 85 segment levels tested, the only one of the four items to do so. It held within the canceled engagements at r = 0.65 and across the active stages at 0.67 to 0.71. Within role it stood at 0.78 among individual contributors and 0.74 among engagement managers and fell to 0.53 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 75.38% (147 of 195) of those who rated it 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

No written answer addressed the financial institution's discussion of the obligations directly. An engagement manager on a canceled regulatory engagement reported that the financial institution's compliance staff answered every call, while the delivery team could not learn which of three regional versions of the control the work was to follow.

> *“i felt for their compliance people to be candid. They answered every time we called. The problem was that surveillance runs three different ways in three regions over there and nobody could tell us which one we were supposed to build to.” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

2.2 Regulatory Training

Survey item C060 · The training available to me effectively teaches me about these laws, regulations, and similar · Rated item analyzed only in Part 3

Reported effectiveness of regulatory training was associated with the wider score, but its adjusted coefficient was sensitive to the comparison measure. Training concerns whether the workforce is equipped to apply the obligations to its work. Its negative coefficient in the main adjusted model should not be read as training worsening governance. The category-removal result limits that interpretation and leaves effectiveness as a reported assessment.

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Figure 3.80. Regulatory Training: observed association and adjustment sensitivity.

Reported effectiveness of regulatory training was associated with the wider score, but its adjusted coefficient was sensitive to the comparison measure.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

Correlations use 150 engagements. The alternative mean removes the stated category items. Estimates are descriptive model comparisons, with nominal inference in the text.

Training was distressed for 48.25% of the respondents who rated it, against 28.50% to 28.88% for the other three rated items.

Training was associated with the score at r = 0.81 (95% CI 0.74 to 0.86, n = 150 engagements), the highest of the four items. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the partial r was −0.35 ($p < 0.001$). The result stayed inverse when the financial institution readiness block was omitted from the comparison mean (−0.25, $p = 0.002$), when the AI technology block left it (−0.30, $p < 0.001$), and when the third-party block left it (−0.24, $p = 0.004$). It reversed to 0.10 ($p = 0.232$) when the vendor capability block was omitted from the comparison mean.

Respondents who rated training distressed recorded a score of 2.74 (n = 385), against 5.09 (n = 413) among the rest (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Of the 385, 244 (63.38%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 402 who rated training 4 to 7, 28 (6.97%) did, and none of the 11 who rated it 8 to 10 did (Monte Carlo chi-square = 284.31, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.60).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.72 and ranged across the active-stage groups from 0.67 in Build-Out to 0.80 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85

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of the 86 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.80 among individual contributors, 0.77 among engagement managers, and 0.64 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 65.59% (204 of 311) of those who rated training 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

Five respondents on 5 engagements wrote about regulatory training, and all five answers were negative. None described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. The answers described individual contributors placed on regulated work without training in its rules, who learned sanctions lists, suitability rules, and returns from colleagues or from the financial institution's own manuals.

> *“What they gave us for training was two weeks of generic e-learning and nothing on sanctions or aml typologies at all. i came in not knowing what a structuring pattern looks like and i learned it from the analyst sitting next to me. kindly note this is the whole reason my numbers here are low. everything else i can live with” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *“To be fair the hands on agent training was useful, I use it daily. The regulatory side they could not teach us, we learn that from the client's returns” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

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The Fit Between Governance Processes and the Pace of Agent Work

Reported mismatches between control processes and the pace of agent work were associated with the governance, oversight, and control score in different ways. Forums and change-control cycles showed negative adjusted engagement relationships, while several other timing or capacity patterns did not. The common substantive concern is fit: authority, review, and evidence must operate on the work's timescale. The variation in results requires an account of each mechanism and its limits.

The written accounts describe five broad explanations: slow response by the firms, processes inherited from people-based work, limited experience with agentic AI, output volume and change frequency, and variable output with inadequate evidence. These are respondent explanations rather than identified causes. Each gathers distinct patterns. Their analysis compares respondent scores and relates the engagement share describing a pattern to the engagement score, before and after adjustment. Conditional source populations are stated separately.

Monthly governance forums and change frequency had negative adjusted engagement associations within the process-answer base (partial r = −0.29 and −0.38, n = 133). Their raw associations and conditional respondent contrasts were much less pronounced. Other accounts identified handoff, acceptance, review, documentation, and knowledge gaps, with different or nonsignificant score relationships. This variation limits a single statistical explanation based on pace. It also shows why each reported mechanism requires its own interpretation alongside the broader score.

Monthly forums, reliance on a person noticing errors, and excessive change frequency were classified within answers on manual alteration of processes. Their principal comparisons use the 516 respondents answering that question and the 133 engagements with an answer. Other patterns retain their specified written-answer sources. Table 3.14 reports each pattern's base, respondent comparison, and unadjusted and adjusted engagement association, including null findings.

Table 3.14. The written patterns under the five reasons against the score

Reason and written pattern	Base	Answers, respondents, engagements	The score, describing against the rest (p)	Engagement r (n)	Adjusted partial r (p)
Slow Response From the Vendor and the Financial Institution					

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Reason and written pattern	Base	Answers, respondents, engagements	The score, describing against the rest (p)	Engagement r (n)	Adjusted partial r (p)
Governance Forums Meeting Monthly Against Work Moving Daily	Answers on process manual alteration, 516 respondents	44, 41, 30	3.10 against 3.24 (p = 0.604)	−0.06 (133)	−0.29 (p < 0.001)
Waiting as an Unmeasured Cost	All written answers	10, 10, 10	2.99 against 4.00 (p = 0.012)	−0.09 (150)	−0.07 (p = 0.390)
Absence of an Escalation Path for Agent Failure Outside Working Hours	All written answers	14, 14, 14	3.91 against 3.99 (p = 0.845)	0.02 (150)	−0.02 (p = 0.787)
Governance Functions Inherited From Before Agentic AI					
Change, Risk, Access, and Quality Processes Designed for People	Answers on process manual alteration, 516 respondents	4, 4, 4	2.79 against 3.23 (p = 0.559)	−0.09 (133)	−0.11 (p = 0.230)
Processes Dependent on a Person Noticing the Error	Answers on process manual alteration, 516 respondents	25, 24, 19	3.13 against 3.23 (p = 0.672)	−0.10 (133)	−0.07 (p = 0.400)
Checks Retained in Individual Knowledge and Lost to Automation	All written answers	23, 22, 17	3.84 against 4.00 (p = 0.658)	−0.04 (150)	−0.01 (p = 0.949)
Service Levels Unsuited to Agent Work	All written answers	23, 20, 15	4.76 against 3.97 (p = 0.107)	0.18 (150)	0.05 (p = 0.555)
Documentation Trailing the Build	All written answers	46, 46, 38	4.93 against 3.94 (p < 0.001)	0.25 (150)	−0.08 (p = 0.305)
Undefined Handoffs Between the Financial Institution's Own Teams	All written answers	41, 39, 35	2.81 against 4.05 (p < 0.001)	−0.28 (150)	0.01 (p = 0.876)
The Newness of Agentic AI to Both Firms					

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Reason and written pattern	Base	Answers, respondents, engagements	The score, describing against the rest (p)	Engagement r (n)	Adjusted partial r (p)
Practice Developed on the Live Engagement	All written answers	95, 93, 71	3.76 against 4.02 (p = 0.199)	−0.12 (150)	−0.15 (p = 0.065)
Knowledge Transfer Not Completed	All written answers	25, 24, 22	3.64 against 4.00 (p = 0.241)	−0.10 (150)	0.09 (p = 0.250)
Unclear Liability and Regulatory Accountability	All written answers	83, 80, 57	4.32 against 3.96 (p = 0.134)	0.09 (150)	−0.06 (p = 0.485)
Comparison With Prior Engagements	All written answers	237, 206, 117	4.35 against 3.88 (p = 0.002)	0.24 (150)	0.00 (p = 0.974)
Volume and Speed of AI Output Beyond the Controls					
Human Review Overrun by Agent Volume	Negative answers on review capacity	123, 115, 80	4.13 against 3.97 (p = 0.409)	0.07 (150)	0.00 (p = 0.954)
Change Frequency Beyond the Capacity of Change Control	Answers on process manual alteration, 516 respondents	101, 93, 65	3.13 against 3.25 (p = 0.477)	−0.08 (133)	−0.38 (p < 0.001)
Non-Deterministic Output and Missing Logs					
Output That Cannot Be Signed Off	All written answers	29, 27, 23	2.34 against 4.05 (p < 0.001)	−0.32 (150)	−0.11 (p = 0.180)
Absence of a Quality Assurance Method for Variable Output	Negative answers on quality assurance for variable output	126, 116, 81	3.60 against 4.05 (p = 0.010)	−0.16 (150)	−0.11 (p = 0.178)
Missing Logs and Evidence of Agent Actions	Respondents rating both items	184 rated both 1 to 3	2.06 against 5.00 (neither)	0.94 (150)	Not tested

Note: Monthly forums, reliance on a person noticing errors, and change frequency use the 516 respondents answering on process alteration and 133 engagements with an answer for their principal comparisons. Any all-study or all-individual-contributor comparison is supplementary and uses a different population. Other patterns retain their stated written-answer sources and analysis bases. Negative-classified source answers are not an independent survey of every respondent. Written nonmention is not confirmed absence. Adjusted-correlation p values are nominal.

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“

Nobody gave us the real process so we reconstruct workflow by watching them work… governance forum meets monthly and we work daily so I cant wait for it”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
CXM, Client servicing and communications

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1 Slow Response From the Vendor and the Financial Institution

Decision and response timing connect formal governance with continuing agent work. Joint decision-speed ratings and financial institution response ratings were associated with the wider score, while monthly-forum accounts had a conditional engagement association. Waiting and after-hours escalation accounts supplied smaller and less conclusive evidence. These findings identify different points at which operational response may lag, rather than one verified cause shared by every engagement.

1.1 Governance Forums Meeting Monthly Against Work Moving Daily

Written pattern · Answers on the manual alteration of processes, read under the Part 5 classification of reasons · 44 answers from 41 respondents on 30 engagements

Governance forums that met on a calendar against daily work were associated with lower scores in the adjusted engagement comparison. The substantive concern is a decision cycle that may not match the pace of agent work. Within respondents who answered on process alteration, however, the mean-score contrast was not clearly detected. Those findings use different units and support a qualified account of timing mismatch.

Figure 3.81. Governance Forums Meeting Monthly Against Work Moving Daily: unadjusted and adjusted associations in the 133 engagements with an answer on process alteration.

Governance forums that met on a calendar against daily work were associated with lower scores in the adjusted engagement comparison.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

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Raw p = 0.484, adjusted nominal p < 0.001. The respondent comparison within 516 process-answer respondents is separate. These are conditional associations, not causal effects.

At the engagement level, within the 133 engagements with an answer on process manual alteration, the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.06 (p = 0.484). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the association reached partial r = −0.29 (p < 0.001). Across all 150 engagements the adjusted association stood at −0.32 and held between −0.33 and −0.27 when each category's block of the 53 was omitted from the comparison mean. The share describing the pattern was associated with the 53 indicators themselves at only r = −0.08, so the pattern marked weak governance on engagements whose other indicators did not.

The following distributions provide supplementary all-study context and do not replace the eligible process-answer comparisons. The pattern was described by 7.77% (22 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 3.60% (19 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 6.80% of respondents in Transition/Cut-Over and 6.52% on canceled engagements, against 1.14% in Build-Out and 0.97% in Production. Individual contributors described it at 5.70% (38 of 667) and engagement managers at 2.00% (3 of 150), with no clearly detected difference by role after Holm adjustment. Among individual contributors alone, the 38 who described it stood at 3.18 against 3.91 among the other 629 (cluster-robust p = 0.009).

The 44 answers came from the answers on the manual alteration of processes, where the reading assigned each answer naming a forum, committee, governance body, panel, or approval loop as the reason for the manual alteration, and 23 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described a sign-off forum that met monthly while the work ran daily, and a two-hour change that waited eleven days for a fortnightly forum.

> *“Decision rights are written down and that part is fine. The issue is timing. A sign-off on the lineage mapping goes to their data governance forum which meets fortnightly, so a two hour change waits eleven days” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“How I feel is caught in the middle, genuinely, because my team override the early-warning alerts before they escalate them, not for fun, but because the signal needs a human check before anyone trusts it. The decision on which alerts even matter sits with a forum that meets far less than the alerts fire, and what reaches the portfolio director is only what my analysts choose to tell me, far as I know.” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

Part 5 (Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes, section 2.4) analyzes the same reading as a reason for process manual alteration.

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1.2 Waiting as an Unmeasured Cost

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 10 answers from 10 respondents on 10 engagements

Respondents describing waiting as an unmeasured cost had lower mean scores, although the small pattern did not show a clear engagement-level association. A delay between recognizing a need and obtaining a decision or action can remain absent from performance measures. Ten accounts support a limited description of that issue. They do not establish the extent of waiting among other respondents.

Figure 3.82. Waiting as an Unmeasured Cost: descriptive mean score comparison.

Respondents describing waiting as an unmeasured cost had lower mean scores, although the small pattern did not show a clear engagement-level association.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

Mean scores were 2.99 for those describing waiting and 4.00 for the remainder. The cluster-robust test on the ten against the other 840 reached p = 0.012. Among individual contributors alone, the five who described waiting stood at 3.36 against 3.87 (cluster-robust p = 0.416).

At the engagement level the share describing waiting was associated with the score at r = −0.09 (p = 0.263, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.07 (p = 0.390).

Waiting was described by 7 of the 283 respondents with a score of 3 or below, 3 of the 528 above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. Five of the ten were engagement managers, and no segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

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The ten answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 4 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described the days between a change by the financial institution and its arrival on the delivery team, and the weeks between a joint meeting and a decision that held, as costs that appeared in no measure.

> *"Nothing here asks about the waiting. Client change their conduct rule on a Monday, we hear about it maybe Thursday from a teammate, and everything flagged in between has to be reviewed again by hand. That part never appear anywhere." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"The joint review side actually worked. Two of their buyers sat with us on the Tuesday call and cleared the flagged POs same day. What no box asks about is the three weeks between one of those calls and any decision that stuck." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

1.3 Absence of an Escalation Path for Agent Failure Outside Working Hours

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 14 answers from 14 respondents on 14 engagements

Accounts of missing after-hours escalation paths did not show a clearly detected score relationship. The operational concern remains specific: agent work may continue when the people authorized to respond are unavailable. A broad score may coexist with this reported gap at different levels. The 14 written descriptions support retaining the issue while limiting any conclusion about prevalence or comparative control performance.

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Figure 3.83. Absence of an Escalation Path for Agent Failure Outside Working Hours: descriptive mean score comparison.

Accounts of missing after-hours escalation paths did not show a clearly detected score relationship.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 14 respondents who described it, a small base, stood at 3.91 and the other 836 at 3.99 (cluster-robust p = 0.845). Among individual contributors alone, the 6 who described it stood at 3.85 against 3.86 (cluster-robust p = 0.976).

At the engagement level the share describing it was associated with the score at r = 0.02 (p = 0.808, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.02 (p = 0.787).

The pattern was described by 5 of the 283 respondents with a score of 3 or below, 7 of the 528 above 3 to 7, and 2 of the 39 above 7, a descriptive comparison that does not establish equal prevalence. It was described by 6 individual contributors, 6 engagement managers, and 2 portfolio directors, with no clearly detected difference by role after Holm adjustment, and by 1.82% of respondents in the lowest indicator quintile against 1.88% in the highest.

The 14 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 7 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described agents that failed at two in the morning with no person rostered to decide, and a portfolio director on a higher-scoring engagement described the hours each day when only one of the two firms was at work.

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“Nothing here asks who we call at 2am when the agent starts closing tickets it shouldn't. There is no such person at our firm, we work it out ourselves.” -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

“The sixes in this section are not a general complaint about how we run the thing together, they come from one narrow gap. Governance in the daytime is genuinely good, and I would say our joint quality loop catches almost everything before it reaches a live endpoint. But the bank's change desk keeps office hours and our desk does not. So the questions about stopping something mid-flight, or holding one view of the risk, are really questions about the eleven hours a day when only one of the two firms is awake. And nobody has written down who makes that call yet. We have not been caught by it, which is luck as much as design.” -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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2 Governance Functions Inherited From Before Agentic AI

Processes inherited from people-based delivery were described as poorly fitted to agent work in several distinct ways. Some depended on a person noticing an error, some left knowledge unwritten, and others used service levels, documentation, or handoffs that respondents considered inadequate. Their score relationships varied. Together, these findings locate the shared governance concern in whether controls have been adapted to the work agents perform.

2.1 Change, Risk, Access, and Quality Processes Designed for People

Written pattern · Answers on the manual alteration of processes, read under the Part 5 classification of reasons · 4 answers from 4 respondents on 4 engagements

Four accounts described processes designed for people being carried into agent work without sufficient adaptation. Their governance relevance lies in the fit between operational authority, review, and the pace of work. The evidence is descriptive and too small for the paper's comparative tests. The separately rated joint-model indicator provides related evidence about that fit. One account in each status group does not establish a percentage gradient.

Figure 3.84. Change, Risk, Access, and Quality Processes Designed for People: descriptive evidence and its limits

Four accounts described processes designed for people being carried into agent work without sufficient adaptation.

Reported practice	Governance implication	Evidence boundary
Four accounts described processes designed for people being carried into agent work without sufficient adaptation.	Their governance relevance lies in the fit between operational authority, review, and the pace of work.	The evidence is descriptive and too small for the paper's comparative tests.

Note: Respondents describing change, Risk, Access, and Quality Processes Designed for People
Small base. No percentage comparison between status groups.
4 written accounts from 4 respondents on 4 engagements.

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Mean score 2.79 among those describing the pattern, compared with 4.00 among the remainder. Descriptive comparison only, with no inferential test.

The four respondents recorded a score of 2.79 against 4.00 among the rest, a contrast printed as description only. Three of the four stood with a score of 3 or below and one above 3 to 7, and the four answers came one each from Build-Out, Transition/Cut-Over, Production, and a canceled engagement.

The four accounts were classified within answers on manual alteration of processes. They described an audit workflow unchanged from people-based work and processes written before agents were introduced. The separately rated fit of the joint model to agent work had a positive adjusted cross-category association (partial r = 0.26). That rating supplies related evidence, with no inference that it verifies the mechanism proposed in four accounts.

> *"This is not one time thing, happen every case here... I tell my lead every time but nothing come back, we just carry on. The audit workflow they gave us was written for people, not for agent, and nobody on their side has looked at it since before the engagement started. So what we do is rebuild the steps as we go and keep own notes. It works, cases close, but the documented process and the actual process are two different things now and everybody knows it and nobody says it out loud. I have kindly asked three times for someone from their side to sit with us for one hour and walk the exceptions. Three times. Nothing. Meanwhile the volumes go up and the sign off window stays the same. My lead is fine, he raise it upward as far as i can tell, but it goes into whatever meeting decides these things and does not come out again. And the frustrating part is when something does go wrong it comes back to us, not to the process, not to the people who wrote it. It comes back to whoever touched it last which is" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"But kindly note this is not a data problem, it is that the process was written before the agent existed. I flag the same issue every review and nothing changes" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

Part 5 (Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes, section 2.4) analyzes the same reading as a reason for process manual alteration.

2.2 Processes Dependent on a Person Noticing the Error

Written pattern · Answers on the manual alteration of processes, read under the Part 5 classification of reasons · 25 answers from 24 respondents on 19 engagements

Dependence on a person noticing an error was reported within process-alteration accounts without a clearly detected conditional mean-score contrast. The control concern is detection that relies on

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individual attention rather than an explicit and consistently operating check. The pattern is distinct from automated monitoring and from knowledge that never entered the process. The principal comparison uses eligible process answers, with all-study comparisons presented separately as context.

Figure 3.85. Processes Dependent on a Person Noticing the Error: descriptive mean score comparison.

Dependence on a person noticing an error was reported within process-alteration accounts without a clearly detected conditional mean-score contrast.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The base is respondents answering on process alteration.

The contrast within the 516 respondents who wrote an answer on process manual alteration reached cluster-robust p = 0.672. Against all 850 respondents it widened to 3.13 against 4.02. This wider comparison also changes the population, so it does not isolate the contribution of the specific written pattern.

Within the 133 engagements with an answer on process manual alteration, the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.10 (p = 0.250), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.07 (p = 0.400).

The following distributions provide supplementary all-study context and do not replace the eligible process-answer comparisons. The pattern was described by 4.59% (13 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 2.08% (11 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7, and by 3.03% in the lowest indicator quintile against none in the highest. Twenty-three of the 24 respondents who described it were individual contributors. Among individual contributors alone, the 23 stood at 3.18 against 3.89 among the other 644 (cluster-robust p = 0.009), a contrast drawn against all individual contributors rather than within the base of the reading.

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The 25 answers came from the answers on the manual alteration of processes, where the reading assigned each answer naming a check that depended on a person noticing, catching, or spotting the error, and 13 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described workflows documented for an analyst who would notice a comparable that looked wrong, and individual contributors who built manual checks of their own to cover the step the agent skipped.

> *"their process leans on a person catching the miss, the agent has no such instinct, so i step in myself before the model runs. that is the whole thing really. the workflow they documented assumes an analyst who notices when a comparable looks wrong, and the agent does not notice, it just uses it. so somebody has to be the analyst. that is me most days. i have said in two different forums now that the process needs rewriting for how the tool actually behaves rather than how a person behaves, and both times people agreed and nothing followed. i think the difficulty is that rewriting it means somebody admits the original design was wrong, and the original design has names on it. so instead we have a documented process and a real process and i am the bridge between them. i am not unhappy about it, the work is interesting and i am learning a lot, in all honesty. i just think if i went on leave for two weeks somebody would find out how much of this was being held together by one person noticing things, and" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"what they did is build a process that expects a human to catch every mistake before it goes anywhere, but agent doesnt catch anything on its own, it just runs and moves to next case, so i built manual checks in myself to cover for that gap, please note this is not something anyone asked me to do, i just did it because gap was there and somebody had to. their systems never agree with each other on same figures, one say one thing other say another, and nobody ever opened up their api for us properly so we pull flat exports and patch from there instead, which take hours some days, and every access request just goes unanswered for weeks, i dont even chase it anymore because whats the point, i just work around same problem every single time it comes up. if I am honest this whole engagement is closing down soon anyway so i dont know why i am even explaining all this, but i wanted to say it properly at least once, because most days it feels like nobody upstream understands how much of this is held together by me checking things twice that agent should have caught the first time, and i dont discuss about it much with anyone because there isnt really anyone left to discuss about it with at this point, so i just" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 5 (Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes, section 2.4) analyzes the same reading as a reason for process manual alteration.

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2.3 Checks Retained in Individual Knowledge and Lost to Automation

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 23 answers from 22 respondents on 17 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 4.5

Accounts of checks retained in individual knowledge did not show a clearly detected score relationship. These descriptions identify a governance concern that can be lost when work is automated without making its informal checks explicit. The small written base supports an account of the mechanism respondents described, while the study does not observe the transfer of each check or establish its causal contribution to an outcome.

Figure 3.86. Checks Retained in Individual Knowledge and Lost to Automation: descriptive mean score comparison.

Accounts of checks retained in individual knowledge did not show a clearly detected score relationship.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The overall respondent contrast had p = 0.658. The 22 respondents who described the pattern, a small base, stood at 3.84 and the other 828 at 4.00. Among individual contributors alone, the 18 who described it stood at 3.94 against 3.86 among the other 649 (cluster-robust p = 0.859).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.04 (p = 0.643, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.01 (p = 0.949).

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The pattern was described by 3.18% (9 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 2.27% (12 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 1 of the 39 above 7. It was described by 18 individual contributors, 2 engagement managers, and 2 portfolio directors, with no clearly detected difference by role after Holm adjustment, and no segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 23 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 11 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 counts 14 answers on 9 engagements for the same pattern, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone, so the two counts rest on different bases. Respondents described a check carried in one person's head and spreadsheet that the agent did not perform and that would leave with that person, and a process that assumed a person would catch the edge cases the agent passed over.

> *"I patch the Vendor records by hand every single day just to keep the Desk running, I told my manager and hes aware, thats not the issue. The issue is the master data on their side has three sources and they disagree with each other, so depending which one the extract pulls from you get a different supplier address, and the agent cannot tell which is right. I can. Usually. Because Ive seen these vendors for eight months and I know which ones moved office and which ones have two entities. That knowledge is entirely in my head and in a spreadsheet on my machine. Nobody has ever asked me to write it down. If I left tomorrow the Desk would start pushing purchase orders to old addresses within a week and nobody would know why. Ive mentioned that. People nod. Its the sort of thing everyone agrees is a problem and nobody has time to fix because fixing it means somebody has to reconcile three master data sources at a bank, which is a project, not a task. So we carry on. And in truth the work itself is fine, its steady, I just think" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I adjusted the triage step because their process assumes a human catches the edge cases and the agent just doesn't, so I added a manual check before it goes further" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 4.5) analyzes the pattern as a factor in manual alteration.

2.4 Service Levels Unsuited to Agent Work

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 23 answers from 20 respondents on 15 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 8.4

Service levels unsuited to agent work were described on engagements with somewhat higher observed scores, and the adjusted relationship was not clearly detected. This qualifies a simple reading in which every reported deficiency must accompany a lower composite. The governance question is whether the service commitment measures the pace and form of work now performed. The positive observed association does not establish that the mismatch improves control.

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Figure 3.87. Service Levels Unsuited to Agent Work: descriptive mean score comparison.

Service levels unsuited to agent work were described on engagements with somewhat higher observed scores, and the adjusted relationship was not clearly detected.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 20 respondents who described the pattern, a small base, recorded a score of 4.76, against 3.97 among the other 830 (cluster-robust p = 0.107). Among individual contributors alone, the 15 who described it stood at 4.67 against 3.85 (cluster-robust p = 0.140).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = 0.18 (p = 0.028, n = 150 engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the partial r fell to 0.05 (p = 0.555). The adjusted comparison did not detect a clear association beyond the comparison mean.

The pattern was described by 5.00% of respondents in the highest indicator quintile against 0.61% in the lowest, by 3.88% in Production against 1.55% on canceled engagements, and by 1.41% (4 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below against 2.84% (15 of 528) above 3 to 7. No role or segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 23 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 7 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 counts 4 answers on 4 engagements for the same pattern, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone, so the two counts rest on different bases. Respondents on active engagements described service level and quality targets written for human pace that lost their meaning once agents handled the work.

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Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 8.4) analyzes the pattern as a factor in manual alteration.

2.5 Documentation Trailing the Build

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 46 answers from 46 respondents on 38 engagements · Listed in Part 5, Additional Conditions Below the Threshold for Statistical Analysis

Documentation lag was described by respondents with higher mean scores, while the adjusted association was not clearly detected. This finding distinguishes reported awareness of a gap from the overall severity of governance weakness. The operational question is whether the record used for oversight reflects the system currently in use. The comparison does not show that better governance causes documentation to lag or that lag is harmless.

Figure 3.88. Documentation Trailing the Build: descriptive mean score comparison.

Documentation lag was described by respondents with higher mean scores, while the adjusted association was not clearly detected.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 46 respondents who described it recorded a score of 4.93, against 3.94 among the other 804 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 33 who described it stood at 4.97 against 3.81 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

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At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = 0.25 (p = 0.002, n = 150 engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the partial r was −0.08 (p = 0.305). The adjusted comparison did not detect a clear association beyond the comparison mean.

The pattern was described by 11.65% of respondents in Production against 2.48% on canceled engagements, and by 9.38% in the highest indicator quintile against 1.82% in the lowest. By the score it was described by 2.12% (6 of 283) of respondents at 3 or below, 6.82% (36 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 4 of the 39 above 7. The share differed after Holm adjustment by class of work and by no other segment family.

The 46 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 8 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 lists 2 answers on 2 engagements for the same pattern below its threshold for statistical analysis, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone. Documentation that trailed the build was a complaint of engagements that had built enough to document, including the highest-scoring engagement of the study, where an individual contributor named it among the three challenges of the work.

> *“Last month a servicing rule changed mid week and process still assumed one change a month, besides there was no time allowed to update documentation properly, so exception just get handled by whoever pick it up” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

2.6 Undefined Handoffs Between the Financial Institution's Own Teams

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 41 answers from 39 respondents on 35 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.5

Undefined handoffs within the financial institution were described by respondents with lower mean scores. The control concern is responsibility at the boundary between the institution's own teams, which can remain unresolved even where the vendor's task is clear. The adjusted engagement comparison did not detect a separate association. Lack of mention in the highest quintile records no observed descriptions there, rather than verified absence of the problem.

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Figure 3.89. Undefined Handoffs Between the Financial Institution's Own Teams: descriptive mean score comparison.

Undefined handoffs within the financial institution were described by respondents with lower mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 39 respondents who described them recorded a score of 2.81, against 4.05 among the other 811 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 34 who described them stood at 2.89 against 3.92 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at $r = -0.28$ ($p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the partial r was 0.01 ($p = 0.876$). The adjusted comparison did not detect a clear association beyond the comparison mean.

The pattern was described by 8.13% (23 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 3.03% (16 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 7.45% of respondents on canceled engagements against 1.94% to 4.00% across the active stages, and by 7.88% in the lowest indicator quintile against none in the highest. The share differed after Holm adjustment by the respondent's understanding of the governing obligations and by regulatory training.

The 41 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 25 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 counts 29 answers from 27 respondents on 24 engagements for the same pattern, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone, so the two counts rest on different bases. Respondents described requirements from two of the financial institution's offices that conflicted with no rule for which prevailed, and discrepancies that had no owner to whom they could be taken.

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> *"If you read one thing here, read this. Nobody on their side owned the surveillance rules. We would get a requirement from compliance in London and a different one from the New York desk for the same scenario, and neither would say which one wins. They answer email fast, Ill give them that, but a fast answer from someone with no authority doesnt move anything. Their lead on this changed twice in eight weeks, so we explained the same design twice to two different people." - Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"There is nothing here that the numbers do not already say. I will put it down anyway. When a discrepancy comes out of the anomaly run there is no person to take it to. I asked in the second month, my lead asked also, and the answer was that it depends on the item. That is not an answer. So the practice is, whoever is on the queue that day decides, we write a note in the tracker and move on. Moreover the client side has three teams in the chain and each one says the sign off is with the other, so nothing moves. I have sat in the joint call. It is a status call, nobody makes decision in it. The same items are read out week after week, the same items, and after a while we stopped putting the hard ones on the list because there is no point. On the quality side, both firms count how many exceptions we cleared. Nobody counts how many we cleared wrongly. That is the measure that is missing and I have said this before to my lead. Two firms and neither one owns the number that matters. I do not think anybody will read this box. The engagement is finished anyway..." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 3.5) analyzes the pattern as a factor in manual alteration.

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3 The Newness of Agentic AI to Both Firms

Learning, knowledge transfer, and accountability were described as unresolved features of agentic delivery across a range of scores. These patterns concern preparation for unfamiliar work and how experience is brought into the operating model. Their inconsistent statistical relationships limit a single explanation based on newness. Each pattern nonetheless identifies a distinct responsibility relevant to oversight.

3.1 Practice Developed on the Live Engagement

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 95 answers from 93 respondents on 71 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 4.3

Developing practice during live delivery was described across a range of scores without a clearly detected contrast. This identifies uncertainty in how the two firms learn to govern unfamiliar work. The governance question is whether authority, checks, and evidence develop alongside live practice or are settled beforehand. The written accounts describe that learning context, without measuring the effectiveness or causal consequences of learning on the engagement.

Figure 3.90. Practice Developed on the Live Engagement: descriptive mean score comparison.

Developing practice during live delivery was described across a range of scores without a clearly detected contrast.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

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The overall respondent contrast had p = 0.199. The 93 respondents who described it stood at 3.76 and the other 757 at 4.02. Among individual contributors alone, the 67 who described it stood at 3.54 against 3.90 (cluster-robust p = 0.082).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.12 (p = 0.154, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.15 (p = 0.065).

The pattern was described by 13.07% (37 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 10.04% (53 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 3 of the 39 above 7. It was described by 8.74% to 10.80% of respondents across the active stages and 12.73% on canceled engagements, and by 10.04% of individual contributors, 14.67% of engagement managers, and 4 of the 31 portfolio directors, with no clearly detected difference by role after Holm adjustment. No segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 95 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 42 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 counts 12 answers from 11 respondents on 10 engagements for the same pattern, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone, so the two counts rest on different bases. Respondents described delivery teams that had never assured agent output at volume and invented their own checking, and teams that learned to run agents on the financial institution's live work.

> *“The playbook is fine on paper. We were never shown how to assure agent output at this volume, so we invented our own checking. Pricing is not solved either, whatever the deck says... Leadership is far from the floor. That is all.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“These ones are for my desk, not the firm. Nobody here had run agents live before us, we learned on the client's tax memos. Elsewhere i am told it is better.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 4.3) analyzes the pattern as a factor in manual alteration.

3.2 Knowledge Transfer Not Completed

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 25 answers from 24 respondents on 22 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 4.4

Incomplete knowledge transfer was described without a clearly detected score relationship. Its relevance to control is the transfer of the operational knowledge needed to recognize exceptions, interpret output, and respond to problems. The small written base supports keeping the issue distinct

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from general experience or training. The result does not establish that knowledge transfer was equally complete across the remaining engagements.

Figure 3.91. Knowledge Transfer Not Completed: descriptive mean score comparison.

Incomplete knowledge transfer was described without a clearly detected score relationship.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The overall respondent contrast had p = 0.241. The 24 respondents who described it, a small base, stood at 3.64 and the other 826 at 4.00. Among individual contributors alone, the 21 who described it stood at 3.71 against 3.87 (cluster-robust p = 0.637).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.10 (p = 0.202, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = 0.09 (p = 0.250).

The pattern was described by 3.53% (10 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 2.65% (14 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7, and by 4.24% in the lowest indicator quintile against 0.62% in the highest. No role or segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 25 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 12 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 counts 6 answers on 5 engagements for the same pattern, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone, so the two counts rest on different bases. Respondents described knowledge transfer measured by the number of sessions held rather than by what was captured, and manual fixes by a former team that had never been written down.

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> *"SME knowledge-transfer completion was tracked by the number of sessions held rather than whether the underwriting logic was actually captured, so the metric looked complete while real institutional knowledge kept leaving with departing staff." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"Nobody wrote down which bits the old team fixed by hand, we are rediscovering it case by case" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 4.4) analyzes the pattern as a factor in manual alteration.

3.3 Unclear Liability and Regulatory Accountability

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 83 answers from 80 respondents on 57 engagements · Listed in Part 5, Additional Conditions Below the Threshold for Statistical Analysis

Unclear liability and regulatory accountability were described across a range of scores. These accounts concern who is responsible when agent work causes an error, a different question from routine workflow ownership or a respondent's knowledge of governing obligations. The descriptions identify uncertainty rather than adjudicate liability. Their concentration in Production is a cross-sectional observation, with no inference about when accountability became unclear.

Figure 3.92. Unclear Liability and Regulatory Accountability: descriptive mean score comparison.

Unclear liability and regulatory accountability were described across a range of scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

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The 80 respondents who raised it recorded a score of 4.32, against 3.96 among the other 770 (cluster-robust p = 0.134). Among individual contributors alone, the 58 who raised it stood at 4.21 against 3.83 (cluster-robust p = 0.138).

At the engagement level the share raising it was associated with the score at r = 0.09 (p = 0.275, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.06 (p = 0.485).

Unclear liability was raised by 9 of the 39 respondents with the score above 7 (23.08%), against 8.13% (23 of 283) at 3 or below and 9.09% (48 of 528) above 3 to 7. It was raised by 14.56% of respondents in Production, against 9.14% to 9.60% in the earlier stages and 7.76% on canceled engagements, and by 11.25% in the highest indicator quintile against 9.70% in the lowest. The share differed after Holm adjustment by class of work.

The 83 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 26 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 lists 2 answers on 2 engagements for the same pattern below its threshold for statistical analysis, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone. The question of who answered for an agent's error reached the highest-scoring engagements and those in Production. An individual contributor whose own score stood above 7, and who credited the engagement's staffing and training, was not sure who would answer for a costly agent error.

> *"On my last account we wait three weeks for one AI person to be assigned, here I get a specialist on the same day I ask. The training also is better now, they teach us the payments side properly. Only thing, if an agent makes a costly mistake I am not sure who stands up for it, we never discuss about that" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

3.4 Comparison With Prior Engagements

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 237 answers from 206 respondents on 117 engagements · Listed in Part 5, Additional Conditions Below the Threshold for Statistical Analysis

Respondents comparing the engagement with prior work had higher observed mean scores, while the adjusted association was not clearly detected. Their comparisons provide context for how they assess current control arrangements. They do not create a measured before-and-after study. The accounts describe respondents' frames of reference and do not establish that prior experience improved the present engagement's controls.

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Figure 3.93. Comparison With Prior Engagements: descriptive mean score comparison.

Respondents comparing the engagement with prior work had higher observed mean scores, while the adjusted association was not clearly detected.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 206 respondents who made a comparison recorded a score of 4.35, against 3.88 among the other 644 (cluster-robust p = 0.002). Among individual contributors alone, the 142 who made one stood at 4.09 against 3.80 (cluster-robust p = 0.108).

At the engagement level the share making a comparison was associated with the score at r = 0.24 (p = 0.003, n = 150 engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the partial r was 0.00 (p = 0.974).

Comparison was made by 36.88% of respondents in the highest indicator quintile against 21.82% in the lowest, and by 38.46% (15 of 39) of respondents with the score above 7 against 21.91% (62 of 283) at 3 or below. It differed by role after Holm adjustment, made by 24 of the 31 portfolio directors (77.42%) against 26.67% of engagement managers and 21.29% of individual contributors, and portfolio directors recorded the highest the score of the three roles. It also differed by the manual alteration methods used and by disclosure to the financial institution.

The 237 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 89 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 lists 1 answer on 1 engagement for the same pattern below its threshold for statistical analysis. The comparisons ran in both directions. On the highest-scoring engagement of the study, an individual contributor compared a change agreed and written down the same day with a

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weekly call on an earlier account, while on a canceled engagement an individual contributor recalled a previous project that had a playbook.

> *“On my last engagement any change had to wait for a weekly call, here the two sides agree a change same day and it is written down properly. Issues still go into two seperate trackers and we chase both, that part is not solved. Overall it runs better than what I saw before” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *“Felt behind from day one. My last project had an actual playbook. Here you learn it by watching the person next to you, half of them are guessing too. But nobody above us has shipped one of these before, so i don't know who'd write it.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

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4 Volume and Speed of AI Output Beyond the Controls

Review volume and change frequency describe two different capacity demands on control. Review-capacity ratings were associated with the wider score, while the written volume pattern was less clearly differentiated by the composite. Change frequency showed a stronger adjusted engagement association than its raw association. The relevant governance question is the fit between work and control capacity, with model dependence stated explicitly.

4.1 Human Review Overrun by Agent Volume

Written pattern · Answers scored negative on human review capacity, read in full · 123 answers from 115 respondents on 80 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.3

Human review overwhelmed by agent volume was described across a range of composite scores. The operational concern is whether review capacity can examine the work it is expected to control. The written source consists of answers classified negative on that capacity, so the pattern is not an independent survey of every respondent's review workload. A high composite does not establish that the reported capacity gap was otherwise contained.

Figure 3.94. Human Review Overrun by Agent Volume: descriptive mean score comparison.

Human review overwhelmed by agent volume was described across a range of composite scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

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The 115 respondents who described it stood at 4.13 and the other 735 at 3.97 (cluster-robust p = 0.409). Among individual contributors alone, the 93 who described it stood at 3.93 against 3.85 (cluster-robust p = 0.667).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = 0.07 (p = 0.369, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = 0.00 (p = 0.954).

The pattern was described by 12.01% (34 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 14.58% (77 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 4 of the 39 above 7. It was described by 17.14% of respondents in Build-Out, falling to 13.59% in Production and 11.18% on canceled engagements, and by 12.73% in the lowest indicator quintile against 13.12% in the highest. No role or segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 123 answers are the written answers scored negative on human review capacity, each read in full, and 122 of them state that review was overrun by the volume of agent output or by its own capacity. Eight of them also describe review reduced to a tick, a click-through, or a small sample, too few to stand as a pattern of their own. Thirty-six of the 123 were written on canceled engagements. On one of the five engagements without a single distressed governance rating, an individual contributor reported that the agents produced more test scripts in a morning than the team could read.

> *"The part that reaches me is volume of review. Agents produce more test scripts in a morning than we can properly look at, so my day becomes reading output instead of building anything. i dont mind it exactly, team is good and my lead shields us where he can. Still i finish the week and cant say what i actually built. That is new for me, in addition nobody planned for it, it just arrived with the tooling." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

The rating of review capacity is analyzed under Co-Management and Governance Across the Other Four Categories, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.3) reports its association with manual alteration.

4.2 Change Frequency Beyond the Capacity of Change Control

Written pattern · Answers on the manual alteration of processes, read under the Part 5 classification of reasons · 101 answers from 93 respondents on 65 engagements

Change frequency exceeding change-control capacity had a negative adjusted association with the score in the eligible engagement comparison. The substantive concern is a process whose operating cycle cannot accommodate the changes it is meant to govern. The raw engagement correlation was small, and the respondent contrast was not clearly detected within process-answer respondents. The stronger conditional estimate depends on the specified comparison model.

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Figure 3.95. Change Frequency Beyond the Capacity of Change Control: unadjusted and adjusted associations in the 133 engagements with an answer on process alteration.

Change frequency exceeding change-control capacity had a negative adjusted association with the score in the eligible engagement comparison.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

Raw p = 0.366, adjusted nominal p < 0.001. The respondent comparison within 516 process-answer respondents is separate. These are conditional associations, not causal effects.

Within the 133 engagements with an answer on process manual alteration, the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.08 (p = 0.366). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the association reached partial r = −0.38 (p < 0.001). Across all 150 engagements the adjusted association stood at −0.45 and held between −0.49 and −0.40 when each category's block of the 53 was omitted from the comparison mean. The share describing the pattern was associated with the 53 indicators themselves at r = −0.17.

The following distributions provide supplementary all-study context and do not replace the eligible process-answer comparisons. The pattern was described by 18.73% (53 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 7.58% (40 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 14.56% of respondents in Production and 13.66% on canceled engagements, against 6.86% in Build-Out, and by 16.36% in the lowest indicator quintile against 8.75% in the highest. It differed by role after Holm adjustment, written by 92 individual contributors and one engagement manager. Among individual contributors alone, the 92 who described it stood at 3.13 against 3.98 among the other 575 (cluster-robust p < 0.001).

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The 101 answers came from the answers on the manual alteration of processes, where the reading assigned each answer naming a change process, change board, queue, window, or release cycle that could not keep pace as the reason for the manual alteration, and 45 of them were written on canceled engagements. The share describing it differed after Holm adjustment by role, by management's understanding of the governing obligations, by the manual alteration methods used, and by disclosure to the financial institution. Respondents described a change process that assumed one change a month against several a day, and a queue of pending changes longer than the queue of work.

> *"The Change Process assumes one change a month and we make several a day... we cannot wait for a ruling so we rule ourselves on most exceptions" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Angry if im honest. The queue of pending changes is longer than the queue of actual work, and the decision arrive after the deadline it was meant to help." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

Part 5 (Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes, section 2.4) analyzes the same reading as a reason for process manual alteration.

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5 Non-Deterministic Output and Missing Logs

Variable output and limited evidence create different assurance problems. Output that cannot be signed off and absence of a quality assurance method concern acceptance, while missing logs concern reconstruction and diagnosis. Their score relationships varied. The joint logs-and-consistency comparison describes the lowest mean score among respondents rating both poorly, with no test of causal interaction.

5.1 Output That Cannot Be Signed Off

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 29 answers from 27 respondents on 23 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 5.4

Output that could not be signed off was described by a small group with low mean scores. This connects acceptance of agent work with the wider control environment: delivery cannot be treated as fully assured where responsible staff cannot establish a basis for sign-off. The adjusted engagement association was not clearly detected. The finding supports a specific reported assurance problem, not a causal severity ranking among written patterns.

Figure 3.96. Output That Cannot Be Signed Off: descriptive mean score comparison.

Output that could not be signed off was described by a small group with low mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

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The 27 respondents who described it, a small base, recorded a score of 2.34, against 4.05 among the other 823 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 26 who described it stood at 2.22 against 3.93 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at $r = -0.32$ ($p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the partial r was −0.11 ($p = 0.180$). The adjusted comparison did not detect a clear association beyond the comparison mean.

The pattern was described by 7.77% (22 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 0.95% (5 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 5.28% of respondents on canceled engagements and by none in Production, and by 5.45% in the lowest indicator quintile against none in the highest. The share differed after Holm adjustment by indicator quintile, by the manual alteration methods used, and by intent to leave.

The 29 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 18 of them were written on canceled engagements. Part 5 counts 28 answers from 26 respondents on 22 engagements for the same pattern, among the written answers on the manual alteration methods alone, so the two counts rest on different bases. Respondents described output that gave a different figure on every run and a delivery team that chose among the runs, the best of three or the middle value, before submitting one.

> *“We get duplicates, have to guess which is real, quiet from them we take as a yes, won't sign off on output that changes each rerun, pick one and go” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *“the problem is we cannot sign off on something that will not reproduce, so i pick the best run out of three and that's the one we submit” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 5.4) analyzes the pattern as a factor in manual alteration.

5.2 Absence of a Quality Assurance Method for Variable Output

Written pattern · Answers scored negative on the vendor's quality assurance for variable output · 126 answers from 116 respondents on 81 engagements · Crossed with manual alteration in Part 5, Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.1

Absence of a quality assurance method for variable output was associated with lower respondent mean scores. Quality assurance needs a defensible basis for accepting outputs that differ across runs. The pattern comes from answers classified negative on that capability, with a less conclusive engagement-level association. It should remain distinct from the tools' testability rating and from the separate evidence provided by logs.

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Figure 3.97. Absence of a Quality Assurance Method for Variable Output: descriptive mean score comparison.

Absence of a quality assurance method for variable output was associated with lower respondent mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 116 respondents describing the pattern had a mean score of 3.60, compared with 4.05 for the other 734 (cluster-robust p = 0.010). Among individual contributors alone, the 93 who described it stood at 3.39 against 3.94 among the other 574 (cluster-robust p = 0.005).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.16 (p = 0.055, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.11 (p = 0.178).

The pattern was described by 18.73% (53 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 10.80% (57 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 6 of the 39 above 7, so it reached the highest-scoring respondents as well. It was described by 16.77% of respondents on canceled engagements against 9.71% to 13.20% across the active stages, and by 17.58% in the lowest indicator quintile against 11.25% in the highest. The share differed after Holm adjustment by intent to leave and by no other segment family.

The 126 answers are the written answers scored negative on the vendor's quality assurance for output that differs between runs, and 54 of them were written on canceled engagements. Twenty-six of them also described output that could not be signed off. Respondents described individual contributors who had become the quality assurance step, and a screenshot of every case as the only check on a tool that never gave the same answer twice.

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> *"There is no QA for a tool that never give the same answer twice. I screenshot every case before I submit it. That is my QA. Nobody ask me to do it" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"My low marks come down to staffing, not to the leadership. We were promised two analysts with market research background and got two juniors who had never read a fund factsheet. Then QA. Nobody at my level was ever shown how to check work that comes out different every run, we werent given a method, we invented one ourselves." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

The rating of the vendor's quality assurance for variable output is reported in Part 2 (Vendor Capability, section 6.2), and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 6.1) reports its association with manual alteration.

5.3 Missing Logs and Evidence of Agent Actions

Rating crossing · Logs, traces, and usage telemetry against consistency of output across runs · 750 respondents who rated both

Respondents giving low ratings to both logs and output consistency had lower mean scores than those giving a low rating to one or neither. Limited logs can make the reasons for variable results difficult to reconstruct. The comparison is descriptive and does not establish statistical interaction or causal compounding. The full composite in this comparison includes the logs item.

Figure 3.98. Logs and output consistency: mean score among 750 respondents with both numeric answers.

Respondents giving low ratings to both logs and output consistency had lower mean scores than those giving a low rating to one or neither.



Note: One hundred respondents missing at least one item are excluded. This joint description is not a test of interaction.

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Among the 750 respondents with both numeric answers, 184 rated both items at 1–3 and had a mean score of 2.06. The 114 rating exactly one item at 1–3 had a mean of 3.12. The 452 rating neither at 1–3 had a mean of 5.00. The 100 respondents missing at least one answer are excluded. Across engagements, the two indicator ratings correlated at r = 0.94 (n = 150).

The ordered means describe joint reported weakness, with no test of interaction or causal compounding. The composite in this comparison includes the logs and telemetry item, so part of its relationship with the groups is built into the score. This is not independent confirmation of the logs rating. The logs item itself had an engagement-level correlation of 0.66 with the score within canceled engagements.

Written accounts concerning these limitations are examined alongside the relevant controls. Logs and telemetry drew 101 written answers and explanation at audit depth drew 163, both reported under Technical Controls and Governance Across the Engagement, and output that could not be signed off is the written form of the same failure. Part 2 (AI Technology, sections 2.3 and 8.3) reports the two ratings, and Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, sections 5.2 and 6.6) their association with manual alteration.

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6 Respondent Explanations Locating Problems Upstream

Some respondents located the problem upstream of the indicator they were rating. These accounts connect a local control assessment with decisions or dependencies elsewhere in the engagement. They did not show a clearly detected adjusted score association. Their interpretive value lies in identifying the proposed location of responsibility, not in establishing the upstream account as a verified root cause.

> *“i felt there is no point giving different marks… it all come back to one thing, their compliance side will not confirm the risk rating threshold for us, therefore every case sit open. the individual people are fine, on top of that they are polite about it, but nobody will put a decision in writing” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Financial crime and client onboarding*

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Manual Alteration and the Operation and Visibility of Controls

Manual work was associated with the governance, oversight, and control score, while its disclosure and recording often provided an incomplete view of how delivery operated. The five methods concern different interventions in data, processes, outputs, reporting, and third-party dependencies. Their different measurement bases and score distributions require separate interpretation. The central governance issue is whether the work remains authorized, visible, and subject to a record that oversight can examine.

The five methods are manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data, manual alteration of financial institution processes, manual alteration of AI outputs, reporting alteration, and third-party work done by hand. The first three use structured yes-or-no answers. The latter two are identified through written accounts, making a count of identified methods different from a verified inventory of all manual practice. Mean scores were 6.04 with no identified method (n = 132), 4.78 with one (210), 4.08 with two (181), 3.15 with three (147), 2.22 with four (162), and 1.85 with five (18). The group comparison was Welch $F = 271.35$ ($p < 0.001$), with $\omega^2 = 0.54$. Across engagements, the mean number identified correlated with the score at $r = -0.89$ (95% CI −0.92 to −0.85), falling to partial $r = -0.43$ after adjustment ($n = 150$, nominal $p < 0.001$).

The data, process, and AI-output methods were reported by 226 of 278, 233 of 280, and 182 of 269 answering respondents in the score band at 3 or below. Reporting alteration was identified for 238 of 283 respondents in that band. Above score 7, one respondent reported the data method, none the process method, one the AI-output method, and one described reporting alteration. Third-party work done by hand was described by 43 of 283 in the lowest band and four of 39 above 7. These observations do not certify effective controls in the upper band. Figure 3.99 compares the recorded method groups under their different ascertainment rules.

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Figure 3.99. Mean score under the five methods' different recorded classifications.

Respondents reporting manual alteration had lower mean governance scores



Note: Bars show mean governance, oversight, and control scores on the 1–10 scale. In each label, the first base is reported use or identification. The second is reported non-use or absence of identification. The first three methods use direct Yes/No answers. The final two use written identification. Absence of written identification does not confirm non-use.

Data, processes, and AI outputs use direct yes-or-no answers. Reporting alteration and third-party work done by hand use written identification. Not identified is not confirmed nonuse.

> *It happens every day, my team fixes it and moves on, we do not log how much we touch, therefore the deck looks cleaner than the underlying work actually is"*

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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1 The Five Manual Alteration Methods and the Score

The first four manual alteration methods were substantially more concentrated in low score bands than third-party work done by hand. Structured use of the data, process, and AI-output methods was reported almost entirely by individual contributors, while reporting alteration extended to engagement managers. These findings connect operational correction and reporting visibility with different responsibilities. Numeric bands describe the distribution and do not certify effective control above a threshold.

Table 3.15. The five manual alteration methods by numeric score band and by role

Manual alteration method	The score 3 or below	Above 3 to 7	Above 7	Cramér's V (Holm p)
Financial institution data	226 of 278 (81.29%)	194 of 522 (37.16%)	1 of 39	0.46 (p < 0.001)
Financial institution processes	233 of 280 (83.21%)	257 of 522 (49.23%)	0 of 39	0.41 (p < 0.001)
AI outputs	182 of 269 (67.66%)	95 of 520 (18.27%)	1 of 39	0.51 (p < 0.001)
Reporting provided to the financial institution	238 of 283 (84.10%)	236 of 528 (44.70%)	1 of 39	0.44 (p < 0.001)
Third-party ecosystem limitations	43 of 283 (15.19%)	40 of 528 (7.58%)	4 of 39	0.12 (p = 0.003)

Manual alteration method	The score, users against non-users	Users by role, individual contributors, engagement managers, portfolio directors
Financial institution data	3.08 against 4.91	418 of 659, 3 of 150, 0 of 30
Financial institution processes	3.27 against 5.00	481 of 662, 9 of 148, 0 of 31
AI outputs	2.71 against 4.69	276 of 650, 2 of 147, 0 of 31
Reporting provided to the financial institution	3.17 against 5.03	383 of 667, 86 of 150, 6 of 31
Third-party ecosystem limitations	3.58 against 4.04	69 of 667, 17 of 150, 1 of 31

Note: Data, process, and AI-output methods use respondents answering the direct yes-or-no question. Reporting alteration and third-party work done by hand are identified from written answers. Nonmention is not confirmed nonuse. The 39 respondents above score 7 are shown as counts where appropriate. Numeric bands are descriptive. Spearman rho measures the direction and strength of a rank association. Cramér's V describes categorical association, while the ordinary chi-square calculation does not adjust for respondents clustered within engagements. Holm labels identify the stated multiplicity correction, not a correction for clustering.

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1.1 Manual Alteration of Financial-Institution-Provided Data

Manual alteration method · 421 of 839 respondents who answered · Part 5, Manual Alteration of Financial-Institution-Provided Data

Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data was more common in the lowest score band, but substantial use also occurred in the middle band. Its governance relevance is that the delivery workforce corrects inputs that the formal input process has not made ready for agent use. The written accounts connect this work with validation, access, and response responsibilities. The distribution does not justify describing the method as confined to failed governance.

Figure 3.100. Manual Alteration of Financial-Institution-Provided Data, share of respondents using the method, by numeric score band

Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data was more common in the lowest score band, but substantial use also occurred in the middle band.



It was used by 81.29% (226 of 278) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 37.16% (194 of 522) above 3 to 7, and 1 of the 39 above 7 (chi-square = 178.40, Holm $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.46).

The 421 respondents who altered data recorded a score of 3.08, against 4.91 among the 418 who did not (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). The share using the method declined across the ordered score bands at Spearman rho = −0.46 ($p < 0.001$). The gap in category governance between users and non-users held in each failure category, widest in the third-party ecosystem (−2.02) and financial institution readiness (−1.87) and narrowest in AI technology and co-management (−1.75 each).

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Individual contributors accounted for 418 of the 421 users. Among individual contributors alone, 95.30% (223 of 234) with a score of 3 or below altered data, against 48.38% (194 of 401) above 3 to 7 and 1 of the 24 above 7. Three of the 150 engagement managers altered data, all three with a score of 3 or below, and none of the 30 portfolio directors who answered did.

The method's open question drew 400 written answers from 400 respondents on 127 engagements, and 213 of them were written on canceled engagements. Of the 400, 210 on 106 engagements described a governance indicator failing or a form of a control bypassed or not working. The governance indicator most often judged negative among the 210 was the financial institution's provisioning of access and identities for agents (112), ahead of its speed of response to issues raised (54) and the maturity of its data governance (49). The form most often described was no validation by the financial institution before handover (45), followed by problems raised with no response (25). The answers described data corrected before each run, from files that arrived unchecked, by staff without the access the agents needed.

> *“i get frustrated everytime, nobody update reference data in years, so i just fix it before we use, dont report it.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“i feel stressed most days, nothing get checked on their end before it land with us, so i fix data myself before using, dont know other way.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Manual Alteration of Financial-Institution-Provided Data) analyzes the method and its techniques in full.

1.2 Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes

Manual alteration method · 490 of 841 respondents who answered · Part 5, Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes

Manual alteration of financial institution processes extended substantially into the middle score band. This connects reported process constraints with work performed outside the intended agent workflow. The governance question concerns whether those departures are authorized, visible, and incorporated into control arrangements. No use was observed among the 39 respondents above score 7, with no inference that process alteration cannot occur where broader ratings are favorable.

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Figure 3.101. Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes, share of respondents using the method, by numeric score band

Manual alteration of financial institution processes extended substantially into the middle score band.



The process method was reported by 257 of 522 respondents above score 3 to 7 (49.23%). It was used by 83.21% (233 of 280) of respondents with a score of 3 or below (chi-square = 143.63, Holm $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.41).

The 490 respondents who altered processes recorded a score of 3.27, against 5.00 among the 351 who did not (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). The share using the method declined across the ordered score bands at Spearman rho = −0.40 ($p < 0.001$). The gap between users and non-users was widest in co-management (−1.93) and financial institution readiness (−1.70) and narrowest in AI technology (−1.50).

Individual contributors accounted for 481 of the 490 users, and all 257 users above 3 to 7 were individual contributors. Among individual contributors alone, 94.51% (224 of 237) with a score of 3 or below altered processes, against 64.09% (257 of 401) above 3 to 7 and none of the 24 above 7. Nine of the 148 engagement managers who answered altered processes, all nine with a score of 3 or below, and none of the 31 portfolio directors did.

The method's open question drew 464 written answers from 464 respondents on 132 engagements, and 222 of them were written on canceled engagements. Of the 464, 277 on 120 engagements described a governance indicator failing or a form of a control bypassed or not working. The governance indicator most often judged negative among the 277 was the financial institution's speed of response to issues raised (152), followed by the effectiveness of its management of its side (61). The forms most often described were problems raised with no response (51), manual alteration not logged or only partly logged

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(32), and undefined handoffs between the financial institution's teams (26). The answers described decisions taken by the delivery team when no ruling came, and changed steps written up later or not at all.

> *"Escalating a break means waiting on someone who never actually rules on it, we just pick a call and run with it. And whatever that forces into the workflow gets written up later, if it gets written up at all." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"i feel stuck waiting always, so we cannot wait for ruling, we just rule ourself and move forward, nobody stop us." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes) analyzes the method and its techniques in full.

1.3 Manual Alteration of AI Outputs

Manual alteration method · 278 of 828 respondents who answered · Part 5, Manual Alteration of AI Outputs

Respondents manually altering AI outputs gave lower ratings to technology-related governance controls. This connects human correction with the reported ability of the tools and surrounding processes to produce controlled work. The category gaps describe aligned assessments, rather than establish that a particular technical weakness caused each correction. The indicator remains distinct from data preparation, process changes, and alterations to the reports used for oversight.

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Figure 3.102. Manual Alteration of AI Outputs, share of respondents using the method, by numeric score band

Respondents manually altering AI outputs gave lower ratings to technology-related governance controls.



Respondents who altered AI outputs rated the AI technology governance indicators at 3.10, against 5.37 among those who did not, a gap of −2.26 and the widest of the 25 gaps between a method and a failure category. The gap in the third-party ecosystem followed at −2.19, and the narrowest gap lay in financial institution readiness (−1.55).

The method was used by 67.66% (182 of 269) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 18.27% (95 of 520) above 3 to 7, and 1 of the 39 above 7 (chi-square = 211.55, Holm $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.51), the steepest gradient of the five methods. The 278 respondents who altered AI outputs recorded a score of 2.71, the lowest among the users of any method, against 4.69 among the 550 who did not (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). The share using the method declined across the ordered score bands at Spearman rho = −0.50 ($p < 0.001$).

Individual contributors accounted for 276 of the 278 users. Among individual contributors alone, 79.30% (180 of 227) with a score of 3 or below altered AI outputs, against 23.81% (95 of 399) above 3 to 7 and 1 of the 24 above 7. Two of the 147 engagement managers who answered altered AI outputs, and none of the 31 portfolio directors did.

The method's open question drew 266 written answers from 266 respondents on 107 engagements, and 160 of them were written on canceled engagements. Only 72 of the 266, on 51 engagements, described a governance indicator failing or a form of a control bypassed or not working, the lowest share of the four methods asked about in an open question. Human rework absorbing agent failure appeared in 127 of the

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266 answers, and the form most often described was output that cannot be signed off (19), followed by an instruction not to raise the problem (9). The answers described output that changed between runs on the same input and was corrected before anyone downstream saw it.

> *"i run it twice and get two different answers, nothing else changed. i can't trust it so i correct it before anyone sees." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"We cannot predict what it will produce... because of that I check every output myself before it goes anywhere, and another thing this takes half my day." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

Part 5 (Manual Alteration of AI Outputs) analyzes the method and its techniques in full.

1.4 Reporting Alteration

Manual alteration method · 475 of 850 respondents with a written answer on the manual alteration of reporting · Part 5, Reporting alteration

Reporting alteration extended beyond individual contributors to engagement managers and portfolio directors. Its governance significance concerns the information through which the financial institution sees the engagement, rather than a correction to the underlying operational work. The method is identified through written accounts. Nonmention is not confirmed nonuse, and the score distribution should be read under that different ascertainment method.

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Figure 3.103. Reporting alteration, share of respondents using the method, by numeric score band

Reporting alteration extended beyond individual contributors to engagement managers and portfolio directors.



Reporting alteration was described by 86 of the 150 engagement managers, including 40 of the 42 with scores at 3 or below, and six of the 31 portfolio directors. Among all respondents, it was described by 238 of 283 (84.10%) in the lowest score band and 236 of 528 (44.70%) above 3 to 7. One of the 39 above 7 described it. The ordinary band comparison was chi-square = 163.16 (Holm $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.44), with the clustering limitation stated in the methods note.

The 475 respondents who described the manual alteration of reporting recorded a score of 3.17, against 5.03 among the 375 who did not (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). The share describing it declined across the ordered score bands at Spearman rho = −0.43 ($p < 0.001$). The gap between the two groups was widest in the third-party ecosystem (−2.05) and AI technology (−1.86) and narrowest in financial institution readiness (−1.77).

Individual contributors described the manual alteration of reporting at 57.42% (383 of 667). Among individual contributors alone, 82.43% (197 of 239) with a score of 3 or below described it, against 45.79% (185 of 404) above 3 to 7 and 1 of the 24 above 7. Among engagement managers above 3 to 7, 46 of 98 described it, and none of the 10 above 7 did.

The method's open question drew 475 written answers on 125 engagements, and 252 of them were written on canceled engagements. Of the 475, 323 on 114 engagements described a governance indicator failing or a form of a control bypassed or not working, the highest share of the four methods asked about in an open question, and 298 of the 323 described a form. Activity counted in place of

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outcome (109), human-corrected work counted as agent work (51), and failures removed from the base of a reported rate (49) led the forms. The reporting techniques are analyzed one by one under Oversight of Reporting Provided to the Financial Institution.

> *"The vendor's dashboard reported system uptime as the primary health metric, which stayed high even as answer accuracy collapsed, so leadership kept seeing a green status while employees kept getting wrong answers." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The vendor rolled uptime and ticket-closure numbers into one dashboard figure so a stalled procurement match still read as resolved, and nobody flagged the pilot until the client asked for raw supplier-match logs directly." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration) analyzes the method and its techniques in full.

1.5 Third-Party Work Done by Hand

Manual alteration method · 87 of 850 respondents with a written answer describing manual third-party work · Part 5, Third-Party Work Done by Hand

Third-party work done by hand was less sharply concentrated in the lowest score band than the other manual alteration methods. This identifies an external-dependency constraint that can coexist with relatively favorable composite ratings. The upper band also contained isolated data, AI-output, and reporting alteration observations, so this was not the only method present there. The three-band distribution was not monotonically declining.

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Figure 3.104. Third-Party Work Done by Hand, share of respondents using the method, by numeric score band

Third-party work done by hand was less sharply concentrated in the lowest score band than the other manual alteration methods.



Third-party work done by hand was described by 43 of 283 respondents at score 3 or below (15.19%), 40 of 528 above 3 to 7 (7.58%), and four of 39 above 7 (10.26%). The three-band pattern was not monotonically declining. Its categorical association was weaker than those of the other methods, with Cramér's V = 0.12, compared with 0.41–0.51 (Monte Carlo chi-square = 11.64, Holm p = 0.003). The calculation does not resolve dependence among respondents within engagements.

The 87 respondents who described it recorded a score of 3.58, against 4.04 among the other 763 (cluster-robust p = 0.042), and the trend across the ordered score bands was slight (Spearman rho = −0.11, p = 0.002). The gap between the two groups was widest in the third-party ecosystem itself (−0.76) and under 0.45 in the other four categories. At the engagement level the share describing the method was associated with the score at r = −0.14 (p = 0.097, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.05 (p = 0.544).

Engagement managers described the method at the same rate as individual contributors, 11.33% (17 of 150) against 10.34% (69 of 667). Among individual contributors alone, the shares stood at 13.39% (32 of 239) with a score of 3 or below, 8.42% (34 of 404) above 3 to 7, and 3 of the 24 above 7. The 69 individual contributors who described it stood at 3.71, against 3.88 among the other 598 (cluster-robust p = 0.474). After Holm adjustment the pattern differed only by process family and by the count of identified manual alteration methods, the second difference following in part from the definition of that count.

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The 91 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 43 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described figures pulled manually from a provider's display at each reconciliation when the custodian team did not reply, and rates pulled once a week into a workbook that every run read in place of the source.

> *"But we ask custodian team and nothing come back for day, so I just pull number by hand from screen, same routine every reconciliation now" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"How we work around it is not complicated and it is not defensible either, so I may as well set it down. Nothing the agents touch on the outside is under our control, so we stopped letting them touch it. The FX and benchmark rates come down once, on a Tuesday, pulled by one of my analysts into a workbook that sits on our own drive, and every run that week reads from the workbook rather than from the source. It means the numbers are stale by design. It also means that when a provider renames a field mid-week, which happens twice in the two months we run this, the models keep producing output instead of failing, and we find out on the following Tuesday when the pull breaks, rather than at four in the morning on a deadline.*
> *I would not put this in a status report. It is a cache with a person in front of it, and the person is a qualified analyst spending Tuesday mornings on a download. But we are two months into a pilot and the alternative is a model that stops mid-run with nobody able to say why, in front of a client already halfway out the door." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Third-Party Work Done by Hand) analyzes the method in full.

1.6 Regular Manual Alteration by the Wider Team

Rated items · Agreement that the wider team regularly altered data, processes, and AI outputs · 773, 779, and 665 respondents · Part 5, section 1.2 of each method

Ratings of regular manual alteration by the wider team were inversely associated with the score for data, processes, and AI outputs. These measures concern whether manual work is an ordinary feature of delivery rather than an isolated correction by the respondent. Their common direction connects collective practice with the reported control environment. Their separate control implications concern input preparation, departures from the intended process, and human correction of delivered outputs.

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Figure 3.105. The three wider-team items: signed correlations with the engagement score.

Ratings of regular manual alteration by the wider team were inversely associated with the score for data, processes, and AI outputs.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

Negative values indicate lower scores with more regular reported manual alteration. The text reports each item and its uncertainty separately.

At the engagement level, agreement that the wider team regularly altered the financial institution's processes was associated with the score at r = −0.85 (95% CI −0.89 to −0.80). Agreement on data stood at −0.83 (95% CI −0.87 to −0.77) and agreement on AI outputs at −0.67 (95% CI −0.75 to −0.57).

Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data (C203). For data, agreement that the wider team regularly performed manual alteration correlated with the score at r = −0.83 across engagements (95% CI −0.87 to −0.77, n = 150). The adjusted association was partial r = −0.24 (nominal p = 0.003). At respondent level, r was −0.79 among 773 numeric answers, with the reported cluster-robust p < 0.001. The governance issue is routine input correction becoming part of collective delivery practice.

Manual alteration of financial institution processes (C209). For processes, the engagement correlation was r = −0.85 (95% CI −0.89 to −0.80, n = 150), with partial r = −0.55 after adjustment (nominal p < 0.001). The respondent correlation was −0.83 among 779 answers, with cluster-robust p < 0.001. This indicates a strong inverse association between perceived regular process intervention and the score, without establishing how much work was altered or who authorized it.

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Manual alteration of AI outputs (C215). For AI outputs, the engagement correlation was r = −0.67 (95% CI −0.75 to −0.57, n = 150), with partial r = −0.30 after adjustment (nominal p < 0.001). The respondent correlation was −0.71 among 665 answers, with cluster-robust p < 0.001. The control question concerns routine human correction of the agents' delivered work and its visibility in review and reporting. No score-by-rating-band calculation is reported for these three wider-team items, so their analysis remains association based.

> *“But i do not report it, i just correct it and carry on. it happens on most files, my team all do the same, nobody raise it up officially.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“Decision rights score is one out of ten, everyone on my team feels same, nobody upstairs decides so we all just decide alone every day” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“please understand I cannot explain why it changes, I just check twice before it goes out, this is normal now for whole team...” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

Part 5 reports the three ratings in section 1.2 of the analysis of each method.

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2 Oversight of Reporting Provided to the Financial Institution

Reporting measures connect the information received by the financial institution with the wider control environment. Reported accuracy and agreement about vendor reporting alteration retained conditional associations in the main model. Written reporting techniques generally had weaker adjusted relationships. The five-year item requires an experience-qualified base and remains a retrospective perception. Each technique identifies a different limit on the information available for oversight.

Table 3.16. The three rated reporting items and the seven reporting techniques against the score

Rated indicator or reporting technique	Base	Engagements	The score, distressed or describing against the rest (p)	Engagement r (p)	Adjusted partial r (p)
Accuracy of the reports	220 of 794 distressed	150	2.28 against 4.68 (p < 0.001)	0.80 (p < 0.001)	0.24 (p = 0.003)
Vendor manual alteration of the reports	235 of 786 distressed	150	2.37 against 4.65 (p < 0.001)	0.77 (p < 0.001)	0.19 (p = 0.019)
Perceived reporting change compared with five years earlier	39 of 176 rated 8–10	150	2.65 against 4.93 (descriptive)	−0.62 (p < 0.001)	−0.08 (p = 0.354)
Activity counted in place of outcome	112 answers from 111 respondents	78	3.15 against 4.12 (p < 0.001)	−0.33 (p < 0.001)	−0.01 (p = 0.890)
Human-corrected work counted as agent work	52 answers from 52 respondents	45	3.65 against 4.02 (p = 0.113)	−0.12 (p = 0.135)	0.10 (p = 0.242)
Failures removed from the base of a reported rate	50 answers from 50 respondents	39	3.46 against 4.03 (p = 0.017)	−0.16 (p = 0.049)	−0.06 (p = 0.436)
Measures restricted to the parseable subset	38 answers from 38 respondents	32	3.30 against 4.03 (p = 0.015)	−0.18 (p = 0.031)	0.01 (p = 0.944)

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Rated indicator or reporting technique	Base	Engagements	The score, distressed or describing against the rest (p)	Engagement r (p)	Adjusted partial r (p)
Accuracy reported on a selected validation set	18 answers from 18 respondents	16	2.76 against 4.02 (p < 0.001)	−0.22 (p = 0.007)	−0.02 (p = 0.797)
Readiness or completion reported falsely	20 answers from 20 respondents	14	2.79 against 4.02 (p < 0.001)	−0.15 (p = 0.071)	−0.09 (p = 0.296)
Exceptions omitted from reports	23 answers from 23 respondents	20	2.67 against 4.03 (p < 0.001)	−0.22 (p = 0.006)	−0.07 (p = 0.426)

Note: For rated reporting items, r is the engagement-level association with the governance, oversight, and control score, using the item's stated direction. For written techniques, r relates the engagement's share describing the pattern to the score. The usual base is 150 engagements. C054 uses only numeric answers from respondents with at least five recorded career years, and its paired engagement base is reported separately. Partial r accounts for the mean of the 53 indicators outside the score. Its p values are nominal. Written nonmention is not confirmed absence of a technique. C054 is reported in its raw direction, where higher ratings indicate more perceived reporting alteration than five years earlier. Its negative correlation is not the favorable-direction coefficient used for the other adverse item.

2.1 Accuracy of the Reports Given to the Financial Institution

Survey item C052 · The dashboard and performance reports given to the customer are accurate · Analyzed as a reporting measure in Part 5, Manual Alteration of Reporting Provided to the Financial Institution, section 1.1

Low reported accuracy of the information supplied to the financial institution was associated with low scores. This places the reporting channel within the governance analysis: oversight depends on a sufficiently faithful account of performance. The positive adjusted association qualifies the finding under the specified comparison model. The measure is a respondent assessment and does not independently audit the reports' arithmetic or completeness.

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Figure 3.106. Accuracy of the Reports Given to the Financial Institution: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Low reported accuracy of the information supplied to the financial institution was associated with low scores.



Note: The score uses all 47 governance indicators. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

Respondents who rated the accuracy of the reports 1 to 3 recorded a score of 2.28 (n = 220), against 4.68 among the other 574 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Of the 220, 173 (78.64%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 492 who rated accuracy 4 to 7, 87 (17.68%) did, and none of the 82 who rated it 8 to 10 did (chi-square = 300.99, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.62).

Accuracy was associated with the score at r = 0.80 (95% CI 0.73 to 0.85, n = 150 engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the adjusted estimate was partial r = 0.24 ($p = 0.003$), the strongest adjusted association of the three reporting items. The item sits outside the 47 governance indicators, so no cross-category measure applies.

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at r = 0.72 and across the active stages at 0.62 in Build-Out, 0.74 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.78 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.79 among individual contributors, 0.77 among engagement managers, and 0.66 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 81.42% (149 of 183) of those who rated accuracy 1 to 3 had a score of 3 or below.

The item drew 468 written answers from 453 respondents on 125 engagements, and 467 of them were negative, 248 from canceled and 219 from active engagements. Of the 467, 304 (65.10%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working, most often activity counted in place of outcome (112), human-corrected work counted as agent work (51), and failures removed from the base of a

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reported rate (50). The answers described dashboards that counted throughput and left out the decisions people reversed, and savings measured against a baseline drawn from the same faulty data.

> *"The compliance dashboard tracked case throughput but not the rate of overridden agent decisions, so the volume of onboarding cases processed looked healthy while the growing number of decisions compliance staff had to quietly reverse never surfaced anywhere." - Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"The vendor's procurement dashboard reported cost savings using the agent's recommended price against an unverified prior baseline pulled from the same broken supplier master, so the savings number could not be trusted." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 1.1) reports the accuracy of the reports as a reporting measure.

2.2 Vendor Manual Alteration of the Reports Given to the Financial Institution

Survey item C053 · The vendor manipulates the dashboard and performance reports given to the customer · Analyzed as a reporting measure in Part 5, Manual Alteration of Reporting Provided to the Financial Institution, section 1.2

Greater agreement that the vendor alters its reporting was associated with lower scores when the item's direction is interpreted consistently. This concerns intervention in the information used for oversight, distinct from correcting operational data or outputs. The reported association supports examining the integrity of that information channel. It does not establish the motive, authorization, or effect of every reporting change.

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Figure 3.107. Vendor manual alteration of the Reports Given to the Financial Institution: share with a score of 3 or below by indicator rating.

Greater agreement that the vendor alters its reporting was associated with lower scores when the item's direction is interpreted consistently.



Note: The score uses all 47 governance indicators. Labels give the low-score numerator and the answering base. Zero observations in a band do not establish absence of risk.

The item was read on its favorable end, so its distressed group comprised the 235 of 786 respondents who rated the vendor's manual alteration of the reports above 7. They recorded a score of 2.37, against 4.65 among the other 551 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Of the 235, 179 (76.17%) had a score of 3 or below. Among the 469 who rated the item 4 to 7, 86 (18.34%) did, and none of the 82 who rated manual alteration least likely did (chi-square = 280.87, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.60).

The item was associated with the score at $r = 0.77$ (95% CI 0.70 to 0.83, n = 150 engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, the adjusted estimate was partial $r = 0.19$ ($p = 0.019$).

The association was observed within the canceled engagements at $r = 0.66$ and across the active stages at 0.57 in Build-Out, 0.71 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 0.78 in Production. After Holm adjustment, it was significant in 85 of the 87 segment levels tested. Within role it stood at 0.76 among individual contributors and engagement managers alike and 0.63 among portfolio directors. Among individual contributors alone, 77.89% (155 of 199) of those in the distressed group had a score of 3 or below.

The written answers on the vendor's manual alteration of the reports were largely those on their accuracy, with 460 answers judged on both items. The item drew 465 answers from 456 respondents on 125 engagements, and 464 of them were negative, 246 from canceled and 218 from active engagements. Of the 464, 304 (65.52%) described one of the 26 forms of a control bypassed or not working. One individual

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contributor described requisitions logged as processed with an override flag that never reached the weekly summary, and another described a benchmark for return on investment revised downward twice.

> *"Purchase requisitions the agent could not match to a valid supplier record were logged as processed with a manual override flag that never surfaced in the weekly summary the customer received." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The vendor reported ROI against a benchmark case that was quietly revised downward twice since the pilot began, so the same percentage improvement appeared each quarter despite the underlying baseline having shifted." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 1.2) reports the vendor's manual alteration of the reports as a reporting measure.

2.3 Perceived Reporting Change Compared With Five Years Earlier

Survey item C054 · Compared to 5 years ago, is manipulation of the dashboards and performance reports given to the customer more or less common now? · Analyzed as a reporting measure in Part 5, Manual Alteration of Reporting Provided to the Financial Institution, section 1.3

The five-year reporting item requires an experience-qualified interpretation. Only respondents with at least five recorded career years can support the study's intended comparison with earlier work. Their answers remain retrospective perceptions, not measured changes in reporting practice. The governance question is whether perceived reporting alteration is associated with the current control environment, with both the eligibility restriction and the paired analysis base explicit.

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Figure 3.108. Perceived five-year reporting change and scores of 3 or below among 176 eligible respondents.

Experience-qualified retrospective reporting ratings differed across score groups



Note: The 567 respondents below five career years and 52 with unknown career length are excluded. Higher indicator ratings mean a perceived increase, not measured historical change.

Of the 795 numeric C054 answers, 176 met the rule of at least five recorded career years. The exclusions were 567 respondents with less than five years and 52 with unknown career length. The eligible base comprised 150 engagement managers, 24 portfolio directors, and two customer management executives, with no individual contributors. This is a substantial scope limitation. The study design allowed answers from people without the intended experience, and the eligible result describes management-level perceptions rather than the full delivery workforce.

Among eligible respondents, the 39 rating the perceived increase at 8–10 had a mean score of 2.65, compared with 4.93 among the other 137. Scores were 3 or below for 27 of those 39 (69.23%), 17 of the 105 rating the item at 4–7 (16.19%), and none of the 32 rating it at 1–3. These respondent comparisons are descriptive.

All 150 engagements had at least one eligible C054 answer. Engagement item means calculated from eligible respondents correlated with the existing full engagement score at $r = -0.62$ (95% CI −0.71 to −0.51, $p < 0.001$). Higher raw C054 ratings indicate a perceived increase in reporting alteration. After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators, partial r was −0.08 (95% CI −0.23 to 0.09, nominal $p = 0.354$). The adjusted association was not clearly detected.

The paired engagement score and comparison mean retain their existing all-respondent definitions. Only C054's answering base is experience restricted. This distinction avoids redefining the paper's outcome

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for one item, but the two measures represent different respondent bases. The comparison remains retrospective perception and does not establish an actual five-year trend, its causes, or a relationship independent of management role.

> *"The tool I used on the fraud desk before this was dumber but it told you when it wasnt sure. This one says done and closed and the ticket is still open underneath. Thats the part that got me. And I dont trust its own numbers on how many alerts it cleared" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"On the reporting engagement I ran before this one, we could never show a reviewer how a number had been arrived at. Here every step is evidenced and their audit people accepted it in the first sitting. The tool permissions still need watching." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 1.3) reports the change in reporting alteration as a reporting measure.

2.4 Activity Counted in Place of Outcome

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 112 answers from 111 respondents on 78 engagements · Analyzed as a reporting technique in Part 5, Reporting alteration, section 2.1

Counting activity in place of outcomes was described by respondents with lower mean scores. The governance issue is whether the measure used to oversee work represents useful completion or simply recorded action. The adjusted engagement association was near zero under the main model. This limits the statistical claim while preserving the substantive difference between activity evidence and outcome evidence.

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Figure 3.109. Activity Counted in Place of Outcome: descriptive mean score comparison.

Counting activity in place of outcomes was described by respondents with lower mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 111 respondents who described it recorded a score of 3.15, against 4.12 among the other 739 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 87 who described it stood at 3.08, against 3.98 among the other 580 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share describing the technique was associated with the score at $r = -0.33$ ($p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = -0.01$ ($p = 0.890$).

The technique was described by 20.14% (57 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 10.23% (54 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 20.81% of respondents on canceled engagements, against 5.83% to 9.71% across the active stages, and by 21.82% in the lowest indicator quintile against 5.62% in the highest. Engagement managers described it at 15.33% (23 of 150) and individual contributors at 13.04% (87 of 667), with no clearly detected difference by role after Holm adjustment. After Holm adjustment it differed by indicator quintile, management's understanding of the obligations, the financial institution's discussion of them, regulatory training, the count of identified manual alteration methods, and intent to leave.

The 112 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 68 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described oversight counted by the transactions routed for review

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rather than those reviewed, and deliverables counted as shipped on schedule with no field for those returned after review.

> *"The vendor reports human-in-the-loop oversight coverage as a percentage of transactions routed for review, not the percentage actually reviewed before the transaction cleared, so a backlog of unreviewed items never dents the dashboard number." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *"The vendor's status reports tracked deliverables shipped on schedule without a field for how many were later flagged and reworked after banker review, so the on-time metric stayed green while trust in the output was already collapsing." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 2.1) analyzes the technique under its own reading of the answers on the manual alteration of reporting.

2.5 Human-Corrected Work Counted as Agent Work

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 52 answers from 52 respondents on 45 engagements · Analyzed as a reporting technique in Part 5, Reporting alteration, section 2.2

Accounts of human-corrected work being credited as agent work did not show a clearly detected score relationship. Their governance relevance lies in visibility of the human contribution to reported performance. A composite score and a description of reporting practice measure different things. The pattern remains a distinct finding even where the analysis does not establish a separate association with the broader score.

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Figure 3.110. Human-Corrected Work Counted as Agent Work: descriptive mean score comparison.

Accounts of human-corrected work being credited as agent work did not show a clearly detected score relationship.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 52 respondents who described it recorded a score of 3.65, against 4.02 among the other 798 (cluster-robust p = 0.113). Among individual contributors alone, the 44 who described it stood at 3.55, against 3.89 among the other 623 (cluster-robust p = 0.190).

At the engagement level the share describing the technique was associated with the score at r = −0.12 (p = 0.135, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = 0.10 (p = 0.242).

The technique was described by 7.07% (20 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 5.87% (31 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 1 of the 39 above 7. It was described by 7.76% of respondents on canceled engagements against 4.57% to 5.60% across the active stages, and by individual contributors at 6.60% (44 of 667) and engagement managers at 5.33% (8 of 150). It differed in no segment family after Holm adjustment.

The 52 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 25 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described quality pass rates calculated after a reviewer had already corrected the output, and fails corrected by a person counted with the fails the agent had resolved on its own.

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> *"The vendor reported QA pass rates against agent outputs that had already been silently corrected by a human reviewer before scoring, so the dashboard never reflected the raw error rate the client was actually exposed to." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"The vendor rolled settlement fails that were manually corrected by a human into the same success bucket as fails the agent resolved on its own, which overstated how much the agent was actually doing correctly." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 2.2) analyzes the technique under its own reading of the answers on the manual alteration of reporting.

2.6 Failures Removed From the Base of a Reported Rate

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 50 answers from 50 respondents on 39 engagements · Analyzed as a reporting technique in Part 5, Reporting alteration, section 2.3

Removing failures from the denominator of a reported rate was associated with lower mean scores among the respondents describing it. This affects the population to which an oversight measure refers: excluding unsuccessful work can change what a rate tells the financial institution. The overall respondent contrast, individual-contributor contrast, and adjusted engagement result differ in strength. Those differences should remain explicit rather than being compressed into one assertion of failure.

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Figure 3.111. Failures Removed From the Base of a Reported Rate: descriptive mean score comparison.

Removing failures from the denominator of a reported rate was associated with lower mean scores among the respondents describing it.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 50 respondents who described it recorded a score of 3.46, against 4.03 among the other 800 (cluster-robust p = 0.017). Among individual contributors alone, the 37 who described it stood at 3.43, against 3.89 among the other 630 (cluster-robust p = 0.111).

At the engagement level the share describing the technique was associated with the score at r = −0.16 (p = 0.049, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.06 (p = 0.436).

The technique was described by 7.42% (21 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 5.49% (29 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 6.86% of respondents in Build-Out, 5.60% in Transition/Cut-Over, 3.88% in Production, and 6.21% on canceled engagements, so it was no more frequent on canceled engagements than in Build-Out. Engagement managers described it at 8.67% (13 of 150) and individual contributors at 5.55% (37 of 667), and no segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 50 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 20 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described accuracy rates that left out each recommendation the agent flagged as low in confidence, and release success rates that left out any release rolled back within the first hour.

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> *"Underwriting recommendations the agent flagged as low-confidence get excluded from the accuracy metric entirely, which raises the reported accuracy rate above what the full recommendation set would show." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"Release-governance dashboards report deployment success against a target that silently excludes any release requiring a rollback within the first hour, so the failure rate the customer sees is well below what actually happened in production." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 2.3) analyzes the technique under its own reading of the answers on the manual alteration of reporting.

2.7 Measures Restricted to the Parseable Subset

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 38 answers from 38 respondents on 32 engagements · Analyzed as a reporting technique in Part 5, Reporting alteration, section 2.4

Restricting measurement to parseable cases was described by respondents with lower mean scores. A result calculated only from parseable cases describes the work the measurement process can read. The adjusted engagement analysis did not detect a clear separate relationship. The accounts identify a selection issue without independently establishing the arithmetic or adequacy of every affected report.

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Figure 3.112. Measures Restricted to the Parseable Subset: descriptive mean score comparison.

Restricting measurement to parseable cases was described by respondents with lower mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 38 respondents who described the technique recorded a score of 3.30, against 4.03 among the other 812 (cluster-robust p = 0.015). Among individual contributors alone, the 34 who described it stood at 3.27, against 3.90 among the other 633 (cluster-robust p = 0.057).

At the engagement level the share describing the technique was associated with the score at r = −0.18 (p = 0.031, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = 0.01 (p = 0.944).

The technique was described by 6.01% (17 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 3.98% (21 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 5.90% of respondents on canceled engagements against 2.29% to 4.40% across the active stages, and by 5.45% in the lowest indicator quintile against 1.25% in the highest. Individual contributors described it at 5.10% (34 of 667) and engagement managers at 2.67% (4 of 150), and no segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 38 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 19 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described compliance with data residency checked once at ingestion, and access trails that logged only the grants made through the standard workflow.

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> *"The vendor logs data residency compliance by checking the storage region at ingestion only, so data later copied or cached outside that region during processing never shows up as a violation on the dashboard." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The vendor's access-control dashboard only logged provisioning events initiated through the standard workflow, so grants pushed through an emergency change process during the incident never appeared in the audit trail the bank later tried to reconstruct." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 2.4) analyzes the technique under its own reading of the answers on the manual alteration of reporting.

2.8 Accuracy Reported on a Validation Set Excluding the Hardest Cases

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 18 answers from 18 respondents on 16 engagements · Analyzed as a reporting technique in Part 5, Reporting alteration, section 2.5

Selected validation sets that excluded difficult cases were described by a small group with low mean scores. Their governance relevance is the relationship between evidence used to demonstrate readiness and the work the agents must perform in operation. The accounts do not independently audit the validation sets or estimate their error rates. The small written base and the inconclusive adjusted association limit broader inference.

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Figure 3.113. Accuracy Reported on a Validation Set Excluding the Hardest Cases: descriptive mean score comparison.

Selected validation sets that excluded difficult cases were described by a small group with low mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 18 respondents who described it, a small base, recorded a score of 2.76, against 4.02 among the other 832 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 11 who described it stood at 2.90, against 3.88 among the other 656 (cluster-robust $p = 0.056$).

At the engagement level the share describing the technique was associated with the score at $r = -0.22$ ($p = 0.007$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = -0.02$ ($p = 0.797$).

The technique was described by 11 of the 283 respondents with a score of 3 or below, 7 of the 528 above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 3.42% of respondents on canceled engagements against 0.97% to 1.60% across the active stages, and by none of the 160 respondents in the highest indicator quintile. Engagement managers described it at 4.67% (7 of 150) and individual contributors at 1.65% (11 of 667), with no clearly detected difference by role after Holm adjustment.

The 18 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 11 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described accuracy measured on scripted test queries in place of live tickets, and a batch rerun on a curated subset of clean accounts before each monthly steering review.

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> *"The vendor's help-desk dashboard reports agent accuracy using a sample of scripted test queries rather than real employee tickets, so the reported accuracy never reflected the failure rate we saw in production." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Before the monthly steering review, the vendor reruns the surveillance batch on a curated subset of accounts with clean exposure histories, so the QA sample looks stable even though the production feed is still full of legacy data gaps." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 2.5) analyzes the technique under its own reading of the answers on the manual alteration of reporting.

2.9 Readiness or Completion Status Reported Falsely

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 20 answers from 20 respondents on 14 engagements · Analyzed as a reporting technique in Part 5, Reporting alteration, section 3.4

False readiness or completion status was described by respondents with lower mean scores, without a clearly detected corresponding engagement-level association. This is a distinct information-control concern because readiness and completion can determine whether work proceeds or is accepted. The two analytical levels describe different comparisons. Their difference should not be used to deny the respondent finding or exaggerate its engagement-wide reach.

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Figure 3.114. Readiness or Completion Status Reported Falsely: descriptive mean score comparison.

False readiness or completion status was described by respondents with lower mean scores, without a clearly detected corresponding engagement-level association.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 20 respondents who described them, a small base, recorded a score of 2.79, against 4.02 among the other 830 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 16 who described them stood at 2.71, against 3.89 among the other 651 (cluster-robust $p = 0.004$).

At the engagement level the share describing the technique was associated with the score at $r = -0.15$ ($p = 0.071$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = -0.09$ ($p = 0.296$).

The technique was described by 12 of the 283 respondents with a score of 3 or below, 8 of the 528 above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. Fourteen of the 20 respondents were on canceled engagements, where 4.35% described it against 0.40% to 2.29% across the active stages. Individual contributors described it at 2.40% (16 of 667) and engagement managers at 2.67% (4 of 150), and no segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 20 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 14 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described letters marked as reviewed once a keyword filter passed, and runbooks reported as complete after the subject matter experts had flagged them as out of date.

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> *"The vendor's compliance dashboard flagged drafts as 'reviewed' based on a keyword filter passing, not on a human actually reading the letter, so the one non-compliant investor letter cleared the report the same day it went out the door." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"Leadership kept reporting the legacy runbooks as complete in the dashboard even after SMEs flagged them stale, so the readiness score stayed green while the actual documentation coverage was under half." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 3.4) analyzes the technique under its own reading of the answers on the manual alteration of reporting.

2.10 Information Withheld From the Financial Institution

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 23 answers from 23 respondents on 20 engagements · Analyzed as a reporting technique in Part 5, Reporting alteration, section 4.1

Withholding recorded information from the financial institution was associated with lower mean scores among the respondents describing it. This concerns the boundary between information known within delivery and information available to the institution's oversight. It differs from a respondent simply not knowing whether disclosure occurred. The small base and the lack of a clearly detected adjusted association limit any broader inference.

Figure 3.115. Information Withheld From the Financial Institution: descriptive mean score comparison.

Withholding recorded information from the financial institution was associated with lower mean scores among the respondents describing it.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

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The 23 respondents who described it, a small base, recorded a score of 2.67, against 4.03 among the other 827 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 20 who described it stood at 2.54, against 3.91 among the other 647 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share describing the technique was associated with the score at $r = -0.22$ ($p = 0.006$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = -0.07$ ($p = 0.426$).

The technique was described by 15 of the 283 respondents with a score of 3 or below, 8 of the 528 above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 3.88% of respondents in Production and 3.42% on canceled engagements, against 1.14% in Build-Out and 2.40% in Transition/Cut-Over. After Holm adjustment it differed only by the count of identified manual alteration methods.

The 23 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 11 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described errors flagged by the financial institution routed to a separate queue that never reached the shared dashboard, and access logs kept in a console never connected to the reports a steering committee reviewed.

> *"The vendor routes any privileged-grant error flagged by the client through a separate remediation queue that never syncs back to the shared KPI dashboard, so the error rate the client sees stays lower than the actual incident count." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"Access logs for the procurement agents were kept in a separate identity-management console that was never connected to the joint reporting dashboard, so unresolved provisioning and access issues never appeared in the numbers the steering committee actually reviewed." - Portfolio Director, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 4.1) analyzes the technique under its own reading of the answers on the manual alteration of reporting.

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3 Escalation, Disclosure, and Record of Manual Alteration

Internal discussion, external disclosure, escalation, and logging describe different forms of visibility over manual work. The structured discussion items showed higher mean scores among respondents who discussed the work, while written accounts described explicit nondisclosure, unknown disclosure, and unanswered escalation. Unlogged work retained a negative adjusted association. The findings concern reported visibility, with different eligible bases and no comprehensive disclosure audit.

Table 3.17. The three items on internal discussion and the nine written patterns of disclosure, escalation, and logging against the score

Item or written pattern	Base	Engagements	The score, yes or describing against the rest (p)	Engagement r (p)	Adjusted partial r (p)
Discussed data manual alteration with internal management	292 of 401 answered yes	126	3.36 against 2.40 (p < 0.001)	0.20 (p = 0.028)	0.10 (p = 0.256)
Discussed process manual alteration with internal management	341 of 459 answered yes	132	3.65 against 2.41 (p < 0.001)	0.30 (p < 0.001)	0.08 (p = 0.339)
Discussed AI output manual alteration with internal management	150 of 253 answered yes	104	3.08 against 2.29 (p < 0.001)	0.20 (p = 0.037)	0.12 (p = 0.235)
Disclosure within the vendor	485 answers from 350 respondents	132	3.78 against 4.14 (p = 0.020)	−0.19 (p = 0.023)	−0.11 (p = 0.191)
Financial institution explicitly not informed	178 answers from 139 respondents	73	3.37 against 4.12 (p < 0.001)	−0.23 (p = 0.005)	0.00 (p = 0.955)
Financial institution told	31 answers from 26 respondents	23	2.84 against 4.03 (p < 0.001)	−0.30 (p < 0.001)	−0.06 (p = 0.482)
Disclosure unknown to the respondent	30 answers from 25 respondents	20	3.18 against 4.02 (p = 0.003)	−0.20 (p = 0.015)	−0.03 (p = 0.728)

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Item or written pattern	Base	Engagements	The score, yes or describing against the rest (p)	Engagement r (p)	Adjusted partial r (p)
Problems raised with no response	326 answers from 255 respondents	119	3.17 against 4.35 (p < 0.001)	−0.57 (p < 0.001)	−0.05 (p = 0.520)
Raising problems seen as futile	149 answers from 122 respondents	81	2.69 against 4.21 (p < 0.001)	−0.49 (p < 0.001)	−0.22 (p = 0.008)
Instructed not to raise the problem	20 answers from 15 respondents	12	2.46 against 4.02 (p < 0.001)	−0.24 (p = 0.003)	−0.04 (p = 0.588)
Manual alteration disclosed to no party	59 answers from 55 respondents	39	2.62 against 4.09 (p < 0.001)	−0.30 (p < 0.001)	−0.10 (p = 0.235)
Manual alteration not logged or only partly logged	143 answers from 118 respondents	72	3.14 against 4.13 (p < 0.001)	−0.30 (p < 0.001)	−0.26 (p = 0.001)

Note: The three structured discussion questions were asked only of users of the respective manual method. Respondent and engagement bases are restricted to those with an answer to that question. The nine written patterns use the stated written-answer source and all 150 engagements. Disclosure within the vendor, disclosure to the financial institution, explicit nondisclosure, and unknown disclosure are different observations. Nonmention is not a confirmed negative response. Adjusted p values are nominal unless stated otherwise.

3.1 Internal Discussion of Manual Alteration of Data

Survey item C200 · I discussed the data alteration with internal management · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 1.1

Among respondents who manually altered data, those reporting internal discussion had higher mean scores than those who did not. This connects management visibility of manual work with the reported control environment. Internal discussion is not the same as disclosure to the financial institution or formal authorization. The engagement-level adjusted result was less conclusive, and the analysis applies to the eligible method users who answered.

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Figure 3.116. Internal Discussion of Manual Alteration of Data: mean score among eligible method users with an answer.

Among respondents who manually altered data, those reporting internal discussion had higher mean scores than those who did not.



Note: The engagement-level adjusted relationship is reported separately. Discussion is not a tested cause of the score difference.

The item was put only to respondents who had altered data, and 292 of the 401 who answered (72.82%) had discussed the manual alteration with internal management. They recorded a score of 3.36, against 2.40 among the 109 who had not (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share raising the manual alteration was associated with the score at $r = 0.20$ (95% CI 0.02 to 0.36, $p = 0.028$, $n = 126$ engagements with an answer), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = 0.10$ ($p = 0.256$).

Discussion with management rose with the engagement's standing, from 67.77% (82 of 121) in the lowest indicator quintile to 93.94% (31 of 33) in the highest. It stood at 65.71% (138 of 210) on canceled engagements, against 76.47% to 84.06% across the active stages. Individual contributors gave 398 of the 401 answers, and 289 of them (72.61%) had raised the manual alteration. After Holm adjustment the share differed by indicator quintile, engagement status, the respondent's understanding of the obligations, the financial institution's discussion of them, regulatory training, the count of identified manual alteration methods, and intent to leave.

The disclosure question for data drew 417 written answers on 127 engagements, and 221 of them were written on canceled engagements. Of the 417, 250 described a governance indicator failing or a form of a control bypassed or not working, led by the financial institution explicitly not informed (67) and problems raised with no response (59). Respondents described raising the manual alteration with a team

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lead and receiving an instruction to manage it, and discussing it at each retrospective while the source went unfixed.

> *"i tell my TL, kindly he say just manage it... we do the same thing every week, i keep no record of the informations i change." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I told my manager, not the client. Given that we just merge duplicates and move on - we discuss about it every retro but in addition nobody upstream ever fixes the actual source." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 1.1) reports the discussion of manual alteration of data with internal management.

3.2 Internal Discussion of Manual Alteration of Processes

Survey item C206 · I discussed the process alteration with internal management · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 1.2

Among respondents who manually altered processes, internal discussion was associated with higher mean scores. The governance issue is whether departures from the expected workflow become visible within the vendor's management. Discussion can be present while external disclosure or a formal record remains absent. The comparison is restricted to method users, and the adjusted engagement association was not clearly detected.

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Figure 3.117. Internal Discussion of Manual Alteration of Processes: mean score among eligible method users with an answer.

Among respondents who manually altered processes, internal discussion was associated with higher mean scores.



Note: The engagement-level adjusted relationship is reported separately. Discussion is not a tested cause of the score difference.

The item was put only to respondents who had altered processes, and 341 of the 459 who answered (74.29%) had discussed the manual alteration with internal management. They recorded a score of 3.65, against 2.41 among the 118 who had not (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share raising the manual alteration was associated with the score at $r = 0.30$ (95% CI 0.14 to 0.45, $p < 0.001$, $n = 132$ engagements with an answer), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = 0.08$ ($p = 0.339$).

Discussion with management rose from 67.44% (87 of 129) in the lowest indicator quintile to 95.35% (41 of 43) in the highest. It stood at 64.19% (138 of 215) on canceled engagements, against 81.94% to 84.25% across the active stages. Individual contributors gave 450 of the 459 answers, and all nine engagement managers who answered had raised the manual alteration. After Holm adjustment the share differed by indicator quintile, the respondent's understanding of the obligations, the financial institution's discussion of them, regulatory training, the count of identified manual alteration methods, and intent to leave, and it did not differ by engagement status.

The disclosure question for processes drew 504 written answers on 133 engagements, and 248 of them were written on canceled engagements. Of the 504, 283 described a governance indicator failing or a form of a control bypassed or not working, led by problems raised with no response (73), the financial institution explicitly not informed (71), and manual alteration not logged or only partly logged (52).

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Respondents described a manager who heard of the manual alteration and did nothing, and a ticket that took days against a fix that took an hour.

> *"But this is just the same pattern every week, i tell my manager and he shrug, kindly nobody ever push back to client about undefined process" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"This is basically every week now, my manager knows about it. Ticket takes days to clear, fix itself takes an hour, so waiting on the ticket process makes no sense when the job needs doing" - Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 1.2) reports the discussion of manual alteration of processes with internal management.

3.3 Internal Discussion of Manual Alteration of AI Outputs

Survey item C212 · I discussed the AI output alteration with internal management · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 1.3

Internal discussion of manual AI-output alteration was less commonly reported than discussion of data or process alteration. Those reporting discussion nevertheless had higher mean scores. This connects visibility of human output correction with the control environment, while leaving its authorization and external disclosure as separate questions. The findings concern the eligible users who answered and do not identify why others did not discuss the work.

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Figure 3.118. Internal Discussion of Manual Alteration of AI Outputs: mean score among eligible method users with an answer.

Internal discussion of manual AI-output alteration was less commonly reported than discussion of data or process alteration.



Note: The engagement-level adjusted relationship is reported separately. Discussion is not a tested cause of the score difference.

The item was put only to respondents who had altered AI outputs, and 150 of the 253 who answered (59.29%) had discussed the manual alteration with internal management, against 72.82% for data and 74.29% for processes. They recorded a score of 3.08, against 2.29 among the 103 who had not (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share raising the manual alteration was associated with the score at $r = 0.20$ (95% CI 0.01 to 0.38, $p = 0.037$, $n = 104$ engagements with an answer), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = 0.12$ ($p = 0.235$).

Discussion with management stood at 51.72% (45 of 87) in the lowest indicator quintile and 12 of 13 in the highest, without a steady rise between them. Across engagement status it ranged from 54.25% (83 of 153) on canceled engagements to 82.50% (33 of 40) in Transition/Cut-Over, a difference that did not survive Holm adjustment. After Holm adjustment the share differed only by the financial institution's discussion of the obligations, regulatory training, and the count of identified manual alteration methods.

The disclosure question for AI outputs drew 274 written answers on 109 engagements, and 166 of them were written on canceled engagements. Of the 274, 115 described a governance indicator failing or a form of a control bypassed or not working, led by the financial institution explicitly not informed (29), problems raised with no response (19), and manual alteration not logged or only partly logged (19). Respondents

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described telling a lead each time until the instruction to note it and move on ended the raising, and a quality step that existed on paper only.

> *"i tell my lead every time because it happen a lot, kindly they just say note it and move on, it dont change anything so i stop raising the same issue." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"nobody reviews what i change most weeks, thus it just goes through, the qa step exists on paper only" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 1.3) reports the discussion of manual alteration of AI outputs with internal management.

3.4 Disclosure Within the Vendor

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 485 answers from 350 respondents on 132 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 1.4

Disclosure within the vendor was associated with a lower overall respondent mean score, but the contrast was not clearly detected among individual contributors alone. This distinguishes a written disclosure pattern from the structured discussion items asked of method users. The governance interpretation concerns where manual work becomes visible and who reports it. Role composition may help explain the overall contrast, without establishing a complete explanation.

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Figure 3.119. Disclosure Within the Vendor: descriptive mean score comparison.

Disclosure within the vendor was associated with a lower overall respondent mean score, but the contrast was not clearly detected among individual contributors alone.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 350 respondents who described it recorded a score of 3.78, against 4.14 among the other 500 (cluster-robust p = 0.020). Among individual contributors alone, the observed difference was small, at 3.83 among the 338 who described it against 3.90 among the other 329 (cluster-robust p = 0.706). Role composition may contribute to the overall contrast, without providing a complete explanation.

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.19 (p = 0.023, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.11 (p = 0.191).

Individual contributors described disclosure within the vendor at 50.67% (338 of 667), engagement managers at 8.00% (12 of 150), and no portfolio director did, a difference by role that held after Holm adjustment. The pattern was described at 36.89% to 42.55% across engagement status, by 41.70% (118 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below and 43.94% (232 of 528) above 3 to 7, and by none of the 39 above 7. The contrast was not restated among the respondents who altered the work, so it compares all respondents.

The 485 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 211 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described each manual alteration raised with a lead, the lead's knowledge serving as its only log, and processes rebuilt around the workaround from one sprint to the next.

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> *"i tell my lead each time, therefore it's logged with them at least. We chase client for weeks about the same codes and still get nothing back" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"i raise it with my lead only, not client side. We get informations that is already stale, so process gets built around workaround, and it stays that way every sprint." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 1.4) analyzes manual alteration reported to vendor-side management within the answers on the three counted methods.

3.5 Financial Institution Explicitly Not Told

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 178 answers from 139 respondents on 73 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 2.5

Explicit accounts that the financial institution was not told were associated with lower mean scores. Reported nondisclosure identifies a possible gap between operational practice and the information available for financial institution oversight. This identifies reported nondisclosure rather than a respondent's uncertainty, while remaining short of a complete disclosure audit. The 178 written answers represent 139 respondents on 73 engagements.

Figure 3.120. Financial Institution Explicitly Not Told: descriptive mean score comparison.

Explicit accounts that the financial institution was not told were associated with lower mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

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The 139 respondents who described the decision recorded a score of 3.37, against 4.12 among the other 711 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone they stood at 3.37, against 4.00 among the other 528 (cluster-robust $p = 0.002$).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at $r = -0.23$ ($p = 0.005$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = 0.00$ ($p = 0.955$).

All 139 were individual contributors, 20.84% of the 667, and no engagement manager or portfolio director wrote that the financial institution had not been told. The pattern was described by 21.74% of respondents on canceled engagements, against 12.62% to 13.20% across the active stages. It was described by 21.55% (61 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 14.77% (78 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7, and by 23.64% in the lowest indicator quintile against 10.00% in the highest. After Holm adjustment it differed by respondent role, the respondent's understanding of the obligations, the count of identified manual alteration methods, disclosure to the financial institution, and intent to leave.

The 178 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 94 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described a team lead who knew of the manual alteration and a financial institution that did not, and one gave the financial institution's likely reaction as the reason.

> *“it's every single day now. i tell my manager, not the client, they'd panic. i'm just tired of making the call myself with no backup.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“i export data manually and match it by hand because nothing come through api, team know, client does not know, this eat my whole morning some day” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 2.5) analyzes the decision not to tell the financial institution within the answers on the three counted methods.

3.6 Financial Institution Told

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 31 answers from 26 respondents on 23 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 2.4

Accounts explicitly stating that the financial institution was told came from a small group with low mean scores. This finding does not establish that disclosure worsens governance or is ineffective. It may describe disclosure occurring amid existing operational problems, but the study does not establish that sequence. Its value is to distinguish confirmed reported telling from explicit nondisclosure and unknown disclosure.

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Figure 3.121. Financial Institution Told: descriptive mean score comparison.

Accounts explicitly stating that the financial institution was told came from a small group with low mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 26 respondents who described it, a small base, recorded a score of 2.84, against 4.03 among the other 824 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 12 who described it stood at 3.17, against 3.88 among the other 655 (cluster-robust $p = 0.061$).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at $r = -0.30$ ($p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = -0.06$ ($p = 0.482$).

Telling the financial institution rose with seniority, from 1.80% (12 of 667) of individual contributors to 5.33% (8 of 150) of engagement managers and 19.35% (6 of 31) of portfolio directors, a difference by role that held after Holm adjustment. The pattern was described by 4.97% of respondents on canceled engagements, against 0.97% to 2.40% across the active stages, and by 15 of the 283 respondents with a score of 3 or below, 11 of the 528 above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7.

The 31 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 20 of them were written on canceled engagements. Telling did not stop the manual alteration in the accounts of those who described it. An engagement manager wrote that the team flagged the manual alteration to the financial institution and went on doing it, and a portfolio director on another canceled engagement described each process change routed through the joint change-control forum.

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> *"We do flag it, both internally and to the client, but flagging does not stop us doing it, strictly speaking the account still needs the composites finished on time. And, management being aware does not lower how often it happens, it only means nobody is surprised the next time. It wears on the team, watching the correct process fail and having to paper over it regardless of how that looks against the rules." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"What we did, throughout this engagement, was route every process change through the joint change-control forum — so, nothing was altered without the client's calculation-methodology owner present. Attribution exceptions were raised, discussed and signed off before any workaround was applied; on top of that, that discipline held even as the account came under pressure. We do not deviate from the agreed process — on that basis the low frequency, six occasions in total, all minuted and shared with the client." -Portfolio Director, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 2.4) analyzes the answers stating that the financial institution knew of the manual alteration within the answers on the three counted methods.

3.7 Disclosure Unknown to the Respondent

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 30 answers from 25 respondents on 20 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 2.6

Uncertainty about whether the financial institution had been told was associated with lower mean scores in the small group describing it. This identifies a visibility limit within the delivery workforce, rather than confirmed concealment or confirmed disclosure. The distinction matters because staff performing manual work may not know how it is communicated elsewhere. The analysis cannot resolve that uncertainty from nonmention.

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Figure 3.122. Disclosure Unknown to the Respondent: descriptive mean score comparison.

Uncertainty about whether the financial institution had been told was associated with lower mean scores in the small group describing it.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 25 respondents who described the uncertainty, a small base, recorded a score of 3.18, against 4.02 among the other 825 (cluster-robust p = 0.003). All 25 were individual contributors, and against the other 642 individual contributors they stood at 3.18 and 3.89 (cluster-robust p = 0.014).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at r = −0.20 (p = 0.015, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.03 (p = 0.728).

The pattern was described by 5.28% of respondents on canceled engagements, against 1.20% to 1.94% across the active stages, and by 6.67% in the lowest indicator quintile against 1.25% in the highest. It was described by 12 of the 283 respondents with a score of 3 or below, 13 of the 528 above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. After Holm adjustment it differed only by the count of identified manual alteration methods and by disclosure to the financial institution.

The 30 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 20 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described breaks cleared without anyone above asking how, and steps adjusted without waiting for the ticket.

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> *"We just patch the breaks ourselves and keep the queue moving, nobody upstairs asks how they got cleared. And I couldn't tell you if the client ever sees the real touch count." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"getting anything through formal change takes forever so everyone just works around it, we adjust the steps and dont wait for the ticket, dont know if client hears." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 2.6) analyzes the uncertainty over whether the financial institution had been told.

3.8 Problems Raised With No Response

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 326 answers from 255 respondents on 119 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Experience, Pressure and Intent of the Delivery Workforce, section 4.1

Problems raised without a response were associated with low scores in the observed comparisons. Their governance significance lies in the gap between recognizing an issue and obtaining action from those responsible. The adjusted engagement association was much weaker. That model result limits a distinct-association claim without showing that unanswered escalation has no operational consequence.

Figure 3.123. Problems Raised With No Response: unadjusted and adjusted engagement associations with the score.

Problems raised without a response were associated with low scores in the observed comparisons.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

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The adjustment uses the mean of the other 53 indicators. Its p value is nominal. Written identification does not establish incidence, and the relationship is observational.

The 255 respondents who described it recorded a score of 3.17, against 4.35 among the other 595 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 220 who described it stood at 3.13, against 4.23 among the other 447 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at $r = -0.57$ (95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, $p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = -0.05$ ($p = 0.520$).

The pattern was described by 47.00% (133 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 22.92% (121 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 1 of the 39 above 7. It was described by 44.10% of respondents on canceled engagements, against 17.48% to 25.14% across the active stages, and by 46.67% in the lowest indicator quintile against 11.88% in the highest. Individual contributors described it at 32.98% (220 of 667), engagement managers at 19.33% (29 of 150), and portfolio directors at 19.35% (6 of 31), a difference by role that held after Holm adjustment. The pattern differed after Holm adjustment in 11 of the 19 segment families, and in none of the structural families of institution type, outsourcing model, process family, class of work, vendor type, and delivery location.

The 326 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 195 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described a request passed from a contributor to a team lead to the financial institution without reply, and flags left to sit in a queue checked the next day.

> *“to be blunt i was angry. we ask for one contact who can approve a new supplier record, for three week nobody reply, i follow up with my TL, he follow up with them, still nothing. we also cannot see their supplier history so we working blind” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“the problem is nobody watches the agents when they misfile a scan. we flag it and it just sits. what would actually fix it is one person on our side owning exceptions for the shift, instead of a queue somebody checks tommorow. training i got was fine, that part i can't complain about” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Part 5 (Experience, Pressure and Intent of the Delivery Workforce, section 4.1) analyzes problems raised with no response within the answers on the three counted methods.

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3.9 Raising Problems Seen as Futile or Discouraged

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 149 answers from 122 respondents on 81 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Experience, Pressure and Intent of the Delivery Workforce, section 4.2

Seeing escalation as futile or discouraged was associated with low scores, including a negative adjusted estimate. This concerns a reported barrier to making problems visible, distinct from a problem raised without response or a direct instruction not to raise it. The interpretation remains conditional on the specified model and test family. It does not independently establish the effect of discouragement on engagement outcomes.

Figure 3.124. Raising Problems Seen as Futile or Discouraged: unadjusted and adjusted engagement associations with the score.

Seeing escalation as futile or discouraged was associated with low scores, including a negative adjusted estimate.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.
The adjustment uses the mean of the other 53 indicators. Its p value is nominal. Written identification does not establish incidence, and the relationship is observational.

The 122 respondents who described it recorded a score of 2.69, against 4.21 among the other 728 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 119 who described it stood at 2.71, against 4.11 among the other 548 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at $r = −0.49$ (95% CI −0.60 to −0.35, $p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = −0.22$ ($p = 0.008$).

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The pattern was described by 27.92% (79 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 8.14% (43 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 20.81% of respondents on canceled engagements, against 10.29% to 10.68% across the active stages, and by 24.24% in the lowest indicator quintile against 3.75% in the highest. Individual contributors described it at 17.84% (119 of 667), and 3 of the 150 engagement managers and none of the 31 portfolio directors did, a difference by role that held after Holm adjustment. The pattern differed after Holm adjustment in 11 of the 19 segment families and in none of the structural families.

The 149 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 86 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described queries answered after the case had moved on, colleagues who then decided alone and wrote a note, and a team that stopped raising disputes left open for days.

> *"The pace is what wear on my team. We raise a query on an escalation and the answer come three days later, by then the case has moved on anyway. So people stop asking. Two of my colleagues just decide and write a note now, and I am doing same, though nobody has asked us to. And the quality checks they run on us do not look at the errors we actually make, so nobody above sees any of this" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"I stop raising things. Two of us sit on the same dispute case for nine days waiting for someone to say yes or no, then it closes on its own because the customer gave up. That does something to you, i dont care about this project now, i just do my hours." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 5 (Experience, Pressure and Intent of the Delivery Workforce, section 4.2) analyzes futile or discouraged escalation within the answers on the three counted methods.

3.10 Instructed Not to Raise the Problem

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 20 answers from 15 respondents on 12 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Experience, Pressure and Intent of the Delivery Workforce, section 4.3

Explicit instructions not to raise a problem were described by a small group with low mean scores. The engagement-level raw association was negative, while the adjusted analysis did not detect a clear association. The 12-engagement reach warrants caution but does not negate the reported raw result. An instruction not to raise a problem directly restricts escalation and is distinct from perceived futility or an unanswered request.

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Figure 3.125. Instructed Not to Raise the Problem: descriptive mean score comparison.

Explicit instructions not to raise a problem were described by a small group with low mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

Fifteen respondents on 12 engagements described an instruction not to raise a problem. Their mean score was 2.46, compared with 4.02 among the other 835 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors, the contrast was 2.65 for the 13 describing it and 3.89 for the other 654 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). The small base warrants caution. It does not negate the raw engagement association reported separately.

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at $r = -0.24$ ($p = 0.003$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = -0.04$ ($p = 0.588$).

The instruction was described by 12 of the 283 respondents with a score of 3 or below, 3 of the 528 above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. Eleven of the 15 respondents were on canceled engagements, and 9 of the 12 engagements were canceled. Thirteen of the 15 were individual contributors and two were engagement managers, and no segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The 20 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 16 of them were written on canceled engagements. The pattern is the written evidence of an instruction from above not to raise the problem. Respondents described an instruction to keep the numbers looking steady without explaining their movement, and a manager who treated a flag as a sign that the respondent could not manage the workload.

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> *"Eight times out of ten someone on my team is fixing the output before it goes anywhere, catching bad attribution numbers before a client sees them... we are told to keep the numbers looking steady, not to explain why they moved." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"the problem is if i flag this stuff my Manager treats it like i cant handle the workload, so i fix it and move on, the exceptions clear either way" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 5 (Experience, Pressure and Intent of the Delivery Workforce, section 4.3) analyzes the instruction not to raise the problem within the answers on the three counted methods.

3.11 Manual Alteration Disclosed to No Party

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 59 answers from 55 respondents on 39 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 3.1

Manual alteration disclosed to no party was associated with low scores and was described entirely by individual contributors. This concerns operational work that remains outside both internal management discussion and financial institution disclosure. The written accounts identify a specific visibility gap. They do not enumerate every unreported intervention or establish that nondisclosure caused the low scores.

Figure 3.126. Manual Alteration Disclosed to No Party: descriptive mean score comparison.

Manual alteration disclosed to no party was associated with low scores and was described entirely by individual contributors.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

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The 55 respondents who described it recorded a score of 2.62, against 4.09 among the other 795 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). All 55 were individual contributors, and against the other 612 individual contributors they stood at 2.62 and 3.98 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at $r = -0.30$ ($p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = -0.10$ ($p = 0.235$).

Thirty-nine of the 55 respondents were on canceled engagements, where 12.11% described the pattern, against 1.71% to 4.00% across the active stages, and 26 of the 39 engagements were canceled. The pattern was described by 13.43% (38 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 3.22% (17 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7, and by 11.52% in the lowest indicator quintile against 1.25% in the highest. After Holm adjustment it differed by indicator quintile, engagement status, cancellation risk band, the financial institution's discussion of the obligations, regulatory training, the count of identified manual alteration methods, disclosure to the financial institution, and intent to leave.

The 59 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 41 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described corrections known to neither their manager nor the financial institution, and silence that followed a problem raised once without result.

> *"Nobody know I do this, not my manager and not the client. I just fix and move on because otherwise report is late every time" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"Nobody know I do this, not manager, not anyone, I dont say anything anymore because last time I raise it nothing happen, so now I just fix and stay quiet" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 3.1) analyzes manual alteration disclosed to no party within the answers on the three counted methods.

3.12 Manual Alteration Not Logged or Only Partly Logged

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 143 answers from 118 respondents on 72 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 3.2

Unlogged or partly logged manual alteration retained a negative association with the score under the main adjustment. This directly concerns the evidence available for oversight: work cannot be fully reconstructed where its manual component is absent from the record. The status distribution supplies context, while the adjusted association answers the main governance question. Both depend on written identification rather than a comprehensive log audit.

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Figure 3.127. Manual Alteration Not Logged or Only Partly Logged: unadjusted and adjusted engagement associations with the score.

Unlogged or partly logged manual alteration retained a negative association with the score under the main adjustment.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

The adjustment uses the mean of the other 53 indicators. Its p value is nominal. Written identification does not establish incidence, and the relationship is observational.

The 118 respondents who described it recorded a score of 3.14, against 4.13 among the other 732 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 109 who described it stood at 3.23, against 3.99 among the other 558 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share describing the pattern was associated with the score at $r = −0.30$ (95% CI −0.44 to −0.14, $p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators the adjusted estimate was partial $r = −0.26$ ($p = 0.001$), the strongest adjusted association of the 41 written patterns tested on all written answers.

The pattern was described by 18.45% of respondents in Production and 17.70% on canceled engagements, against 8.00% in Build-Out and 11.20% in Transition/Cut-Over. It was described by 21.91% (62 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 10.61% (56 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7, and by 23.64% in the lowest indicator quintile against 8.12% in the highest. Individual contributors described it at 16.34% (109 of 667), engagement managers at 6.00% (9 of 150), and no portfolio director did, a difference by role that held after Holm adjustment.

The 143 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 69 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described half of their fixes missing from any log, and mismatches reconciled with no note of which system had been right.

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> *“Half of what we fix never make it into any log… and another thing nobody above us even ask about it anymore, so we just decide and move on with the fix” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“my team hits this seven times out of ten, we just reconcile the mismatches ourselves and dont log which system was right, theres no time to write it up” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 3.2) analyzes manual alteration not logged or only partly logged within the answers on the three counted methods.

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4 Additional Reporting Practices Below the Threshold for Statistical Analysis

Three additional reporting practices identify control questions through very small written bases. They concern attribution of human work, the elapsed time assigned to rework, and the age of unresolved items. Each remains a separate descriptive finding. The paper's minimum count for comparative analysis is not met, so the score contrasts are descriptions without inferential tests.

4.1 Human Work Presented as Agentic

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 6 answers from 6 respondents on 5 engagements · Listed in Part 5, Additional Conditions Below the Threshold for Statistical Analysis

Six respondents described human work being presented as agentic. The governance relevance is the attribution of delivery work and the resulting visibility of human intervention. The accounts are too few for the paper's comparative statistical analysis.

Figure 3.128. Human Work Presented as Agentic: descriptive evidence and its limits

Six respondents described human work being presented as agentic.

Reported practice	Governance implication	Evidence boundary
Six respondents described human work being presented as agentic.	The governance relevance is the attribution of delivery work and the resulting visibility of human intervention.	The accounts are descriptive. They do not establish the prevalence of the practice or a causal effect.

Note: Respondents describing human Work Presented as Agentic
Small base. No percentage comparison between status groups.
6 written accounts from 6 respondents on 5 engagements.
Mean score 3.15 among those describing the pattern, compared with 4.00 among the remainder. Descriptive comparison only, with no inferential test.

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The six respondents recorded a score of 3.15, against 4.00 among the rest, a description without a test. Five of the six were on canceled engagements, and they were three individual contributors, two engagement managers, and one portfolio director.

A portfolio director on a canceled engagement in regulatory, audit, tax and legal work described the delivery model inverting within six weeks, engineers writing the logic and the agent producing the documentation, with the change never recorded as a design change.

> *"What we ended up doing — and I would want this recorded, because I think it is the actual finding of the engagement — is that we staffed around the tool. The design had the agent drafting surveillance logic with an engineer reviewing it. Within about six weeks that inverted. The engineers wrote the scenario logic themselves and used the agent for the documentation and the test cases around it, because the documentation is where it was strong and the logic is where it kept losing the thread. It would hold a constraint through the first half of a long session and then quietly stop applying it, so anything needing more than an hour of back and forth had to be broken into pieces small enough that nothing needed carrying between them. We never wrote that down as a design change. It happened at desk level and I allowed it, because the alternative was telling the client we had inverted the delivery model in month two. I would handle that differently now. The pattern is going to repeat on every regulatory build we take on, and if we do not name it we will keep selling work as agent-led that is in practice engineer-led with an agent doing the paperwork."*
> *-Portfolio Director, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

Part 5 (Additional Conditions Below the Threshold for Statistical Analysis) lists human work presented as agentic among the answers on manual alteration.

4.2 Elapsed-Time Measures Restarted on Rework

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 4 answers from 4 respondents on 3 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Reporting alteration, section 3.5

Four respondents described restarting elapsed-time measurement when work was redone. This affects what a completion-time measure captures and can leave the history of rework outside the reported duration. The score comparison is descriptive and was not tested. The finding concerns the reported measurement practice, with no established difference between the small group and other respondents.

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Figure 3.129. Elapsed-Time Measures Restarted on Rework: descriptive evidence and its limits

Four respondents described restarting elapsed-time measurement when work was redone.

Reported practice	Governance implication	Evidence boundary
Four respondents described restarting elapsed-time measurement when work was redone.	This affects what a completion-time measure captures and can leave the history of rework outside the reported duration.	The score comparison is descriptive and was not tested.

Note: Respondents describing elapsed-Time Measures Restarted on Rework
Small base. No percentage comparison between status groups.
4 written accounts from 4 respondents on 3 engagements.
Mean score 3.90 among those describing the pattern, compared with 3.99 among the remainder. Descriptive comparison only, with no inferential test.

The four respondents describing restarted elapsed-time measures had a mean score of 3.90, compared with 3.99 among the rest. No inferential test was performed, so the comparison does not establish either a difference or equivalence. Two accounts came from Build-Out, one from Transition/Cut-Over, and one from a canceled engagement.

An engagement manager described a misrouted ticket that received a fresh timestamp on reassignment, so that chronic misrouting never registered as delay.

> *"The service management dashboard reports ticket resolution time from the moment the agent first touches a ticket, but any ticket the agent routes incorrectly and has to be manually reassigned gets a fresh timestamp on reassignment, so chronic misrouting never shows up as a delay in the headline metric." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

Part 5 (Reporting alteration, section 3.5) reports the practice within the answers on the manual alteration of reporting.

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4.3 Suppressed Aging of Open Items

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 3 answers from 3 respondents on 3 engagements · Listed in Part 5, Additional Conditions Below the Threshold for Statistical Analysis

Three respondents described suppression of the aging of open items. This concerns whether oversight can see how long unresolved work has remained outstanding, distinct from restarting a timer on rework. The small base supports descriptive reporting only. It does not establish prevalence, a score gradient, or the motives and consequences of each reported practice.

Figure 3.130. Suppressed Aging of Open Items: descriptive evidence and its limits

Three respondents described suppression of the aging of open items.

Reported practice	Governance implication	Evidence boundary
Three respondents described suppression of the aging of open items.	This concerns whether oversight can see how long unresolved work has remained outstanding, distinct from restarting a timer on rework.	The small base supports descriptive reporting only.

Note: Respondents describing suppressed Aging of Open Items
Small base. No percentage comparison between status groups.
3 written accounts from 3 respondents on 3 engagements.
Mean score 3.40 among those describing the pattern, compared with 3.99 among the remainder. Descriptive comparison only, with no inferential test.

The three respondents recorded a score of 3.40, against 3.99 among the rest, a description without a test. Two of them were in Production and one on a canceled engagement.

Respondents described custody breaks grouped under a pending status that never aged, and certification delays rolled into a single line on the dashboard.

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> *"The vendor's exception dashboard groups unresolved custody breaks under a catch-all pending category that does not age, so a break sitting open for weeks looks the same as one opened yesterday." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"The vendor rolled certification delays into a single 'network dependency' line on the dashboard so the customer never saw which processor gate was actually stuck or for how long." - Engagement Manager, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Part 5 (Additional Conditions Below the Threshold for Statistical Analysis) lists the practice among the answers on manual alteration.

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Practices Adopted in Place of Controls

Human rework and normalized workarounds were associated with lower governance, oversight, and control scores, while habit in place of an explicit control showed no clearly detected gradient. These practices connect delivery continuity with work that formal control and reporting may represent incompletely. Their differing relationships with the composite matter: a specific unwritten dependency can be reported even where the broader score is relatively favorable.

These practices distinguish correction of agent work from its visibility in the record used for oversight. Human rework and normalized workarounds had lower observed scores, while unreported effort showed a weaker adjusted relationship and habit showed no clearly detected gradient. Four of the 39 respondents above score 7 described habit in place of a control. The normalized-workaround partial correlation of −0.18 is nominally significant and remains subject to the stated test-family qualification. Table 3.18 retains each practice and the separately identified proposed remedies.

Table 3.18. The four practices adopted in place of controls and the remedies proposed by respondents against the score

Written pattern	Base	Engagements	The score, describing against the rest (cluster-robust p)	Engagement r (p)	Adjusted partial r (p)
Human rework absorbing agent failure	344 answers from 244 respondents	111	2.88 against 4.44 (p < 0.001)	−0.57 (p < 0.001)	−0.11 (p = 0.180)
Workarounds normalized into the process	152 answers from 137 respondents	86	3.16 against 4.15 (p < 0.001)	−0.36 (p < 0.001)	−0.18 (p = 0.027)
Effort absent from reported figures	71 answers from 64 respondents	54	3.14 against 4.06 (p < 0.001)	−0.27 (p < 0.001)	−0.14 (p = 0.098)
Habit in place of a control	91 answers from 87 respondents	69	3.93 against 4.00 (p = 0.705)	−0.02 (p = 0.789)	−0.01 (p = 0.872)
Remedies proposed by respondents	225 answers from 203 respondents	118	4.05 against 3.98 (p = 0.600)	−0.01 (p = 0.868)	−0.11 (p = 0.194)

Note: The four practices and proposed remedies use written answers to the open questions. Correlation r relates the engagement's share describing a practice to its score, across 150 engagements. Partial r accounts for the mean of the 53 indicators outside the score. The reported partial-correlation p values are nominal. Description of a practice does not establish its frequency, and nonmention does not establish its absence.

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Theres a model defect form youre supposed to file when the Bot gets a fix wrong. Nobody fills it out, takes about twenty minutes and it goes to a queue that answers in like three weeks. So my team keeps a notepad file in Teams with what actually worked on which ticket type, and we just use that."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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1 Workarounds Adopted as Standard Practice

The four practices distinguish human correction, routine workarounds, unreported effort, and dependence on habit. Rework and missing effort had negative observed relationships with the score, while normalized workarounds retained a nominal adjusted association. Habit showed no clearly detected relationship. Each contributes a different view of how actual work can diverge from the process visible to oversight.

1.1 Human Rework Absorbing Agent Failure

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 344 answers from 244 respondents on 111 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Manual Alteration of AI Outputs, section 2.1

Human rework absorbing agent failure was associated with lower mean scores and a strong negative observed engagement association. Operational delivery can depend on human correction whose contribution is incompletely represented in formal control and reporting. The adjusted association was weaker and not clearly detected. This distinguishes substantial reported rework from evidence of an independently identified governance effect.

Figure 3.131. Human Rework Absorbing Agent Failure: unadjusted and adjusted engagement associations with the score.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.

The adjustment uses the mean of the other 53 indicators. Its p value is nominal. Written identification does not establish incidence, and the relationship is observational.

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The 244 respondents who described it recorded a score of 2.88, against 4.44 among the other 606 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 232 who described it stood at 2.87, against 4.40 among the other 435 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share describing the practice was associated with the score at $r = -0.57$ (95% CI −0.67 to −0.45, $p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = -0.11$ ($p = 0.180$).

The practice was described by 52.30% (148 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 17.80% (94 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 2 of the 39 above 7. It was described by 44.41% of respondents on canceled engagements, against 16.00% in Build-Out, 19.60% in Transition/Cut-Over, and 23.30% in Production, and by 51.52% in the lowest indicator quintile against 10.00% in the highest. Individual contributors described it at 34.78% (232 of 667), engagement managers at 7.33% (11 of 150), and 1 of the 31 portfolio directors, a difference by role that held after Holm adjustment. The practice differed after Holm adjustment in 11 of the 19 segment families and in none of the structural families.

Rework followed the capacity of human review. Among respondents who rated human review capacity against agent volume 1 to 3, 43.57% (166 of 381) described rework, against 14.90% (59 of 396) of those who rated it 4 to 7 and 1 of the 28 who rated it 8 to 10 (chi-square = 87.67, $p < 0.001$, Cramér's V = 0.33).

The 344 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 207 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described a funding cutoff missed twice and reconciled manually while a rule change waited for approval, and documents checked manually where no test environment had proved the agent before live work began.

> *“A funding rule change sat with them for four days... And in that time the agent kept releasing on the old rule, so we missed the cutoff twice and i squared it by hand after. Nobody could tell me who was allowed to stop it. Moreover when they asked later what the agent did, we had nothing to show them.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“there is no test setup, we could not prove anything before it ran on live cases. passport and address proof it reads sometimes, everything else i check by hand” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Financial crime and client onboarding*

Part 5 (Manual Alteration of AI Outputs, section 2.1) analyzes human rework within the answers on the manual alteration of AI outputs.

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1.2 Workarounds Normalized Into the Process

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 152 answers from 137 respondents on 86 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes, section 2.4

Workarounds normalized into the process were associated with lower scores and a negative adjusted estimate. When an exceptional correction becomes routine, its visibility and formal control may not develop with it. The nominal adjusted result requires the stated multiple-testing qualification. It supports retaining the pattern as a distinct analytical subject without treating its significance as settled under every test family.

Figure 3.132. Workarounds Normalized Into the Process: unadjusted and adjusted engagement associations with the score.

Workarounds normalized into the process were associated with lower scores and a negative adjusted estimate.



Note: r measures signed linear association from −1 to +1. Partial r describes the adjusted association under the model specified in the section. Adjusted p values are nominal. The comparisons do not establish causal effects.
The adjustment uses the mean of the other 53 indicators. Its p value is nominal. Written identification does not establish incidence, and the relationship is observational.

The 137 respondents who described them recorded a score of 3.16, against 4.15 among the other 713 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 130 who described them stood at 3.15, against 4.04 among the other 537 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$).

At the engagement level the share describing the practice was associated with the score at $r = -0.36$ (95% CI −0.50 to −0.22, $p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements). After adjustment for the mean of the other 53

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indicators the adjusted estimate was partial r = −0.18 (p = 0.027), one of three written patterns of the 41 to keep an adjusted association.

The practice was described by 24.24% of respondents in the lowest indicator quintile and 5.00% in the highest. It was described by 25.44% (72 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 12.31% (65 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. It was described by 21.43% of respondents on canceled engagements, against 12.57% to 13.59% across the active stages, a difference that did not survive Holm adjustment. Individual contributors described it at 19.49% (130 of 667), engagement managers at 4.67% (7 of 150), and no portfolio director did, a difference by role that held after Holm adjustment.

The 152 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 75 of them were written on canceled engagements. Respondents described workarounds that were never signed off and that became normal with time, and silence from the financial institution taken as approval.

> *"my team does this most days now, in addition nobody signs off the workaround, it just becomes normal after time" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"This happens every week, when i raise it with Client they just revert back with nothing useful, so silence is treated as approval by us now" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Part 5 (Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes, section 2.4) analyzes the workaround within the answers on the manual alteration of processes.

1.3 Effort Absent From Reported Figures

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 71 answers from 64 respondents on 54 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 3.3

Effort absent from reported figures was described by respondents with lower mean scores. This connects the record used for oversight with the work required to sustain delivery. The engagement association was negative, while the adjusted analysis did not detect a clear separate association. The reported visibility gap remains substantively relevant, while the adjusted result limits a claim of a separate statistical association.

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Figure 3.133. Effort Absent From Reported Figures: descriptive mean score comparison.

Effort absent from reported figures was described by respondents with lower mean scores.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 64 respondents who described it recorded a score of 3.14, against 4.06 among the other 786 (cluster-robust $p < 0.001$). Among individual contributors alone, the 50 who described it stood at 3.07, against 3.93 among the other 617 (cluster-robust $p = 0.002$).

At the engagement level the share describing the practice was associated with the score at $r = -0.27$ (95% CI −0.41 to −0.11, $p < 0.001$, $n = 150$ engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial $r = -0.14$ ($p = 0.098$).

The practice differed across engagement status, described by 2.86% of respondents in Build-Out, 6.00% in Transition/Cut-Over, 7.77% in Production, and 11.18% on canceled engagements. It was described by 11.31% (32 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 6.06% (32 of 528) above 3 to 7, and none of the 39 above 7. Engagement managers described it at 9.33% (14 of 150) and individual contributors at 7.50% (50 of 667), with no clearly detected difference by role after Holm adjustment. After Holm adjustment it differed by indicator quintile, engagement status, cancellation risk band, the financial institution's discussion of the obligations, process family, the count of identified manual alteration methods, and disclosure to the financial institution.

The 71 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 41 of them were written on canceled engagements. An engagement manager described two nights of manual re-tagging on work no

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count recorded, and an individual contributor described errors caught before release that appeared in no count.

> *"Incident last cycle: we pull month of call recordings and half have no adviser ID or call reason on them, so my team spends two nights re-tagging by hand. People are willing on client side, thats not issue. But I am the one explaining to our own leadership why throughput is short, and my QA leads are burning out on work nobody counts." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"problem is nobody counts the wrong answers we caught, only ones the client complains about" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 3.3) analyzes effort left out of the reported numbers within the answers on the three counted methods.

1.4 Habit in Place of a Control

Written pattern · All written answers to the open questions · 91 answers from 87 respondents on 69 engagements · Analyzed in Part 5, Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 3.4

Habit standing in for an explicit control was described across score bands without a clearly detected score gradient. This is a distinct governance finding because favorable composite ratings can coexist with work that depends on particular people and unwritten routines. The analysis does not formally establish that the score fails as a detection instrument. It shows that this reported practice was not sharply distinguished by the measured comparisons.

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Figure 3.134. Habit in Place of a Control: descriptive mean score comparison.

Habit standing in for an explicit control was described across score bands without a clearly detected score gradient.



Note: The comparison group did not describe the pattern and is not a verified nonincident group. The eligible source and inferential qualifications are stated in the text.

The 87 respondents who described it recorded a score of 3.93, against 4.00 among the other 763 (cluster-robust p = 0.705). Among individual contributors alone, the 64 who described it stood at 3.65, against 3.89 among the other 603 (cluster-robust p = 0.297).

At the engagement level the share describing the practice was associated with the score at r = −0.02 (p = 0.789, n = 150 engagements), and after adjustment for the mean of the other 53 indicators at partial r = −0.01 (p = 0.872).

The practice was described by 11.31% (32 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 9.66% (51 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 4 of the 39 above 7. It was described by 11.52% in the lowest indicator quintile and 8.75% in the highest, and by 7.77% to 12.40% across engagement status. Portfolio directors described it at 19.35% (6 of 31), engagement managers at 11.33% (17 of 150), and individual contributors at 9.60% (64 of 667), and no segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

The rating about replacing informal fixes with explicit checks did not show a clear association with the written habit pattern. The pattern was described by 27 of 267 respondents rating that item at 1–3, 47 of 459 at 4–7, and 10 of 70 at 8–10. The corresponding shares were 10.11%, 10.24%, and 14.29%. The ordinary chi-square result was 1.14 (p = 0.567, Cramér's V = 0.04), subject to the stated clustering limitation. This is not a formal validation test of the rating's detection capability.

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The 91 answers came from all written answers to the open questions, and 36 of them were written on canceled engagements. An individual contributor who wrote that the providers gave notice of change described a colleague who read every release note unasked, a step written into no process. Another individual contributor described an engagement held together by two people talking directly, an arrangement that stopped when one of them was away for a week.

> *“Feel fine about this part mostly... the providers do tell us in advance when something change, that works. What these questions leave out is the person side. One colleague reads every release note from the model provider and posts a summary in our channel. He started it himself, nobody asked him to. It is not written into any process anywhere.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“what actually held this together was my lead and one guy on their side talking directly, everything else on paper never got used... that is not a process, when my lead was out for a week nothing moved at all. none of these questions get at how much of it was just two people knowing each other” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

Part 5 (Disclosure of Manual Alteration, section 3.4) analyzes workarounds held as personal habit within the answers on the three counted methods.

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2 Remedies Proposed by Respondents

The proposed remedies addressed operational responsibility, shared evidence, and timely authority. They included named people able to stop an agent, one incident record, written limits on autonomous action, and ownership of input definitions. These proposals connect the paper's reported weaknesses with possible control responses. They are suggestions from respondents, not interventions whose effectiveness the study evaluated. Remedies appeared in 225 answers from 203 respondents on 118 engagements, including 95 answers on canceled engagements.

Remedies were proposed by 27.56% (78 of 283) of respondents with a score of 3 or below, 21.02% (111 of 528) above 3 to 7, and 35.90% (14 of 39) above 7, the highest share of any score band. Portfolio directors proposed them at 41.94% (13 of 31), engagement managers at 26.00% (39 of 150), and individual contributors at 22.64% (151 of 667), and no segment family differed after Holm adjustment.

Of the 225 answers, 142 were judged negative on at least one governance indicator, and the indicators named the control the remedy would restore. Co-management indicators appeared in 56 of the 142 and financial institution readiness indicators in 54, against 20 for AI technology, 18 for the third-party ecosystem, and 6 for vendor capability. The indicators named most often were the financial institution's speed of response to issues raised (19), its provisioning of access and identities for agents (18), the effectiveness of its management of its side (16), the maturity of its data governance (12), and the placement of human review points (12). The remedies asked for one person on each side with authority to stop an agent, one shared list of incidents in place of two, a written statement of what an agent may do without a person, and one owner on the financial institution's side for the definitions the agents read.

> *“How I feel is nobody can press stop. What would help is simple, one person on each side with authority to pause the run, and the check should sit before the payment file goes out not after” - Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“two separate queues is the real issue. one shared incident list would fix most of it, at present their soc raise their own ticket and we raise ours and nobody reconciles them.” -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“Practically, one page is needed: which program parameters an agent may set without a human, agreed by client treasury and by our operations together. Until that is signed, our reviewers approve everything on trust and the review point is decoration” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

> *“I pulled the field mappings myself, the same policy field is named three ways across their systems and nothing lines up. What would help is a single owner over there for the definitions... right now we ask four people and get four answers.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

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Taken together, the findings place the operation and visibility of controls at the center of the governance problem. Lower scores were associated with canceled engagements and substantial manual correction, while specific reported weaknesses also appeared among more favorable composite assessments. Co-management showed consistent conditional associations, but category composition and model sensitivity limit claims of statistical uniqueness. The evidence supports examining who can decide, stop, review, and reconstruct agent work across organizational boundaries. It does not establish causal effects or certify effective governance at a numeric threshold. The respondents' remedies address those operating responsibilities and remain proposals to be evaluated in practice.

Part 5 (Leading Dynamics of Manual Alteration, section 10) analyzes the remedies proposed by the delivery team within the answers on manual alteration.

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About the Author

Phil Hatch is an outsourcing and workforce-development executive with more than 30 years of experience. He previously led the global outsourcing business of ManpowerGroup/Experis. His work includes service delivery, workforce strategy, and organizational development across industries and countries.

Hatch has also advised governments on labor and economic development, including workforce strategies intended to support investment and employment.

Following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Hatch was asked by the U.S. Department of State and USAID to advise Ukraine on workforce and economic development. His work has addressed technology, outsourcing, skills development, and international investment in support of economic recovery.

Through Akholi, Hatch advises organizations and governments on outsourcing and the implications of AI for work and service delivery.

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About Akholi

Akholi, established in 2003, is a research and advisory firm focused on outsourcing, service delivery, and global capability centers. Its work includes the 2026 study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements described in this report.

The study examines relationships among financial institution readiness, co-management, vendor capability, AI technology, the third-party ecosystem, and reported engagement outcomes. Its findings are observational and do not establish that any one category is the sole or primary cause of those outcomes.

Akholi applies this research through advisory and educational work with institutional leaders. Recommendations derived from the study require assessment against the circumstances and evidence of each engagement.

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“to be blunt it frustrates me, kindly speaking we dont actually touch their process ourself, its release governance that moves too slow, ticket sit in change board for week while pipeline still need to run, my team just absorb wait most weeks and nobody above us really see cost of it”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Payments, cards and disputes

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PART 3

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Governance, Oversight, and Control

A study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements, drawn from the accounts of 850 members of the vendors' delivery teams

PUBLICATION DATE	November 1, 2026
VERSION	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
FIGSHARE DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890

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04

PART 4

The Delivery Workforce

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REPORT INFORMATION

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Full Study Report

Author	Phil Hatch
Publication date	November 1, 2026
Version	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
Figshare DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890
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SUGGESTED CITATION

Hatch, Phil. 2026. *Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions: Full Study Report*. Version 1.8.2. Akholi. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559.

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USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Artificial intelligence tools were used to prepare this report. Appendix G discloses how they were used.

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The Delivery Workforce

The delivery workforce's reported fatigue, dissatisfaction, and intent to leave raised concerns about the continuity of agentic AI outsourcing engagements. More than half of respondents in the combined sample of active and canceled engagements rated their likelihood of leaving within 12 months at 7 or above. Their written accounts described recurring manual work and unresolved decisions, alongside operational knowledge retained in personal notes, informal routines, and individual delivery team members. In a workforce with limited career and agentic AI experience, departures could remove knowledge that remaining delivery team members relied on to perform the work.

Job satisfaction and relationship ratings were associated with the study's reported outcomes. Associations with the frequency of contact with the financial institution were small under the study's stated criteria. The cross-sectional design, in which respondents answered once, establishes associations among reported experiences and outcomes without establishing their temporal or causal direction.

> *"two people on my team left already. one of them was training me. i am four months in and already worn out in a way i did not expect from an office job." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

The study collected the reported experience of 850 members of vendor delivery teams on 150 engagements between January and June 2026. No financial institution was approached for corroboration or comment. The results describe the study set and do not establish its representativeness of the industry.

The four core study measures are cancellation rate, customer satisfaction, engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave. Cancellation rate is the share of engagements canceled by the study date. Customer satisfaction is the figure recorded for each engagement on a 100-point scale. The engagement indicator mean is calculated from each respondent's mean across the 100 rated indicators and then across respondents within the engagement. Intent to leave is the respondent's rating of the likelihood of leaving the current job within 12 months. Appendix D provides the full definitions and method.

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“you ask me to give training a number from one to ten. there is no training, so what do i put. i was put on KYC screening in my first week with a two hour recording made for a different client, besides nobody checked what i learned from it. one is not right answer either but it is closest”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

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Composition and Experience of the Delivery Workforce

The respondent sample was dominated by individual contributors with limited career and agentic AI experience. It comprised 667 individual contributors (78.47%), 150 engagement managers (17.65%), 31 portfolio directors (3.65%), and two customer management executives. Each of the 150 engagements was represented by one engagement manager and a majority of individual contributors. These proportions describe the sample, rather than the composition of every delivery team.

Career experience, outsourcing-industry experience, and financial-industry experience are examined separately from agentic AI experience. Every recorded answer on years of agentic AI experience was zero or one. This restricted range limits the comparisons that can be made.

> *"I might not have been working as long as them but I have more AI experience than my entire management team combined." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

Experience differed by role, and role was associated with respondents' ratings and intent to leave. The unadjusted experience comparisons therefore do not isolate the contribution of experience from that of role. Engagement-level associations for career and industry experience met the study's equivalence criteria. Equivalence tests assess whether an association lies within prespecified bounds, here −0.30 to +0.30 for the correlation coefficient, r. The coefficient measures the strength and direction of a linear relationship, from −1 to +1. Equivalence within these bounds does not establish a zero relationship or the absence of operational importance.

"

Got put on the account with no training on the agent tooling at all, I learned it off a guy who ran it on a diferent account. The course they did put me on was banking basics I already knew"

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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1 Role Composition of the Engagements

Individual contributor was the most frequent role in every engagement's respondent sample. Assigning each engagement its most frequent role consequently produced the same classification for all 150 engagements. With no variation between engagements, this classification could not support an engagement-level comparison. Respondent-level comparisons nevertheless identified differences among roles.

1.1 Role Composition of the Respondent Sample

INDICATOR C005 · WHAT IS YOUR ROLE ON THIS ENGAGEMENT? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Individual contributors formed the majority of respondents, and reported intent to leave differed by role. All 850 respondents answered the role question. Individual contributors and engagement managers were represented on all 150 engagements. Portfolio directors were represented on 31 engagements (20.67%). A role's absence from the respondent sample does not establish its absence from the delivery team.

Table 4.1. Respondents by role

Role	Respondents	Share of 850 respondents	Engagements with at least one respondent in the role	Share of 150 engagements
Individual contributor	667	78.47%	150	100.00%
Engagement manager	150	17.65%	150	100.00%
Portfolio director	31	3.65%	31	20.67%
Customer management executive	2	Not reported	2	Not reported

Note: Percentages are omitted for customer management executives because the respondent base was below 10.

Respondent-level tests used standard errors, estimates of uncertainty, clustered by engagement to account for similarities among answers from respondents on the same engagement. The p value is the probability, under the null hypothesis of no difference or association, of a result at least as extreme as the one observed. Differences by role were statistically significant for respondents' own ratings and intent to leave ($p < 0.001$ for each). Ratings of intent to leave at 7 or above were reported by 342 of 616 individual contributors (55.52%), 75 of 150 engagement managers (50.00%), and 13 of 31 portfolio directors (41.94%). Comparisons of cancellation and customer satisfaction did not identify statistically significant

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differences by respondent role. These comparisons describe the engagements on which respondents worked and do not attribute their outcomes to a particular role.

Role was addressed in 22 written answers from 22 respondents on 21 engagements. Seven answers were coded as negative. Six of those seven described decisions that respondents considered beyond their role but made because neither of the two firms would decide. Written answers were coded by subject and sentiment. Sentiment scores took five values, −10, −5, 0, +5, and +10, with negative values denoting unfavorable accounts and positive values favorable accounts. These scores describe the written answers, rather than an independently observed outcome.

> *"I end up being the person who decide who owns what, and that is not really my job level. My team lead take it fine but I notice the newer guys ask me instead of asking the client side, so now im the middle man for surveillance rule questions." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"Same story every week, nobody wants to be the one who says yes so I decide. Its not my job to own that call but somebody has to" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"I dont say much on this one, but it cost me sleep some week, numbers move and I am the one who decide what go to client file" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

"

The problem is process readiness on their side is genuinely poor, and the reconciliation team re-keys counterparty static data most weeks just to keep the break queue moving. i do not touch it myself now, my role is managing how i frame it upward, as far as i have visibility, and kindly worded updates do not seem to change anything on the client side."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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2 Career, Outsourcing, and Financial Industry Experience

Reported career, outsourcing-industry, and financial-industry experience were limited and closely related to role. Each was recorded in years. A recorded zero was classified as less than one year, rather than proof of no experience.

For all three experience questions, engagement-level associations with cancellation, customer satisfaction, and the engagement indicator mean met the study's equivalence criteria. The small respondent-level associations with intent to leave also met those criteria. Because experience was closely related to role, these unadjusted results do not establish its independent contribution.

2.1 Career Experience of the Delivery Workforce

INDICATOR C007 · HOW MANY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE DO YOU HAVE IN YOUR CAREER? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Experience differed substantially by role. Reported career experience had a mean of 3.9 years and a median of 2.0 years, with recorded values from 0 to 25 (n = 797 respondents). Sixty-one respondents recorded zero, classified as less than one year. The mean was 1.9 years among individual contributors (n = 614 respondents), 10.0 among engagement managers (n = 150), and 15.1 among portfolio directors (n = 31).

Figure 4.1. Career Experience of the Delivery Workforce: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean years of career experience: 3.9 (n = 797 respondents).

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Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 614): 1.87. Engagement manager (n = 150): 9.97. Portfolio director (n = 31): 15.06. Build-Out (n = 163): 3.84. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 4.19. Production (n = 95): 4.20. Canceled (n = 307): 3.74.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational. A confidence interval expresses uncertainty under the stated method. A p value is the probability, under the null model, of a result at least as extreme as the observed result.

The mean is the sum of the recorded values divided by their number. The median is the middle value in an ordered distribution. The notation n identifies the number of respondents or engagements included in a result.

Career experience was not statistically significantly associated at engagement level with cancellation (r = −0.11, p = 0.191, n = 150 engagements), customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.03, p = 0.757, n = 94 engagements), or the engagement indicator mean (r = 0.10, p = 0.208, n = 150 engagements). All three met the equivalence criteria. Greater career experience was associated at respondent level with lower intent to leave (r = −0.09, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.15 to −0.04, p = 0.001, n = 746 respondents), also within the equivalence bounds. A confidence interval (CI) expresses uncertainty around an estimate. The cluster bootstrap resampled whole engagements to preserve the grouping of respondents.

Four written answers addressed career experience. Three were from respondents early in their careers. These accounts provide illustrations of reported experience and do not establish its prevalence.

> *"Im a fresher and know more about AI than anyone in our executive team." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

2.2 Experience in the Outsourcing Industry

INDICATOR C009 · HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN WORKING IN THE OUTSOURCING INDUSTRY? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Reported outsourcing-industry experience was limited, with a mean of 2.6 years and a median of 1.0 year, with recorded values from 0 to 17 (n = 806 respondents). For 112 respondents, the recorded zero represented less than one year of experience.

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Figure 4.2. Experience in the Outsourcing Industry: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean years in the outsourcing industry: 2.6 (n = 806 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 623): 1.25. Engagement manager (n = 150): 6.41. Portfolio director (n = 31): 9.74. Build-Out (n = 168): 2.54. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 2.63. Production (n = 100): 2.63. Canceled (n = 303): 2.49.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

At engagement level, outsourcing-industry experience was not statistically significantly associated with cancellation (r = −0.04, p = 0.617, n = 150 engagements), customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.06, p = 0.573, n = 94 engagements), or the engagement indicator mean (r = 0.07, p = 0.415, n = 150 engagements). All three associations met the equivalence criteria. At respondent level, greater outsourcing-industry experience was associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.07, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.14 to −0.01, p = 0.025, n = 758 respondents). The association was within the equivalence bounds and may reflect the relationship between experience and role.

2.3 Experience in the Financial Industry

INDICATOR C010 · HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN WORKING WITHIN THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Reported financial-industry experience was limited, with a mean of 2.1 years and a median of 1.0 year, with recorded values from 0 to 15 (n = 789 respondents). A zero, classified as less than one year of experience, was recorded by 136 respondents.

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Figure 4.3. Experience in the Financial Industry: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean years in the financial industry: 2.1 (n = 789 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 608): 1.08. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.33. Portfolio director (n = 29): 7.62. Build-Out (n = 161): 2.16. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 228): 2.10. Production (n = 98): 2.37. Canceled (n = 302): 2.10.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

At engagement level, financial-industry experience was not statistically significantly associated with cancellation (r = −0.03, p = 0.684, n = 150 engagements), customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = −0.08, p = 0.470, n = 94 engagements), or the engagement indicator mean (r = 0.00, p = 0.955, n = 150 engagements). All three associations met the equivalence criteria. At respondent level, the association with intent to leave was also within the equivalence bounds (r = −0.06, cluster bootstrap 95% CI −0.12 to 0.00, p = 0.033, n = 742 respondents). It did not meet the criteria in three robustness checks, which repeat an analysis using alternative assumptions or samples. The respondent-level association therefore requires particular caution.

One written answer addressed financial-industry experience. It described a delivery team without banking experience learning financial tasks from tickets. This account is illustrative.

> *"Send us on proper payroll training first… nobody in my team ever worked in bank before, we learn from tickets" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

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3 Agentic AI Experience

Agentic AI experience was limited across roles, and nearly half of respondents were working on their first such engagement. The mean recorded response was 0.4 for individual contributors (n = 611), 0.5 for engagement managers (n = 150), and 0.3 for portfolio directors (n = 30). Because every answer was zero or one, these means summarize the recorded categories rather than precise elapsed durations.

Figure 4.4. Mean recorded career and agentic AI experience by respondent role

Agentic AI experience was limited across roles despite differences in career experience



Note: n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Career experience was reported by 614 individual contributors, 150 engagement managers, and 31 portfolio directors. Agentic AI experience was reported by 611, 150, and 30 respondents in those roles, respectively. A zero for agentic AI experience represented less than one year. No answer exceeded one year. The figure describes reported experience and does not estimate its effect on engagement outcomes.

The two panels use different scales, each labeled in years. Zero recorded years means less than one year.

The number of agentic AI outsourcing engagements worked on provides a separate measure of experience. It includes the current engagement and is examined independently of reported years of experience.

3.1 Reported Years of Agentic AI Experience

INDICATOR C008 · HOW MANY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE DO YOU HAVE WITH AGENTIC AI? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

No respondent reported more than one year of agentic AI experience. Of the 793 respondents who reported years of agentic AI experience, 467 (58.89%) recorded zero, classified as less than one year, and

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326 (41.11%) recorded one year. Within this restricted range, no statistically significant difference by role was identified.

Figure 4.5. Reported Years of Agentic AI Experience: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean recorded years of agentic AI experience: 0.4 (n = 793 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 611): 0.40. Engagement manager (n = 150): 0.47. Portfolio director (n = 30): 0.33. Build-Out (n = 159): 0.40. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 0.43. Production (n = 96): 0.40. Canceled (n = 302): 0.40.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

At engagement level, reported agentic AI experience was not statistically significantly associated with cancellation (r = 0.00, p = 0.993, n = 150 engagements), customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.13, p = 0.220, n = 94 engagements), or the engagement indicator mean (r = 0.02, p = 0.829, n = 150 engagements). Its respondent-level association with intent to leave was also not statistically significant (r = −0.04, p = 0.232, n = 746 respondents).

All four associations met the equivalence criteria, and the reported conclusions were retained under the applicable robustness checks. No statistically significant difference in reported agentic AI experience was identified across the segment families examined. The restricted range prevents these results from establishing the value of experience beyond the period represented in the study.

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3.2 Agentic AI Outsourcing Engagements Worked On

INDICATOR C011 · HOW MANY AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENTS HAVE YOU WORKED ON ACROSS YOUR CAREER, INCLUDING THIS ONE? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

For 371 of the 799 respondents (46.43%), the current engagement was their first agentic AI outsourcing engagement. The mean number of agentic AI outsourcing engagements worked on, including the current engagement, was 1.8. The median was 2.0, with recorded values from 1 to 5 (n = 799 respondents). The mean was 2.5 engagements for engagement managers (n = 150 respondents), 2.4 for portfolio directors (n = 31), and 1.7 for individual contributors (n = 617).

Figure 4.6. Agentic AI Outsourcing Engagements Worked On: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean agentic AI engagements worked on: 1.8 (n = 799 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 617): 1.66. Engagement manager (n = 150): 2.46. Portfolio director (n = 31): 2.35. Build-Out (n = 163): 1.93. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 1.89. Production (n = 102): 1.68. Canceled (n = 300): 1.80.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

At engagement level, the number of agentic AI outsourcing engagements worked on was not statistically significantly associated with cancellation (r = −0.05, n = 150 engagements), customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = −0.02, n = 94 engagements), or the engagement indicator mean (r = 0.07, n = 150 engagements). The respondent-level association with intent to leave was also not statistically significant (r = −0.03, n = 751 respondents). All four associations met the equivalence criteria, and the conclusions were unchanged under the reported robustness checks.

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Eight written answers addressed experience on previous engagements. They described respondents drawing comparisons with earlier engagements and provide illustrative accounts of that experience.

> *"I have seen one engagement only. What I can say is I got no sanctions training at all before I started, I learnt the lists from a colleague." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"i have run four of these now. on the account before this one, a card operations desk, we had a standing call every tuesday with one person from their side who could say yes or no on the spot, and if she said no it was no and we moved on." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

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4 Self-Assessed Knowledge and Expertise

Respondents rated their financial-industry knowledge, knowledge of agentic AI in financial services, and overall agentic AI expertise below the scale's midpoint. Higher ratings were associated with more favorable results on the four core study measures. These self-assessments describe perceived capability rather than independently tested knowledge. A distressed rating is at the unfavorable end of the question's 10-point scale. It is 3 or below when lower ratings are unfavorable and 8 or above when higher ratings are unfavorable. At engagement level, the same thresholds apply to the mean rating.

Each self-assessment was associated with the four core study measures, with the conclusions retained under the applicable robustness checks. Correlations with the engagement indicator mean ranged from r = 0.78 to r = 0.80 (n = 150 engagements). None of the three questions is included in that mean. Shared perceptions of the engagement may contribute to the observed relationships, and the study does not distinguish their contribution from differences in knowledge.

Written answers described learning through colleagues, financial institution material, and experience during delivery. Some respondents valued that learning despite other difficulties on the engagement.

> *"None of us came from wealth management, so when the tool flags an advisor call for suitability we are reading the rule for the first time ourselves. Thus people stay late going through the clients policy pack on their own time. Nobody trained us for this, we taught each other" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

4.1 Self-Rated Knowledge of the Financial Industry

INDICATOR C012 · HOW WELL DO YOU KNOW THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Self-rated financial-industry knowledge received distressed ratings in 217 of 796 answers (27.26%). The mean rating was 4.8 and the median was 5.0 (n = 796 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 3.5 (n = 309), below the means in the three active lifecycle stages.

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Figure 4.7. Self-Rated Knowledge of the Financial Industry: associations with the study measures



Note: Distressed ratings: 217 of 796 answers (27.26%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 617): 4.70. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.17. Portfolio director (n = 28): 6.14. Build-Out (n = 163): 5.83. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 230): 5.54. Production (n = 94): 5.78. Canceled (n = 309): 3.51.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

At engagement level, higher self-rated financial-industry knowledge was associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.61, n = 150 engagements), higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.77, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.80, n = 150 engagements). At respondent level, it was associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.76, n = 750 respondents). The conclusions were retained under the applicable robustness checks. The mean rating was distressed on 25 of 150 engagements.

Thirty written answers addressed financial-industry knowledge. Sixteen came from comments on vendor capability and 14 from the question about valued aspects of the job. Eighteen were positive and 10 negative. Comments on vendor capability described respondents acquiring financial-industry knowledge from colleagues during delivery. Answers about valued aspects of the job identified that knowledge as a benefit of the work.

> *"I come on this desk knowing nothing about settlement, they give me two e-learning module and a recording, and after that i am on live breaks in same week. My senior teach me, not company."*
> *-Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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"i had one week of a slide deck about banking and then i am on a private equity reporting job with no idea what a capital call is. laptop and access come quick, that part they did well, i give them that. everything else i learn from a colleague who is also new." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

4.2 Self-Rated Knowledge of Agentic AI in the Financial Industry

INDICATOR C013 · HOW WELL DO YOU KNOW AGENTIC AI SPECIFIC TO THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Self-rated knowledge of agentic AI in the financial industry received distressed ratings in 225 of 797 answers (28.23%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 797 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 3.6 (n = 306).

Figure 4.8. Self-Rated Knowledge of Agentic AI in the Financial Industry: associations with the study measures



Note: Distressed ratings: 225 of 797 answers (28.23%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 615): 4.76. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.32. Portfolio director (n = 31): 6.32. Build-Out (n = 167): 5.93. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 228): 5.56. Production (n = 96): 5.79. Canceled (n = 306): 3.64.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.57, n = 150 engagements), higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.76, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.78, n = 150 engagements). At respondent level, higher ratings were

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associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.75, n = 748 respondents). The conclusions for all four associations were retained under the applicable robustness checks. The mean rating was distressed on 22 of 150 engagements.

Seven written answers addressed knowledge of agentic AI in financial services, and all were positive. Each described learning during the engagement. Three also described cancellation or substantial delivery difficulties. These accounts illustrate the reported value of learning without establishing the effectiveness of the engagement.

> *"learned agentic payroll operations ... team stayed steady through the shutdown" -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

4.3 Self-Rated Agentic AI Expertise

INDICATOR C014 · RATE YOUR OVERALL AGENTIC AI EXPERTISE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Self-rated agentic AI expertise received distressed ratings in 222 of 800 answers (27.75%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 800 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 3.5 (n = 308).

Figure 4.9. Self-Rated Agentic AI Expertise: associations with the study measures



Note: Distressed ratings: 222 of 800 answers (27.75%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 617): 4.75. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.26. Portfolio director (n = 31): 6.10. Build-Out (n = 164): 5.83. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 230): 5.68. Production (n = 98): 5.91. Canceled (n = 308): 3.50.

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r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Higher self-rated expertise was associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.61, n = 150 engagements), higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.74, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.78, n = 150 engagements). At respondent level, higher ratings were associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.78, n = 753 respondents). The conclusions were retained under the applicable robustness checks. The mean rating was distressed on 26 of 150 engagements.

Thirty-seven written answers addressed agentic AI expertise. Thirty came from the question about valued aspects of the job and seven from comments on vendor capability. Twenty-four were positive and four negative. All 30 answers about valued aspects of the job identified agentic AI skills acquired during the engagement, most often quality assurance of agent output. Comments on vendor capability described brief training, instruction through videos, and respondents who considered their own AI knowledge greater than that of people in more senior roles.

> *"The technical stretch of learning how to evaluate an agent's own output" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"... was my first job out of university. They sent me to training. I knew more about AI than the trainer." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

"

the training was two days of slides on the ticket tool and nothing about how the ai decides a routing, so i am learning from seniors on the floor. it slows me down and i feel behind. rest of it i have no complaint about"

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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5 Certifications and Sources of AI Knowledge

Professional certifications closely followed role, more than half of those answering the AI-certification question reported none, and source-of-knowledge comparisons did not identify statistically significant outcome differences. These findings do not isolate preparation from role or establish the contribution of certification to engagement outcomes.

> *"what they did is put five of us on agent test automation with nobody who has built it before, my lead learn it from the vendor documents same as me. we had one trainer for whole floor and his diary is full for weeks." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

5.1 Professional Certifications and Respondent Role

INDICATOR C015 · WHAT PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATIONS DO YOU HAVE? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Professional-certification answer categories each occurred within a single role, so their associations could not be separated from role in these comparisons. Professional certifications were reported by 793 of 850 respondents. Of those who answered, 236 (29.76%) reported none. The most frequent named certifications were Six Sigma Green Belt (127 respondents), Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) Foundation (126), and Amazon Web Services (AWS) Certified Cloud Practitioner (124).

Table 4.2. Professional certifications reported by respondents

Answer	Respondents	Share of 793 respondents who answered	Engagements with at least one respondent
None	236	29.76%	129
Six Sigma Green Belt	127	16.02%	95
ITIL Foundation	126	15.89%	88
AWS Certified Cloud Practitioner	124	15.64%	89
PMP, ITIL	44	5.55%	44
PMP, Scrum Master	43	5.42%	43
PMP	35	4.41%	35
Six Sigma Black Belt	28	3.53%	28

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Answer	Respondents	Share of 793 respondents who answered	Engagements with at least one respondent
PMP, MBA	12	1.51%	12
PMP, ITIL Expert	9	1.13%	9
PgMP	8	1.01%	8
MBA	1	0.13%	1

Note: PMP = Project Management Professional. ITIL = Information Technology Infrastructure Library. MBA = Master of Business Administration. PgMP = Program Management Professional. AWS = Amazon Web Services. Engagement counts identify engagements with at least one respondent reporting the answer. An engagement may appear in more than one answer category.

Individual contributors reported no certification or one of the three certifications identified above. Engagement managers reported Project Management Professional (PMP), alone or with ITIL or Scrum Master, or Six Sigma Black Belt. Portfolio directors reported PMP with a Master of Business Administration (MBA) or ITIL Expert, or Program Management Professional (PgMP). Engagement-level comparisons assigned the unique most frequent answer to each engagement. Tied assignments and answer categories below the required base were excluded.

The chi-square test assesses whether the distribution across categories differs from that expected under independence. Welch's F test compares group means while allowing the spread of values within each group to differ. Engagement-level comparisons of professional certifications did not identify statistically significant differences in cancellation (chi-square 4.29, p = 0.235, n = 99 engagements), customer satisfaction among active engagements (Welch F 0.00, p = 0.992, n = 50), engagement indicator mean (Welch F 1.60, p = 0.211, n = 99), or intent to leave (Welch F 1.15, p = 0.346, n = 99). Respondent-level differences closely followed role and do not isolate the contribution of certification.

5.2 Artificial Intelligence Certifications

INDICATOR C016 · WHAT AI CERTIFICATIONS DO YOU HAVE? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

More than half of respondents answering the AI-certification question, 437 of 788 (55.46%), reported no AI certification. AI certifications were reported by 788 of 850 respondents. The remaining 351 respondents named one of five AI certifications, each reported by between 66 and 78 respondents.

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Table 4.3. AI certifications reported by respondents

Answer	Respondents	Share of 788 respondents who answered	Engagements with at least one respondent
None	437	55.46%	148
Databricks Generative AI Fundamentals	78	9.90%	60
Google Cloud Generative AI	72	9.14%	59
Azure AI Fundamentals	68	8.63%	58
DeepLearning.AI certificate	67	8.50%	55
AWS Certified Machine Learning	66	8.38%	56

Note: AI = artificial intelligence. AWS = Amazon Web Services. Counts describe reported certifications. Engagement counts identify engagements with at least one respondent reporting the answer and are not mutually exclusive.

AI-certification answers did not differ statistically significantly by role, vendor type, or the engagement-level segment families examined. Engagement-level comparisons with the four core study measures could not be estimated under the study's eligibility rule. Fewer than two answer categories contained at least 10 engagements. The certification distribution remains descriptive and does not establish the contribution of certification to capability or engagement outcomes.

5.3 Sources of Agentic AI Knowledge

INDICATOR C017 · WHERE DID YOU GAIN YOUR AI KNOWLEDGE? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Selected sources of AI knowledge did not differ statistically significantly by role, vendor type, or the engagement-level segment families examined. A source of AI knowledge was reported by 800 of 850 respondents. Each of the six sources was selected by between 125 and 140 respondents.

Table 4.4. Reported sources of AI knowledge

Answer	Respondents	Share of 800 respondents who answered	Engagements with at least one respondent
Vendor and partner training	140	17.50%	97
On the job	136	17.00%	92

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Answer	Respondents	Share of 800 respondents who answered	Engagements with at least one respondent
Online courses	136	17.00%	103
University coursework	132	16.50%	89
Self-taught	131	16.38%	85
Vendor training program	125	15.63%	88

Note: Counts describe the selected source of AI knowledge. Engagement counts identify engagements with at least one respondent selecting the source and are not mutually exclusive.

The source of AI knowledge assigned to each engagement was not statistically significantly associated with cancellation (chi-square 2.39, p = 0.792, n = 94 engagements), customer satisfaction among active engagements (Welch F 0.43, p = 0.521, n = 22 engagements), engagement indicator mean (Welch F 0.24, p = 0.940, n = 94 engagements), or intent to leave (Welch F 0.36, p = 0.871, n = 94 engagements). The cancellation, engagement indicator mean, and intent-to-leave comparisons met the equivalence criterion for categorical answers. That criterion uses omega squared, an estimate of the variation associated with differences between groups, with a study-defined bound of 0.09. The customer-satisfaction comparison did not meet the equivalence criterion and remains inconclusive. The conclusions were retained under the reported robustness checks.

Thirty-seven written answers addressed sources of AI knowledge, all from individual contributors on 33 engagements. Nineteen were negative and 14 positive. They described brief formal instruction supplemented by colleagues, external material, and experience during delivery. The structured question recorded one selected source, whereas the written answers described learning that could involve several sources.

> *“i did the agent course after i was already three months on the desk, i learned the hard way first, then the course told me what i should have done. Order is wrong, content is fine” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

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The Manager

Respondents frequently identified their immediate manager as a valued aspect of the job. Their assessments of that manager are considered separately from accounts of knowledge and support at more senior levels of the vendor's management.

> *"My lead is good, he pushes back where he can. But nobody above him has built one of these either, and thats the real gap." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"A manager who pushed back on the vendor honestly, to the end" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

Each of the five management questions was associated with the four core study measures, with the conclusions retained under the applicable robustness checks. The close relationships among these ratings limit the extent to which outcomes can be attributed to a particular managerial capability.

"

last month i ask for someone senior who knows sanctions screening properly, there is nobody free, we get a person off a retail project instead. They say they will revert back on the staffing, nothing comes. That part has not changed at all. But training did improve, the new course on agent monitoring is actually useful and i finish it in two weeks. And my own lead is fine, he shields us where he can. It is the people above him i cannot say anything good about."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding

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1 Manager Effectiveness and Knowledge

Ratings of manager effectiveness, knowledge, and capability were below the scale's midpoint, and approximately 30% of answers to each of the five questions were distressed. The questions covered financial-industry knowledge, agentic AI knowledge, and capability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements, including engagements for financial institutions. Mean ratings were 4.7 or 4.8, with medians of 5.0 and bases of 791 to 803 respondents. Distressed ratings ranged from 241 of 800 answers (30.13%) to 253 of 800 answers (31.63%).

Table 4.5. Manager effectiveness and knowledge

Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed ratings (%)
Effectiveness of the manager	4.8	242 of 802	30.17%
Manager knowledge of the financial industry	4.8	253 of 800	31.63%
Manager knowledge of agentic AI	4.7	242 of 803	30.14%
Manager capability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements	4.8	241 of 800	30.13%
Manager capability to manage such engagements for financial institutions	4.8	242 of 791	30.59%

Indicator	r, cancellation	r, customer satisfaction	r, Indicator mean	r, intent to leave
Effectiveness of the manager	−0.67	0.69	0.83	−0.68
Manager knowledge of the financial industry	−0.62	0.70	0.82	−0.66
Manager knowledge of agentic AI	−0.65	0.72	0.82	−0.67
Manager capability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements	−0.64	0.73	0.84	−0.67
Manager capability to manage such engagements for financial institutions	−0.64	0.72	0.84	−0.67

Note: r denotes the correlation coefficient. Cancellation rate and engagement indicator mean use 150 engagements. Customer satisfaction uses the 94 active engagements. Intent to leave uses the respondents with both answers, with bases from 745 to 753. Higher original ratings of intent to leave indicate greater likelihood of departure. Distressed ratings are 3 or below for these management questions. The displayed correlations describe associations and do not establish causation.

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The five management ratings were closely related. Their correlations with the engagement indicator mean ranged from r = 0.82 to r = 0.84 (n = 150 engagements), although none of the questions is included in that mean. Differences of this magnitude do not establish a ranking of managerial capabilities. On canceled engagements, the mean ratings ranged from 3.2 to 3.3 (n = 296–304 respondents).

1.1 Effectiveness of the Immediate Manager

INDICATOR C080 · MY MANAGER IS EFFECTIVE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Manager effectiveness received distressed ratings in 242 of 802 answers (30.17%). The mean rating was 4.8 and the median was 5.0 (n = 802 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.67, n = 150 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.68, n = 753 respondents). Ratings differed by engagement status and lifecycle stage. The mean on canceled engagements was 3.2 (n = 304 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 28 of 150 engagements.

Figure 4.10. Mean rating of manager effectiveness by respondent role and engagement status

Manager effectiveness received distressed ratings in 242 of 802 answers (30.17%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 242 of 802 answers (30.17%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Manager effectiveness was addressed in 248 written answers from 226 respondents on 112 engagements. Of those answers, 213 were positive and 30 negative. The question about valued aspects of the job supplied 169 answers. These counts are specific to manager effectiveness and differ from the overlapping theme counts for skills, colleagues, and pay reported in section 5 of “Job Satisfaction.”

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> *"strong manager support / meaningful compliance work / steady client trust" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"My team lead is doing what she can with what she got, she stay late same as us. Nobody trained anybody for this, they just put HR cases in front of us and said use the tool. Thats not her fault." - Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Negative accounts of managers described absence or unresolved escalation. Active engagements with a negative written answer had lower customer satisfaction. Respondents whose written answers were more negative also reported higher intent to leave.

> *"my manager is on another account most of the time so there's nobody to ask." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

1.2 Manager Knowledge of the Financial Industry

INDICATOR C081 · MY MANAGER KNOWS THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY WELL · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The manager's financial-industry knowledge received distressed ratings in 253 of 800 answers (31.63%), the highest proportion among the five management questions. The mean rating was 4.8 and the median was 5.0 (n = 800 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.62, n = 150 engagements) and higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.70, n = 94 engagements). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.2 (n = 302 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 29 of 150 engagements.

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Figure 4.11. Mean rating of the manager's financial-industry knowledge by respondent role and engagement status

The manager's financial-industry knowledge received distressed ratings in 253 of 800 answers (31.63%), the highest proportion among the five management questions.



Note: Distressed ratings: 253 of 800 answers (31.63%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

One written answer addressed the manager's knowledge of the financial industry. It described managers learning the financial-industry work at the same time as the people they managed. The account is illustrative.

> *"Where they are behind is insurence itself, most of our leads never touched policy admin before this, they are learning it same time we are. Can't blame them for that really." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

1.3 Manager Knowledge of Agentic AI

INDICATOR C082 · MY MANAGER KNOWS AGENTIC AI WELL · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The manager's agentic AI knowledge received distressed ratings in 242 of 803 answers (30.14%). The mean rating was 4.7 and the median was 5.0 (n = 803 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.72, n = 94 engagements) and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.82, n = 150 engagements). Individual contributors rated this knowledge lower than engagement managers and portfolio directors. The mean rating was distressed on 29 of 150 engagements.

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Figure 4.12. Mean rating of the manager's agentic AI knowledge by respondent role and engagement status

The manager's agentic AI knowledge received distressed ratings in 242 of 803 answers (30.14%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 242 of 803 answers (30.14%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

All 10 written answers addressing the manager's knowledge of agentic AI were negative. Eight described limited knowledge or experience in production among people in more senior roles, and four described unanswered escalations. These descriptions could occur in the same answer. The limited number of accounts does not support generalization to all managers.

> *"When I ask about how tool decide, my Lead also dont know, he ask someone in other city and no answer come back... Nobody from company sat with us even one day since account start." - Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Nobody in my line management has used one of these tools for a day — that is the honest position, and it lands on me." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *"My management chain struggles to understand basic AI realities. I bounce between meetings with executives that either think AI is overpromised or vastly under-respected." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

1.4 Manager Capability to Manage Agentic AI Outsourcing Engagements

INDICATOR C085 · MY MANAGER KNOWS HOW TO MANAGE AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENTS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Capability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements received distressed ratings in 241 of 800 answers (30.13%). The mean rating was 4.8 and the median was 5.0 (n = 800 respondents). Its correlation

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with the engagement indicator mean was r = 0.84 (n = 150 engagements), equal to the largest observed coefficient among the five management questions. This is a descriptive comparison. Higher ratings were also associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.67, n = 752 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 28 of 150 engagements.

Figure 4.13. Mean rating of the manager's capability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements by respondent role and engagement status

Capability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements received distressed ratings in 241 of 800 answers (30.13%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 241 of 800 answers (30.13%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

One written answer addressed this capability and received the strongest negative sentiment score. It contrasted the current manager with a previous manager whose experience performing the work had enabled informed judgments about it.

> *"On the old account my manager had done the job himself for years, so he knew when I said a batch was bad. Here they dont know, so they just push." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

1.5 Manager Capability to Manage Agentic AI Outsourcing Engagements for Financial Institutions

INDICATOR C086 · MY MANAGER KNOWS HOW TO MANAGE AGENTIC AI OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENTS FOR GLOBAL BANKS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Capability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements for financial institutions received distressed ratings in 242 of 791 answers (30.59%). The mean rating was 4.8 and the median was 5.0 (n = 791

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respondents). The survey question used the wording “global banks,” retained above. Ratings were associated with all four core study measures, including cancellation (r = −0.64, n = 150 engagements) and the engagement indicator mean (r = 0.84, n = 150 engagements). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.2 (n = 296 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 32 of 150 engagements.

Figure 4.14. Mean rating of the manager’s capability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements for financial institutions by respondent role and engagement status

Capability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements for financial institutions received distressed ratings in 242 of 791 answers (30.59%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 242 of 791 answers (30.59%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

No written answer specifically addressed managerial capability for engagements serving financial institutions. This question’s results therefore rest on the structured ratings alone.

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Job Satisfaction

Dissatisfaction, fatigue, and unresolved delivery difficulties were prominent in respondents' accounts, while current job satisfaction was strongly associated with cancellation and intent to leave. Learning, colleagues, and pay remained valued even on canceled engagements. These associations may reflect both the experience preceding cancellation and respondents' reactions to a difficult or canceled engagement. The study cannot establish their temporal direction.

Written answers linked dissatisfaction to recurring manual work, unresolved decisions, departures from the delivery team, and concerns respondents had ceased raising. Current satisfaction, retrospective comparisons, challenges, and valued aspects of the job are examined separately.

> *"Frankly the part that wore us down was waiting. My people would sit on a misrouted ticket queue for a week while the two sides worked out who was allowed to change the routing rules, and in that time they are doing the triage by hand, again." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Honestly I am just tired now. Two of us spend the first hour of every shift re-checking what the agent did overnight, as such we start the real queue already behind. My teammate stop taking her break." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

"

How we felt going into this was already worn down — the escalation process for HR-sensitive tickets was never written down anywhere by the client, and when a case needed a ruling we could not wait days for one, so we made the call ourselves and routed it, and we told both our own leadership and the client this was happening."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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1 Current Satisfaction of the Respondent and the Delivery Team

Respondents' own job satisfaction and their perceptions of delivery team satisfaction were low, with distressed ratings accounting for 46.79% and 45.30% of answers, respectively. The latter represents the respondent's assessment of other delivery team members and is not a separate response from every person concerned.

Both satisfaction ratings were associated with all four core study measures, with the conclusions retained under the applicable robustness checks. Each had a cancellation correlation of r = −0.81 (n = 150 engagements), greater in absolute magnitude than the observed correlations for the 100 rated indicators. This descriptive ordering does not establish statistically significant differences between coefficients.

Respondent job satisfaction was correlated with intent to leave at r = −0.91 (n = 732 respondents). Both answers concern the same respondent and the same job. The corresponding correlation for perceived satisfaction of the extended delivery team was r = −0.76 (n = 742 respondents).

1.1 Respondent Job Satisfaction

INDICATOR C018 · HOW HAPPY ARE YOU WITH YOUR CURRENT JOB? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondent job satisfaction received distressed ratings in 365 of 780 answers (46.79%). The mean rating was 4.2 and the median was 4.0 (n = 780 respondents). The mean on canceled engagements was 1.8 (n = 300 respondents).

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Figure 4.15. Respondent Job Satisfaction: associations with the study measures



Note: Distressed ratings: 365 of 780 answers (46.79%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 598): 4.09. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.45. Portfolio director (n = 30): 5.00. Build-Out (n = 157): 5.86. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 228): 5.50. Production (n = 95): 5.97. Canceled (n = 300): 1.76.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Higher job-satisfaction ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.81, n = 150 engagements), higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.76, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.86, n = 150 engagements). At respondent level, higher satisfaction was associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.91, n = 732 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 63 of 150 engagements.

Job satisfaction was addressed in 250 written answers from 219 respondents on 113 engagements. Of the 124 answers outside the question about valued aspects of the job, 60 described the respondent or the delivery team as tired, exhausted, or worn down. All four tests of the relationships between written answers and outcomes were statistically significant. Engagements with a negative written answer had a higher cancellation rate. Respondents whose written answers were more negative reported higher intent to leave.

> *"Tired, mostly... two months and we still could not get a name for who owns the vendor master file at their end. We asked for access to their procurement system four times, and received a spreadsheet extract instead." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

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"Its been more tiring than hard if that makes sense, we spend a lot of the day waiting on access to things and then catching up at the end. Nobody on my team is angry about it, we just come out of the week feeling like we did two jobs" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"How this has felt for months now is exhausting — closing IT tickets bot could not resolve and rerouting HR cases by hand, because there is still no written escalation path." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

1.2 Satisfaction of the Extended Delivery Team

INDICATOR C020 · HOW HAPPY IS YOUR EXTENDED TEAM WITH THE CURRENT ENGAGEMENT? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Perceived delivery team satisfaction received distressed ratings in 357 of 788 answers (45.30%). The mean rating was 4.3 and the median was 4.0 (n = 788 respondents). These ratings describe the respondents' assessments of the delivery team.

Figure 4.16. Satisfaction of the Extended Delivery Team: associations with the study measures



Note: Distressed ratings: 357 of 788 answers (45.30%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 610): 4.14. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.55. Portfolio director (n = 27): 5.78. Build-Out (n = 163): 5.70. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 233): 5.67. Production (n = 99): 6.22. Canceled (n = 293): 1.73.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

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Higher ratings of delivery team satisfaction were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.81, n = 150 engagements), higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.68, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.87, n = 150 engagements). They were also associated with lower respondent intent to leave (r = −0.76, n = 742 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 61 of 150 engagements.

Delivery team satisfaction was addressed in 56 written answers from 54 respondents on 44 engagements. Forty-three answers were negative. Of the 47 answers outside the question about valued aspects of the job, 34 described the delivery team as tired, exhausted, or worn down. Ten described departures, applications for other employment, or requests to move to another engagement.

> *"If every income calculation has to be opened and checked anyway, the processors were doing their old job plus a review job, and they knew it. Two of my best people asked to be moved within the first month." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"so two of my analysts spent most of their evenings that month re-running tests instead of the work they were hired for. Please understand it is that, and not the volume, which wears people down. I lost one of them to another account over exactly this." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *"The effect on my team is tiredness more than anything. Every week we take decisions that are not ours to take, because waiting for both sides to agree costs more time than the ticket has. Nobody above notices, they only see the ticket time going up, and then we get asked why the numbers slipped" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

"

Nobody tell us when something change on their side. We find out because a run fail and then the whole day is gone for two of us. My team have stopped trusting anything that come in, so now we check every file twice even when it is fine, and that is extra hours nobody count. It make people tired and quiet in standup."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Client servicing and communications

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2 Satisfaction Relative to Five Years Earlier

Retrospective satisfaction ratings had a mean of 4.9 for both respondents and delivery teams, but did not establish measured change over five years. The answers were judgments collected once, rather than repeated measurements of the same respondents or delivery teams.

The median reported career experience was two years, and the survey accepted five-year comparisons from respondents whose careers were shorter than that reference period. The figures below describe all valid answers, without restriction to respondents with at least five years of career experience. This limitation prevents their interpretation as established five-year changes in satisfaction. Differences from the current-satisfaction questions also do not measure change over that period.

2.1 Respondent Satisfaction Relative to Five Years Earlier

INDICATOR C022 · COMPARED TO 5 YEARS AGO, I AM HAPPIER WITH THE WORK I AM DOING NOW · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Retrospective respondent satisfaction received distressed ratings in 214 of 804 answers (26.62%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 804 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.59, n = 150 engagements), higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.72, n = 94 engagements), and lower intent to leave (r = −0.76, n = 755 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 26 of 150 engagements. These figures retain the full answering base and the reference-period limitation described above.

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Figure 4.17. Respondent Satisfaction Relative to Five Years Earlier: associations with the study measures



Note: Distressed ratings: 214 of 804 answers (26.62%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 4.80. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.19. Portfolio director (n = 31): 6.35. Build-Out (n = 166): 5.90. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 239): 5.53. Production (n = 97): 5.96. Canceled (n = 302): 3.60.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The graphic includes the associations reproduced in the section. Additional results remain in the text.

One written answer addressed the retrospective comparison. It described an agent handling repeated questions while the respondent handled cases requiring judgment. This account illustrates reported experience and does not establish a measured change over five years.

> *"before this i am answering same password and leave-balance question fifty time a day. now only the unusual ones reach me, where policy is not clear. my team is less bored and less tired by evening." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

2.2 Delivery Team Satisfaction Relative to Five Years Earlier

INDICATOR C024 · COMPARED TO 5 YEARS AGO, THE TEAM I WORK WITH SEEMS TO BE HAPPIER · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Retrospective delivery team satisfaction received distressed ratings in 242 of 797 answers (30.36%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 797 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.80, n = 150 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.61, n = 751 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 33 of 150 engagements. The figures describe the full answering base and remain subject to the reference-period limitation.

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Figure 4.18. Mean retrospective rating of delivery team satisfaction relative to five years earlier by respondent role and engagement status

Retrospective delivery team satisfaction received distressed ratings in 242 of 797 answers (30.36%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 242 of 797 answers (30.36%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

The single written answer addressing the delivery team comparison came from the respondent whose account also addressed the comparison of personal satisfaction. It described less boredom and fatigue after an agent assumed responsibility for repeated questions. It is one account addressing both questions, rather than independent evidence for each comparison.

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3 Challenges Named as Reducing Job Satisfaction

Respondents more frequently identified preparation of the vendor and the financial institution as challenges to job satisfaction than the agents themselves. The question asking respondents to identify the three principal challenges to job satisfaction received 755 answers about their own engagements, covering all 150 engagements. The most frequent subjects were the vendor's delivery playbook (139 answers) and the financial institution's legacy systems (128). Pricing of agentic AI work was identified in 115 answers, and provisioning of access and agent identities in 115.

These accounts concerned the arrangements needed to perform and check delivery work, as well as the performance of the agents themselves. The vendor's commercial model was identified in 110 answers and the availability of qualified agentic AI talent in 86. Capacity to review agent output was identified in 77 answers, and the explainability of agent output in 72. Unclear liability or regulatory accountability for agent errors was identified in 72 answers.

> *"No real data governance before automating ... Vendor-risk model was not built for this ... Agent decisions were a black box to us" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"No real agentic playbook to follow yet ... Data governance still catching up ... Documentation always trails the actual process" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

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4 Fatigue in the Written Answers

Qualitative coding identified expressions of fatigue, resignation, and frustration in the written answers. The code “tired” was assigned to 133 answers from 111 respondents on 74 engagements. “Resigned” was assigned to 155 answers from 124 respondents on 76 engagements, and “frustrated” to 119 answers from 99 respondents on 71 engagements. These counts describe expressed emotional states in the supplied answers. They are neither clinical assessments nor estimates of prevalence across the delivery workforce.

> *“it wear you down. Every region of theirs book a break different way, so we learn one and then the next month it change again. My team is four people and two already ask to move.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

Accounts coded as resigned described respondents who had ceased raising recurring concerns or had reduced their expectations after unresolved requests for access, decisions, or data.

> *“In all honesty i stopped expecting anything. Three months and my access to their break system never come through, we work off screenshots somebody email us each morning, nobody ask about that part” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“Wears you down explaining the same thing to their people every week” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

> *“Truthfully I am tired of being middle man. My team asks me every week which expense methodology is approved and I have no answer to give them, because their change board has not met since March. It wears on people” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“I dont raise it as a defect because nobody actually fixes the root problem, were just told to keep the queue moving, its bloody exhausting.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

The code “calm or fine” was assigned to 115 answers from 94 respondents on 65 engagements, and “proud” to 22 answers. Respondents could express more than one emotional state. These counts are consequently overlapping descriptions of written answers rather than mutually exclusive categories of the delivery workforce.

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5 Sources of Sustained Satisfaction

Skills learned, colleagues, and pay were the most frequently valued aspects of the job, including on canceled engagements. The question received 786 answers about respondents' own engagements, covering all 150 engagements. Skills learned were identified in 427 answers, colleagues in 393, and pay in 214. In 204 answers, a positive statement was accompanied by a qualification identifying a problem. Theme codes could overlap. These counts therefore differ from the counts for specific questions, such as manager effectiveness, and should not be treated as equivalent bases.

Respondents on canceled engagements identified the same valued aspects of the job. Among 296 answers from the 56 canceled engagements, skills learned appeared in 238, colleagues in 192, and pay in 134.

> *"Learned pricing and margining lessons that will stick ... Some solid people on a doomed project ... Pay held up through the cancellation" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Learned more about liability frameworks than I expected ... Coworkers who understood the mess we were in ... The role stays interesting even when the project fails" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Twenty-six answers identified the use case as a valued aspect of the job. These accounts described the underlying problem as worth addressing and the financial-industry work as worth learning.

> *"the security discipline this work has taught me ... a genuinely cautious, well-designed IAM use case ... colleagues who take the identity risks as seriously as I do" -Engagement Manager, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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“Truthfully I don't know how to score top leadership out of ten, I have never met any of them and I've been here a year. What I can score is the training, which was actually decent, the agentic modules were hands on and I use that stuff daily. And the playbook is fine, someone clearly thought about it. But asking me about leadership development programmes when I'm on a POC queue all day is a bit much... my manager is good, that's the bit I can actually see.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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Trust, Care, and Contact

Trust and perceived care in relationships with the financial institution, manager, and vendor were associated with all four core study measures, while contact-frequency associations were small under the study's equivalence criteria. Conclusions for all 12 trust and care questions were retained under the applicable robustness checks. Correlations with the engagement indicator mean ranged from r = 0.76 to r = 0.84 (n = 150 engagements).

The three contact questions distinguish reported frequency of contact from assessments of the relationship. Their results do not establish that contact has no operational value.

> *"Their integration team knows the product properly, when i ask about a webhook retry they come back the same day and they know what they are talking about. The gap is only on data." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

"

Whats hurting us is the HR policy data. Access itself is fine, they had our accounts up in two days and their SMEs will actually sit with us. But half the entitlement tables we read from are years out of date and nobody there owns them, so my team spends its mornings checking answers we should be able to trust. It grinds on you."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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1 Trust in and Care from the Financial Institution

Approximately one quarter of answers were distressed across all four questions on trust in and care from the financial institution. Four questions addressed trust in the financial institution, its perceived care for the respondent, and the respondent's knowledge of how it regarded the delivery team and the engagement. Each had a mean rating of 4.9 and a median of 5.0, on bases from 789 to 799 respondents.

Table 4.6. Trust in and care from the financial institution

Indicator	Distressed answers	Distressed ratings (%)	r, cancellation	r, customer satisfaction	r, Indicator mean	r, intent to leave
Trust in the financial institution	204 of 799	25.53%	−0.60	0.74	0.77	−0.78
Financial institution care for the respondent	216 of 789	27.38%	−0.61	0.75	0.78	−0.76
Knowledge of how the financial institution regards the delivery team	212 of 798	26.57%	−0.59	0.72	0.76	−0.77
Knowledge of how the financial institution regards the engagement	219 of 791	27.69%	−0.60	0.74	0.78	−0.76

Note: r denotes the correlation coefficient. Cancellation rate and engagement indicator mean use 150 engagements. Customer satisfaction uses the 94 active engagements. Intent to leave uses the respondents with both answers, with bases from 742 to 751. Distressed ratings are 3 or below for these questions. The columns describe different analytical bases and do not establish a ranking of causal importance.

The four ratings were closely related. Their correlations with intent to leave ranged from r = −0.76 to r = −0.78, and their correlations with cancellation ranged from r = −0.59 to r = −0.61. The measures and analytical units differ, so these magnitudes do not establish relative causal importance. Written answers addressing these relationships were predominantly favorable, with many elicited by the question about valued aspects of the job.

1.1 Trust in the Financial Institution

INDICATOR C069 · I TRUST THE CUSTOMER · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Trust in the financial institution received distressed ratings in 204 of 799 answers (25.53%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 799 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.74, n = 94 engagements) and lower intent to leave

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(r = −0.78, n = 750 respondents). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.5 (n = 296 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 26 of 150 engagements.

Figure 4.19. Mean rating of trust in the financial institution by respondent role and engagement status

Trust in the financial institution received distressed ratings in 204 of 799 answers (25.53%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 204 of 799 answers (25.53%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Trust in the financial institution was addressed in 54 written answers from 54 respondents on 37 engagements. Fifty-one were positive. All but two came from the question about valued aspects of the job and identified the relationship with the financial institution among those aspects. The three negative answers described reduced trust or deterioration in that relationship.

> *"Client relationship here is stable enough to have honest conversations" -Portfolio Director, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

1.2 Financial Institution Care for the Respondent

INDICATOR C070 · THE CUSTOMER KNOWS AND CARES ABOUT ME · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

The financial institution's perceived care for the respondent received distressed ratings in 216 of 789 answers (27.38%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 789 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.61, n = 150 engagements) and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.78, n = 150 engagements). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.5 (n = 301 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 27 of 150 engagements.

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Figure 4.20. Mean rating of financial institution care for the respondent by respondent role and engagement status

The financial institution's perceived care for the respondent received distressed ratings in 216 of 789 answers (27.38%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 216 of 789 answers (27.38%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

No written answer specifically addressed whether the financial institution knew or cared about the respondent. The results for this question rest on the structured ratings.

1.3 Knowledge of How the Financial Institution Regards the Delivery Team

INDICATOR C074 · I KNOW HOW THE CUSTOMER FEELS ABOUT MY TEAM · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Knowledge of how the financial institution regarded the delivery team received distressed ratings in 212 of 798 answers (26.57%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 798 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.59, n = 150 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.77, n = 751 respondents). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.5 (n = 298 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 26 of 150 engagements.

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Figure 4.21. Mean rating of knowledge of how the financial institution regards the delivery team by respondent role and engagement status

Knowledge of how the financial institution regarded the delivery team received distressed ratings in 212 of 798 answers (26.57%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 212 of 798 answers (26.57%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Two positive written answers addressed how the financial institution regarded the delivery team. Both described trust expressed through discretion to design or revise the agentic AI processes. These accounts are illustrative.

> *"Client trusts the team enough to let us redesign as we go" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

1.4 Knowledge of How the Financial Institution Regards the Engagement

INDICATOR C075 · I KNOW HOW THE CUSTOMER FEELS ABOUT THE ENGAGEMENT I AM ON · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Knowledge of how the financial institution regarded the engagement received distressed ratings in 219 of 791 answers (27.69%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 791 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.74, n = 94 engagements) and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.78, n = 150 engagements). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.6 (n = 305 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 27 of 150 engagements.

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Figure 4.22. Mean rating of knowledge of how the financial institution regards the engagement by respondent role and engagement status

Knowledge of how the financial institution regarded the engagement received distressed ratings in 219 of 791 answers (27.69%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 219 of 791 answers (27.69%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

No written answer specifically addressed how the financial institution regarded the engagement. The results for this question rest on the structured ratings.

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2 Contact with the Financial Institution

Reported contact frequency had only small associations with the four core study measures under the study's equivalence criteria, across peer, engagement-management, and leadership levels. The results and relevant written answers are examined separately for each question.

Some written answers described frequent contact alongside unresolved access, data, approval, or responsibility for decisions. Others described no contact. These accounts address the quality and reach of interaction as well as its frequency.

2.1 Regular Contact With Financial Institution Peers

INDICATOR C071 · I TALK WITH PEERS INSIDE THE CUSTOMER REGULARLY · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Regular contact with financial institution peers had only small associations with all four core study measures under the equivalence criteria. Regular contact with peers in the financial institution had a mean rating of 5.5 and a median of 6.0 (n = 809 respondents). The rating was not statistically significantly associated with cancellation (r = 0.00, n = 150 engagements), customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = −0.06, n = 94 engagements), engagement indicator mean (r = −0.08, n = 150 engagements), or intent to leave (r = 0.01, n = 760 respondents). Distressed ratings accounted for 48 of 809 answers (5.93%). No engagement had a distressed mean rating.

Figure 4.23. Regular Contact With Financial Institution Peers: associations with the study measures

Regular contact with financial institution peers: associations with the study measures



Note: Distressed ratings: 48 of 809 answers (5.93%).

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Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 631): 5.51. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.51. Portfolio director (n = 27): 5.33. Build-Out (n = 165): 5.53. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 239): 5.59. Production (n = 100): 5.35. Canceled (n = 305): 5.49.
r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Contact with peers in the financial institution was addressed in 48 written answers from 47 respondents on 37 engagements, mainly in comments on financial institution readiness. In 27 answers, respondents described financial institution staff responding promptly or working alongside the delivery team, while locating the difficulty in access, data, approval, or responsibility for decisions. The eight answers with the strongest negative sentiment score came from respondents who reported never meeting financial institution staff.

> *"I never speak to anyone from the client side, not once in eight months. So these questions are asking me to rate people I only know from the file names on a deal folder." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

2.2 Regular Contact With Financial Institution Engagement Management

INDICATOR C072 · I TALK WITH ENGAGEMENT MANAGEMENT INSIDE THE CUSTOMER REGULARLY · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Regular contact with financial institution engagement management had only small associations with all four core study measures under the equivalence criteria. Regular contact with engagement management in the financial institution had a mean rating of 5.5 and a median of 6.0 (n = 790 respondents). The rating was not statistically significantly associated with cancellation (r = 0.01, n = 150 engagements) or intent to leave (r = 0.05, n = 743 respondents). Distressed ratings accounted for 41 of 790 answers (5.19%). No engagement had a distressed mean rating.

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Figure 4.24. Mean rating of regular contact with financial institution engagement management by respondent role and engagement status

Regular contact with financial institution engagement management had only small associations with all four core study measures under the equivalence criteria.



Note: Distressed ratings: 41 of 790 answers (5.19%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

The 26 written answers addressing contact with financial institution engagement management came mainly from comments on financial institution readiness and co-management. Seven described a recurring call or a shared list maintained with a manager in the financial institution. All nine negative answers received the strongest negative sentiment score and came from respondents who reported never meeting financial institution management.

The written-answer comparisons differed from the structured-rating results. Negative accounts were associated with a higher cancellation rate and higher intent to leave. With only nine negative written answers, these relationships are exploratory. The accounts described an absence of management contact, a more specific circumstance than variation in reported contact frequency.

> *"Their side has no single owner for this programme, so we run a standing Thursday call with the three compliance leads and take whatever we can get agreed in that hour as the decision of record." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

2.3 Regular Contact With Financial Institution Leadership

INDICATOR C073 · I TALK WITH THE CUSTOMER'S LEADERSHIP TEAM REGULARLY · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Only 333 of the 850 respondents supplied numeric ratings of contact with financial institution leadership. Their mean rating was 5.6 and their median 6.0. Another 274 answered "I do not know," and 243 left the question blank. The mean and distressed proportion describe the 333 respondents who supplied

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numeric ratings. The rating was not statistically significantly associated with cancellation (r = 0.01, n = 150 engagements) or intent to leave (r = 0.07, n = 324 respondents). All four associations met the equivalence criteria. Distressed ratings accounted for 20 of 333 answers (6.01%). The mean rating was distressed on two of 150 engagements.

Figure 4.25. Mean rating of regular contact with financial institution leadership by respondent role and engagement status

Only 333 of the 850 respondents supplied numeric ratings of contact with financial institution leadership.



Note: Distressed ratings: 20 of 333 answers (6.01%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Twelve written answers addressed contact with financial institution leadership. Eight received the strongest negative sentiment score and described no contact with financial institution staff. Three described direct contact with a senior leader or committee after a problem arose. The limited number of accounts constrains generalization.

> *"half these questions assume somebody on both sides is managing this together. there was no joint anything here, we had a standup nobody from the bank joined." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Payments, cards and disputes*

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3 Trust in and Care from the Manager

Manager care and trust received distressed ratings in approximately 30% of answers to each question, while positive written accounts described practical support and acceptance of responsibility. The three indicators covered care for the respondent, care for the larger delivery team, and trust in the manager.

> *...this platform work is new for everybody here... I would not say they know agents deeply yet, but when the agent posted a wrong instruction on an account my lead owned it and did not push it down to us. That counts." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"A manager who is actually fair given how tense the vendor talks get" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

3.1 Manager Care for the Respondent

INDICATOR C083 · MY MANAGER CARES ABOUT ME · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Perceived care from the immediate manager was associated with less cancellation and more favorable engagement indicator ratings. The manager's perceived care for the respondent received distressed ratings in 243 of 804 answers (30.22%). The mean rating was 4.7 and the median was 5.0 (n = 804 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.65, n = 150 engagements) and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.82, n = 150 engagements). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.2 (n = 306 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 33 of 150 engagements.

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Figure 4.26. Mean rating of manager care for the respondent by respondent role and engagement status

Perceived care from the immediate manager was associated with less cancellation and more favorable engagement indicator ratings.



Note: Distressed ratings: 243 of 804 answers (30.22%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Seven written answers addressed the manager's care for the respondent. All were positive and came from the question about valued aspects of the job. Five described a supportive manager. These illustrative accounts reflect the positive framing of that question.

> *"Manager genuinely has my back" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

3.2 Manager Care for the Larger Delivery Team

INDICATOR C084 · MY MANAGER CARES ABOUT THE LARGER TEAM · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Perceived manager care for the larger delivery team was associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements and lower respondent intent to leave. The manager's perceived care for the larger delivery team received distressed ratings in 247 of 797 answers (30.99%). The mean rating was 4.7 and the median was 5.0 (n = 797 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.73, n = 94 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.68, n = 748 respondents). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.1 (n = 304 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 33 of 150 engagements.

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Figure 4.27. Mean rating of manager care for the delivery team by respondent role and engagement status

Perceived manager care for the larger delivery team was associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements and lower respondent intent to leave.



Note: Distressed ratings: 247 of 797 answers (30.99%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Care for the larger delivery team was addressed in 73 written answers from 71 respondents on 57 engagements. Seventy-two were positive. All 66 answers to the question about valued aspects of the job identified the manager. With only one negative answer, none of the tests relating written answers to outcomes was statistically significant. The reported associations therefore rest on the structured ratings.

> *"My employer has been decent with me personally, my lead backs us when a flag turns out to be wrong and that matters more than people think. We are short handed though, two people left and weren't replaced, so the rota is tight." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

3.3 Trust in the Manager

INDICATOR C091 · I TRUST MY MANAGER · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Trust in the immediate manager was closely associated with the engagement indicator mean, although both reflect reported assessments from the study. Trust in the manager received distressed ratings in 245 of 807 answers (30.36%). The mean rating was 4.7 and the median was 5.0 (n = 807 respondents). Its correlation with the engagement indicator mean was r = 0.84 (n = 150 engagements), the largest observed coefficient among the three questions on managerial care and trust. This is a descriptive ordering. The mean on canceled engagements was 3.2 (n = 314 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 32 of 150 engagements.

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Figure 4.28. Mean rating of trust in the manager by respondent role and engagement status

Trust in the immediate manager was closely associated with the engagement indicator mean, although both reflect reported assessments from the study.



Note: Distressed ratings: 245 of 807 answers (30.36%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Two positive written answers associated trust with the manager's honesty. These accounts provide illustrations rather than evidence of prevalence.

> *"very little on this engagement ... the process knowledge I picked up ... a manager who was at least honest" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

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4 Trust in and Care from the Vendor

Approximately one quarter of answers were distressed across the five questions on the respondent's relationship with the vendor, ranging from 192 of 786 answers (24.43%) to 218 of 799 (27.28%). They assessed perceived care for the respondent and the delivery team, the care of the vendor's top leadership for the respondent's well-being and development, trust in the vendor, and the vendor's effective use of the respondent.

Table 4.7. Trust in and care from the vendor

Indicator	Mean rating	Distressed answers	Distressed ratings (%)
Vendor care for the respondent	5.0	192 of 786	24.43%
Vendor care for the delivery team	4.9	214 of 802	26.68%
Top leadership care for well-being and development	4.9	214 of 812	26.35%
Trust in the vendor	4.9	218 of 799	27.28%
Effective use of the respondent by the vendor	4.9	212 of 808	26.24%

Indicator	r, cancellation	r, customer satisfaction	r, Indicator mean	r, intent to leave
Vendor care for the respondent	−0.56	0.73	0.76	−0.77
Vendor care for the delivery team	−0.57	0.65	0.78	−0.59
Top leadership care for well-being and development	−0.59	0.74	0.78	−0.76
Trust in the vendor	−0.61	0.79	0.80	−0.77
Effective use of the respondent by the vendor	−0.61	0.77	0.80	−0.78

Note: r denotes the correlation coefficient. Cancellation rate and engagement indicator mean use 150 engagements. Customer satisfaction uses the 94 active engagements. Intent to leave uses the respondents with both answers, with bases from 740 to 762. Distressed ratings are 3 or below for these questions. The columns describe different analytical bases and do not establish a ranking of causal importance.

Written answers described perceived care from the vendor through attention, training, and support. Negative accounts described limited contact with management above the immediate manager and insufficient assistance with delivery difficulties.

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"The problem is nobody above my lead knows my name... no career path was ever discussed about with me. I like the work, I like my team. But I have no idea what I am in two years." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

4.1 Vendor Care for the Respondent

INDICATOR C087 · MY EMPLOYER CARES ABOUT ME · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Perceived vendor care for the respondent had the lowest distressed proportion among the five vendor relationship indicators, at 192 of 786 answers (24.43%). The mean rating was 5.0 and the median was 5.0 (n = 786 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.56, n = 150 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.77, n = 740 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 25 of 150 engagements.

Figure 4.29. Mean rating of vendor care for the respondent by respondent role and engagement status

Perceived vendor care for the respondent had the lowest distressed proportion among the five vendor relationship indicators, at 192 of 786 answers (24.43%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 192 of 786 answers (24.43%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Six written answers addressed the vendor's care for the respondent, all in comments about the vendor. Four were negative and described inadequate training, attention, or support. These accounts are illustrative.

"Two months of this and I stopped caring, which is not like me. Nobody checked in once" - Individual Contributor, ITO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

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4.2 Vendor Care for the Delivery Team

INDICATOR C088 · MY EMPLOYER CARES ABOUT THE TEAM · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Perceived vendor care for the delivery team was related to customer satisfaction and intent to leave, with smaller observed absolute coefficients than the other vendor relationship indicators. The vendor's perceived care for the delivery team received distressed ratings in 214 of 802 answers (26.68%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 802 respondents). Its correlations with customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.65, n = 94 engagements) and intent to leave (r = −0.59, n = 751 respondents) were the smallest observed absolute coefficients among the five questions about the vendor. This is a descriptive comparison. The mean rating was distressed on 29 of 150 engagements.

Figure 4.30. Mean rating of vendor care for the delivery team by respondent role and engagement status

Ratings of vendor care for the delivery team differed by role and engagement status



Note: Distressed ratings: 214 of 802 answers (26.68%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Four written answers addressed the vendor's care for the delivery team. Two were positive and two negative. They concerned training and support when difficulties arose and provide illustrative accounts only.

> *"Am comfortable with how the firm has backed this team, training budget was approved without argument and two of my people sat the agent operations course in full." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"we are on our own here" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

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4.3 Vendor Leadership Care for Well-Being and Development

INDICATOR C089 · MY EMPLOYER'S TOP LEADERSHIP TEAM CARES ABOUT MY WELLBEING AND DEVELOPMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Perceived vendor leadership care for well-being and development was associated with higher customer satisfaction and lower intent to leave. Vendor leadership care for the respondent's well-being and development received distressed ratings in 214 of 812 answers (26.35%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 812 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.74, n = 94 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.76, n = 762 respondents). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.6 (n = 303 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 22 of 150 engagements.

Figure 4.31. Mean rating of vendor leadership care for well-being and development by respondent role and engagement status

Perceived vendor leadership care for well-being and development was associated with higher customer satisfaction and lower intent to leave.



Note: Distressed ratings: 214 of 812 answers (26.35%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

No written answer specifically addressed the care of the vendor's top leadership for the respondent's well-being and development. The results for this question rest on the structured ratings.

4.4 Trust in the Vendor

INDICATOR C090 · I TRUST MY EMPLOYER · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Trust in the vendor had the largest observed customer-satisfaction coefficient among the five vendor relationship indicators, a descriptive ordering of the estimates. Trust in the vendor received distressed

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ratings in 218 of 799 answers (27.28%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 799 respondents). Its correlation with customer satisfaction among active engagements was r = 0.79 (n = 94 engagements), the largest observed coefficient among the five questions about the vendor. This is a descriptive ordering. The mean on canceled engagements was 3.5 (n = 300 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 24 of 150 engagements.

Figure 4.32. Mean rating of trust in the vendor by respondent role and engagement status

Trust in the vendor had the largest observed customer-satisfaction coefficient among the five vendor relationship indicators, a descriptive ordering of the estimates.



Note: Distressed ratings: 218 of 799 answers (27.28%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

No written answer specifically addressed trust in the vendor. The results for this question rest on the structured ratings.

4.5 Effective Use of the Respondent by the Vendor

INDICATOR C092 · I AM BEING USED EFFECTIVELY BY MY EMPLOYER · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

A more favorable assessment of how the vendor used the respondent was associated with less cancellation and lower intent to leave. The vendor's effective use of the respondent received distressed ratings in 212 of 808 answers (26.24%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 808 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.61, n = 150 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.78, n = 756 respondents). The mean on canceled engagements was 3.5 (n = 307 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 24 of 150 engagements.

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Figure 4.33. Mean rating of the vendor's effective use of the respondent by respondent role and engagement status

A more favorable assessment of how the vendor used the respondent was associated with less cancellation and lower intent to leave.



Note: Distressed ratings: 212 of 808 answers (26.24%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Effective use of the respondent was addressed in 33 written answers from 33 respondents on 31 engagements. Twenty-one were negative. Eight described a delivery team too small for its assigned work or departures without replacement, and six described respondents spending their time on work for which they had not been hired. The 11 answers to the question about valued aspects of the job identified a steady pace or workload.

> *"What the ratings do not show is how alone we are on this account. Our own platform team is good on paper but they support ten accounts, so when routing breaks on a Friday I am the escalation and the fix both." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"my whole afternoon is review now. two of us do nothing else some days, and it is not the work i was hired for" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

> *"it say job completed and half the composites are not built. so nobody on my team trust that summary now, we open the output and count accounts by hand. it add two hours to my evening, that is not what i was hired for." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Spent most of the month sitting in calls where neither side would decide anything. Three of us on this pod and two of us were doing nothing for days at a time. It wears you down more than being busy does" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

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Intent to Leave

More than half of the answering respondents, 430 of 798 (53.88%), rated their likelihood of leaving the current job within 12 months at 7 or above on the original 10-point scale. Distressed ratings formed a narrower group: 370 respondents (46.37%) rated that likelihood at 8–10. Conversion to the favorable direction subtracts each original rating from 11, so that higher converted ratings indicate lower intent to leave. Original ratings of 8–10 consequently become converted ratings of 1–3. The two thresholds identify different groups.

All 300 answers from respondents on canceled engagements were distressed. Those answers were collected after cancellation and do not establish the likelihood of departure before it occurred. Among respondents on active engagements, 130 of 498 (26.10%) rated intent to leave at 7 or above. Cancellation of an engagement does not itself establish termination of the respondent's employment.

> *"Asking about two years from now is a joke, i do not know if i am here next month" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I have four analysts on this and two of them have asked me this month to be moved elsewhere. We chase their compliance side for a threshold decision, nothing comes back, and my people sit idle and then work late when it finally arrives." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"the team was never staffed with anybody who has done this provisioning work before. i am the third person on this queue in three months. And that is the main thing." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

A stronger preference for employment directly by a financial institution was associated with less favorable results on the four core study measures. The preference questions have no designated favorable or unfavorable end. Their direction must therefore be interpreted in relation to the particular question.

Written answers described departures involving delivery team members who held undocumented operational knowledge. The study did not follow respondents prospectively to establish whether those who reported an intention to leave subsequently departed.

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1 Intent to Leave of the Respondent and the Delivery Team

Distressed ratings were common for respondents' own intent to leave and their perceptions of delivery team intent to leave, at 46.37% and 46.06% of answers, respectively. Both are presented in the favorable direction, with higher ratings indicating a lower likelihood of departure. Ratings of delivery team intentions describe the respondent's perception and are not direct answers from every delivery team member.

Figure 4.34. Distressed intent-to-leave ratings by engagement status and lifecycle stage, with the overall study-set reference

Intent-to-leave ratings were least favorable on canceled engagements



Note: The groups are ordered categories. The connecting lines do not represent elapsed time.

Distressed intent-to-leave ratings were 8–10 on the original 10-point scale and 1–3 after conversion to the favorable direction. The counts were 19 of 166 respondents in active Build-Out, 39 of 237 in active Transition/Cut-Over, 12 of 95 in active Production, and 300 of 300 on canceled engagements. The overall reference is 370 of 798 answers (46.37%). Ratings on canceled engagements were collected after cancellation.

Shares refer to distressed intent-to-leave ratings. The study-set reference is repeated for comparison. Lifecycle stage and cancellation status are categories, not a time sequence.

Distressed intent-to-leave ratings differed across engagement status and lifecycle stage. The proportions were 19 of 166 respondents in active Build-Out (11.45%), 39 of 237 in active Transition/Cut-Over (16.46%), and 12 of 95 in active Production (12.63%). All 300 respondents on canceled engagements were distressed (100.00%). Overall, distressed ratings accounted for 370 of 798 answers (46.37%). These figures use the 8–10 threshold and should be distinguished from the broader group at 7 or above.

Both questions were associated with the other core study measures. For respondent intent to leave converted to the favorable direction, correlations were r = −0.80 with cancellation (n = 150 engagements), r = 0.73 with customer satisfaction among active engagements (n = 94 engagements), and r = 0.84 with

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the engagement indicator mean (n = 150 engagements). For perceived intent to leave among delivery team members, the cancellation correlation was r = −0.81 (n = 150 engagements).

1.1 Respondent Intent to Leave Within Twelve Months

INDICATOR C019 · HOW LIKELY ARE YOU TO LEAVE YOUR CURRENT JOB IN THE NEXT 12 MONTHS? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondent intent to leave received distressed ratings in 370 of 798 answers (46.37%). In the favorable direction, the mean rating was 4.2 and the median was 4.0 (n = 798 respondents). On canceled engagements, the converted mean was 1.7 and every rating was distressed (n = 300 respondents).

Figure 4.35. Mean respondent intent-to-leave rating in the favorable direction by respondent role and engagement status

Respondent intent to leave received distressed ratings in 370 of 798 answers (46.37%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 370 of 798 answers (46.37%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

This question is the study's measure of respondent intent to leave, so no association with itself was computed. Higher converted ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.80, n = 150 engagements) and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.84, n = 150 engagements). The conclusions were retained under the applicable checks in the 16-check protocol. The mean rating was distressed on 64 of 150 engagements.

Ten written answers addressed respondent intent to leave. Four described an active search for other employment or an expectation of departure. Three identified pay as the reason for remaining in the job.

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"My lead say escalate but escalate to who, nothing come back. Two people on my team already resign and honestly i am also looking." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"Pay is the main thing holding me here ... Picked up real QA instincts ... A few teammates worth keeping in touch with" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

1.2 Delivery Team Intent to Leave Within Twelve Months

INDICATOR C021 · HOW LIKELY ARE MEMBERS OF YOUR CURRENT TEAM TO LEAVE THEIR JOBS IN THE NEXT 12 MONTHS? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Perceived delivery team intent to leave received distressed ratings in 368 of 799 answers (46.06%). In the favorable direction, the mean rating was 4.3 and the median was 4.0 (n = 799 respondents). The converted mean on canceled engagements was 1.8 (n = 308 respondents).

Figure 4.36. Delivery Team Intent to Leave Within Twelve Months: associations with the study measures



Note: Distressed ratings: 368 of 799 answers (46.06%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 616): 4.20. Engagement manager (n = 150): 4.49. Portfolio director (n = 31): 5.39. Build-Out (n = 158): 5.82. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 235): 5.70. Production (n = 98): 6.29. Canceled (n = 308): 1.81.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The indicator is converted to the favorable direction as 11 minus the original rating before these comparisons.

The graphic includes the associations reproduced in the section. Additional results remain in the text.

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Higher converted ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.81, n = 150 engagements), a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.86, n = 150 engagements), and lower respondent intent to leave (r = −0.76, n = 749 respondents). The cancellation coefficient was the second largest in absolute magnitude among the 172 numeric survey questions, a descriptive ordering rather than a tested ranking. The mean rating was distressed on 63 of 150 engagements.

Delivery team intent to leave was addressed in 55 written answers from 52 respondents on 45 engagements. All 50 answers outside the question about valued aspects of the job described delivery team members who had left, were seeking other employment, or had requested a move to another engagement. These are distinct events and intentions. Thirteen of those 50 answers described knowledge of manual corrections leaving with the people who performed them.

> *“My analysts came onto this thinking they will learn something and instead they spend six months rewriting research notes by hand while nobody above decides anything. Two of them are already asking me for a move.” -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“the effect on us is two extra hours most evenings checking what it produced, and one of our seniors left in may partly for this. i dont blame him.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“my teammate left in march for the same reason exactly. the ones who stay are the ones who stopped caring and i can feel myself going that way, which is the part i actually mind.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“Last Tuesday i sit two hours on one alert because nobody will say if i can close it myself. That is what wears you. i check dispositions in the evening on my phone now. Two of my team already ask to move off.” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *“Two of my best analysts resigned since March. I spend my days on status calls where both firms agree there is a problem and neither will own it, then I go back and ask the same people to give up another weekend.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

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My team carries this personally… when a runner image or a plugin changes upstream, the pipeline fails at two in the morning and it is my engineers on the call, not the provider who changed it. There is a leave rotation on paper that never happens. I have lost two people from this engagement in three months and kindly understand, they did not leave over the client, they left over the nights."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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2 Job Seeking Relative to Five Years Earlier

The retrospective questions on job seeking had lower proportions of distressed ratings than the questions on current intent to leave. As in the satisfaction comparisons, the median career experience of two years limits interpretation of a five-year reference period. The figures below retain the full answering sample and do not establish a change in job-seeking behavior over five years.

Both retrospective questions were associated with the four core study measures. Their cancellation correlations were r = −0.59 for the respondent and r = −0.57 for the delivery team (n = 150 engagements). Both were smaller in absolute magnitude than the corresponding correlations for current intent to leave. No written answer specifically addressed either retrospective comparison.

2.1 Respondent Job Seeking Relative to Five Years Earlier

INDICATOR C023 · COMPARED TO 5 YEARS AGO, I AM MORE LIKELY TO SEEK A NEW JOB · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Retrospective respondent job seeking received distressed ratings in 216 of 801 answers (26.97%). In the favorable direction, the mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 801 respondents). Higher converted ratings were associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.74, n = 94 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.76, n = 754 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 28 of 150 engagements. The full answering base remains subject to the five-year reference-period limitation.

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Figure 4.37. Mean retrospective rating of respondent job seeking in the favorable direction by respondent role and engagement status

Retrospective respondent job seeking received distressed ratings in 216 of 801 answers (26.97%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 216 of 801 answers (26.97%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

No written answer specifically addressed the respondent's retrospective comparison of job seeking.

2.2 Delivery Team Job Seeking Relative to Five Years Earlier

INDICATOR C025 · COMPARED TO 5 YEARS AGO, THE TEAM I WORK WITH IS MORE LIKELY TO SEEK A NEW JOB · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Retrospective delivery team job seeking received distressed ratings in 221 of 799 answers (27.66%). In the favorable direction, the mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 799 respondents). Higher converted ratings were associated with a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.78, n = 150 engagements) and lower respondent intent to leave (r = −0.60, n = 754 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 30 of 150 engagements. The figures describe the full answering base and retain the five-year reference-period limitation.

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Figure 4.38. Mean retrospective rating of delivery team job seeking in the favorable direction by respondent role and engagement status

Retrospective delivery team job seeking received distressed ratings in 221 of 799 answers (27.66%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 221 of 799 answers (27.66%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

No written answer specifically addressed the retrospective comparison of delivery team job seeking.

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3 Commitment to Financial-Industry Work and Preference for Financial Institution Employment

Stronger preferences for direct financial institution employment were associated with higher intent to leave the current job. Stronger commitment to financial-industry work was associated with lower intent to leave. These were separate indicators of employment preference and industry commitment. Dissatisfaction with employment by a vendor does not necessarily imply an intention to leave the financial industry.

No written answer specifically addressed either preference question. A separate account described delivery team members moving from the vendor to the financial institution. It illustrates a reported employment transition without establishing how frequently such transitions occurred or validating the preference ratings.

> *"The team that did the work left to work for the bank. I had no understanding of how much they did beyond their defined job to keep things running. A few days after they left, the FX agent failed. I had to call the bank and ask them to send the team back to us for a few days to fix it." -Portfolio Director, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

3.1 Commitment to Work in the Global Financial Industry

INDICATOR C026 · I WANT TO CONTINUE WORKING ON PROJECTS IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL INDUSTRY · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Commitment to financial-industry work received distressed ratings in 214 of 784 answers (27.30%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0 (n = 784 respondents). Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.57, n = 150 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.75, n = 739 respondents). The mean rating was distressed on 27 of 150 engagements.

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Figure 4.39. Mean rating of commitment to financial-industry work by respondent role and engagement status

Commitment to financial-industry work received distressed ratings in 214 of 784 answers (27.30%).



Note: Distressed ratings: 214 of 784 answers (27.30%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

No written answer specifically addressed commitment to continued work in the global financial industry.

3.2 Preference for Employment in a Financial Institution Global Capability Center

INDICATOR C027 · I WOULD PREFER TO WORK DIRECTLY FOR A BANK IN ONE OF THEIR GLOBAL CAPABILITY CENTERS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Stronger preference for financial institution global capability center employment was associated with higher intent to leave (r = 0.79, n = 752 respondents). Preference for employment in a financial institution global capability center had a mean rating of 6.0 and a median of 6.0 (n = 799 respondents). A global capability center is an operation through which a financial institution employs people directly to perform work that may otherwise be assigned to a vendor. The question has no designated favorable or unfavorable end. Higher ratings indicate stronger agreement with the stated preference, using the survey wording quoted above.

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Figure 4.40. Preference for Employment in a Financial Institution Global Capability Center: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean rating: 6.0 (n = 799 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 617): 6.13. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.83. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.77. Build-Out (n = 167): 4.96. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 240): 5.35. Production (n = 97): 5.05. Canceled (n = 295): 7.49.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Stronger agreement was associated with a higher cancellation rate (r = 0.61, n = 150 engagements), lower customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = −0.74, n = 94 engagements), and a lower engagement indicator mean (r = −0.78, n = 150 engagements). The mean rating on canceled engagements was 7.5 (n = 295 respondents), above the means in the three active lifecycle stages.

No written answer specifically addressed preference for employment in a financial institution global capability center.

3.3 Preference for Direct Financial Institution Employment Over Vendor Employment

INDICATOR C028 · WORKING DIRECTLY FOR A BANK WOULD BE BETTER THAN WORKING FOR AN OUTSOURCING VENDOR · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Stronger preference for direct financial institution employment over vendor employment was associated with a higher cancellation rate (r = 0.59, n = 150 engagements) and higher intent to leave (r = 0.75, n = 753 respondents). Preference for direct financial institution employment over vendor employment had a mean rating of 6.1 and a median of 6.0 (n = 802 respondents). The question has no designated favorable or unfavorable end. Higher ratings indicate stronger agreement with the comparison stated in the survey wording quoted above.

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Figure 4.41. Preference for Direct Financial Institution Employment Over Vendor Employment: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean rating: 6.1 (n = 802 respondents).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 620): 6.23. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.75. Portfolio director (n = 30): 4.77. Build-Out (n = 166): 5.07. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 236): 5.51. Production (n = 95): 5.00. Canceled (n = 305): 7.41.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The graphic includes the associations reproduced in the section. Additional results remain in the text.

Its correlation with the engagement indicator mean was r = −0.79 (n = 150 engagements), the largest of its four observed absolute coefficients. The differing analytical units limit comparison of those magnitudes. The mean rating on canceled engagements was 7.4 (n = 305 respondents).

No written answer specifically addressed the comparison of direct financial institution employment with vendor employment.

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4 Sentiment Toward Manual Alteration

Resignation, frustration, and tiredness were recurrent features of written accounts of manual alteration. Manual alteration comprises manual changes to financial-institution-provided data, financial institution processes, and AI outputs, reporting alteration, and third-party work done by hand. The six written-answer questions on manual alteration received 2,325 answers about respondents' own engagements, from 641 respondents on 146 engagements. The accounts described both recurring manual intervention and workarounds incorporated into normal delivery. Part 5 examines the frequency and operational context of manual alteration.

Within those answers, qualitative coding identified resignation in 145 answers from 117 respondents on 76 engagements. Frustration appeared in 104 answers, tiredness in 87, a calm or neutral state in 82, and pride in six. These codes describe emotional states expressed in the written answers, rather than clinical measurements. The categories could overlap.

> *"i just fix it myself and move on... dont discuss about it with anyone, no need to, we all do same thing quietly and i think that is the real process now, works better than the version somebody wrote down anyway." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Some respondents described manual alteration as an application of skill. Competence or technical achievement was identified in 62 answers from 59 respondents.

> *"I don't make a big thing of it, I just fix it and send it through, quicker that way, I'm good at catching what's wrong before it moves on." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Other written answers described unsuccessful attempts to resolve the underlying difficulties. Part 5 considers these accounts alongside the methods and reasons for manual alteration and its reported disclosure.

> *"last sprint upstream Api moved and we are last to know, again. i just patch data myself, dont even ask anymore, whats the point." -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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Knowledge at Risk of Departure

Reported departures identified a potential continuity concern: operational knowledge was sometimes retained in personal notes, informal routines, and individual delivery team members. Accounts of departures indicated possible knowledge loss where that knowledge had not been documented or transferred. The study does not establish that respondents holding the most critical operational knowledge were the most likely to leave.

> *"the manual runbook for a network outage needs rewriting and rehearsing, since the four people who used to absorb that by hand have gone, and what is left is a document nobody has opened in a year." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"On the agent side there are two people in the whole floor who really know the tooling, and both are shared across accounts." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

Among individual contributors who answered the intent-to-leave question, 342 of 616 (55.52%) reported a likelihood of leaving at 7 or above. The comparison below examines career experience among respondents above and below that threshold. Because career experience was closely related to role, the result does not isolate an independent relationship between experience and intent to leave.

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1 Experience Among Respondents Likely to Leave

Respondents who rated intent to leave at 7 or above reported slightly less career experience than those below that threshold. The difference was small and did not isolate experience from its close relationship with role. The analysis included the 746 respondents who answered both questions.

1.1 Shorter Careers Among Respondents Likely to Leave

Respondents classified as likely to leave reported slightly less career experience: a mean of 3.77 years (n = 409), compared with 4.44 years among the other respondents (n = 337). The difference was −0.66 years, calculated from the unrounded means of 3.7726 and 4.4362. Welch's t test compares two means while allowing the spread of values within the two groups to differ. The difference was statistically significant under that test (t = −2.04, p = 0.041) and under a test with standard errors clustered by engagement (t = −2.64, df = 149, p = 0.009, 150 engagements). Here t is the test statistic and df denotes degrees of freedom, which reflect the information available for estimating uncertainty.

The standardized difference was small (Cohen's d = −0.15). Cohen's d expresses the difference between group means in units of their pooled standard deviation, a measure of the spread of observations around the mean. Career experience was correlated with intent to leave at r = −0.09 (n = 746 respondents). The primary C007 analysis treated intent to leave as the outcome and reported p = 0.001 using standard errors clustered by engagement. Regression estimates the relationship between an outcome and an explanatory quantity. The separate derived analysis reversed that direction and reported p = 0.002 for the same correlation. The primary direction is retained here. Neither analysis accounts for the close relationship between experience and role.

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2 Undocumented Manual Practice Held by Departing Delivery Team Members

Departing delivery team members were described as holding knowledge of unlogged corrections and personal workarounds that had not been fully documented. These observations identify possible continuity gaps. They do not establish that all manual practice was undocumented.

> *"The seniors who used to do the correspondent matching by hand have left, and nobody wrote it down. thus if a feed changes format on a Friday there is no one on my shift who knows the old method, we simply hold the alerts till Monday" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *"Two people used to fix its date formats by hand every morning and both have left, and nobody wrote down what they were doing." -Engagement Manager, ITO, Client servicing and communications*

Respondents described acquiring knowledge of agents and financial-industry work from colleagues, including colleagues preparing to leave. They also described shared notes that new delivery team members consulted before the official material. These accounts indicate how knowledge was transferred within the delivery team when formal documentation was incomplete.

> *"So my team make our own note file, every time somebody find how to fix a case we put it there. Now new joiner read that file first, not the official one. That is how we learn here" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I learn trust administration from the person sitting next to me, not from any training. And when she leaves, that knowledge goes also." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"And the training was for the ticket tool, not for procurement, so I learned what a PO status actually means from the guy sitting next to me." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

Operational knowledge held only by a departing delivery team member may become unavailable to those who remain. Part 5 examines the manual interventions to which this concern applies. The study did not measure the probability or operational cost of subsequent knowledge loss. The accounts identify a continuity concern without establishing its frequency or quantifying its consequences.

> *"What would help practically is a written list of the small corrections the analysts used to do on the bureau file before the model saw it, name matching mostly. Two of those people have moved on and it is only in their heads" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

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The data governance mark is the lowest I have given anywhere in this form, and it deserves to be. But the bankers we depend on for comparables and deal assumptions are running live mandates alongside this, so when a valuation query sits with them for three days it is not indifference, it is a coverage team that is thin. Their infrastructure side, to be fair to them, provisions our access inside a week, which is faster than I expect from a bank of that size."

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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About the Author

Phil Hatch is an outsourcing and workforce-development executive with more than 30 years of experience. He previously led the global outsourcing business of ManpowerGroup/Experis. His work includes service delivery, workforce strategy, and organizational development across industries and countries.

Hatch has also advised governments on labor and economic development, including workforce strategies intended to support investment and employment.

Following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Hatch was asked by the U.S. Department of State and USAID to advise Ukraine on workforce and economic development. His work has addressed technology, outsourcing, skills development, and international investment in support of economic recovery.

Through Akholi, Hatch advises organizations and governments on outsourcing and the implications of AI for work and service delivery.

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About Akholi

Akholi, established in 2003, is a research and advisory firm focused on outsourcing, service delivery, and global capability centers. Its work includes the 2026 study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements described in this report.

The study examines relationships among financial institution readiness, co-management, vendor capability, AI technology, the third-party ecosystem, and reported engagement outcomes. Its findings are observational and do not establish that any one category is the sole or primary cause of those outcomes.

Akholi applies this research through advisory and educational work with institutional leaders. Recommendations derived from the study require assessment against the circumstances and evidence of each engagement.

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“The client gets us access fast, that part takes pressure off my team more than people realize. And their data team answers same day. Where we feel it is the format differences between their invoice sources, my processors carry that by hand and it is tiring for them, not hard.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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PART 4

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

The Delivery Workforce

A study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements, drawn from the accounts of 850 members of the vendors' delivery teams

PUBLICATION DATE	November 1, 2026
VERSION	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
FIGSHARE DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890

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04

05

PART 5

Manual Alteration by the Delivery Team

IN THIS PART

The Five Manual Alteration Methods

Manual Alteration by Cancellation Status and Engagement Indicator Mean

Distribution of Manual Alteration Across Roles

Reasons Given for Manual Alteration

Disclosure of Manual Alteration

Recording of Manual Alteration

Regulatory and Legal Context Reported by Respondents

Regulatory and Legal Knowledge of the Delivery Team

REPORT INFORMATION

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Full Study Report

Author	Phil Hatch
Publication date	November 1, 2026
Version	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
Figshare DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890
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SUGGESTED CITATION

Hatch, Phil. 2026. *Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions: Full Study Report*. Version 1.8.2. Akholi. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559.

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USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Artificial intelligence tools were used to prepare this report. Appendix G discloses how they were used.

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Manual Alteration by the Delivery Team

Respondents on all 150 engagements reported manual alteration as part of delivery. Their accounts of limited disclosure and incomplete recording raised concerns about how fully reported performance represented the work being done. Manual alteration, the study's term for the delivery team's changes to data, processes, outputs, or reporting and its performance of third-party work by hand, often involved several methods on the same engagement. Respondents described corrections that sustained delivery but were not always visible in engagement records or reports to the financial institution. Their unfavorable assessments of regulatory training added a concern about preparation for work subject to legal and regulatory requirements. Together, these findings describe a gap between the work respondents reported performing and the visibility and preparation surrounding that work.

The five manual alteration methods are manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data, manual alteration of financial institution processes, manual alteration of AI outputs, reporting alteration, and third-party work done by hand. They are distinct practices, may overlap, and were measured differently. The occurrence counts combine direct True answers with written descriptions of a method on the respondent's engagement. Related ratings describe frequency, capability, knowledge, or controls rather than independently establishing occurrence.

The study collected the accounts of 850 members of vendor delivery teams on 150 engagements between January and June 2026. Its cross-sectional design recorded each engagement once. The results describe this study set and do not establish industry prevalence. The accounts do not independently establish what the financial institution knew or whether a legal or contractual obligation was breached.

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Figure 5.1. Engagements with each manual alteration method, 150 engagements

Respondents on all 150 engagements reported manual alteration as part of delivery.



Note: An engagement is counted for a method when at least one respondent answered True to its yes-or-no question or described that method in a written answer about the engagement. Manual alteration of data, processes, and AI outputs uses both sources. Reporting alteration and third-party work done by hand use written answers. An engagement may be counted under several methods. The base is 150 engagements.

Respondents reported manual alteration of financial institution processes on 138 of the 150 engagements (92.00%) and manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data on 133 (88.67%). They reported reporting alteration on 126 (84.00%), manual alteration of AI outputs on 122 (81.33%), and third-party work done by hand on 74 (49.33%).

Several methods were usually reported on the same engagement. Respondents described all five on 51 engagements (34.00%) and four on 65 (43.33%). They reported a single method on eight engagements.

Across the structured and written answers, 738 of the 850 respondents reported at least one method (86.82%). The method-based compilation included 2,410 written answers from 725 respondents on all 150 engagements. In 475 answers from respondents on 131 engagements, manual alteration was described as occurring every cycle or on most days. These are overlapping answer counts, not counts of separate incidents.

> *“i do this almost every day now. i inform my team lead please, not the client, therefore it stays internal. it is exhausting but i see no other way.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

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These findings describe the delivery team's reported experience. They do not establish what the financial institution knew or whether a reported practice breached a contractual or regulatory obligation. Manual correction may have been approved or necessary to maintain delivery. Neither its occurrence nor its absence from a report independently establishes misconduct.

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“This is the one area I would hold up as an example — the monitoring we added after last year's provider upgrade scare has held, and the model vendor has not surprised us once. What has not improved is our own memory of the manual work. The people who used to fix awkward LP questionnaires by hand have moved on, and I am not certain we could go back to that if we had to.”

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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The Five Manual Alteration Methods

Manual alteration of processes and data was reported on more engagements than any other method, although the five methods commonly overlapped. The evidence also differed by method. Personal manual alteration of data, processes, and AI outputs was asked through yes-or-no questions, with separate ratings of regular manual alteration by the wider delivery team. Reporting alteration and third-party work done by hand were identified in written answers. Their related ratings assess respondents' judgments about reporting and the retention or replacement of manual practices. Table 5.1 distinguishes the occurrence counts from these related measures.

Table 5.1. The five manual alteration methods and their evidence

Method	Occurrence evidence and related ratings	Respondents	Engagements
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	Occurrence: C199 True answers and written answers. Related rating: C203.	452	133
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	Occurrence: C205 True answers and written answers. Related rating: C209.	546	138
Manual alteration of AI outputs	Occurrence: C211 True answers and written answers. Related rating: C215.	328	122
Reporting alteration	Occurrence: written answers, including C055. Related ratings: C052–C054.	477	126
Third-party work done by hand	Occurrence: written answers. Related ratings: C190–C192.	108	74

Note: Counts identify respondents and engagements with at least one direct True answer or written description of the method on the engagement, from 850 respondents and 150 engagements. Counts overlap across methods. Related ratings do not add to the occurrence counts. C numbers identify survey questions, including rated indicators. The outsourcing models shown in the paper are business process outsourcing (BPO), information technology outsourcing (ITO), customer experience management (CXM), and knowledge process outsourcing (KPO).

Weekly status decks reported case-processing speed against targets set for the manual process, so faster agent throughput looked like a win even on cases the agent had gotten factually wrong and compliance later had to unwind."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

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1 Manual Alteration of Financial-Institution-Provided Data

Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data was reported on 133 of the 150 engagements (88.67%), often as recurring correction rather than an isolated intervention.

For personal manual alteration, the direct yes-or-no question recorded 421 True answers among 839 valid answers (50.18%), representing 127 engagements. The broader method-based compilation across written questions included 588 answers from 382 respondents on 128 engagements. Of those answers, 573 had negative sentiment and 223 described manual alteration every cycle or on most days.

Sentiment classifies an answer's reported effect on the engagement or respondent on five values: −10, −5, 0, +5, and +10. Negative values indicate harm, zero a neutral assessment, and positive values benefit. An answer may have an overall sentiment score and separate scores for the survey subjects it addresses. These classifications describe the account and do not establish its truth, the legality of a practice, or the adequacy of disclosure.

> *"I fix wrong Data every day, team lead know but we do not raise it with client, feedbacks would go nowhere anyway" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"I flag it every week, my manager knows but nothing changes upstream. This Vendor takes zero ownership so we are the ones patching data every single day" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"i correct the extracts before loading them, half the fields come swapped or blank before we even open the file," -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

1.1 Personal Manual Alteration of Financial-Institution-Provided Data

INDICATOR C199 · I HAVE ALTERED CLIENT-PROVIDED DATA · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Half of the respondents answering the personal data question reported that they had manually altered financial-institution-provided data: 421 of 839 answered True (50.18%), while 418 answered False (49.82%). The True share was 69.62% among respondents on canceled engagements (n = 316 respondents), compared with 36.59% among those on active engagements in Transition/Cut-Over (n = 246). The notation n identifies the number of respondents or engagements in an analysis. These respondent-level shares describe personal answers, not the proportion of engagements assigned to a comparison group.

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Figure 5.2. Share answering True to "I have altered client-provided data", by respondent role and engagement status

Personal manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data differed by role



Note: True or Yes answers: 421 of 839 answers (50.18%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

The four core measures are cancellation rate, customer satisfaction, engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave. Cancellation rate is the share of a stated group of engagements canceled by the study date. Customer satisfaction is the figure recorded for each engagement on a 100-point scale, with the comparisons here restricted to active engagements. Engagement indicator mean summarizes respondents' ratings across the 100 engagement indicators, averaged within each engagement. The mean is the arithmetic average of the recorded values, and the median is the middle value in an ordered distribution. Intent to leave is the respondent's rating of the likelihood of leaving the current job within 12 months.

For categorical comparisons, an engagement is assigned the most frequent answer among its respondents, termed the plurality answer. Sentinel categories such as a preference not to answer remain answer categories under the existing rule, and tied engagements are excluded. This assignment differs from counting an engagement whenever any respondent reports a manual alteration method. An engagement-level analysis uses one summarized observation per engagement, while a respondent-level analysis uses paired answers from individuals.

A chi-square test examines whether a categorical distribution differs from independence. Welch F compares group means while allowing their variances, or spread of ratings, to differ. Degrees of freedom, df, describe the information available to estimate variation. A p value is the probability, under the null model, of a result at least as extreme as the observed result. Statistical significance does not establish the size, operational importance, or cause of a relationship.

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Engagements assigned True on the personal data question had a higher observed cancellation rate and less favorable results on the other three core study measures. Cancellation was recorded on 61.84% of the 76 engagements assigned True, compared with 10.17% of the 59 assigned False (chi-square 37.19, df = 1, $p < 0.001$, n = 135 engagements). Among active engagements, customer satisfaction differed between the groups (Welch F 17.74, $p < 0.001$, n = 82 engagements). The groups also differed in engagement indicator mean (Welch F 93.60, $p < 0.001$) and intent to leave (Welch F 55.34, $p < 0.001$), each on 135 engagements. These associations describe reported experience measured after cancellation where an engagement had already been canceled. They do not establish whether manual alteration preceded cancellation or caused it.

Robustness checks repeat an analysis using alternative assumptions or selections. Their interpretation depends on the particular check and analytical unit. The linked indicator analyses provide the existing check results. The qualifications reported below, including failed or uncomputable checks and differences between engagement-level and respondent-level results, limit any general claim of stability.

The separate indicator-specific compilation for C199 contained 578 written answers from 378 respondents on 128 engagements, of which 571 received negative sentiment scores for this subject. Respondents described data arriving unusable despite earlier cleaning and access restrictions that prevented correction at the source. This indicator-specific count differs from the broader method-based compilation above and is not an additional set of incidents.

> *"Last cycle their file was missing tax ids for half the batch, I fixed it myself before run started... nothing gets checked before it lands on our desk, this happens basically every cycle now" - Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Last cycle it was three whole cohort missing from one file, I only catch it because I count row against last cycle total and numbers didnt match up, if I hadnt counted it would have gone straight through with people missing pay." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"last month the cash statement came after cut off again... so i take previous day file and roll forward, thus the break clears on time." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

1.2 Regular Manual Alteration of Financial-Institution-Provided Data by the Wider Delivery Team

INDICATOR C203 · MY GREATER TEAM REGULARLY ALTERS CLIENT PROVIDED DATA · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents described data manual alteration as a wider delivery-team practice as well as a personal activity. Agreement with the statement about regular manual alteration had a mean rating of 5.4 and a median of 5.0 (n = 773 respondents). The mean was 6.9 among respondents on canceled engagements

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(n = 287). Higher ratings indicate stronger agreement that regular manual alteration occurred. The question has no study-defined favorable or unfavorable direction, so these ratings are not classified as distressed.

Figure 5.3. Regular Manual Alteration of Financial-Institution-Provided Data by the Wider Delivery Team: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean rating: 5.4 (n = 773 respondents).

Survey question: “My greater team regularly alters client provided data”.

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 622): 5.70. Engagement manager (n = 131): 4.28. Portfolio director (n = 20): 2.45. Build-Out (n = 161): 4.68. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 4.48. Production (n = 93): 4.24. Canceled (n = 287): 6.87.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational. A confidence interval expresses uncertainty under the stated method. A p value is the probability, under the null model, of a result at least as extreme as the observed result.

A mean is the arithmetic average and a median is the middle ordered rating. The coefficient r measures the direction and strength of a linear association, ranging from −1 to +1. A coefficient near either end describes a stronger linear relationship, while its sign identifies the direction. It does not establish causation.

The correlation coefficient r describes the direction and strength of a linear association. Stronger agreement was associated with higher cancellation rates (r = 0.70, n = 150 engagements) and a lower engagement indicator mean (r = −0.84, n = 150). Among active engagements, it was associated with lower customer satisfaction (r = −0.65, n = 94 engagements). At respondent level, stronger agreement was associated with higher intent to leave (r = 0.66, n = 722 respondents). The distinction between personal

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correction and a regular delivery-team practice is substantive, although these associations do not establish the sequence of events.

Of the 84 written answers coded to regular data manual alteration, 83 had negative sentiment. Respondents described data that required cleaning again after each delivery, with manual alteration known to the team lead but seldom logged or disclosed to the financial institution. The single positive answer described a data-exception procedure agreed with the financial institution's platform owner before correction.

> *"I keep note of fixes i make each sprint, my lead know about it, client does not. Take maybe extra hour every day and i do not think should be my job to clean their data before agent see it." - Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

"

The vendor master data is a mess every time it lands with us. We clean it up each cycle and it just arrives dirty again. Their security team wont approve us a proper connection either, so I dont wait anymore, I just fix it myself."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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2 Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes

Manual alteration of financial institution processes was the most widely reported method, occurring in respondents' accounts on 138 of the 150 engagements (92.00%).

For personal manual alteration, the direct question recorded 490 True answers among 841 valid answers (58.26%), representing 132 engagements. The method-based compilation contained 857 written answers from 515 respondents on 137 engagements, including 826 classified as negative. In 143 answers, respondents described manual alteration every cycle or on most days.

> *"nobody upstream will say yes or no so i just go with my own call, decision take too long to come back and Payroll deadline is same every cycle so i cannot wait" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"This is basically every week now, my manager knows about it. Ticket takes days to clear, fix itself takes an hour, so waiting on the ticket process makes no sense when the job needs doing" - Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

2.1 Personal Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes

INDICATOR C205 · I HAVE ALTERED CLIENT PROCESSES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

A majority of respondents answering the personal process question reported manual alteration: 490 of 841 answered True (58.26%), while 351 answered False (41.74%). The True share was 73.73% among respondents on canceled engagements (n = 316), compared with 45.14% among those on active engagements in Build-Out (n = 175). By outsourcing model, it ranged from 69.42% among respondents on BPO engagements (n = 206) to 50.87% on CXM engagements (n = 230).

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Figure 5.4. Share answering True to "I have altered client processes", by respondent role and engagement status

A majority of respondents answering the personal process question reported manual alteration: 490 of 841 answered True (58.26%), while 351 answered False (41.74%).



Note: True or Yes answers: 490 of 841 answers (58.26%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Engagements assigned True on the process question had a cancellation rate of 50.00%, compared with 15.22% for engagements assigned False (94 and 46 engagements, respectively). The difference was supported by the existing categorical comparison (chi-square 15.77, df = 1, $p < 0.001$, n = 140 engagements). Active-engagement customer satisfaction also differed (Welch F 17.72, $p < 0.001$, n = 86 engagements), as did engagement indicator mean (Welch F 64.36, $p < 0.001$) and intent to leave (Welch F 36.02, $p < 0.001$), each on 140 engagements. These are associations with the assigned answer, not evidence that process manual alteration caused the outcomes.

The indicator-specific compilation for C205 contained 849 written answers from 513 respondents on 137 engagements, including 841 with negative sentiment scores for this subject. Respondents described delayed financial institution decisions, change approval designed for infrequent changes, and procedures that were undocumented or inconsistent with practice. They reported changing processes before recording the changes, or without recording them. The method-based compilation above and this indicator-specific compilation are separate summaries. Their different sentiment counts have not been reconciled and must not be interpreted as a whole and its subset.

> *"Escalating a break means waiting on someone who never actually rules on it, we just pick a call and run with it. And whatever that forces into the workflow gets written up later, if it gets written up at all." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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> *"i changed a step on the reconciliation process last week, nothing about the change process here really matches how the agent behaves day to day, so we adjust as we go and i discuss about it with my lead, its not a big drama" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

2.2 Regular Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes by the Wider Delivery Team

INDICATOR C209 · MY GREATER TEAM REGULARLY ALTERS CLIENT PROCESSES · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Regular process manual alteration received stronger agreement than the corresponding questions on data or AI outputs. Its mean rating was 5.7 and its median was 6.0 (n = 779 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 7.1 (n = 291). Higher ratings indicate stronger agreement that the wider delivery team regularly performed manual alteration. The question has no study-defined favorable or unfavorable direction.

Figure 5.5. Regular Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes by the Wider Delivery Team: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean rating: 5.7 (n = 779 respondents).

Survey question: "My greater team regularly alters client processes".

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 631): 6.00. Engagement manager (n = 130): 4.56. Portfolio director (n = 18): 3.00. Build-Out (n = 161): 4.63. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 230): 4.84. Production (n = 97): 5.23. Canceled (n = 291): 7.10.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

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Stronger agreement was associated with a lower engagement indicator mean (r = −0.83, n = 150 engagements) and a higher cancellation rate (r = 0.63, n = 150). Among active engagements, it was associated with lower customer satisfaction (r = −0.64, n = 94 engagements). It was also associated with higher intent to leave at respondent level (r = 0.65, n = 730 respondents).

Of the 111 written answers coded to regular process manual alteration, 110 had negative sentiment. Respondents described routine changes made by the delivery team when financial institution decisions were delayed. The team lead was described as knowing about these changes, while disclosure to the financial institution was uncommon in the accounts.

> *"This is normal now, my team decide small things ourselves and tell manager after not before. I don't ask if client know, not my place. Happens most weeks, only way to hit the cycle." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

"

I have always felt confident about how change is handled on this account. When the client's watchlist data arrives incomplete, the team raises it with the client's financial-crime unit, we discuss about the gap together, and any adjustment to triage process is agreed and logged before it is applied. We do not revert back to old workflows without that sign-off. Precedent across our sanctions engagements shows this is consistently how it works, five or six times a quarter at most."

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR
KPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

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3 Manual Alteration of AI Outputs

Manual alteration of AI outputs was reported on 122 of the 150 engagements (81.33%), although fewer respondents personally reported this method than personal manual alteration of data or processes.

For personal manual alteration, the direct question recorded 278 True answers among 828 valid answers (33.57%), representing 108 engagements. The method-based compilation contained 429 written answers from 289 respondents on 121 engagements. Of those answers, 413 had negative sentiment and 95 described manual alteration every cycle or on most days.

Within the method-based compilation, 14 written answers on nine engagements described instructions to continue processing outputs without raising the problem. The reasons compilation later in the paper reports a different count for this theme. The two summaries are identified separately because their coverage has not been reconciled.

> *“Nobody trusts the raw output so I rewrite it every time, that's the real Job now not what they think we do” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“the problem is nobody talk about how often team do this because everyone just fix quietly on their own, do understand I only track for myself, I do it almost every case I recieve” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

3.1 Personal Manual Alteration of AI Outputs

INDICATOR C211 · I HAVE ALTERED AI OUTPUTS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

One-third of respondents answering the personal AI-output question reported manual alteration: 278 of 828 answered True (33.57%), while 550 answered False (66.43%). The True share was 54.19% among respondents on canceled engagements (n = 310), compared with 18.52% among those on active engagements in Transition/Cut-Over (n = 243).

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Figure 5.6. Share answering True to "I have altered AI outputs", by respondent role and engagement status

One-third of respondents answering the personal AI-output question reported manual alteration: 278 of 828 answered True (33.57%), while 550 answered False (66.43%).



Note: True or Yes answers: 278 of 828 answers (33.57%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

The cancellation rate was 76.19% among the 42 engagements assigned True on the AI-output question, compared with 22.00% among the 100 assigned False (chi-square 36.86, df = 1, $p < 0.001$, n = 142 engagements). Active-engagement customer satisfaction differed between the groups (Welch F 11.44, $p = 0.005$, n = 88 engagements). Engagement indicator mean (Welch F 87.54, $p < 0.001$) and intent to leave (Welch F 79.99, $p < 0.001$) also differed, each on 142 engagements. The direction of these associations is consistent with the accounts of difficult delivery, but it does not establish the timing or causal role of manual alteration.

The indicator-specific compilation for C211 contained 407 written answers from 276 respondents on 116 engagements, including 399 with negative sentiment. Respondents described inconsistent outputs from repeated runs on the same input. They reported selecting and correcting outputs by hand before passing them onward because the approval process was slower than the delivery deadline. These counts refer to C211 coding rather than the broader AI-output method compilation.

> *"the problem is the ai gives a different match each time i run it, so i correct it myself before it moves on, on that basis i do not wait for approval" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"So what I do is run it, then run it again, and if the two agree I go with it, and if they don't I work it out by hand. That's my process. Nobody designed that, I invented it because I needed something." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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> *"the problem is change control takes weeks for anything, so whats the point raising it every time, i patch the output myself and keep the queue moving, thats just how this job works and truthfully im quicker at catching it than the process is anyway" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

3.2 Regular Manual Alteration of AI Outputs by the Wider Delivery Team

INDICATOR C215 · MY GREATER TEAM REGULARLY ALTERS AI OUTPUTS · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Regular manual alteration of AI outputs received the weakest agreement among the three wider delivery-team questions. The mean rating was 4.4 and the median was 4.0 (n = 665 respondents), compared with means of 5.4 for data and 5.7 for processes. Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 5.8 (n = 228). Higher ratings indicate stronger agreement that manual alteration was regular. The question has no study-defined favorable or unfavorable direction.

Figure 5.7. Regular Manual Alteration of AI Outputs by the Wider Delivery Team: associations with the study measures



Note: Mean rating: 4.4 (n = 665 respondents).

Survey question: "My greater team regularly alters AI outputs".

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 556): 4.58. Engagement manager (n = 99): 3.59. Portfolio director (n = 10): 2.50. Build-Out (n = 150): 3.41. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 201): 3.61. Production (n = 86): 4.35. Canceled (n = 228): 5.77.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

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Stronger agreement was associated with a higher cancellation rate (r = 0.59, n = 150 engagements) and higher intent to leave (r = 0.58, n = 620 respondents). Its association with customer satisfaction among active engagements was negative (r = −0.40, n = 94 engagements) and weaker than for the corresponding data and process questions. Agreement was also associated with a lower engagement indicator mean (r = −0.66, n = 150 engagements).

All 23 written answers coded to this indicator had negative sentiment. The 19 that addressed AI-output manual alteration described continuing delivery-team correction before outputs were seen outside the delivery team, with little recording of that work.

> *“it's f***ing unpredictable, same input different answer. i fix it quiet every time, my lead knows, client doesn't. that's just how it is here.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

What would help is one person owning this end to end. Right now delivery lead, the AI team and quality all give different instruction and we follow whichever came last. Second, when the assist gives a wrong answer to the floor it must be somebody's job to fix the source, not mine to patch it in the ticket, we do that all week and nothing changes upstream”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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4 Reporting Alteration

Respondents described reporting alteration on 126 of the 150 engagements (84.00%), including methods that obscured manual correction or overstated agent-completed work.

In the reporting-method question, 484 of 775 respondents named a method (62.45%), while 291 answered “I do not know.” A separate compilation of descriptions concerning the respondent’s own engagement contained 486 written answers from 477 respondents on 126 engagements, including 485 with negative sentiment. Naming a method and describing it on one’s own engagement are different count populations.

> *“The vendor rolled unresolved reconciliation exceptions into the next period's dashboard so the error count never showed as owned, and it took a manual pull of the raw exception log to see the real backlog.” -Engagement Manager, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

4.1 Reporting Methods Described by Respondents

Substituting activity counts for outcomes was the most frequently described reporting method, appearing in 112 answers on 78 engagements. This method is termed proxy substitution. Category conflation, which counted human-corrected work as the agent’s, appeared in 52 answers on 45 engagements. Denominator exclusion, which removed failures from the base of a reported rate, appeared in 50 answers on 39 engagements. Table 5.2 defines the reporting methods identified in the coded written answers.

Table 5.2. Reporting methods described in the written answers

Reporting method	Description	Answers	Engagements
Proxy substitution	An activity count stands in for an outcome.	112	78
Category conflation	Human-corrected, sandbox or overridden work is counted as agent-completed production work.	52	45
Denominator exclusion	Failures or exceptions are removed from the base of a reported rate.	50	39
Scope restriction	The measure covers only the easy or parseable subset.	38	32
Manual effort omitted from reported measures	The labor does not appear in any reported measure.	27	25
Exceptions omitted from financial institution reports	The exception is recorded internally but omitted from what the financial institution receives.	23	20

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Reporting method	Description	Answers	Engagements
Status misrepresentation	A readiness or completion status is reported falsely, letting a gate pass.	20	14
Validation-set selection	Accuracy is reported on a set chosen to exclude the hardest cases.	18	16
Clock reset	Elapsed-time measurement restarts on rework so delay never accrues.	4	3
Aging suppressed	Open items are pooled into a category that does not age, so duration never surfaces.	3	3

Note: The base is 486 written answers describing reporting alteration on the respondent's own engagement, covering 126 engagements. An answer may describe several methods. The method labels summarize coded descriptions, rather than independently verified reporting practices.

> *"The vendor rolled settlement fails that were manually corrected by a human into the same success bucket as fails the agent resolved on its own, which overstated how much the agent was actually doing correctly." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"The vendor's settlement dashboard reported the fails rate as a percentage of trades processed that day rather than trades still open, so a growing backlog of unresolved fails never showed up as a rising number." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"The help-desk dashboard reports agent deflection rate as tickets the agent handled without escalation, but tickets the agent closes and the same employee reopens within 24 hours are counted as a new, separate ticket rather than a reopened one, which hides the actual repeat-contact rate the deflection number is supposed to reflect." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

4.2 Accuracy of Dashboards and Performance Reports

INDICATOR C052 · THE DASHBOARD AND PERFORMANCE REPORTS GIVEN TO THE CUSTOMER ARE ACCURATE · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents' ratings of dashboard and performance-report accuracy indicated substantial reservations about the reports the financial institution received. The mean rating was 4.8 and the median was 5.0 (n = 794 respondents). Ratings were distressed in 220 answers (27.71%). Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 3.5 (n = 301). These ratings describe perceived accuracy rather than an independent audit of the reports.

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Figure 5.8. Accuracy of Dashboards and Performance Reports: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "The dashboard and performance reports given to the customer are accurate".

Distressed ratings: 220 of 794 answers (27.71%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 615): 4.66. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.16. Portfolio director (n = 27): 6.33. Build-Out (n = 162): 5.85. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 233): 5.46. Production (n = 98): 5.67. Canceled (n = 301): 3.47.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Distressed ratings are ratings of 3 or below on indicators for which a higher rating is favorable. The percentage uses valid respondent ratings as its base. An engagement with a distressed mean is a separate engagement-level classification. For indicators converted to the favorable direction, the same threshold applies after conversion.

Higher perceived report accuracy was associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.61, n = 150 engagements) and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.81, n = 150). It was also associated with higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.65, n = 94 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.62, n = 745 respondents). The engagement mean for this indicator was distressed on 29 of the 150 engagements.

The indicator-specific compilation contained 468 written answers from 453 respondents on 125 engagements, including 467 with negative sentiment. Respondents described measures that counted a task as complete when an agent acted, excluded cases requiring human correction, or blended and reclassified failures. The single positive answer concerned figures the respondent could substantiate.

> *"The vendor's status dashboard counted a task as complete the moment the agent submitted an action, before any human check confirmed the pay run was correct, so failed items looked closed until someone dug into the underlying case log." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

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"The vendor's weekly report calculates average handle time using only tickets the agent fully resolves on its own, so the growing share of tickets the agent partially processes and then silently hands back to a human queue never enters the handle-time calculation at all, keeping the headline average artificially low." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

"The vendor's monthly billing accuracy dashboard reports fee exceptions only after they clear a manual override queue, so exceptions the agent catches and auto-corrects same-day never post as exceptions at all, making the vendor's own error rate look better than the fee leakage the agent is actually finding." -Engagement Manager, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes

4.3 Reporting Alteration in Dashboards and Performance Reports

INDICATOR C053 · THE VENDOR MANIPULATES THE DASHBOARD AND PERFORMANCE REPORTS GIVEN TO THE CUSTOMER · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents' assessments of reporting alteration were less favorable on canceled engagements. After conversion to the favorable direction, the overall mean rating was 4.7 and the median was 5.0 (n = 786 respondents). The mean among respondents on canceled engagements was 3.4 (n = 302). The conversion subtracts the original rating from 11, so a higher converted rating indicates less perceived reporting alteration. It does not turn a reported judgment into a verified occurrence count.

Figure 5.9. Reporting Alteration in Dashboards and Performance Reports: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "The vendor manipulates the dashboard and performance reports given to the customer". Distressed ratings: 235 of 786 answers (29.90%).

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Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 613): 4.61. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.19. Portfolio director (n = 22): 5.41. Build-Out (n = 168): 5.52. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 220): 5.56. Production (n = 96): 5.78. Canceled (n = 302): 3.38.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The indicator is converted to the favorable direction as 11 minus the original rating before these comparisons.

Higher converted ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.61, n = 150 engagements) and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.79, n = 150). They were also associated with higher active-engagement customer satisfaction (r = 0.62, n = 94 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.62, n = 739 respondents). Distressed ratings were recorded in 235 of the 786 answers (29.90%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 33 of the 150 engagements. For this converted indicator, distressed ratings of 3 or below correspond to original ratings above 7.

The indicator-specific compilation contained 465 written answers from 456 respondents on 125 engagements, including 464 with negative sentiment. Respondents described the use of activity counts, exclusion of failures, and attribution of human-corrected work to the agent in ways that maintained favorable reported figures.

> *"Purchase requisitions the agent could not match to a valid supplier record were logged as processed with a manual override flag that never surfaced in the weekly summary the customer received." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"The vendor's exception dashboard groups unresolved custody breaks under a catch-all pending category that does not age, so a break sitting open for weeks looks the same as one opened yesterday." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"The vendor's monthly performance report calculates first-contact resolution using only tickets the agent both received and closed within the same reporting window, so any ticket the agent picks up late in the month and carries into the next cycle simply disappears from both months' denominators instead of counting as a miss." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The vendor's weekly ops dashboard tracks fee break resolution time starting from ticket creation rather than from when the agent first flagged the anomaly internally, so breaks the agent catches and holds for days before a ticket gets opened never count against the resolution clock at all." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

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4.4 Retrospective Comparison of Reporting Alteration

INDICATOR C054 · COMPARED TO 5 YEARS AGO, IS MANIPULATION OF THE DASHBOARDS AND PERFORMANCE REPORTS GIVEN TO THE CUSTOMER MORE OR LESS COMMON NOW? · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents' retrospective judgments of reporting alteration were less favorable on engagements with less favorable reported outcomes. The converted mean rating was 4.8 and the median was 5.0 (n = 795 respondents). A higher converted rating indicates less perceived reporting alteration relative to five years earlier. It was associated with a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.79, n = 150 engagements) and a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.60, n = 150 engagements). Among active engagements, it was associated with higher customer satisfaction (r = 0.66, n = 94 engagements). At respondent level, it was associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.60, n = 747 respondents). Ratings were distressed in 247 answers (31.07%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 35 of the 150 engagements.

Figure 5.10. Retrospective Comparison of Reporting Alteration: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “Compared to 5 years ago, is manipulation of the dashboards and performance reports given to the customer more or less common now?”.

Distressed ratings: 247 of 795 answers (31.07%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 619): 4.67. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.25. Portfolio director (n = 24): 5.96. Build-Out (n = 164): 5.65. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 5.57. Production (n = 98): 5.95. Canceled (n = 301): 3.43.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

The indicator is converted to the favorable direction as 11 minus the original rating before these comparisons.

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No written answer addressed this comparison. The figures retain the full answering base and do not establish that every respondent had sufficient work experience to make a five-year comparison. They describe retrospective judgments, not a measured change over five years. The present results must not be interpreted as an analysis restricted to respondents with an established five-year work history. Part 3, “Perceived Reporting Change Compared With Five Years Earlier,” section 2.3 under “Oversight of Reporting Provided to the Financial Institution,” uses an experience-eligible base of 176 respondents and examines the governance, oversight, and control score. That analysis has a different base and outcome from the full-answering-base comparisons reported here. Its raw direction also differs from the favorable-direction conversion used in this section.

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5 Third-Party Work Done by Hand

Third-party work done by hand was described on 74 of the 150 engagements (49.33%), making it the least widely reported of the five methods.

The method-based compilation included 113 written answers from 108 respondents on those engagements, of which 95 answers had negative sentiment. Most descriptions appeared in the comment question on the third-party ecosystem (84 of 113 answers).

5.1 Third-Party Work Described by Respondents

Respondents described performing work by hand when third-party systems did not deliver it in a form an agent could use. They reported retrieving records individually from provider portals without an interface, entering data when feeds failed or changed format, and repeating work after unannounced provider changes. In 31 of the 113 answers, the work occurred every cycle or on most days. In 18 answers, respondents said the change became apparent only after a downstream failure.

> *"administrator portal is same as day one... still no proper interface, we pull screens by hand at cut off." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Everything we use sits on one account with one provider. When that access got suspended in June nobody has a second way in, my team did the tickets by hand for two days" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I score that section down for one reason only, nobody wrote down what old ops team use to patch by hand before the monitoring agent came" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

5.2 Ratings Related to Third-Party Work Done by Hand

Ratings indicated gaps in retaining manual capability, knowing where informal corrections had occurred, and replacing those corrections with explicit controls. Each of the three indicators had a mean below the midpoint of the 10-point scale. They assess different aspects of the delivery team's preparation for third-party problems and are considered separately after the comparison in Table 5.3.

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Table 5.3. Ratings related to third-party work done by hand

Indicator	Mean	Distressed ratings	r, cancellation	r, customer satisfaction	r, intent to leave
C190 Retention of the Ability to Perform Manual Workarounds	4.66	249 of 808 (30.82%)	−0.65	0.72	−0.67
C191 Knowledge of Informal Third-Party Corrections	4.61	262 of 792 (33.08%)	−0.66	0.61	−0.66
C192 Replacement of Informal Corrections With Explicit Controls	4.58	267 of 796 (33.54%)	−0.64	0.71	−0.65

Note: Means are respondent-level arithmetic means, with bases of 808, 792, and 796 for C190, C191, and C192, respectively. Distressed ratings are ratings of 3 or below. The coefficient r measures the direction and strength of a linear association, from −1 to +1. Cancellation correlations use 150 engagements and customer-satisfaction correlations use the 94 active engagements. Intent-to-leave correlations use paired respondent answers: 757 for C190, 746 for C191, and 748 for C192. Related ratings do not establish the occurrence of third-party work done by hand. Each indicator's separate discussion below also reports its relationship with engagement indicator mean.

A 95% confidence interval (CI) expresses the uncertainty around an estimated association under the stated method. Cluster-bootstrap intervals resample whole engagements to retain the grouping of respondents within engagements. The intervals below are existing reported results. Correlations with engagement indicator mean exclude the indicator being tested to avoid including it in both quantities.

5.3 Retention of the Ability to Perform Manual Workarounds

Retained manual capability received 249 distressed ratings among 808 answers (30.82%), indicating gaps in the delivery team's reported ability to perform work by hand when third-party systems failed. The mean rating was 4.66 and the median was 5.0. Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 3.2 (n = 311). These ratings concern retained capability, not the occurrence count for third-party work done by hand.

Higher capability ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.65, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements), higher active-engagement customer satisfaction (r = 0.72, 95% CI 0.60 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean calculated without this indicator (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.84 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). Higher ratings were also associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.67, cluster-bootstrap 95% CI −0.73 to −0.62, n = 757 respondents). The engagement mean was distressed on 38 of the 150 engagements.

The indicator-specific compilation contained 43 written answers about manual capability, with 22 negative and 21 positive sentiment classifications. Respondents described both retained skills used during outages and capability lost when experienced delivery team members left without documenting or passing on the work. The existing written-sentiment analysis detected no statistically significant relationship with the core measures. Retaining a capability and relying on undocumented individual knowledge remain distinct aspects of the reported experience.

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5.4 Knowledge of Informal Third-Party Corrections

Knowledge of where informal third-party corrections had occurred received 262 distressed ratings among 792 answers (33.08%). The mean rating was 4.61 and the median was 5.0. Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 3.1 (n = 305). This indicator concerns knowledge of earlier manual practices rather than the delivery team's present ability to perform them.

Higher knowledge ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.66, 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56, n = 150 engagements), higher active-engagement customer satisfaction (r = 0.61, 95% CI 0.47 to 0.73, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean calculated without this indicator (r = 0.87, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.90, n = 150 engagements). They were also associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.66, cluster-bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.60, n = 746 respondents). The engagement mean was distressed on 39 of the 150 engagements.

Of the 21 indicator-specific written answers, 20 had negative sentiment. The accounts described undocumented corrections, departures of people who knew them, and repeated rediscovery of the same correction when a third-party problem recurred. The existing written-sentiment analysis detected no statistically significant relationship with the core measures. The accounts illustrate the knowledge gap without measuring how often it occurred across all engagements.

5.5 Replacement of Informal Corrections With Explicit Controls

Replacement of informal third-party corrections with explicit checks received 267 distressed ratings among 796 answers (33.54%). The mean rating was 4.58 and the median was 5.0. Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 3.1 (n = 302). The indicator distinguishes knowing about a correction from incorporating it into a control when agents assumed the work.

Higher replacement ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.64, 95% CI −0.73 to −0.54, n = 150 engagements), higher active-engagement customer satisfaction (r = 0.71, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.80, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean calculated without this indicator (r = 0.88, 95% CI 0.84 to 0.91, n = 150 engagements). They were also associated with lower intent to leave (r = −0.65, cluster-bootstrap 95% CI −0.71 to −0.59, n = 748 respondents). The engagement mean was distressed on 40 of the 150 engagements.

Nine indicator-specific written answers addressed control replacement: seven had negative sentiment, one positive, and one neutral. They described corrections not incorporated into explicit checks when agents assumed tasks. The small base supports illustration rather than a frequency estimate of the incidents described. The structured ratings remain respondents' assessments of control replacement rather than an independent control test.

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Manual Alteration by Cancellation Status and Engagement Indicator Mean

Manual alteration was reported across the full range of engagement indicator means, although four methods were more common on canceled engagements and engagements with lower indicator means. Respondents on all 56 canceled engagements described manual alteration of financial institution processes and AI outputs. They described manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data and reporting alteration on 55 of those engagements, and third-party work done by hand on 29.

The observed cancellation rate was higher among engagements on which respondents reported the four most common methods than among engagements with no such report. For AI-output manual alteration, cancellation was recorded on 45.90% of the 122 engagements with a report and on none of the 28 without one. The corresponding contrast for third-party work done by hand was smaller: 39.19% of 74 engagements with a report, compared with 35.53% of 76 without one. Absence of a report does not independently establish absence of the practice.

Table 5.4. Cancellation by the presence of each manual alteration method, 150 engagements

Method	Engagements with the method	Canceled	Engagements without the method	Canceled
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	133	55 (41.35%)	17	1 (5.88%)
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	138	56 (40.58%)	12	0 (0.00%)
Manual alteration of AI outputs	122	56 (45.90%)	28	0 (0.00%)
Reporting alteration	126	55 (43.65%)	24	1 (4.17%)
Third-party work done by hand	74	29 (39.19%)	76	27 (35.53%)

Note: Cancellation was recorded on 56 of the 150 engagements. Method presence means at least one qualifying report on the engagement. The study observed each engagement once. These comparisons do not establish whether manual alteration preceded or followed cancellation. They are descriptive contrasts, not forecasts of cancellation.

Every indicator quintile included reports of manual alteration on all 30 engagements. An indicator quintile is one of five groups of 30 engagements ordered by engagement indicator mean. Four methods were less common in higher quintiles. AI-output manual alteration was reported on all 30 engagements in the

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lowest quintile and 13 in the highest. Third-party work done by hand showed no comparable ordered pattern, with 16 engagements in both the lowest and highest quintiles.

Table 5.5. Engagements with each manual alteration method, by quintile of the engagement indicator mean

Method	Quintile 1	Quintile 2	Quintile 3	Quintile 4	Quintile 5
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	30 of 30	29 of 30	29 of 30	26 of 30	19 of 30
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	30 of 30	30 of 30	30 of 30	29 of 30	19 of 30
Manual alteration of AI outputs	30 of 30	29 of 30	27 of 30	23 of 30	13 of 30
Reporting alteration	30 of 30	29 of 30	26 of 30	25 of 30	16 of 30
Third-party work done by hand	16 of 30	17 of 30	13 of 30	12 of 30	16 of 30
Any of the five methods	30 of 30	30 of 30	30 of 30	30 of 30	30 of 30

Note: Quintile 1 contains the 30 engagements with the lowest engagement indicator mean and quintile 5 the 30 with the highest. Cells count engagements with at least one qualifying report of the method. Methods overlap. Rows are not additive. Indicator quintiles describe relative positions within this study set rather than validated categories of engagement performance.

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Distribution of Manual Alteration Across Roles

Individual contributors reported manual alteration more often than the other roles, with at least one method reported by 627 of 667 individual contributors (94.00%), 100 of 150 engagement managers (66.67%), and 11 of 31 portfolio directors (35.48%). Neither of the two customer management executives reported a method. These counts combine direct personal answers with written descriptions of practices on the engagement, so they do not measure personal performance of manual alteration uniformly across roles.

Individual contributors reported manual alteration of data, processes, and AI outputs more often than engagement managers. For process manual alteration, the counts were 515 of 667 individual contributors (77.21%) and 28 of 150 engagement managers (18.67%). Reporting alteration was described by similar shares of engagement managers and individual contributors: 87 of 150 (58.00%) and 384 of 667 (57.57%), respectively. Third-party work done by hand was described by 25 engagement managers (16.67%) and 79 individual contributors (11.84%). The comparisons describe reporting by role, not a direct allocation of responsibility for the work.

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Figure 5.11. Respondents reporting each manual alteration method, by role

Manual alteration methods had different reported distributions across roles



Note: Shares use all respondents in each role: 667 individual contributors, 150 engagement managers, and 31 portfolio directors. Neither of the two customer management executives reported a method, and they are omitted from the figure. A report may concern personal action or a practice described on the engagement.

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Table 5.6. Respondents reporting each manual alteration method, by role

Method	Individual contributors	Engagement managers	Portfolio directors
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	436 of 667 (65.37%)	15 of 150 (10.00%)	1 of 31 (3.23%)
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	515 of 667 (77.21%)	28 of 150 (18.67%)	3 of 31 (9.68%)
Manual alteration of AI outputs	314 of 667 (47.08%)	13 of 150 (8.67%)	1 of 31 (3.23%)
Reporting alteration	384 of 667 (57.57%)	87 of 150 (58.00%)	6 of 31 (19.35%)
Third-party work done by hand	79 of 667 (11.84%)	25 of 150 (16.67%)	4 of 31 (12.90%)
Any of the five methods	627 of 667 (94.00%)	100 of 150 (66.67%)	11 of 31 (35.48%)

Note: A respondent is counted after a direct True answer or a written description of the method on the engagement. These sources do not uniformly establish personal performance of the method. Counts overlap across methods, and no report is not proof that a practice did not occur.

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1 Engagement Managers and Portfolio Directors

Reporting alteration accounted for most method reports from engagement managers. Of the 100 engagement managers reporting any method, 87 described reporting alteration, 15 reported data manual alteration, and 13 reported AI-output manual alteration. Among all 31 portfolio directors, six described reporting alteration and four described third-party work done by hand. The pattern concerns what these roles reported, rather than a verified division of work or knowledge.

> *"The vendor excluded misrouted regulated inquiries from the routing-accuracy dashboard by reclassifying them as client-side data errors after the fact, so the reported accuracy stayed above threshold while the actual misroutes kept mounting." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

The vendor's portfolio reporting rolled this engagement's missed savings targets into a blended regional average, which kept the account's failure from showing clearly in any single dashboard view."

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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Reasons Given for Manual Alteration

Respondents most often linked manual alteration to unusable data, delayed financial institution decisions, unreliable AI outputs, and problems with third-party feeds and interfaces. The written answers describe reasons for changing or completing the work by hand. Table 5.7 maps those descriptions to the relevant survey questions and rated indicators. These mappings connect the accounts to Part 2 without establishing that the reported reasons caused the study outcomes.

Table 5.7. Survey subjects most frequently identified in written answers describing each manual alteration method

Method	Survey question or rated indicator	Answers	Engagements
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	C094 Quality of Financial-Institution-Provided Data	341	103
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	C108 Ability to Provision Access and Identities for Agents	92	61
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	C096 Normalization of Financial Institution Data Across Source Systems	89	64
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	C109 Speed of Financial Institution Response to Issues Raised by the Engagement	229	108
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	C100 Completeness of Financial Institution Process Documentation	138	83
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	C105 Financial Institution Management of Its Side of the Engagement	94	62
Manual alteration of AI outputs	C157 Factual Reliability Before Human Review	321	106
Manual alteration of AI outputs	C159 Inconsistency of Output Across Repeated Runs	176	85
Manual alteration of AI outputs	C175 Stability Without Known Engagement-Side Changes	27	25
Reporting alteration	C157 Factual Reliability Before Human Review	53	37
Reporting alteration	C148 Human Review Capacity Against Agent Output Volume	8	8
Reporting alteration	C173 Explainability of Outputs to Audit Depth	7	7
Reporting alteration	C176 Diagnostic Value of Logs and Telemetry	7	7

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Method	Survey question or rated indicator	Answers	Engagements
Reporting alteration	C127 Quality Assurance for Nondeterministic Agent Output	7	7
Reporting alteration	C036 What stage is the engagement in?	7	7
Third-party work done by hand	C188 Usability of Third-Party Feed Data	36	27
Third-party work done by hand	C181 Advance Notice From Third-Party Providers	29	26
Third-party work done by hand	C187 Stability of Third-Party Interfaces and Data Structures	29	25

Note: Rows identify the three most frequent survey subjects in the coded written answers for each method, including every tie for third place. The method's own questions are excluded. Codes link descriptions to survey subjects and do not mean respondents used the formal indicator names. C036 is a stage question, not one of the 100 rated engagement indicators. An answer may concern several subjects. Counts overlap.

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1 Reasons for Manual Alteration of Financial-Institution-Provided Data

Data quality was the most frequently reported reason for manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data. It was identified in 341 of the 588 method-based written answers, covering 103 engagements. Borrowed and shared credentials were identified in 92 answers and normalization across source systems in 89. The accounts connected recurring correction with data quality and restricted access to the systems in which the problems originated.

Recurring correction in these accounts concerned the suitability of inputs for agent use and access to the systems in which errors originated. Correcting a supplied file does not by itself resolve the source-data or access problem. The reported reasons connect manual alteration to the data quality, accessibility, and normalization indicators examined in Part 2, “Financial-Institution-Provided Data.”

> *“I re-key the SSI details every time the layout shifts between deliveries, we still don't have working access to the source, so it's manual. Every time.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“We scrub the incoming Data clean every single cycle, as well as that it just turns up dirty again the very next time, so I just spend hours rebuilding same fields week after week” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *“Credentials to the client Repository expire and nobody renews them, so I use a workaround login just to keep the files moving... it's the same thing every status call, we chase it and nothing changes” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

“

i cleaned the policy data again before load, we clean it every cycle and it comes back dirty again, i still don't have proper access to the source system so i pull what i can and patch the rest by hand.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Client servicing and communications

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2 Reasons for Manual Alteration of Financial Institution Processes

Delayed decisions were the most frequently reported reason for process manual alteration. The financial institution's speed of response was identified in 229 of the 857 method-based written answers, covering 108 engagements. Process documentation was identified in 138 answers and financial institution management and decision authority in 94. These accounts describe delivery teams changing the work when the decisions or documented procedures needed to perform it were unavailable.

A changed process may allow work to continue while leaving its authoritative definition or the required financial institution decision unresolved. These accounts connect manual alteration to process ownership and authorization, not simply to the frequency of intervention. Part 2 distinguishes process documentation from the financial institution's decision authority and response speed. The accounts here do not establish that every process change lacked approval or was improper.

> *"Process never written down anywhere, everyone do it different way. I ask questions and nothing come back so I change step myself to keep work moving." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"What they gave us was a slide, not a procedure. And change control cant keep up with the speed we work at so I just adjust it" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Last month the Client raise a request that need urgent proccess change but formal Change board only meet monthly, so I make the update myself and inform team lead after" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"The change process was built for quarterly release, not for agent making decision every day... so when servicing rule need small update I please make the same myself rather than wait weeks for formal sign off" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Payments, cards and disputes*

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3 Reasons for Manual Alteration of AI Outputs

Unreliable output before human review was the most frequently reported reason for AI-output manual alteration. It was identified in 321 of the 429 method-based written answers, covering 106 engagements. Inconsistency across repeated runs was identified in 176 answers. The separate reasons compilation recorded instructions to continue processing outputs without raising the problem in 16 answers from 12 respondents on 10 engagements. This differs from the method-based count of 14 answers on nine engagements reported earlier. The counts remain separate because the coverage of that theme has not been reconciled.

The reported correction and selection of outputs place human review within the work required to produce an acceptable result. A corrected output cannot by itself demonstrate the factual reliability or repeatability of the agent's uncorrected work. Whether the human contribution was recorded and visible in performance reporting is examined separately below. The two escalation counts remain descriptions from their respective compilations.

> *“yesterday i ran same question twice and bot gave different policy answer both time, nothing else changed. and i had to correct it before new hire saw wrong one.” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *“Nothing about it is repeatable, i get different Output on same Input twice in one day and Change process assumes normal release cycle not agent running every day” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“The tool gives a different attribution breakdown each time I rerun it... consistency is the one thing it cannot do and my own leadership does not want that raised with the client” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *“It changes its mind between one pass and the next on the same input, this has occured on nearly every run this week, pressure from our own side is only to keep it moving, so I just pick the best version and send” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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4 Reasons for Reporting Alteration

Factual reliability before human review was the most frequently identified additional subject in accounts of reporting alteration, appearing in 53 answers on 37 engagements. Most accounts described how reports were altered rather than supplying a separate reason for the practice. Table 5.2 distinguishes those reporting methods from the additional survey subjects summarized here.

The distinction between a reporting method and a reason for using it limits interpretation of these counts. Accounts of corrected work attributed to agents connect reporting alteration to the visibility of human effort, but identifying such a method does not independently establish the respondent's or vendor's motive. The relevant comparison is between the work described and what its reported performance represented.

> *"The vendor's onboarding metrics counted a task as agent-handled even when a human quietly redid it afterward because the agent's output was unusable, which overstated automation coverage." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

"

The vendor's delivery dashboard reported reporting-rule coverage as a percentage of rules migrated into the agent, but counted a rule as migrated the moment a draft version was uploaded, regardless of whether an SME had validated it, so coverage looked near complete while unvalidated rules kept producing quiet errors downstream."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

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5 Reasons for Third-Party Work Done by Hand

Unusable feeds, unstable interfaces, and insufficient notice of provider changes were the reported reasons for third-party work done by hand. Feed-data usability was identified in 36 of the 113 method-based written answers, covering 27 engagements. Interface and data-structure stability and advance notice from third-party providers were each identified in 29 answers. The accounts describe manual work needed when the delivery team could not rely on the third-party connection or its data.

These accounts place part of the effort needed to use third-party services within the delivery team's own work. They identify a potential continuity dependency on the people who know how to complete that work by hand. The related ratings of retained manual capability and replacement of informal corrections remain separate from counts of reported occurrence.

> *"Their bureau feed changed a field layout back in march and nobody flagged it... we found it when the challenger run wouldn't reconcile. Two days gone. And half of what we need from the Bureau portal has no real interface. You log in and export it by hand. That part is invisible here." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

> *"i type the return into Submission portal by hand every time, agent cannot use a screen made for a person. give us a proper interface, and please tell us before they change the format, that is what has to happen" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

> *The feeds themselves have settled — the supplier registry and sanctions data have not moved under us once this year, and our contracts with those providers now say something sensible about notice periods, which was not true in January. Where we have not moved is our own map of who sits behind them. We know our direct providers; we do not honestly know their sub processors, and the truthful answer on the fourth party question is that we never finished the exercise. Nor could we run the onboarding checks by hand for long if one of them went dark — the people who used to do that work are doing something else now."*

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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The vendor's dashboard reported average turnaround time per valuation without disclosing that a meaningful share of deliverables were quietly redone by senior staff after bankers rejected the initial agent output, understating real cycle time.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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Disclosure of Manual Alteration

Answers about discussion of manual alteration with vendor management were much more frequently affirmative than answers about discussion with the financial institution. The overall contrast pools answers to separate questions and does not describe a matched comparison of the same people.

> *"My own management told me to keep it at working level and not put it in the client summary. So there are two versions of the issue list and neither one is complete." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

Across the three questions following personal manual alteration of data, processes, and AI outputs, 783 of 1,113 valid answers reported discussion with vendor management (70.35%). Discussion with the financial institution was reported in 13 of 1,004 valid answers (1.29%). These are pooled answers across three questions, not unique respondents or separate incidents. The two totals have different answering bases and do not form a matched comparison for every respondent.

Figure 5.12. Reported discussion of manual alteration with vendor management and the financial institution, pooled answers across three questions for each

Discussion with vendor management was reported more often than discussion with the financial institution



Note: Numerators count True answers and denominators count True or False answers: 783 of 1,113 for vendor management and 13 of 1,004 for the financial institution. A person may answer more than one question. The answers describe what respondents reported that they or their management discussed, rather than establishing the financial institution's knowledge.

Written descriptions also distinguished vendor management disclosure from financial institution disclosure, but the evidence was uneven across methods. Among the 2,410 method-based written

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answers, 309 from respondents on 119 engagements stated that vendor management had been told. Financial institution nondisclosure was described in 106 answers on 51 engagements, while disclosure was described in 26 on 19 engagements. Another 44 answers on 31 engagements stated that nobody had been told. These themes overlap and are not an exhaustive accounting of disclosure on all engagements.

Table 5.8. Disclosure of each manual alteration method

Method	Discussed with internal management	Discussed with the financial institution	Told vendor management
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	292 of 401	3 of 366	105 (69)
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	341 of 459	9 of 414	162 (87)
Manual alteration of AI outputs	150 of 253	1 of 224	51 (38)
Reporting alteration	Not asked	Not asked	0 (0)
Third-party work done by hand	Not asked	Not asked	6 (6)

Method	Financial institution was told	Financial institution was not told	Told nobody
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	8 (7)	41 (28)	19 (16)
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	17 (14)	52 (32)	13 (12)
Manual alteration of AI outputs	3 (2)	17 (14)	12 (11)
Reporting alteration	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Third-party work done by hand	0 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)

Note: The first two columns report True answers among valid True or False answers to the disclosure questions following personal manual alteration of data, processes, and AI outputs. They are question-specific answering bases. The final four columns count method-based written answers, with engagements in parentheses. Themes and methods overlap. Zero means no identified statement in that coded set, not verified absence of disclosure. Reporting-alteration answers concerned the vendor's reports and supplied little evidence about the respondent's own disclosure.

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“we do this every week now, the informations from client side never matches whats current, i just fix it and move on, nobody outside my team knows how much we touch before it reaches new hires.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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1 Disclosure to Vendor Management

Most respondents answering the internal-disclosure questions reported discussing manual alteration with vendor management, although discussion was less common for AI outputs than for data or processes. True answers numbered 292 of 401 for data (72.82%), 341 of 459 for processes (74.29%), and 150 of 253 for AI outputs (59.29%). Each percentage uses that question's own valid-answer base.

Internal disclosure of data or process manual alteration was associated with a lower cancellation rate, a higher engagement indicator mean, and lower intent to leave at engagement level. The data comparison for engagement indicator mean did not retain statistical significance under the Kruskal–Wallis check, a rank-based comparison of groups, and its customer-satisfaction comparison could not be estimated. AI-output disclosure had no statistically significant engagement-level association, although two respondent-level checks accounting for clustering within engagements did. The differences limit a single interpretation of disclosure as beneficial.

> *"I revert back the numbers to match the Statement and keep the same in my own tracker... I told my Lead, we never discuss about it with the client." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

1.1 Internal Disclosure of Data Manual Alteration

INDICATOR C200 · I DISCUSSED THE DATA ALTERATION WITH INTERNAL MANAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Discussion of data manual alteration with vendor management was reported by 292 of 401 respondents answering True or False (72.82%), while 109 answered False (27.18%). The reported share showed no statistically significant differences across the groups of study classifications after Holm correction. That correction adjusts comparisons within a defined family of tests to limit false-positive conclusions from multiple testing.

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Figure 5.13. Share answering True to "I discussed the data alteration with internal management", by respondent role and engagement status

Discussion of data manual alteration with vendor management was reported by 292 of 401 respondents answering True or False (72.82%), while 109 answered False (27.18%).



Note: True or Yes answers: 292 of 401 answers (72.82%).

n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Group shares and answering bases: Individual contributor (n = 398): 72.61%. Engagement manager (n = 3): 3 of 3 answered True. Build-Out (n = 69): 84.06%. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 88): 79.55%. Production (n = 34): 76.47%. Canceled (n = 210): 65.71%.

The cancellation rate was lower among engagements assigned True on internal data disclosure: 39.77% of 88 engagements, compared with 64.00% of 25 assigned False (chi-square 4.61, df = 1, p = 0.032, n = 113 engagements). Engagement indicator mean (Welch F 6.49, p = 0.014) and intent to leave (Welch F 9.59, p = 0.003) also differed, each on 113 engagements. The indicator-mean result did not retain statistical significance under the Kruskal–Wallis check. Active-engagement customer satisfaction could not be compared because fewer than two answer categories included at least 10 engagements.

The 210 indicator-specific written answers included 172 with positive sentiment and 37 with negative sentiment. Positive answers described telling a team lead or manager, sometimes while also stating that the financial institution was not told. Negative answers described telling nobody or nobody more senior than the respondent. The sentiment classification therefore concerns the subject of internal discussion and does not establish complete disclosure or adequate oversight.

> *"I dont say to client, only to my Lead… takes time I dont have, and if I pick wrong duplicate nobody would know." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"And this happen almost every week, i catch it before it move on. i tell my manager same day, because of that it stop right there, no need to trouble client with it." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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"This is routine for my team now, we get bad informations every week and nobody fixes the Source, I clean it myself and tell my Lead, not the client" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

1.2 Internal Disclosure of Process Manual Alteration

INDICATOR C206 · I DISCUSSED THE PROCESS ALTERATION WITH INTERNAL MANAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Discussion of process manual alteration with vendor management was reported by 341 of 459 respondents answering True or False (74.29%), while 118 answered False (25.71%). No study classification family showed a statistically significant difference in the reported share after Holm correction.

Figure 5.14. Share answering True to "I discussed the process alteration with internal management", by respondent role and engagement status

Discussion of process manual alteration with vendor management was reported by 341 of 459 respondents answering True or False (74.29%), while 118 answered False (25.71%).



Note: True or Yes answers: 341 of 459 answers (74.29%).

n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Group shares and answering bases: Individual contributor (n = 450): 73.78%. Engagement manager (n = 9): 9 of 9 answered True. Build-Out (n = 72): 81.94%. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 127): 84.25%. Production (n = 45): 82.22%. Canceled (n = 215): 64.19%.

The cancellation rate was 35.00% among the 100 engagements assigned True on internal process disclosure and 65.22% among the 23 assigned False (chi-square 7.08, df = 1, p = 0.008, n = 123 engagements). The True group also had a higher engagement indicator mean (Welch F 12.68, p = 0.001) and lower intent to leave (Welch F 14.96, p < 0.001), each on 123 engagements. Active-engagement

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customer satisfaction could not be compared because fewer than two answer categories included at least 10 engagements.

The 257 indicator-specific written answers included 225 with positive sentiment and 29 with negative sentiment. Respondents described reporting changes to the team lead after making them. Some also stated that the financial institution was not told, distinguishing internal discussion from disclosure to the financial institution.

> *"Same workaround every week, we do the fix and backfill the paperwork after. And training the next new hire on it is getting old." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"Every person on client side do process different way, we chase same point on every status call and nothing move, raising ticket take longer than doing fix myself so most time I just fix it and tell my lead after" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

1.3 Internal Disclosure of AI-Output Manual Alteration

INDICATOR C212 · I DISCUSSED THE AI OUTPUT ALTERATION WITH INTERNAL MANAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Discussion of AI-output manual alteration with vendor management was reported less often than discussion of data or process manual alteration. True answers numbered 150 of 253 valid answers (59.29%). No statistically significant differences across study classification families were detected after Holm correction.

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Figure 5.15. Share answering True to "I discussed the AI output alteration with internal management", by respondent role and engagement status

Discussion of AI-output manual alteration with vendor management was reported less often than discussion of data or process manual alteration.



Note: True or Yes answers: 150 of 253 answers (59.29%).

n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Group shares and answering bases: Individual contributor (n = 251): 58.96%. Engagement manager (n = 2): 2 of 2 answered True. Build-Out (n = 31): 54.84%. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 40): 82.50%. Production (n = 29): 58.62%. Canceled (n = 153): 54.25%.

Internal AI-output disclosure had no statistically significant engagement-level association with any of the four core measures. The existing tests reported chi-square 1.94 for cancellation (df = 1, p = 0.163, n = 93 engagements), Welch F 3.67 for active-engagement customer satisfaction (p = 0.063, n = 42 engagements), Welch F 3.13 for engagement indicator mean (p = 0.080, n = 93 engagements), and Welch F 2.32 for intent to leave (p = 0.131, n = 93 engagements). Two respondent-level checks accounting for clustering within engagements reached statistical significance for engagement indicator mean and intent to leave. That difference in analytical unit does not establish an engagement-level association where the primary tests did not detect one.

The 95 indicator-specific written answers included 67 with positive sentiment and 26 with negative sentiment. Respondents who reported no disclosure described correcting outputs without raising the issue, sometimes because earlier escalation had not changed the situation.

> *"This one i don't mention to anyone, not even my lead. Output changes between runs and i just pick version that looks right, nobody asks how it happened." -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"i do not raise this to anyone... it happen most days, i kindly correct the output myself and send it, there is no other option for me" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

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2 Disclosure to the Financial Institution

Discussion with the financial institution was rarely reported in the three structured disclosure questions. True answers numbered three of 366 for data, nine of 414 for processes, and one of 224 for AI outputs. No engagement was assigned True under the plurality rule, so an engagement-level comparison could not be estimated. That assignment result does not mean no individual respondent reported disclosure.

> *"I fix it quiet. And nobody official know except my team. Client never ask, I do not know if they hear. It happen every week, feels normal but not right." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I do this most days now, my manager know about it, please note we dont tell client, half the records missing values every batch and somebody has to catch that before it break something downstream," -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

2.1 Disclosure of Data Manual Alteration to the Financial Institution

INDICATOR C201 · I OR MY MANAGEMENT DISCUSSED DATA ALTERATION WITH THE CLIENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Discussion of data manual alteration with the financial institution was reported in three of 366 valid True or False answers (0.82%). No engagement was assigned True under the plurality rule. The answers support a respondent-level description, while an engagement-level association with the core measures could not be estimated.

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Figure 5.16. Share answering True to "I or my management discussed data alteration with the client", by respondent role and engagement status

Discussion of data manual alteration with the financial institution was reported in three of 366 valid True or False answers (0.82%).



Note: True or Yes answers: 3 of 366 answers (0.82%).

n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Group shares and answering bases: Individual contributor (n = 363): 0.00%. Engagement manager (n = 3): 3 of 3 answered True. Build-Out (n = 61): 0.00%. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 80): 1.25%. Production (n = 36): 0.00%. Canceled (n = 189): 1.06%.

Of the 109 indicator-specific written answers, 96 had negative sentiment. At least 53 of those 96 stated that the financial institution was not told or that the manual alteration remained within the delivery team or vendor management. Eleven answers stated that the financial institution had been told, had requested correction, or had been shown the changes. These written-answer counts use a different source and definition from the direct True-or-False count.

> *"When source-system feeds arrive late or malformed, the team logs a data exception, shares the informations with the client's platform owner, and agrees the correction before it is applied upstream. Nothing touches client data outside that channel." -Portfolio Director, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"what they did is send us mortgage files that dont reconcile, happens most days at this point, I tell my Lead, we dont tell client," -Individual Contributor, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

2.2 Disclosure of Process Manual Alteration to the Financial Institution

INDICATOR C207 · I OR MY MANAGEMENT DISCUSSED PROCESS ALTERATION WITH THE CLIENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Discussion of process manual alteration with the financial institution was reported in nine of 414 valid True or False answers (2.17%). No engagement was assigned True under the plurality rule. With fewer

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than two answer categories containing at least 10 engagements, none of the four engagement-level comparisons could be estimated.

Figure 5.17. Share answering True to "I or my management discussed process alteration with the client", by respondent role and engagement status

Discussion of process manual alteration with the financial institution was reported in nine of 414 valid True or False answers (2.17%).



Note: True or Yes answers: 9 of 414 answers (2.17%).
n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.
Group shares and answering bases: Individual contributor (n = 405): 0.00%. Engagement manager (n = 9): 9 of 9 answered True. Build-Out (n = 72): 0.00%. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 113): 1.77%. Production (n = 38): 0.00%. Canceled (n = 191): 3.66%.

Of the 124 indicator-specific written answers, 99 had negative sentiment. At least 57 of those 99 stated that the financial institution was not told or that the manual alteration remained within the delivery team or vendor management. Twelve answers stated that the financial institution had been told, and four described approval before a change was applied. These descriptions distinguish notification from prior approval, without independently verifying either.

> *"Same problem, they never gave us a real procedure, just a slide deck, so my team built our own steps, looped the client in as we went" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I tell Lead every time, we dont tell client, happens most days, informations we get is never enough to wait on approval, know which call to make most times now" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

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2.3 Disclosure of AI-Output Manual Alteration to the Financial Institution

INDICATOR C213 · I OR MY MANAGEMENT DISCUSSED AI OUTPUT ALTERATION WITH THE CLIENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Discussion of AI-output manual alteration with the financial institution was reported in one of 224 valid True or False answers. No engagement was assigned True under the plurality rule, so an engagement-level association could not be estimated. The individual True answer remains part of the descriptive result.

Figure 5.18. Share answering True to "I or my management discussed AI output alteration with the client", by respondent role and engagement status

Discussion of AI-output manual alteration with the financial institution was reported in one of 224 valid True or False answers.



Note: True or Yes answers: 1 of 224 answers (0.45%).

n gives the numeric-answer base for each group. These are descriptive comparisons of reported answers.

Group shares and answering bases: Individual contributor (n = 222): 0.00%. Engagement manager (n = 2): 1 of 2 answered True. Build-Out (n = 33): 0.00%. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 33): 0.00%. Production (n = 25): 0.00%. Canceled (n = 133): 0.75%.

Of the 50 indicator-specific written answers, 43 had negative sentiment. At least 22 of those 43 stated that the financial institution was not told or that correction remained within the delivery team or vendor management. The single positive answer described telling both the financial institution and vendor leadership.

> *"We just patch the breaks ourselves and keep the queue moving, nobody upstairs asks how they got cleared. And I couldn't tell you if the client ever sees the real touch count." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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“i tell team lead but not client… this happen maybe once a week, i fix informations in output before it go to review, otherwise sprint slip” -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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3 Sources of the Disclosures That Occurred

Engagement managers supplied all 13 True answers on financial institution discussion across the three structured questions. They supplied 14 valid True or False answers in total, while individual contributors supplied 990 valid answers and none was True. These are answer counts across questions and do not establish the number of unique people who disclosed manual alteration.

Individual contributors supplied 1,175 of the 1,189 True answers on personal manual alteration of data, processes, and AI outputs. On discussion with vendor management, 769 of their 1,099 answers were True (69.97%). The contrast concerns personal-action and disclosure answers with different bases, rather than a matched sequence of incidents.

> *"We do flag it, both internally and to the client, but flagging does not stop us doing it, strictly speaking the account still needs the composites finished on time." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

> *"we have told the client directly that we alter their data before it reaches the model, and told our own management as well, also I am careful how that gets phrased since altering anything on their side sits close to a line we are not meant to cross without sign-off." -Engagement Manager, CXM, Financial crime and client onboarding*

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Recording of Manual Alteration

Respondents described manual alteration that was incompletely recorded and manual labor that did not appear in reported performance. In the method-based compilation, 107 written answers from 89 respondents on 56 engagements stated that manual alteration was not logged or only partly logged. Manual labor omitted from reported measures was described in 51 answers on 43 engagements, and undocumented practices dependent on an individual were described in 32 answers on 28 engagements. These accounts establish reported gaps in recording, not deliberate concealment in every case.

Table 5.9. Recording of each manual alteration method in the written answers

Method	Not logged or only partly logged	Manual effort omitted from reported measures	Undocumented practices dependent on individuals
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	25 (22)	11 (11)	8 (8)
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	64 (40)	7 (7)	14 (12)
Manual alteration of AI outputs	19 (15)	10 (10)	4 (4)
Reporting alteration	2 (2)	27 (25)	0 (0)
Third-party work done by hand	2 (2)	4 (4)	9 (9)

Note: Cells count method-based written answers, with engagements in parentheses. An answer may describe several themes or methods. Rows and columns overlap. A zero identifies no coded statement in this set rather than verified absence of the practice. The table distinguishes recording gaps, omitted labor, and dependence on individual knowledge.

> *"What we settle on in the end is a parallel note. Every synthesis the agents produce, one of my seniors reads it against the source before it goes over, and we hold a sheet of our own recording what changed and why. It is not part of any joint process, the client never sees the sheet. But when they come back three weeks later and ask why a figure moved, we can show them, and that is the only reason those conversations stay civil. It is a lot of hours for something that should be in the QA design itself." -Engagement Manager, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"the other thing is when the agent got a requirement wrong on a case, and it does, nobody above wanted to say it was ours. it went round for two weeks. my lead said just fix it and log it as data issue. so we did." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

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“Some of it makes it into the tracker, plenty does not, this is not every week, maybe once or twice a month, I share informations with my lead when it happen and we move forward” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Credit, underwriting and suitability

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1 Systems of Record

Records described by respondents were sometimes limited to team trackers, personal notes, or shared sheets rather than a complete engagement record. Process manual alteration accounted for the largest count of incomplete-recording descriptions: 64 written answers stated that a change was not logged or only partly logged. A personal or informal record could retain useful knowledge while still leaving the engagement's formal account incomplete.

> *"i tell my TL but not client, they dont ask anyway, there is no place to put rest of it, so it just disappear off record." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"i tell my TL, kindly he say just manage it... we do the same thing every week, i keep no record of the informations i change." -Individual Contributor, CXM, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"Last week the same paragraph came out different twice in a row on the same draft, consistency is the one thing it cannot do, and I catch it before it reaches an investor every time, that is simply the job and nobody logs it separately" -Individual Contributor, CXM, Client servicing and communications*

"

We just pick whichever record looks right and move on, raising this properly takes too long and nobody responds anyway. I don't discuss about what happens after with client, that's not for me, but this happens most weeks on this engagement."

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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2 Visibility in Reported Performance

Respondents described performance reports attributing human-corrected work to agents while omitting the labor needed to produce the result. Human-corrected work counted as the agent's was described in 52 answers on 45 engagements. Manual labor absent from all reported measures was described in 51 answers on 43 engagements. These are overlapping descriptions, not a quantified estimate of overstatement. The study did not measure how far reported performance was overstated.

> *"no one logs it as a defect, it's just cleanup we do every time we recieve a bad batch, so it never counts as extra work" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"I don't report it as a fix, I just note it in our internal Tracker for the team... my manager sees it but nobody escalates, it just eats time every single week" -Individual Contributor, BPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

> *"security approval takes months so we keep reconciling duplicates by hand meanwhile what goes out the other end always looks clean" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Technology engineering and operations*

> *"The vendor's monthly NAV accuracy report averaged in reruns after a manual correction as if the agent had gotten it right the first time, hiding how often fund accountants had to step in." -Individual Contributor, BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation*

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Regulatory and Legal Context Reported by Respondents

Knowledge of the regulatory context was uneven among the respondents who answered the question. Of 795 answers, 548 named at least one law, regulation, guidance document, or regulatory concept, collectively covering all 150 engagements. The other 247 answers (31.07%) were “I do not know.” All 247 came from individual contributors on 126 engagements. Coverage of every engagement by at least one named reference does not establish that every delivery team member knew the relevant obligations.

The references concerned model risk, anti-money laundering, outsourcing and third-party risk, data protection, operational resilience, and conduct. They combined laws, supervisory guidance, and broader concepts rather than a uniform set of verified legal obligations.

The study did not test legal applicability or compliance. These answers identify the regulatory references respondents believed were relevant to their engagements. They do not establish which requirements legally governed a particular practice or whether the financial institution or vendor complied with them.

> *“the issue is if anyone ever asks how the number was arrived at, the answer involves a decision that i made on a tuesday afternoon because nobody else would.” -Individual Contributor, KPO, Corporate and back-office functions*

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1 Regulatory Items Named by Respondents

Model risk governance was the most frequently named regulatory reference, appearing in 219 answers on 58 engagements. Anti-money laundering and know-your-customer requirements (“AML and KYC”) appeared in 192 answers on 48 engagements, and third-party and outsourcing risk guidance in 189 answers on 52 engagements. Respondents named 40 distinct references in total. Seven others appeared in 173 or 174 answers each, including Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) outsourcing guidance, supervisory letter SR 11-7, California and other state privacy laws, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), European Banking Authority (EBA) outsourcing guidelines, and the European Union (EU) AI Act.

Table 5.10. Regulatory references most frequently named by respondents as relevant to the engagement

Reference named	Answers	Engagements
Model risk governance	219	58
“AML and KYC”	192	48
Third-party and outsourcing risk guidance	189	52
OCC outsourcing guidance	174	48
SR 11-7 model risk guidance	174	48
CCPA and state privacy laws	174	48
GDPR	173	47
DORA	173	47
EBA outsourcing guidelines	173	47
The emerging EU AI Act	173	47
Operational resilience requirements	140	40
MAS and local regulator outsourcing rules and local data protection laws	120	31

Note: The table selects the most frequently named references from the 40 identified in 548 answers that named at least one. An answer may name several references. Counts reflect respondent descriptions rather than verified legal applicability. CCPA means California Consumer Privacy Act. MAS means Monetary Authority of Singapore. Other abbreviations are expanded in the preceding paragraph. Labels identifying guidance, legislation, and broader concepts do not give them equivalent legal status.

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All 150 engagement managers and all 29 portfolio directors who answered named at least one regulatory reference. Among the 615 individual contributors who answered, 247 reported “I do not know” (40.16%). Individual contributors also reported manual alteration most often (Table 5.6). The juxtaposition identifies a difference in reported knowledge and practice by role, without establishing that individual contributors’ work breached an obligation.

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2 Relationship to the Work Subject to Manual Alteration

The regulatory references named by respondents concerned work addressed by all five manual alteration methods. They included data and privacy, model outputs and validation, outsourced processes and dependencies, and decisions supported by those processes. This overlap establishes the relevance of regulatory knowledge to the reported work, rather than the legal applicability of every reference to every manual alteration.

Explicit descriptions of regulatory exposure were less frequent than descriptions of uncertainty about accountability. Sixteen written answers from 14 respondents on 12 engagements linked a practice, gap, or incident to a breach or risk of breach. Unclear liability or regulatory accountability for agent errors was described in 83 answers from 80 respondents on 57 engagements. These statements report respondents' assessments, not legal findings.

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Regulatory and Legal Knowledge of the Delivery Team

Respondents' ratings indicated limited confidence in their own regulatory understanding, their management's understanding, and the financial institution's discussion of obligations, while training received still less favorable assessments. Each understanding or discussion indicator had a mean below 5.0. These are perceptions of preparation and dialogue rather than tests of legal knowledge or compliance.

Regulatory training received a mean rating of 3.6 (n = 798 respondents), with 385 distressed ratings (48.25%). The pattern connects the reported manual work to a preparation concern: respondents described working within a regulatory context that they did not consistently consider themselves well equipped to understand or apply.

> *"To be fair the hands on agent training was useful, I use it daily. The regulatory side they could not teach us, we learn that from the client's returns" -Individual Contributor, KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal*

I feel bad marking everything low, it is mostly the training. They put me on contract review with two day orientation, nothing about payments regulation, nothing about what a clause actually mean, I learn from the senior girl sitting next to me. People here can do the work if somebody teach them"

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

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1 Regulatory Understanding of the Respondent and Management

Respondents gave their own and their management's regulatory understanding mean ratings below 5.0, indicating limited confidence in both. Their own understanding was rated by 800 respondents and management's by 516. The different answering bases do not establish a matched comparison between the two ratings or explain why other respondents did not rate management.

Higher ratings of both forms of understanding were associated with a lower cancellation rate, higher customer satisfaction among active engagements, a higher engagement indicator mean, and lower intent to leave. Each indicator remains a separate reported perception. Similar associations from the same survey do not provide independent tests of legal capability.

1.1 Respondent Understanding of the Governing Laws and Regulations

INDICATOR C057 · I FULLY UNDERSTAND HOW THESE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND SIMILAR AFFECT THE OUTSOURCING ENGAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Respondents' self-assessed regulatory understanding received 228 distressed ratings among 800 answers (28.50%). The mean rating was 4.8 and the median was 5.0. Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 3.5 (n = 304). Higher ratings were associated with a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.76, n = 150 engagements), lower intent to leave (r = −0.65, n = 754 respondents), a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.58, n = 150 engagements), and higher active-engagement customer satisfaction (r = 0.69, n = 94 engagements). The engagement mean for this indicator was distressed on 26 of the 150 engagements.

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Figure 5.19. Respondent Understanding of the Governing Laws and Regulations: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "I fully understand how these laws, regulations, and similar affect the outsourcing engagement".

Distressed ratings: 228 of 800 answers (28.50%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 623): 4.66. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.21. Portfolio director (n = 27): 5.96. Build-Out (n = 164): 5.87. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 5.39. Production (n = 98): 5.73. Canceled (n = 304): 3.48.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

Eight indicator-specific written answers addressed regulatory understanding, supporting only a limited description. Seven identified regulatory knowledge learned on the engagement as something the respondent valued. The eighth described a delivery team encountering requirements as the agent flagged cases. Neither these accounts nor the self-ratings independently tested knowledge.

> *"Sharpened my sense of what regulatory accountability actually requires" -Individual Contributor, ITO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

1.2 Management Understanding of the Governing Laws and Regulations

INDICATOR C058 · MY MANAGEMENT TEAM FULLY UNDERSTANDS THESE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND SIMILAR, AND HOW THEY AFFECT THE ENGAGEMENT · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Management's regulatory understanding received 149 distressed ratings among 516 answers (28.88%). The mean rating was 4.9 and the median was 5.0. Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 3.5 (n = 193). Higher ratings were associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.53, n = 150 engagements), lower intent to leave (r = −0.63, n = 492 respondents), higher active-engagement customer

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satisfaction (r = 0.62, n = 94 engagements), and a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.71, n = 150 engagements). The engagement mean for this indicator was distressed on 31 of the 150 engagements. These findings describe the answering subset and do not establish what nonanswerers knew about management.

Figure 5.20. Management Understanding of the Governing Laws and Regulations: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “My management team fully understands these laws, regulations, and similar, and how they affect the engagement”.

Distressed ratings: 149 of 516 answers (28.88%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 343): 4.72. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.19. Portfolio director (n = 23): 6.35. Build-Out (n = 112): 6.10. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 155): 5.43. Production (n = 56): 6.04. Canceled (n = 193): 3.53.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

No written answer was coded to management’s understanding of the governing obligations.

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2 Financial Institution Discussion of Obligations With the Delivery Team

Respondents' ratings indicated limited agreement that financial institution staff actively discussed regulatory and legal obligations with the delivery team. The mean was 4.8, and 231 of 801 ratings were distressed (28.84%). The answers describe perceived dialogue rather than the financial institution's own knowledge, documentation, or compliance.

2.1 Discussion of Obligations With the Delivery Team

INDICATOR C059 · THE CUSTOMER'S TEAM ACTIVELY DISCUSSES THESE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND SIMILAR WITH OUR TEAM · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Discussion of obligations received a mean rating of 4.8 and a median of 5.0 (n = 801 respondents). Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 3.4 (n = 305). Higher ratings were associated with a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.80, n = 150 engagements), a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.62, n = 150), higher active-engagement customer satisfaction (r = 0.67, n = 94 engagements), and lower intent to leave (r = −0.65, n = 752 respondents). Ratings were distressed in 231 answers (28.84%), and the engagement mean was distressed on 26 of the 150 engagements.

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Figure 5.21. Discussion of Obligations With the Delivery Team: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: “The customer’s team actively discusses these laws, regulations, and similar with our team”.

Distressed ratings: 231 of 801 answers (28.84%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 621): 4.63. Engagement manager (n = 150): 5.09. Portfolio director (n = 29): 6.34. Build-Out (n = 163): 5.66. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 232): 5.59. Production (n = 101): 5.68. Canceled (n = 305): 3.40.

r is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

No written answer was coded to the financial institution’s discussion of regulatory and legal obligations with the delivery team.

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3 Regulatory Training

Regulatory training was rated less favorably than regulatory understanding or discussion of obligations. Its mean of 3.6 was the 19th-lowest among the 146 survey questions with a favorable or unfavorable direction. That comparison covers the broader set of directional survey questions, rather than only the 100 rated engagement indicators.

3.1 Adequacy of Regulatory Training

INDICATOR C060 · THE TRAINING AVAILABLE TO ME EFFECTIVELY TEACHES ME ABOUT THESE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND SIMILAR · FULL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ›

Nearly half of the regulatory-training ratings were distressed: 385 of 798 answers (48.25%). The mean rating was 3.6 and the median was 4.0. Respondents on canceled engagements reported a mean of 2.4 (n = 308). These assessments concern the perceived adequacy of available training, not an independent assessment of the instruction or respondents' legal knowledge.

Figure 5.22. Adequacy of Regulatory Training: associations with the study measures



Note: Survey question: "The training available to me effectively teaches me about these laws, regulations, and similar".

Distressed ratings: 385 of 798 answers (48.25%).

Group means and numeric-answer bases: Individual contributor (n = 620): 3.48. Engagement manager (n = 150): 3.85. Portfolio director (n = 27): 4.22. Build-Out (n = 162): 4.37. Transition/Cut-Over (n = 234): 4.23. Production (n = 94): 4.48. Canceled (n = 308): 2.39.

r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, measuring signed linear association from −1 to +1. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals where reported. Intent-to-leave intervals, where shown, use a cluster bootstrap. The bootstrap resamples engagements to preserve the grouping of respondent answers. Associations are observational.

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Higher training ratings were associated with a higher engagement indicator mean (r = 0.87, n = 150 engagements) and higher customer satisfaction among active engagements (r = 0.70, n = 94 engagements). They were also associated with a lower cancellation rate (r = −0.59, n = 150 engagements) and lower intent to leave (r = −0.61, n = 750 respondents). The engagement mean for training was distressed on 64 of the 150 engagements.

All five indicator-specific written answers about regulatory training received the most negative sentiment score, −10. They described instruction that did not address the requirements relevant to the work. Four described learning instead from colleagues or financial institution material. The small number supports illustration of reported experience, rather than an estimate of how often these training gaps occurred.

> *“whoever trained us knows nothing about AML, consequently we learn the rules from the client's own manual.” -Individual Contributor, BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding*

> *“tool training was good, nobody taught us the suitability rules” -Individual Contributor, CXM, Credit, underwriting and suitability*

The reported experience indicates that manual alteration was widespread while disclosure, recording, and regulatory preparation were incomplete in important respects. Respondents described manual work that sustained delivery but was not consistently represented in engagement records or performance reports. Their accounts of limited financial institution disclosure and unfavorable training ratings make that limited visibility consequential for interpreting reported performance and the preparation of the delivery team. The study establishes neither the amount of performance overstatement nor legal noncompliance, and its cross-sectional associations do not establish that manual alteration caused cancellation.

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About the Author

Phil Hatch is an outsourcing and workforce-development executive with more than 30 years of experience. He previously led the global outsourcing business of ManpowerGroup/Experis. His work includes service delivery, workforce strategy, and organizational development across industries and countries.

Hatch has also advised governments on labor and economic development, including workforce strategies intended to support investment and employment.

Following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Hatch was asked by the U.S. Department of State and USAID to advise Ukraine on workforce and economic development. His work has addressed technology, outsourcing, skills development, and international investment in support of economic recovery.

Through Akholi, Hatch advises organizations and governments on outsourcing and the implications of AI for work and service delivery.

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About Akholi

Akholi, established in 2003, is a research and advisory firm focused on outsourcing, service delivery, and global capability centers. Its work includes the 2026 study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements described in this report.

The study examines relationships among financial institution readiness, co-management, vendor capability, AI technology, the third-party ecosystem, and reported engagement outcomes. Its findings are observational and do not establish that any one category is the sole or primary cause of those outcomes.

Akholi applies this research through advisory and educational work with institutional leaders. Recommendations derived from the study require assessment against the circumstances and evidence of each engagement.

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We reran a full quarter twice as a control and the residuals did not match — small differences, but not the same numbers, and that was enough for the client's performance team to stop taking the output at face value. Separately the tool read the front and the back of a sixty-page investment management agreement and missed a rebalancing note sitting in the middle of it. In fairness, it behaved the same in month seven as it did in month one."

PORTFOLIO DIRECTOR
KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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PART 5

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Manual Alteration by the Delivery Team

A study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements, drawn from the accounts of 850 members of the vendors' delivery teams

PUBLICATION DATE	November 1, 2026
VERSION	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
FIGSHARE DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890

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06

PART 6

Executive Action Plan

IN THIS PART

Recommended Controls

Proposed Implementation Schedule

REPORT INFORMATION

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Full Study Report

Author	Phil Hatch
Publication date	November 1, 2026
Version	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
Figshare DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890
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SUGGESTED CITATION

Hatch, Phil. 2026. *Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions: Full Study Report*. Version 1.8.2. Akholi. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559.

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USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Artificial intelligence tools were used to prepare this report. Appendix G discloses how they were used.

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“They stood up the ticket integration quickly and their people have taken to the change better than I expected. What has to change is upstream. Job titles, cost centers and location codes are spelled three different ways across the HR platform, the directory and the badge system, so an agent answering a leave question has to guess which record is current. One owner for the employee master, and half our escalations disappear.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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Recommended Controls

The study reports gaps in financial institution readiness, which covers the data, processes, people, and internal controls needed for delivery. Weaknesses in co-management, the two firms' arrangements for decisions, risks, changes, and human review, were accompanied by limited visibility into work performed by delivery teams (Parts 2–5). These findings call for controls that establish preparation before commitment and verify how work is actually completed during delivery.

For new engagements, financial institution readiness should be established before contract approval. Co-management should be established before contract signature. For existing engagements, the same controls provide the basis for identifying gaps and prioritizing corrections. The recommendations and schedule are proposed responses to the findings. Their effectiveness was not tested by the study.

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Table 6.1. Recommended controls and the reported evidence supporting them

Action	Delivery conditions	Engagement outcomes	Failure-category ratings	Manual alteration	Recording and disclosure
1 Establish financial institution readiness before contract approval		Part 1: outcomes	Part 2: readiness		
2 Establish co-management before contract signature			Parts 2 and 3: co-management		
3 Audit the design and calculation of vendor reporting		Part 1: outcomes		Part 5: reporting alteration	Part 5
4 Restructure commercial terms around outcomes and exit	Part 2: commercial terms	Part 1: outcomes			
5 Treat human oversight as a control function			Parts 2 and 3: oversight	Part 5: manual work	
6 Listen directly to the vendor delivery team	Part 4: delivery workforce			Parts 4 and 5	
7 Require a manual alteration register and test it				Part 5: five methods	Part 5

Note: References identify the supporting Part and relevant subject. The five failure categories are financial institution readiness, vendor capability, co-management, AI technology, and third-party ecosystem. Manual alteration covers human changes to data, processes, AI outputs, or reporting, and third-party work done by hand. A manual alteration register is a shared record of material manual alteration and its authorization. The delivery workforce comprises all 850 respondents. The mappings support the proposed controls without establishing their effectiveness or the effect of manual alteration on engagement survival. For controls 3 and 7, see Part 5, “Reporting Alteration” and “Recording of Manual Alteration.” For control 5, see Part 2, “Human Review and the Joint Quality Assurance Loop.” For control 6, see Part 4, “Knowledge at Risk of Departure,” and Part 5, “Distribution of Manual Alteration Across Roles.”

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1 Establish a Readiness Standard Before Contract Approval

Financial institution readiness received the lowest category rating in the sample. This category covers the financial institution's data, processes, systems, people, internal controls, and responsiveness. Respondents described difficulties with those conditions, including staffing, decision-making, access, and business-case preparation (Part 2).

Before contract approval, assess data ownership and validation, technical access, documented processes, the identities and access permissions assigned to agents, decision rights, and the business case. Record material gaps, assign owners, and identify those that must be resolved before approval. Specify any remaining conditions that must be satisfied before deployment.

The proposed readiness review is intended to identify work that might otherwise transfer informally to the delivery team. Its effectiveness should be evaluated through implementation and subsequent operational evidence.

> *Data is bad, this is true, but is not fault of people on their side. Systems are old and nobody there build them, they inherit. When we ask for someone who know the data, they find person same day usually, i cannot complain about that. Access also came through quicker than i expect. What they will not do is change process, they want agent to do exact same steps as before, and for governing AI risk nobody there has done this before, so of course is not mature yet. Two months is not long time."*
>
> **INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR**
> ITO, Technology engineering and operations

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2 Establish Co-Management Before Contract Signature

Accounts of co-management identified separate risk lists, unresolved decisions, and unclear authority to suspend agents (Parts 2 and 3). Positive accounts described arrangements that resolved issues and supported timely intervention.

Before contract signature, agree joint decision rights, limits on the actions agents may take, escalation routes, and shared risk and issue records. Confirm that these arrangements operate before delivery begins. Assign reachable personnel with authority to suspend operation whenever agents are active, with documented coverage and escalation if those personnel are unavailable.

These arrangements should be tested in realistic scenarios. The study provides reasons to examine them but does not establish their implementation cost or guarantee a particular operational benefit.

> *Step ownership is much clearer now than at kickoff. We sat with their servicing lead in month one and wrote down who owns which part of the flow, voice and chat separately, and that document has held. Change visibility also improved, when the assistant's behaviour is adjusted between releases both sides now see it before it goes live, which was not so in first weeks. What has not moved is the stopping decision. If a reply is going out wrong on chat there is no single agreed person who can pull it from the queue, so i have to find their duty manager on call, and that is twenty minutes we do not have. Fault is the same story, after an incident the two firms are still arguing whose it was. Our joint sampling is also too thin to catch much before cardholder sees it."*
>
> **ENGAGEMENT MANAGER**
> CXM, Payments, cards and disputes

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3 Audit the Design and Calculation of Vendor Reporting

Respondents described reporting based on activity counts, exclusions, or outputs corrected by delivery teams (Part 5). Such choices can materially affect interpretation even when the underlying arithmetic is correct.

Review reporting definitions, denominators, exclusions, baselines, case aging (the elapsed time since a case was opened), and the treatment of work corrected by people. Reconcile reported results to sampled operational records and check the calculations. Verify agent-generated completion reports against evidence of execution.

Performance measures should distinguish unassisted agent output from work requiring review, correction, or manual completion, with definitions that allow comparison over time.

> *The vendor's attribution dashboard reports a figure as verified once it passes an internal reconciliation check the vendor itself designs and controls, with no independent audit trail the client can inspect."*

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
KPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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4 Restructure Commercial Terms Around Outcomes and Exit

Accounts of pricing based on delivery team headcount, uncertain licensing, and limited tested alternatives suggest areas for commercial review (Part 2). The study did not establish that any one pricing model caused concealment or delivery failure.

Align commercial terms with measurable service outcomes and disclose the human effort included in delivery. Confirm permissions for agent use of third-party services and document feasible transition or exit arrangements. Test those arrangements to an extent proportionate to the consequences of losing the vendor or a relevant model provider or third-party provider.

Outcome-based terms may improve alignment, but they can also create incentives to select favorable measures. Reporting definitions, verification rights, and transparency about manual effort remain necessary under any pricing structure.

> *When we discussed about the second cycle estimate in March, it was still built on how many analysts sit on the work, which does not fit when the model does the first pass, and I marked those items low for that reason. To be fair, when a calibration run went wrong my leadership did not push it down to my team, they took it up themselves. The banking training is thin though. Most of what my modellers know about the client's chart of accounts they learned from the client."*
>
> **ENGAGEMENT MANAGER**
> KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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5 Treat Human Oversight as a Control Function

Respondents described inadequate review capacity, superficial approval, and change procedures poorly matched to operational needs (Parts 2 and 3). These accounts support testing how oversight functions in practice.

Design, staff, and test human oversight according to output volume, risk, complexity, and the time required for meaningful review. Record what reviewers examine. Independently repeat the review work for a risk-based sample of approvals, a procedure known as reperformance, to assess the quality of scrutiny.

Use risk-based change procedures with defined approval, notification, emergency handling, and subsequent reconciliation of emergency changes with the approved records. Assign responsibility for detecting unexpected agent behavior and investigating changes in inputs, configurations, or services supplied by the vendor, model provider, or third-party providers.

> *The suspicious-activity dashboard reports case-closure volume against target without separately reporting how many closures were auto-approved agent recommendations versus human-reviewed decisions, which hides the real oversight bottleneck from anyone reading the summary."*

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
BPO, Financial crime and client onboarding

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6 Listen Directly to the Vendor Delivery Team

Evidence obtained directly from the delivery team should complement management reporting because the roles reported different aspects of manual alteration and its discussion. Individual contributors supplied most affirmative answers about personally performing manual alteration. Engagement managers supplied all 13 affirmative answers about discussion with the financial institution across the three structured questions on data, processes, and AI outputs (Parts 4 and 5). These are pooled answer counts, not counts of unique people or engagements. The pattern does not establish individual contributors' overall contact with the financial institution.

Establish appropriate channels for delivery team members to describe operational problems, manual alteration, and suggestions. Options include confidential interviews, periodic surveys, and review of delivery team records. Define access, privacy, protection against retaliation, escalation, and the limits of confidentiality before collecting information.

Accounts from the delivery team may identify issues not apparent in aggregate reports. They should be assessed alongside operational evidence and information from other relevant parties.

> *We are sitting till midnight most cycles because their side answer nothing. I miss two family functions for a deadline that move anyway… my team is tired and two of the juniors are already applying somewhere else. It is not only the work that suffer"*

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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7 Require a Manual Alteration Register and Test It

At least one form of manual alteration was reported on every sampled engagement in the combined direct answers and written accounts reported in Part 5. This does not mean that every method occurred on every engagement. Accounts of incomplete recording and limited discussion support reviewing how manual alteration is authorized, documented, and reported.

Establish a manual alteration register, a shared record of material manual alteration and its authorization. Cover manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data, manual alteration of financial institution processes, manual alteration of AI outputs, reporting alteration, and third-party work done by hand. Define materiality and record routine low-risk corrections through proportionate workflow logging linked to the register. Together, the records should identify what was done, by whom, why, under what authority, to which output, and with what required communication.

Test the completeness of these records by tracing samples of outputs, data loads, and reported results to documented manual alteration. Reconcile local trackers with shared records where appropriate and investigate unexplained differences.

> *This is close to constant on this engagement at this point. We reconcile document versions and fix formatting nearly every week, we have told our own leadership and we have told the client in writing, and nothing has really changed on their end. It has become the baseline expectation rather than an exception at this point."*

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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“The vendor's change log recorded release approvals as complete once submitted for sign-off, not once actually approved, so the client-facing change-control dashboard showed a healthy pace of updates even during weeks when several releases sat pending for days.”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
BPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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Proposed Implementation Schedule

The proposed 52-week schedule moves from assessment, containment, and initial corrective action during the first 12 weeks to completion of the remaining first-year work. Containment limits exposure while an issue remains unresolved. The timetable is a planning assumption, not a study finding. Scope and dates should reflect engagement volume, severity, available resources, and applicable obligations.

Table 6.2. Proposed implementation phases and oversight deliverables

Weeks	Actions	Oversight deliverables
Week 1	Appoint the audit lead and the executive accountable for corrections. Approve the mandate and budget. Preserve relevant records, establish risk-based interim controls and emergency procedures, and communicate the review's purpose.	Mandate, appointments, preservation instructions, interim controls
Week 2	Assemble the audit team with defined roles and appropriate independence. Notify vendors of scope, access rights, and preservation expectations. Compile and reconcile the engagement inventory.	Review roles, engagement inventory
Weeks 3 to 4	Prioritize engagements and apply proportionate interim restrictions. Open the confidential channel. Issue the questionnaire, set initial response dates, and allow necessary follow-up.	Prioritized engagements, restrictions, participation status
Weeks 5 to 8	Review prioritized engagements on site or remotely as appropriate. Assess other engagements for emerging concerns. Document critical findings, evidence gaps, and the prioritized action plan.	Supported findings, action plan, decisions requested
Weeks 9 to 12	Implement prioritized corrections, verify closures, and decide controls for unresolved critical issues. Prepare the funded first-year plan and assign continuing oversight responsibilities.	Closure evidence, unresolved issues and controls, funded plan
Weeks 13 to 52	At week 13, approve priorities and decisions on reviewed engagements. Complete remaining reviews and corrective work, train relevant personnel, and independently verify material closures. Keep delays and unresolved findings visible.	Quarterly reports, year-end dispositions and unresolved findings

Note: Deliverables go to the oversight committee acting under the board's delegation. Prioritized engagements are those selected for the initial detailed review. Critical findings are those whose financial exposure, operational impact, or control gaps require urgent containment or correction under documented prioritization criteria. Containment limits exposure while an issue remains unresolved. Closure requires evidence that corrective action works. Independent assurance is verification by personnel separate from those responsible for the correction. Disposition means a documented decision to continue, impose controls, restructure, transfer, or exit. The dates are proposed targets, and unresolved findings remain open and visible.

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1 Week 1: Appoint the Audit Lead

Week 1 should establish the review mandate and assign accountable leadership. The board or its designated oversight committee should appoint a senior executive as audit lead, with sufficient independence from engagement sponsorship and delivery. The oversight committee acts under the board's delegation. The mandate should define scope, reporting, budget, access within applicable rights, escalation, and authority to recommend interim controls. Assign management responsibility for corrections separately from independent assurance of closure.

Preserve relevant records, establish risk-based interim controls, and name the personnel authorized to suspend agent operation. Legal and compliance specialists should determine any notification, privacy, or privilege requirements. Management should explain the review's purpose, cooperation expectations, and protections against retaliation for good-faith reporting. Emergency changes should remain possible through documented procedures.

Agree reporting frequency with the oversight committee and escalate critical findings promptly. The first-week deliverables should be the approved mandate, named responsibilities, preservation instructions, and initial control decisions.

> *Reconciliation-break reports showed a shrinking break count each week, but the drop reflected a human logging in manually to clear breaks the agent could not touch, not the agent resolving more on its own. Settlement-funding reports never separated agent-initiated actions from human keyboard fixes, so the dashboard read as steady progress right up to cancellation."*
>
> **INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR**
> BPO, Trade, settlement and reconciliation

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2 Week 2: Form the Audit Team and Notify the Vendors

Week 2 should establish an appropriately independent audit team and a reconciled engagement inventory. Assemble expertise in risk, compliance, legal matters, technology, procurement, outsourcing management, finance, and workforce issues as required. Preserve Internal Audit's independence from management's corrective responsibilities. If an external firm conducts interviews or supports the review, define its role and manage conflicts. It should not simultaneously act as an independent investigator and an advocate for a party under review.

Notify vendors of the review's scope, evidence requests, applicable access rights, and preservation expectations. Invite documented concerns about obstacles within the financial institution. Agree arrangements for participation by delivery team members and financial institution staff, confidentiality, and protection against retaliation, subject to applicable law and contractual provisions.

Compile the engagement inventory from procurement, outsourcing, payment, technology, and model records. Include relevant pilots and transition work, record their subcontractors and third-party dependencies, and reconcile differences among the source registers.

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3 Weeks 3 to 4: Rank Every Engagement and Open the Confidential Channel

Weeks 3–4 should identify the prioritized engagements, those selected for the initial detailed review. Assess financial exposure, impact on the financial institution and its customers, regulatory relevance, agent autonomy, processing volume, and known control gaps. Use documented criteria to select the prioritized engagements and determine proportionate interim restrictions. Submit the prioritization method and material scope limitations to the oversight committee. Classify findings as critical when their financial exposure, operational impact, or control gaps require urgent containment or correction under the documented criteria. Record the reason for that designation. This review prioritization does not replace the study's defined engagement-outcome categories.

Open a protected channel for delivery team members and financial institution staff. Explain who can access identifiable information, how findings will be reported, the limits of confidentiality, and procedures for urgent concerns. State only those protections the review can provide. Report findings in aggregate where feasible without obscuring matters requiring action.

Issue a questionnaire covering manual alteration, reasons, authorization, records, disclosure, reporting, and operational obstacles. Seek improvement proposals across financial institution readiness, vendor capability, co-management, AI technology, and the third-party ecosystem. Set initial response dates and allow meaningful participation and follow-up beyond week 4 where needed. Report participation and outstanding evidence requests to the oversight committee.

> *We did a POC with the bank to see if we could handle regulatory filings. Using the same sample documents, the AI never generated the same filing reports. The bank canceled the pilot and started looking at every other AI project."*

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Client servicing and communications

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4 Weeks 5 to 8: Audit the Prioritized Engagements

Weeks 5–8 should produce an assessment of the prioritized engagements and an action plan supported by operational evidence. Conduct walkthroughs on site or remotely as appropriate. Examine four areas, retaining separate consideration of AI technology and the third-party ecosystem within the fourth.

1. Assess financial institution readiness through data and processes, organizational arrangements, dependent processes, assigned ownership, and the time taken to answer delivery requests and make decisions.
2. Assess vendor capability through the delivery team, documented delivery methods, controls over manual alteration, and knowledge of the financial institution's business and applicable obligations.
3. Assess co-management through the two firms' decision rights, change procedures, escalation routes, issue resolution, and the time taken to make decisions and resolve issues.
4. Assess AI technology through agent configurations, change history, and monitoring. Assess the third-party ecosystem separately through the services and dependencies on which those agents rely.

Test controls in operation using risk-based samples. Reconstruct material manual alteration for the review period where evidence permits, reconcile performance reports to underlying work, and assess relevant skills. Record gaps in evidence explicitly. Reassess the remaining engagements as new concerns emerge and expand the prioritized reviews when warranted.

Assign each critical finding an accountable owner, containment decision, corrective-action target, impact assessment, and evidence required for closure. Legal and compliance specialists should assess notification and contractual implications. By the end of week 8, the proposed deliverable is a supported assessment and prioritized action plan, with unresolved evidence gaps clearly identified.

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5 Weeks 9 to 12: Correct the Critical Issues and Set the First-Year Plan

Weeks 9–12 should deliver verified initial corrections, decisions on unresolved critical issues, and a funded first-year plan for approval. Management should implement prioritized corrections and verify them against operational evidence. Revised policies or attestations alone are insufficient to demonstrate that a correction works. Where critical risks remain, accountable executives should determine proportionate restrictions, suspension, or exit, with escalation through the financial institution's risk governance arrangements. Containment measures should remain in place while the issue is unresolved.

Prepare the first-year plan around four workstreams.

1. Review remaining engagements in risk order under a consistent evidence standard and document a disposition for each within an agreed timetable.
2. Strengthen co-management where required through assigned decision rights, shared issue records, defined response times, coordinated change control, manual alteration records, and reconciled reporting.
3. Address financial institution readiness through process and data ownership, validated inputs, appropriate access, documented dependencies, and training for engagement owners and oversight personnel.
4. Address vendor capability through relevant domain and regulatory training, demonstrated competence for assigned responsibilities, sustainable staffing, documented delivery methods, and clear requirements for manual alteration records and disclosure.

Assign continuing responsibility for inventories, change control, monitoring, review capacity, suspension authority, and applicable requirements. Use existing governance functions where suitable and define additional responsibilities explicitly. Each action should have an owner, target date, budget, and criterion for closure supported by operational evidence. Require independent assurance proportionate to risk. Report unresolved critical issues and containment measures alongside the plan.

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6 Weeks 13 to 52: Complete the First-Year Plan

Week 13 should establish the approved priorities and decisions governing the remaining first-year work. The oversight committee should approve priorities and decide whether reviewed engagements continue, require additional controls or restructuring, or should transfer or exit, referring decisions to the board where required by its delegated authority. During the remainder of the year, monitor progress, verify material closures independently, and reassess residual risks. Submit quarterly progress reports. The year-end objective is a documented disposition for every in-scope engagement and evidence that required controls operate effectively. Keep delays and unresolved findings visible in those reports.

The reported gaps in financial institution readiness, co-management, and visibility into manual alteration support a review grounded in the work actually performed. Financial institutions should use that evidence to decide which engagements can continue, which require correction or restriction, and which should transfer or exit. The proposed schedule provides a framework for those decisions. Its effectiveness must be judged by operational evidence of implemented controls and transparent reporting of unresolved findings.

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“we see it happen a lot on my team. i don't do the hands on fixes myself anymore, but i sign off on what they change, access provisioning never finish before we go live so the agents patch around missing permissions constantly, happens most days. and frankly i am tired of explaining it upward to management, though what actually reaches them versus what the team handles day to day, i sometimes wonder about that.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER
CXM, Corporate and back-office functions

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About the Author

Phil Hatch is an outsourcing and workforce-development executive with more than 30 years of experience. He previously led the global outsourcing business of ManpowerGroup/Experis. His work includes service delivery, workforce strategy, and organizational development across industries and countries.

Hatch has also advised governments on labor and economic development, including workforce strategies intended to support investment and employment.

Following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Hatch was asked by the U.S. Department of State and USAID to advise Ukraine on workforce and economic development. His work has addressed technology, outsourcing, skills development, and international investment in support of economic recovery.

Through Akholi, Hatch advises organizations and governments on outsourcing and the implications of AI for work and service delivery.

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About Akholi

Akholi, established in 2003, is a research and advisory firm focused on outsourcing, service delivery, and global capability centers. Its work includes the 2026 study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements described in this report.

The study examines relationships among financial institution readiness, co-management, vendor capability, AI technology, the third-party ecosystem, and reported engagement outcomes. Its findings are observational and do not establish that any one category is the sole or primary cause of those outcomes.

Akholi applies this research through advisory and educational work with financial institution leaders. Recommendations derived from the study require assessment against the circumstances and evidence of each engagement.

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“last week handoff between their tax team and compliance team was undefined, nobody knew who own next step, also their SME was not available when we needed answer, so i made call myself to keep research moving”

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTOR
KPO, Regulatory, audit, tax and legal

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PART 6

Agentic AI Outsourcing at Tier 1 Financial Institutions

Executive Action Plan

A study of 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements, drawn from the accounts of 850 members of the vendors' delivery teams

PUBLICATION DATE	November 1, 2026
VERSION	1.8.2
ISBN	979-8-234-26882-2
SSRN DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7164559
FIGSHARE DOI	https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34036890

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A

REFERENCE

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G	Disclosure of the Use of Artificial Intelligence

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“The thing the numbers cannot show is that all of this is untested. On paper the contracts with our model and data providers cover changes on their side, and I scored that well. In practice, the one time a provider moved a model version underneath us, the contract did nothing for me on the day, and we found out from a broken overnight refresh rather than from anybody's notice. And the licences were written for named humans, so nobody can tell me whether the agent counts as one user or as ten. None of it has cost us anything yet, because our volumes are small and we are still pre-POC. But a rating between one and ten cannot say fine until it is not, and that is the honest position.”

ENGAGEMENT MANAGER

KPO, Corporate and back-office functions

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Appendices

The appendices provide definitions, the indicator and exhibit inventories, methods, a guide to the companion analyses, an index, and the AI-use disclosure. The companion analyses provide more detailed results than the main text.

Appendices A–C identify terms, indicators, and exhibits. Appendix D explains the methods and limitations; Appendix E describes and provides access to the 216 companion analyses. Appendices F and G contain the index and the AI-use disclosure.

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1 Appendix A: Definitions

Appendix A defines the study's principal terms using the Study Taxonomy. Survey questions and respondent quotations retain their original wording, including terminology that differs from the report's usage.

Table 33. Terms used in the report and their definitions

Term	*Definition*
Financial institution	Tier 1 firm buying the outsourced service, of 10 types that include insurers and private equity and private capital firms.
Vendor	Outsourcing firm delivering the service and employing every respondent.
The two firms	Financial institution and the vendor considered together, where a weakness belongs to their relationship rather than to either firm alone.
Model provider	Supplier of the underlying AI models and the platforms they run on.
Third-party provider	Any other supplier to the engagement, such as a supplier of tools, data feeds, or platforms.
Engagement	One contracted piece of outsourced work performed by one vendor for one financial institution. The engagement is the primary unit of the study.
Agent	One autonomous AI system operating within an engagement.
Agentic AI outsourcing	Outsourcing in which agents perform part of the contracted work alongside the vendor's delivery team.
Study set	150 engagements and 850 respondents the study covers.
Respondent	A member of the vendor's delivery team who answered the survey about one engagement.
Individual contributor	Vendor role that performs the engagement's tasks. The study set holds 667.
Engagement manager	Vendor role that runs a single engagement. The study set holds 150, one on each engagement.
Portfolio director	Vendor role that oversees several engagements and their engagement managers. The study set holds 31.
Customer management executive	Vendor role that owns the relationship with the financial institution. The study set holds two, reported as counts only.
Delivery team	All vendor staff on one engagement, across roles.
Delivery workforce	All 850 respondents across the study set.
Financial institution staff	People employed by the financial institution who work with the engagement, including named subject-matter experts.
Outsourcing model	Form of outsourcing under which an engagement was contracted, customer experience management (CXM), information technology outsourcing (ITO), business process outsourcing (BPO) or knowledge process outsourcing (KPO).
Class of work	Whether an engagement served a line of business the financial institution runs or a corporate or back-office function.
Process family	One of eight groups of use cases. Each engagement was assigned to one process family from the use case it recorded.
Type of financial institution	One of 10 types recorded for each engagement, from asset management to private equity and private capital.
Vendor type	Respondent's employer type. The five types are the IT services major, the BPO specialist, the consulting firm, the pure-play agentic AI firm, and the boutique or specialist provider.
Build-Out	First stage measured, covering planning, team build-out, and knowledge transfer.
Transition/Cut-Over	Second stage measured, covering development, proof of concept, and engagements on hold.
Production	Third stage measured, covering engagements in production and delivery.
Canceled	An engagement terminated as of the study date.
Active	An engagement still running as of the study date.
Failure category	One of five groups of 20 rated indicators, each describing the conditions of an engagement by where a weakness lies.
Financial institution readiness	Conditions inside the financial institution, covering its data, its processes, its legacy systems, the skills of its people, its governance, and its responsiveness.
Vendor capability	Conditions inside the vendor, covering leadership, industry knowledge, agentic AI knowledge, the delivery playbook, platforms, talent, training, and the commercial model.
Co-management	Conditions arising from the two firms working together, covering decision rights, joint management of risks and issues, change control, human review, and the fit of governance.
AI technology	Conditions of the agentic tools themselves, covering reliability, non-determinism, memory, context, security, authorized action, token economics, and observability.
Third-party ecosystem	Conditions arising from third-party providers and the chain of dependencies beneath them.
Indicator	A survey question, engagement field or study measure analyzed in its own companion analysis.
Rated indicator	One of the 100 indicators, 20 in each failure category, that make up the engagement indicator mean.
10-point scale	Scale from 1 to 10 on which respondents rated the indicators and the other rated questions.
Rating	A respondent's answer from 1 to 10 on a rated question.
Favorable-direction indicator	An indicator on which favorability increases across the 10-point scale, where 1 is the most unfavorable rating and 10 the most favorable.
Favorable-direction conversion	Presentation of an unfavorable-direction indicator's rating in the favorable direction, made by subtracting each rating from 11, so that a higher figure denotes the more favorable outcome.
Unfavorable-direction indicator	An indicator on which 1 is the most favorable rating and 10 the least favorable. The eight are C019, C021, C023, C025, C039, C051, C053 and C054, among them intent to leave and cancellation likelihood.
Question without a favorable end	A rated question with neither a favorable nor an unfavorable end. The eight are C027, C028, C066, C067, C068, C203, C209 and C215.
Distressed	A rating at the bad end of the question's own scale, 3 or below where a low rating is bad and 8 or above where a high rating is bad. The rule applies to an engagement's mean rating in the same way.
Indicators distressed	Share of an engagement's ratings on the rated indicators that are distressed, computed for each respondent, averaged within the engagement and then across engagements.
Indicator quintile	One of five bands of 30 engagements, ranked by engagement indicator mean.
Indicator class	Level at which an indicator was recorded, as respondent level, engagement attribute, or perceived fact.

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Term	*Definition*
Engagement attribute	One fact about the engagement, repeated across its respondents and never counted as independent observations.
Perceived fact	A fact about the engagement as the respondent understood it, such as the asset size of the financial institution. An answer of "I do not know" is reported as a finding.
Structured answers	Answers to the 195 structured survey questions, 172 numeric and 23 categorical. The study holds 149,619.
Written answers	Answers to the study's 16 open questions. The study holds 8,918.
Written response	A written answer about the respondent's own engagement that addresses a given indicator. Non-answers and answers about another engagement are excluded.
Primary and secondary response	A primary response answered the open question of the indicator's own survey section. A secondary response answered another open question and addressed the indicator in its content.
Sentiment score	Score of a written response on five values, from −10, a subject described at or near its worst, through −5, 0 and +5 to +10, at or near its best.
Theme	A recurring point in the written answers that no survey question captures, such as the frequency of manual work.
Emotional state	A state the respondent reported of himself or herself in a written answer, such as stressed, tired, or frustrated.
Non-answer	Answer "I do not know" or "I prefer not to answer," counted separately and excluded from a mean.
Four core study measures	Cancellation rate, customer satisfaction, engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave, applied to every indicator in that order.
Cancellation rate	Share of a named group of engagements canceled by the study date, computed at engagement level.
Customer satisfaction	Satisfaction figure recorded against each engagement on a 100-point scale, as reported by the delivery team. The measure is never abbreviated.
Engagement indicator mean	Mean of an engagement's ratings on the 100 rated indicators, computed for each respondent and averaged within the engagement.
Intent to leave	A respondent's rating, from 1 to 10, of how likely he or she is to leave the current job in the next 12 months.
Measured return	Return on an engagement, recorded for the 30 engagements in Production and printed with that base.
Cancellation likelihood	Delivery team's rating, from 1 to 10, of how likely the financial institution was to cancel an active engagement.
High risk	An active engagement whose mean cancellation likelihood rating was 7 or above.
Moderate risk	An active engagement whose mean cancellation likelihood rating was 5 or above and below 7.
Canceled or at risk	Canceled engagements together with the active engagements at high or moderate risk.
Manual alteration	A change made by hand by the delivery team to financial institution material, agent output, or reporting, counted by five methods.
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	Changing by hand the data the financial institution supplied to the engagement.
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	Changing by hand a process of the financial institution, such as deciding a process step the financial institution had not decided.
Manual alteration of AI outputs	Adjusting by hand the output of an agent before it was used or sent.
Reporting alteration	Vendor's alteration of the performance reports and dashboards the financial institution received.
Third-party work done by hand	Delivery team performing by hand the tasks a third-party system did not deliver, such as keying in data a broken feed did not supply.
Internal disclosure	Telling the vendor's own management about a manual alteration.
Financial institution disclosure	Respondent or the respondent's management discussing a manual alteration with the financial institution.
Reported experience	Respondents' account of their own engagements, the evidence class of the whole study.
Engagement level	A figure computed with one value per engagement, on a base of up to 150 engagements.
Respondent level	A figure computed across respondents, whose answers cluster within engagements, on a base of up to 850 respondents.
Base	Count of respondents, answers, or engagements on which a figure was computed, being those who answered rather than those who were asked.
Confidence interval	Range around an estimate that contains the true value at a stated level of confidence, 95% unless stated otherwise.
p value	Probability of a result at least as extreme as the one observed if no association existed.
Pearson's r	Correlation between two measured quantities, from −1 to 1.
Spearman's rho	A correlation computed on the ranks of the values, used as a check on Pearson's r.
Chi-square test	A test of whether a split across categories departs from what independence would produce.
Welch's analysis of variance	A test of whether a mean differs across the levels of an attribute, without assuming equal spread across the levels.
Holm correction	An adjustment of each p value in a family of tests for the number of tests in the family.
False discovery rate	Expected share of false positives among the results that pass the test, controlled across the 300 partial tests.
Detection floor	Smallest correlation the tests could reliably detect, 0.23 at 150 engagements, a test level of 0.05, and 80% power.
Equivalence bound	Bound of 0.30 in absolute value of r, below which an association is treated as negligible.
Equivalence test	A pair of one-sided tests of whether an association lies within the equivalence bound.
Held	State of an association that had p below 0.05, survived correction for multiple comparisons, and kept its sign and its p below 0.05 under the robustness checks.
Did not hold	State of an association that had p below 0.05 on the primary test but failed correction or one or more robustness checks.
Null equivalent to zero	A result that had p of 0.05 or above and whose interval lay within the equivalence bound.
Inconclusive null	A result that had p of 0.05 or above and could not be shown equivalent to zero.
Clean estimate	An association computed against customer satisfaction among the 94 active engagements, where no cancellation had occurred for a respondent to react to.
Descriptive contrast	An association computed against realized cancellation across all 150 engagements, whose canceled engagements were rated after cancellation.
Leave-one-out	Recomputation of the engagement indicator mean without the indicator under test.
Partial test	A test of whether an indicator was associated with a measure beyond what the engagement indicator mean accounts for.
Intraclass correlation (ICC)	Share of the variance in an indicator that lies between engagements rather than within them.
Design effect	Factor by which clustering within engagements inflates variance, equal to one plus the ICC multiplied by the mean cluster size less one.
Effective sample size	Number of respondents who answered divided by the design effect, the number of independent answers the clustered answers are worth.

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Term	*Definition*
Cluster bootstrap	An interval computed by resampling whole engagements rather than respondents. The answers from one engagement stay together.
Robustness check	A repeat of a primary test on a subset of the study set or under another method.
Study norm	Median association of the study's indicators with each of the four core study measures, against which each indicator is compared.
Thin base	A base under 30, printed with its count and without a confidence interval.
Anecdote strength	A base under 10, reported as counts only and never as a rate.
Companion analysis	Full statistical analysis of one indicator, engagement field, study measure, or derived analysis. The study holds 216.

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2 Appendix B: Indicator Inventory

Appendix B lists the analyzed indicators by code, with the question wording, survey section, analytical class, report location, and companion-analysis filename. A perceived-fact classification identifies information reported from the respondent's perspective; it does not establish independent verification.

Table 34. Indicator inventory

Code	*Question as asked*	*Survey section*	*Class*	*Polarity*	*Where reported*	*Companion analysis*
C005	What is your role on this engagement?	1.1 Role and Identity	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 1.1.1	Part 4, C005
C006	What country are you located in?	1.1 Role and Identity	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 1, 5.3.4	None
C007	How many years of experience do you have in your career?	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 1.2.1	Part 4, C007
C008	How many years of experience do you have with agentic AI?	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 1.3.1	Part 4, C008
C009	How many years have you been working in the outsourcing industry?	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 1.2.2	Part 4, C009
C010	How many years have you been working within the financial industry?	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 1.2.3	Part 4, C010
C011	How many agentic AI outsourcing engagements have you worked on across your career, including this one?	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 1.3.2	Part 4, C011
C012	How well do you know the financial industry?	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 1.4.1	Part 4, C012
C013	How well do you know agentic AI specific to the financial industry?	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 1.4.2	Part 4, C013
C014	Rate your overall agentic AI expertise.	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 1.4.3	Part 4, C014
C015	What professional certifications do you have?	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 1.5.1	Part 4, C015
C016	What AI certifications do you have?	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 1.5.2	Part 4, C016
C017	Where did you gain your AI knowledge?	1.2 Experience and Expertise	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 1.5.3	Part 4, C017
C018	How happy are you with your current job?	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 3.1.1	Part 4, C018
C019	How likely are you to leave your current job in the next 12 months?	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Lower is better	Part 4, 5.1.1; Introduction, 4.5.4	Part 4, C019
C020	How happy is your extended team with the current engagement?	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 3.1.2	Part 4, C020
C021	How likely are members of your current team to leave their jobs in the next 12 months?	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Lower is better	Part 4, 5.1.2	Part 4, C021
C022	Compared to 5 years ago, I am happier with the work I am doing now.	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 3.2.1	Part 4, C022
C023	Compared to 5 years ago, I am more likely to seek a new job.	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Lower is better	Part 4, 5.2.1	Part 4, C023
C024	Compared to 5 years ago, the team I work with seems to be happier.	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 3.2.2	Part 4, C024
C025	Compared to 5 years ago, the team I work with is more likely to seek a new job.	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Lower is better	Part 4, 5.2.2	Part 4, C025
C026	I want to continue working on projects in the global financial industry.	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 5.3.1	Part 4, C026
C027	I would prefer to work directly for a bank in one of their global capability centers.	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Directional	Part 4, 5.3.2	Part 4, C027
C028	Working directly for a bank would be better than working for an outsourcing vendor.	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Directional	Part 4, 5.3.3	Part 4, C028
C029	What are your top 3 challenges that reduce your job satisfaction?	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 3.3	None
C030	What are the top 3 things that you love most about your job?	1.3 Sentiment and Retention	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 4, 3.5	None
C031	What type of a bank is the customer?	2.1 Engagement Identification	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 5.1.1	Part 1, C031
C032	What is the outsourcing type?	2.1 Engagement Identification	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 5.3.1	Part 1, C032

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Code	*Question as asked*	*Survey section*	*Class*	*Polarity*	*Where reported*	*Companion analysis*
C033	Is the outsourcing engagement Corporate Functional, or Line of Business Operational?	2.1 Engagement Identification	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 5.3.2	Part 1, C033
C034	What is the specific use case for this engagement?	2.1 Engagement Identification	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 5.3.3	None
C035	How long ago did this specific engagement start, in months?	2.2 Timeline and Status	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 1.1.2	Part 1, C035
C036	What stage is the engagement in?	2.2 Timeline and Status	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 1.1.1; Introduction, 4.5.2	Part 1, C036
C037	How many months has the engagement been in its current stage?	2.2 Timeline and Status	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 1.1.3	Part 1, C037
C038	Per the current plan, how many months from today until the engagement reaches Production/Delivery?	2.2 Timeline and Status	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 1.1.4	Part 1, C038
C039	If the engagement has not been canceled, how likely is the customer to cancel the engagement?	2.2 Timeline and Status	Perceived fact	Lower is better	Part 1, 2.2.1	Part 1, C039
C040	How many people are on the vendor team for this engagement today?	2.3 Scale and Team	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 5.6.1	Part 1, C040
C041	What was the peak vendor team headcount on this engagement to date?	2.3 Scale and Team	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 5.6.2	Part 1, C041
C042	Per the current plan, how many people will be on the vendor team 12 months from now?	2.3 Scale and Team	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 5.6.3	Part 1, C042
C043	How many AI agents are running in production on this engagement today?	2.3 Scale and Team	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 1.2.1	Part 1, C043
C044	What is the pricing model for this engagement?	2.4 Commercial Structure	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 5.4.1	Part 1, C044
C045	What is the contract term of this engagement, in months?	2.4 Commercial Structure	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 5.4.2	Part 1, C045
C046	What is the annual contract value of this engagement, in USD?	2.4 Commercial Structure	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 5.4.3	Part 1, C046
C047	I know the KPIs the customer uses to measure success.	2.5 Performance and Delivery	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 1, 3.2.4	Part 1, C047
C048	The customer is happy with the performance of the engagement at this stage.	2.5 Performance and Delivery	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 1, 3.1.2	Part 1, C048
C049	The engagement is meeting delivery dates successfully.	2.5 Performance and Delivery	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 1, 3.2.1	Part 1, C049
C050	The engagement is within budget.	2.5 Performance and Delivery	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 1, 3.2.2	Part 1, C050
C051	The engagement is not achieving stated KPIs.	2.5 Performance and Delivery	Respondent level	Lower is better	Part 1, 3.2.3	Part 1, C051
C052	The dashboard and performance reports given to the customer are accurate.	2.5 Performance and Delivery	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 5, 1.4.1	Part 5, C052
C053	The vendor manipulates the dashboard and performance reports given to the customer.	2.5 Performance and Delivery	Respondent level	Lower is better	Part 5, 1.4.2	Part 5, C053
C054	Compared to 5 years ago, is manipulation of the dashboards and performance reports given to the customer more or less common now?	2.5 Performance and Delivery	Respondent level	Lower is better	Part 5, 1.4.3	Part 5, C054
C055	How does the vendor manipulate performance reports and dashboards?	2.5 Performance and Delivery	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 1.4	None
C056	What laws, regulations, and similar govern this outsourcing engagement?	2.6 Regulatory Context	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 6.1	None
C057	I fully understand how these laws, regulations, and similar affect the outsourcing engagement.	2.6 Regulatory Context	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 5, 7.1.1	Part 5, C057
C058	My management team fully understands these laws, regulations, and similar, and how they affect the engagement.	2.6 Regulatory Context	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 5, 7.1.2	Part 5, C058
C059	The customer's team actively discusses these laws, regulations, and similar with our team.	2.6 Regulatory Context	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 5, 7.2.1	Part 5, C059
C060	The training available to me effectively teaches me about these laws, regulations, and similar.	2.6 Regulatory Context	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 5, 7.3.1	Part 5, C060
C062	What is the customer's approximate total asset size, in USD?	3.1 Institution Profile	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 5.1.2	Part 1, C062
C063	Does the customer operate its own global capability centers?	3.1 Institution Profile	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 5.1.3	Part 1, C063

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C064	How many months has your employer been serving this customer across all work, not just this engagement?	3.1 Institution Profile	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 5.2.1	Part 1, C064
C065	How many agentic AI outsourcing engagements does your employer run concurrently with this customer today?	3.1 Institution Profile	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 5.2.2	Part 1, C065
C066	The customer is scaling their agentic AI outsourcing engagements.	3.2 Customer AI Strategy	Perceived fact	Directional	Part 1, 5.1.5	Part 1, C066
C067	The customer is increasing the number of agentic AI outsourcing engagements.	3.2 Customer AI Strategy	Perceived fact	Directional	Part 1, 5.1.6	Part 1, C067
C068	The customer is shifting more work to their global capability centers.	3.2 Customer AI Strategy	Perceived fact	Directional	Part 1, 5.1.4	Part 1, C068
C069	I trust the customer.	3.3 Relationship and Communication	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.1.1	Part 4, C069
C070	The customer knows and cares about me.	3.3 Relationship and Communication	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.1.2	Part 4, C070
C071	I talk with peers inside the customer regularly.	3.3 Relationship and Communication	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.2.1	Part 4, C071
C072	I talk with engagement management inside the customer regularly.	3.3 Relationship and Communication	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.2.2	Part 4, C072
C073	I talk with the customer's leadership team regularly.	3.3 Relationship and Communication	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.2.3	Part 4, C073
C074	I know how the customer feels about my team.	3.3 Relationship and Communication	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.1.3	Part 4, C074
C075	I know how the customer feels about the engagement I am on.	3.3 Relationship and Communication	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.1.4	Part 4, C075
C076	What type of company is your employer?	4.1 Vendor Profile	Engagement attribute	Not rated	Part 1, 5.5.1	Part 1, C076
C077	Approximately how many employees does your employer have worldwide?	4.1 Vendor Profile	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 5.5.2	Part 1, C077
C078	How many years has your employer been delivering agentic AI outsourcing?	4.1 Vendor Profile	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 1.2.2	Part 1, C078
C079	How many agentic AI engagements does your employer run for banks today?	4.1 Vendor Profile	Perceived fact	Not rated	Part 1, 5.5.3	Part 1, C079
C080	My manager is effective.	4.2 My Manager	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 2.1.1	Part 4, C080
C081	My manager knows the financial industry well.	4.2 My Manager	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 2.1.2	Part 4, C081
C082	My manager knows agentic AI well.	4.2 My Manager	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 2.1.3	Part 4, C082
C083	My manager cares about me.	4.2 My Manager	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.3.1	Part 4, C083
C084	My manager cares about the larger team.	4.2 My Manager	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.3.2	Part 4, C084
C085	My manager knows how to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements.	4.2 My Manager	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 2.1.4	Part 4, C085
C086	My manager knows how to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements for global banks.	4.2 My Manager	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 2.1.5	Part 4, C086
C087	My employer cares about me.	4.3 Employer Relationship	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.4.1	Part 4, C087
C088	My employer cares about the team.	4.3 Employer Relationship	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.4.2	Part 4, C088
C089	My employer's top leadership team cares about my wellbeing and development.	4.3 Employer Relationship	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.4.3	Part 4, C089
C090	I trust my employer.	4.3 Employer Relationship	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.4.4	Part 4, C090
C091	I trust my manager.	4.3 Employer Relationship	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.3.3	Part 4, C091
C092	I am being used effectively by my employer.	4.3 Employer Relationship	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 4, 4.4.5	Part 4, C092
C093	Compared to 5 years ago, is my employer more or less prepared to manage outsourcing engagements?	4.3 Employer Relationship	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.8.1	Part 2, C093
C094	Rate the quality of the customer's data across the systems this engagement depends on.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.1.1	Part 2, C094
C095	Rate how accessible the customer's data is to this engagement when and where the work requires it.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.1.2	Part 2, C095

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C096	Rate how well the customer's data is normalized, with consistent formats and definitions across source systems.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.1.3	Part 2, C096
C097	Rate the maturity of the customer's data governance over the data this engagement uses.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.1.4	Part 2, C097
C098	Rate how well the customer's legacy systems support the integration this engagement requires.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.2.1	Part 2, C098
C099	Rate the readiness of the customer's technical infrastructure to support the agentic AI this engagement deploys.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.2.2	Part 2, C099
C100	Rate how completely the customer's processes are mapped and documented to the depth agentic AI requires.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.3.1	Part 2, C100
C101	Rate the maturity of the customer's processes in scope, meaning how standardized and repeatable they are.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.3.2	Part 2, C101
C102	Rate how consistently the customer performs the same processes across its business units and regions.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.3.3	Part 2, C102
C103	Rate the customer's willingness to redesign processes for agentic AI rather than automate them as they are.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.3.4	Part 2, C103
C104	Rate the agentic AI knowledge and skills of the customer staff working with this engagement.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.4.2	Part 2, C104
C105	Rate the effectiveness of the customer's management of its side of this engagement.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.5.1	Part 2, C105
C106	Rate the availability of the customer's subject matter experts when this engagement needs them.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.4.3	Part 2, C106
C107	Rate the customer organization's readiness to absorb the changes to daily work that agentic AI introduces.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.4.1	Part 2, C107
C108	Rate the customer's ability to provision the system access and identities that AI agents require.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.7.1	Part 2, C108
C109	Rate how quickly the customer responds when this engagement raises issues that need customer action.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.5.2	Part 2, C109
C110	Rate how well the customer's change control process handles the changes this engagement requires.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.6.3	Part 2, C110
C111	Rate the customer's capacity to govern and oversee the risks of AI agents doing this work.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.6.2	Part 2, C111
C112	Rate how clearly ownership and accountability for AI are assigned inside the customer organization.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.6.1	Part 2, C112
C113	Rate the stability of the customer's business case and ROI definition for this engagement.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 2.8.1	Part 2, C113
C114	Add any comments on the customer organization that the ratings in this section do not capture.	5.1 Customer	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 2, 2	None
C115	Rate the overall effectiveness of your employer's top leadership team.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.1.1	Part 2, C115
C116	Rate how well your employer is transforming its commercial model as agentic AI reduces the billable human effort it sells today.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.1.2	Part 2, C116
C117	Rate how well your employer's internal management processes have been redesigned for agentic AI delivery rather than traditional staffed delivery.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.2.1	Part 2, C117
C118	Rate the effectiveness of your employer's process and leadership development programs.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.5.2	Part 2, C118
C119	Rate your employer's ability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements end to end.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.2.2	Part 2, C119
C120	Rate the depth of your employer's knowledge of the financial industry.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.3.1	Part 2, C120

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C121	Rate your employer's ability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements for global banks in particular.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.2.3	Part 2, C121
C122	Rate your employer's current supply of qualified agentic AI talent against what its engagements need.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.5.1	Part 2, C122
C123	Rate the adequacy of your employer's investment in training its workforce.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.5.3	Part 2, C123
C124	Rate how well your employer's training programs build practical agentic AI skills.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.5.4	Part 2, C124
C125	Rate how well your employer's training programs build financial industry knowledge.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.5.5	Part 2, C125
C126	Rate the maturity of your employer's playbook for taking agentic use cases from concept to governed production.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.6.1	Part 2, C126
C127	Rate your employer's quality assurance capability for agents whose outputs are not identical every run.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.6.2	Part 2, C127
C128	Rate your employer's ability to price agentic work profitably when billable hours no longer measure the value delivered.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.1.3	Part 2, C128
C129	Rate how well the technical platforms your employer builds or licenses are optimized for agentic AI outsourcing.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.6.3	Part 2, C129
C130	Rate your employer's readiness to take accountability when an agent it operates makes a costly error.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.7.1	Part 2, C130
C131	Rate the depth of your employer's knowledge of agentic AI.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.3.2	Part 2, C131
C132	Rate the depth of your employer's experience running agentic AI systems in live production, beyond pilots.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.4.1	Part 2, C132
C133	Rate your employer's ability to operate large numbers of agents in production, including monitoring and exception handling.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.4.2	Part 2, C133
C134	Rate your employer's overall qualification to deliver elite agentic AI outsourcing services to banks.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 4.2.4	Part 2, C134
C135	Add any comments on your employer that the ratings in this section do not capture.	5.2 Vendor	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 2, 4	None
C136	Rate how effectively the customer and vendor jointly manage this engagement now that agents perform part of the work.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.1.1	Part 2, C136
C137	Rate how clearly the two firms have settled who decides what agents may do without human approval.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.1.2	Part 2, C137
C138	Rate how clearly ownership of each workflow step is assigned when agents, vendor staff, and customer staff work in the same process.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.1.3	Part 2, C138
C139	Rate how clearly accountability lands on one firm when an agent's action causes a problem in this engagement.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.1.4	Part 2, C139
C140	Rate how well the two firms maintain a single shared view of the risks that agent work introduces.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.2.1	Part 2, C140
C141	Rate how effectively the two firms manage issues arising from agent work as one team rather than through two separate processes.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.2.2	Part 2, C141
C142	Rate how well the speed of joint issue resolution matches the speed at which agent-caused problems can spread.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.2.3	Part 2, C142
C143	Rate how quickly the two firms together can stop an agent that is behaving badly in live operations.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.2.4	Part 2, C143
C144	Rate how well the joint change control process keeps pace with the speed of agent behavior changes.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.3.1	Part 2, C144
C145	Rate how well agent updates made by one firm become visible to the other firm before they take effect.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.3.2	Part 2, C145

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C146	Rate how well the two firms jointly govern changes agents make to their own behavior between formal releases.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.3.3	Part 2, C146
C147	Rate how well human review points are placed across the two firms at the moments where agent errors would matter most.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.4.1	Part 2, C147
C148	Rate how well joint human review capacity keeps up with the volume of output the agents produce.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.4.2	Part 2, C148
C149	Rate how much genuine scrutiny agent outputs receive at human review points rather than routine approval.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.4.3	Part 2, C149
C150	Rate how reliably the joint quality assurance loop catches agent errors before they reach live operations.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.4.4	Part 2, C150
C151	Rate how well the quality measures both firms use capture the kinds of errors agents actually make.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.4.5	Part 2, C151
C152	Rate how fully each firm can see what the other firm's agents actually did when questions arise.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.5.1	Part 2, C152
C153	Rate how closely the speed of joint decision making matches the speed at which the agents act.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.5.2	Part 2, C153
C154	Rate how well today's joint governance model fits work performed by agents rather than work performed by people.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.5.3	Part 2, C154
C155	Rate how ready the joint management model is for the level of agent autonomy you expect in this engagement within two years.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 3.5.4	Part 2, C155
C156	Add any comments on the joint management of this engagement that the ratings in this section do not capture.	5.3 Co-Management	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 2, 3	None
C157	Rate the factual reliability of the AI tools' outputs on this engagement before any human review.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.2.1	Part 2, C157
C158	Rate the accuracy of citations, references, and quotations the tools produced against the real sources.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.2.2	Part 2, C158
C159	Rate the consistency of the tools' outputs when given the same input and instructions more than once.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.2.3	Part 2, C159
C160	Rate the end-to-end reliability of the tools on multi-step tasks, from first step to finished output.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.2.4	Part 2, C160
C161	Rate the predictability of the tools' token consumption for a given volume of work.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.4.1	Part 2, C161
C162	Rate the efficiency of the tools' token use, considering retries, loops, and reprocessing needed to complete work.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.4.2	Part 2, C162
C163	Rate how completely the tools kept each client's and each session's information isolated from every other client and session.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.5.1	Part 2, C163
C164	Rate how reliably the tools retained instructions and constraints given earlier in long tasks and sessions.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.3.1	Part 2, C164
C165	Rate how completely the tools captured material facts located anywhere in long documents, including mid-document content.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.3.2	Part 2, C165
C166	Rate the integrity of the tools' persistent memory against contamination by incorrect or malicious content encountered during work.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.3.3	Part 2, C166
C167	Rate the tools' resistance to hostile instructions embedded in the content they read and process.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.5.3	Part 2, C167
C168	Rate how consistently the agents took only intended and authorized actions when operating connected tools and systems.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.6.1	Part 2, C168

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C169	Rate how safely the tools handled sensitive data, with no exposure through outputs, logs, or connected systems.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.5.2	Part 2, C169
C170	Rate how reliably the tools' built-in guardrails and safety controls held during production use.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.6.2	Part 2, C170
C171	Rate the overall production readiness of the AI tools for bank-grade work as experienced on this engagement.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.1.1	Part 2, C171
C172	Rate how accurately the tools' own reports of success or failure matched the actual outcomes of their work.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.8.1	Part 2, C172
C173	Rate the tools' ability to explain and evidence how each output was produced, at the depth an audit requires.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.8.2	Part 2, C173
C174	Rate how well the tools supported reliable testing, meaning correct behavior could be proven before work went live.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.7.1	Part 2, C174
C175	Rate the stability of the tools' behavior over the engagement when nothing changed on the engagement side.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.7.2	Part 2, C175
C176	Rate the quality of the tools' logs, traces, and usage telemetry for detecting and diagnosing failures.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 5.8.3	Part 2, C176
C177	Add any comments on the agentic AI tools that the ratings in this section do not capture.	5.4 AI	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 2, 5	None
C178	Rate how well the agents on this engagement are protected from breaking silently when a third party changes something without warning.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.2.1	Part 2, C178
C179	Rate the quality of the fallback the engagement has ready when a critical third-party feed, platform, or model stops working.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.7.1	Part 2, C179
C180	Rate the security posture of the third-party tools, platforms, and sub-processors the engagement's agents connect to.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.6.1	Part 2, C180
C181	Rate the quality of advance notice third-party providers give before changes that can affect the agents on this engagement.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.1.1	Part 2, C181
C182	Rate how reliably word of an upcoming third-party change reaches the people who operate the affected agents in time to act.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.1.2	Part 2, C182
C183	Rate the engagement's monitoring for unannounced changes in the third-party APIs, data feeds, and models its agents depend on.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.2.2	Part 2, C183
C184	Rate how well the contracts with third-party providers deal with provider changes that can break the agents on this engagement.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.4.1	Part 2, C184
C185	Rate how well the engagement absorbs model version deprecations and retirements forced by model providers.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.3.2	Part 2, C185
C186	Rate the availability of true machine interfaces, rather than screens built for humans, across the third-party systems the agents must use.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.5.1	Part 2, C186
C187	Rate the stability of the third-party APIs and data structures the agents depend on, from one provider release to the next.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.3.1	Part 2, C187
C188	Rate the quality of the data arriving from third-party feeds, judged by whether agents can use it without human cleanup.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.5.2	Part 2, C188
C189	Rate how well third-party rate limits and quotas hold up under the volume the agents on this engagement generate.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.5.3	Part 2, C189
C190	Rate the engagement's ability to still perform by hand the manual workarounds that once absorbed third-party quirks and breakage.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.7.2	Part 2, C190

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Code	*Question as asked*	*Survey section*	*Class*	*Polarity*	*Where reported*	*Companion analysis*
C191	Rate how completely the engagement knows where humans used to quietly fix third-party data and interface problems before agents took over.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.7.3	Part 2, C191
C192	Rate how deliberately the quiet human fixes for third-party quirks were replaced with explicit checks when agents took over the work.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.7.4	Part 2, C192
C193	Rate how well the engagement manages its dependence on a small number of model and cloud providers.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.6.2	Part 2, C193
C194	Rate how well this engagement could keep operating if it had to switch its primary model or cloud provider.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.6.3	Part 2, C194
C195	Rate how well third-party licenses on this engagement cover work done by agents rather than named human users.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.4.2	Part 2, C195
C196	Rate how completely the engagement has mapped every third and fourth party its agents depend on, down the full chain.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.8.1	Part 2, C196
C197	Rate how well the engagement manages agent dependence on gated external rails such as payment networks and regulatory submission systems.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Higher is better	Part 2, 6.8.2	Part 2, C197
C198	Add any comments on the third-party ecosystem that the ratings in this section do not capture.	5.5 3rd Party Ecosystem	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 2, 6	None
C199	I have altered client-provided data	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 1.1.1	Part 5, C199
C200	I discussed the data alteration with internal management	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 4.1.1	Part 5, C200
C201	I or my management discussed data alteration with the client	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 4.2.1	Part 5, C201
C202	Why did you alter client provided data?	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 3.1	None
C203	My greater team regularly alters client provided data.	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Directional	Part 5, 1.1.2	Part 5, C203
C204	Comment	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 1.1	None
C205	I have altered client processes	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 1.2.1	Part 5, C205
C206	I discussed the process alteration with internal management	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 4.1.2	Part 5, C206
C207	I or my management discussed process alteration with the client	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 4.2.2	Part 5, C207
C208	Why did you alter client processes?	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 3.2	None
C209	My greater team regularly alters client processes.	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Directional	Part 5, 1.2.2	Part 5, C209
C210	Comment	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 1.2	None
C211	I have altered AI outputs	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 1.3.1	Part 5, C211
C212	I discussed the AI output alteration with internal management	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 4.1.3	Part 5, C212
C213	I or my management discussed AI output alteration with the client	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 4.2.3	Part 5, C213
C214	Why did you alter AI outputs?	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 3.3	None
C215	My greater team regularly alters AI outputs.	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Directional	Part 5, 1.3.2	Part 5, C215
C216	Comment	5.6 Alterations	Respondent level	Not rated	Part 5, 1.3	None
Eng: Delivery location	Engagements sheet field: Delivery Location	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 1, 5.3.4	None
Field: Bank Type	Engagements sheet field: Bank Type	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 1, 5.1.1	Part 1, Field: Bank Type
Field: Outsourcing Type	Engagements sheet field: Outsourcing Type	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 1, 5.3.1	Part 1, Field: Outsourcing Type
Field: Class of Work	Engagements sheet field: Corporate Functional or LOB Operational	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 1, 5.3.2	Part 1, Field: Class of Work

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Code	*Question as asked*	*Survey section*	*Class*	*Polarity*	*Where reported*	*Companion analysis*
Field: Use Case	Engagements sheet field: Use Case	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 1, 5.3.3	Part 1, Field: Use Case
Field: Engagement Age	Engagements sheet field: Age of Engagement (Months)	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 1, 1.1.2	Part 1, Field: Engagement Age
Field: Engagement Phase	Engagements sheet field: Engagement Phase	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 1, 1.1.1	Part 1, Field: Engagement Phase
Field: Headcount	Engagements sheet field: Headcount	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 1, 5.6.1	Part 1, Field: Headcount
Field: IC Respondents	Engagements sheet field: IC Respondent Count	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 4, 1.1.1	Part 4, Field: IC Respondents
Field: PD Respondents	Engagements sheet field: PD Respondent Count	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 4, 1.1.1	Part 4, Field: PD Respondents
Field: CME Respondents	Engagements sheet field: CME Respondent Count	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 4, 1.1.1	Part 4, Field: CME Respondents
Field: Total Respondents	Engagements sheet field: Total Respondents	Engagements sheet	Engagement field	Not rated	Part 4, 1.1.1	Part 4, Field: Total Respondents
Measure: Cancellation	Measure: Cancellation	Study measure	Study measure	Not rated	Part 1, 2.1.1	Part 1, Measure: Cancellation
Measure: Satisfaction	Measure: Satisfaction	Study measure	Study measure	Not rated	Part 1, 3.1.1; Introduction, 4.5.3	Part 1, Measure: Satisfaction
Measure: Indicator Mean	Measure: Indicator Mean	Study measure	Study measure	Not rated	Part 1, 4.1.1; Introduction, 4.5.1	Part 1, Measure: Indicator Mean

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3 Appendix C: Tables and the Indicators Behind Them

Each table and figure of the report is listed in Appendix C with the indicators it draws on and its base. Where one base covers the whole exhibit, Appendix C gives it. Where the base differs from row to row, the exhibit prints it beside each figure. From any table or figure, a reader can move to the companion analyses that hold the full statistics behind it. Where a table combines several indicators, each indicator is listed.

Table 35. Tables and figures of the report and the indicators behind them

Exhibit	*Title*	*Where reported*	*Indicators*	*Base*
Figure 1	Mean indicator rating of the five failure categories	Introduction, 3	Study: cancellation, Analysis: Active Engagements, Study: customer satisfaction, Analysis: Measured Return, C051, Study: disclosure, Study: intent to leave, C148, C144, C150, C078, C008, C126, C104, C103, Study: engagement indicator mean	Given in the exhibit
Figure 2	Respondents by role and engagements by lifecycle stage	Introduction, 4.1	Study: roles, Study: lifecycle, Study: outsourcing type, Study: class of work, Study: institution type, Study: vendor type, Study: delivery location	n = 850 respondents
Figure 3	Engagements by status and lifecycle stage	Introduction, 4.1.3	Study: lifecycle	n = 150 engagements
Figure 4	Engagements by outsourcing model	Introduction, 4.1.4	Study: outsourcing type	n = 150 engagements
Figure 5	Engagements by type of financial institution	Introduction, 4.1.5	Study: institution type	n = 150 engagements
Figure 6	Engagements by process family	Introduction, 4.1.6	Study: process families	n = 150 engagements
Table 1	The five manual alteration methods	Introduction, 4.6.1	C199, C205, C211, C055, C191, C192	Given in the exhibit
Figure 1.1	Cancellation rate by lifecycle stage against the study-set rate	Part 1, 1.1	Study: lifecycle, Field: Engagement Phase, C036	n = 150 engagements
Figure 1.2	Composition of the 150 engagements by cancellation and rated risk	Part 1, 2	Study: cancellation, Analysis: Active Engagements, C039, Measure: Cancellation	Given in the exhibit
Figure 1.3	Engagements by recorded customer satisfaction	Part 1, 3.1	Measure: Satisfaction, C048	Given in the exhibit
Figure 1.4	Cancellation rate by engagement indicator quintile	Part 1, 4.2	Analysis: Four Measures, Analysis: Mean Quintiles, Analysis: Active Engagements	n = 150 engagements
Table 2	The study measures by engagement indicator quintile	Part 1, 4.2.2	Analysis: Mean Quintiles	Given in the exhibit
Table 3	Structural attributes against the four core study measures	Part 1, 5	C031, Field: Bank Type, C032, C033, Field: Use Case, C044, C045, C046, C062, C063, C064, C065, C066, C067, C068, C076, C077, C079, C040, C041, C042	Given in the exhibit
Table 4	The four core study measures by type of financial institution	Part 1, 5.1.1	Field: Bank Type, Study: cancellation, Study: customer satisfaction, Study: engagement indicator mean, Study: intent to leave	n = 150 engagements
Table 5	The four core study measures by outsourcing model	Part 1, 5.3.1	C032, Field: Outsourcing Type, Study: cancellation, Study: customer satisfaction, Study: engagement indicator mean, Study: intent to leave	n = 150 engagements
Table 6	The four core study measures by class of work	Part 1, 5.3.2	C033, Field: Class of Work, Study: cancellation, Study: customer satisfaction, Study: engagement indicator mean, Study: intent to leave	n = 150 engagements
Table 7	The four core study measures by process family	Part 1, 5.3.3	Field: Use Case (process family), Study: cancellation, Study: customer satisfaction, Study: engagement indicator mean, Study: intent to leave	n = 150 engagements
Table 8	The four core study measures by pricing model	Part 1, 5.4.1	C044, Study: cancellation, Study: customer satisfaction, Study: engagement indicator mean, Study: intent to leave	n = 107 engagements
Table 9	The four core study measures by vendor type	Part 1, 5.5.1	C076, Study: cancellation, Study: customer satisfaction, Study: engagement indicator mean, Study: intent to leave	n = 150 engagements
Table 10	The five failure categories ranked by mean rating	Part 2, 1	Study: engagement indicator mean	Given in the exhibit
Figure 2.1	Share of answers in the distressed range, by failure category	Part 2, 1.1	Study set (no single indicator)	Given in the exhibit
Table 11	Mean rating of each failure category by engagement status, lifecycle stage and respondent role	Part 2, 1.1	Study set (no single indicator)	Given in the exhibit
Table 12	The indicators of financial institution readiness, from the lowest mean rating	Part 2, 2	C114	Given in the exhibit
Figure 2.2	Share of answers in the distressed range, the four data indicators	Part 2, 2.1	C094, C095, C096, C097	Given in the exhibit
Table 13	The indicators of co-management, from the lowest mean rating	Part 2, 3	C156	Given in the exhibit
Figure 2.3	Written responses on the scrutiny of agent output, by sentiment score	Part 2, 3.4.3	C149	Given in the exhibit

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Exhibit	*Title*	*Where reported*	*Indicators*	*Base*
Table 14	The indicators of vendor capability, from the lowest mean rating	Part 2, 4	C093, C135	Given in the exhibit
Table 15	The indicators of AI technology, from the lowest mean rating	Part 2, 5	C177	Given in the exhibit
Table 16	The indicators of the third-party ecosystem, from the lowest mean rating	Part 2, 6	C198	Given in the exhibit
Figure 3.1	Share of answers in the distressed range, the 19 governance indicators	Part 3, 1	C110, C111, C112, C136, C137, C138, C139, C140, C141, C142, C143, C144, C145, C146, C147, C148, C149, C150, C154	Given in the exhibit
Table 17	Respondents by role	Part 4, 1.1.1	C005, Study: roles, Study: intent to leave	Given in the exhibit
Figure 4.1	Mean years of career experience and of agentic AI experience, by respondent role	Part 4, 1.3	C007, C008, C011	Given in the exhibit
Table 18	Professional certifications reported by respondents	Part 4, 1.5.1	C015	Given in the exhibit
Table 19	AI certifications reported by respondents	Part 4, 1.5.2	C016	Given in the exhibit
Table 20	Sources of AI knowledge reported by respondents	Part 4, 1.5.3	C017	Given in the exhibit
Table 21	The five manager indicators	Part 4, 2.1	C080, C081, C082, C085, C086	Given in the exhibit
Table 22	Trust in and care from the financial institution	Part 4, 4.1	C069, C070, C074, C075	Given in the exhibit
Table 23	Trust in and care from the employer	Part 4, 4.4	C087, C088, C089, C090, C092	Given in the exhibit
Figure 4.2	Share of intent-to-leave ratings in the distressed range, by engagement status and lifecycle stage	Part 4, 5.1	C019, C021	Given in the exhibit
Figure 5.1	Respondents reporting each directly counted manual alteration method	Part 5, 1	C199, C205, C211, C203, C209, C215	Given in the exhibit
Table 24	Cancellation by the answer assigned to each engagement on each counted method	Part 5, 1	C199, C205, C211, C203, C209, C215	Given in the exhibit
Figure 5.2	Share of respondents reporting each manual alteration, by respondent role	Part 5, 2	Analysis: Alterations by Role, Analysis: Manager Alterations, Study: disclosure	Given in the exhibit
Table 25	Respondents answering True on each counted question, by role	Part 5, 2.1.1	Analysis: Alterations by Role	Given in the exhibit
Table 26	Disclosure of the alterations by role, summed across the three paired questions	Part 5, 2.2.1	Analysis: Manager Alterations	Given in the exhibit
Table 27	Respondents answering True on each counted method, by indicator quintile	Part 5, 2.3	Study: alteration by indicator quintile	Given in the exhibit
Table 28	Indicators named most in the reasons for each counted method	Part 5, 3.4	C094, C108, C109, C100, C159, C157	Given in the exhibit
Figure 5.3	Manual alterations discussed with vendor management and with the financial institution	Part 5, 4	Study: disclosure, C200, C206, C212, C201, C207, C213	Given in the exhibit
Table 29	Disclosure of manual alteration to the financial institution	Part 5, 4.2	Study: disclosure, C201, C207, C213	Given in the exhibit
Table 30	Obligations named in the most answers as governing the engagement	Part 5, 6.1	C056	Given in the exhibit
Table 31	The seven immediate actions and the primary findings on which each rests	Part 6, 1	Study set (no single indicator)	Given in the exhibit
Table 32	The program at a glance, with what reaches the board at the end of each block	Part 6, 2	Study set (no single indicator)	Given in the exhibit

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4 Appendix D: Method

The study analyzed responses from 850 vendor delivery staff associated with 150 agentic AI outsourcing engagements serving institutions classified in the study as Tier 1. The reported fieldwork period was January–June 2026. A common analytical framework was applied, with tests selected according to variable type, analytical unit, and available sample size.

4.1 Survey Design

Each respondent answered about the one engagement on which they worked. Five sections made up the survey. Its first section covered the respondent's role, experience, and intent to stay in the job. A second covered the engagement, including its timeline, scale, commercial structure, performance, and governing regulations. Questions on the financial institution followed, on its profile, its AI strategy, and its relationship with the vendor. A fourth section asked about the vendor, the respondent's manager, and the respondent's relationship with the employer.

In the fifth section, the survey examined the challenges of the engagement in depth. Each of the five failure categories, financial institution readiness, vendor capability, co-management, AI technology, and the third-party ecosystem, received 20 rated indicators. An open question closed each category, inviting comment on what its ratings did not capture.

A final group of 18 questions covered manual alteration. Three methods were asked about directly, manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data, of financial institution processes, and of AI outputs. Each method received six questions. A yes-or-no question asked whether the respondent had made the alteration, and a written question asked why. Two further yes-or-no questions asked whether the respondent had discussed it with the vendor's management and whether the respondent or the respondent's management had discussed it with the financial institution. A rating of the wider team's practice and an open question for comment completed the set.

Three types of question appeared in the survey. Rated questions used a scale from 1 to 10. Categorical questions recorded attributes such as role or outsourcing model, together with the yes-or-no answers on manual alteration and its disclosure. Open questions asked for a written answer. In place of a rating, respondents could answer “I do not know” or “I prefer not to answer,” and both answers were counted apart from the ratings.

Rated questions ran in both directions. Of the 146 rated questions with a favorable and an unfavorable end, 138 were worded so that a low rating is bad and eight so that a high rating is bad. Eight further rated questions had neither end. Another 18 numeric questions recorded typed numbers, such as months of experience, team size, or contract term.

Survey answers fill 216 columns of the study data. Five were set aside before analysis, namely the respondent and engagement identifiers, two codes that repeated another answer, and the location of the

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financial institution's headquarters. What remains is 211 survey questions, of which 172 are numeric, 23 categorical, and 16 open. Analysis also covers 12 engagement fields, recorded once for each engagement.

4.2 Sampling and Respondents

Respondents were vendor employees answering about a sampled engagement. The study records state that financial institutions, vendors, model providers, and other third parties did not supply independent validation. The analytical files available to the author contained deidentified records. This does not establish that identifying information was never collected during recruitment or administration.

The reported recruitment process used professional networks, published profiles, vetted panels, and referrals through a specialist provider. Participation was compensated. More than 900 completed responses were reportedly screened for working knowledge of banking, outsourcing, and agentic AI, leaving 850 respondents. Study documentation also describes telephone validation with 122 respondents and reports no material discrepancies. These are descriptions of the administration process; the files supporting the present analysis do not provide a complete recruitment disposition, response rate, screening instrument, or validation record.

Engagement selection sought variation in institutional type, outsourcing model, and use case. The sample is not established as probability-based or representative of the industry. Estimates describe the sampled engagements; confidence intervals and significance tests do not remove this selection limitation.

Three lifecycle stages are represented, with 60 engagements in Build-Out, 60 in Transition/Cut-Over, and 30 in Production. By the study date, 56 engagements had been canceled and 94 remained active. Customer experience management accounted for 42 engagements, information technology outsourcing for 40, business process outsourcing for 37, and knowledge process outsourcing for 31. Line-of-business operations held 76 engagements and corporate functions 74. Engagement age had a mean of 5.69 months and a median of 5 months (n = 150 engagements).

Individual contributors made up 667 of the 850 respondents (78.47%). Alongside them were 150 engagement managers, one on each engagement, 31 portfolio directors, and two customer management executives.

Among the 793 respondents with an originally recorded vendor type, 316 reported an IT services major, 198 a BPO specialist, 117 a consulting firm, 87 a boutique or specialist provider, and 75 a pure-play agentic AI firm.

Vendor type was originally blank for 57 respondents. The analytical preparation derived these values from the engagement-level classification, which was internally consistent within each engagement. Derived

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values remain distinguishable from originally reported values; the preceding counts describe the original answers.

The valid base varies by question and analysis. Numeric summaries exclude nonnumeric answers unless a stated sensitivity analysis specifies otherwise. Categorical analyses identify which answers are retained as levels. Counts of written answers, respondents, and engagements are reported separately.

4.3 The Study Data

Two sheets and the written answers make up the study data. One row for each respondent and one column for each survey question form the Data sheet. On the Engagements sheet, each of the 150 engagements has one row of 17 columns. Those columns record the delivery location, the type of financial institution, the outsourcing model, the class of work, the use case, the age of the engagement, and its lifecycle stage. Cancellation, the return on the engagement, customer satisfaction, headcount, and the number of respondents in each role fill the remaining columns.

The analysis uses the Engagements sheet as the governing source when it conflicts with respondent-level records. The two sources agreed on lifecycle stage in all 501 comparable cases. Cancellation, customer satisfaction, return, and lifecycle stage were taken from the engagement record; this source hierarchy does not independently validate the recorded values.

Data preparation excluded one of 851 rows because it contained only a column mean, leaving 850 respondent records. Zero values in career and tenure fields were interpreted under the study rules as less than one year. Return was blank for the 120 engagements outside Production; among the 30 production records, zero and positive values were retained as recorded.

The 150 engagement records contain 121 distinct use-case strings. The computational engine matches each string exactly to the crosswalk in Study Meta.md, section 9, dated September 21, 2026, which assigns one of eight process families. The supplied metadata states that these assignments agree with the process_family values in the coded-answer records. This is an exact lookup against an established crosswalk, not a new first-match keyword classification during statistical computation.

Analytical classes determine the unit and treatment of a variable. Respondent-level indicators describe individual answers. Engagement attributes use one engagement-level value. Perceived facts describe the respondent's understanding of engagement conditions. "I do not know" identifies unavailable or uncertain information for that respondent; it does not establish that the organization lacked the information.

The statistical record identifies compute_statistics.py as the computational engine and records input fingerprints. Its v16 layer specifies random seed 20261006, sequential bootstrap settings, and Monte Carlo settings. The older base layer records different settings. These records support traceability but do not establish independent reproducibility in a separate environment.

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4.4 Construction of the Four Core Study Measures

The four core measures are cancellation, customer satisfaction, engagement indicator mean, and intent to leave. Their original directions are retained in ordinary association reporting: cancellation and intent to leave are adverse outcomes. For formal comparisons of association strength, the measures are reoriented so that higher values consistently indicate more favorable outcomes. Ratings converted to the favorable direction are identified where used.

Cancellation is recorded as one binary value per engagement; 56 of 150 engagements were canceled (37.33%). Engagement-level analysis gives each engagement equal weight unless a sensitivity analysis specifies otherwise. Respondent-weighted comparisons answer a different question and are identified separately. Ratings on canceled engagements were collected after cancellation, so associations with cancellation are retrospective descriptive contrasts.

Customer satisfaction is a recorded engagement score on a 100-point scale. Its mean was 43.85 points across all 150 engagements and 64.10 points across the 94 active engagements. The source field is labeled as a percentage, but these values should not be interpreted as the percentage of customers satisfied. Primary satisfaction associations use active engagements; all-engagement comparisons include post-cancellation scores and are descriptive.

The engagement indicator mean is constructed by averaging each respondent's available favorable-direction ratings across the 100 rated indicators, then averaging respondent means within each engagement. Study-level summaries give each engagement equal weight. The mean was 4.02 on the 10-point scale (n = 150 engagements), with a standard deviation of 1.48, median of 3.81, and range of 1.16–7.28. Differences in missing-item coverage can affect the composition of respondent means.

Each rated indicator is one of the 100 components of that mean. Tested against a mean that contains it, an indicator would be correlated in part with itself. When a rated indicator is tested, the mean is recomputed without it. Its companion analysis prints the correlation with the indicator included and the change. An indicator outside the 100 components is tested against the full mean.

Intent to leave is the answer to the question of how likely the respondent is to leave the current job in the next 12 months, rated from 1 to 10. Measured at respondent level, it is reported on its original scale. Its mean was 6.77 (n = 798 respondents). A rating of 7 or above was given by 430 of the 798 respondents (53.88%). An engagement-level form, the mean of each engagement's respondents, is reported alongside.

The four measures were strongly interrelated: all pairwise engagement-level correlations had absolute values of at least 0.72, and one component accounted for 88.23% of their variance (n = 150 engagements). The analysis also examined 300 partial associations between individual rated indicators and cancellation, satisfaction, or intent to leave, controlling for the engagement indicator mean. Thirty-three unadjusted p values were below 0.05, but none remained significant after false-discovery-rate correction. This does not establish that every independent effect is zero.

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Supplementary results include recorded return, the share of distressed indicator ratings, and indicator quintiles. Of 30 production engagements, 17 had positive recorded returns, averaging 24.71%; the other 13 had recorded zero values. The reporting period, financial denominator, and treatment of costs were not established in the supplied analytical records. The mean distressed-rating share was 42.49%, calculated within respondents, then engagements, and then across engagements. Quintiles contain 30 engagements each, ordered by indicator mean with identifier-based tie breaking; differences in that mean across quintiles are true by construction.

4.5 Tests of Association and Difference

Association and difference tests generally use a two-sided significance threshold of 0.05; equivalence tests use two one-sided tests as described below. Under the specified assumptions, the approximate detectable correlation at 80% power is |r| = 0.23 for 150 independent engagements. This is a design calculation, not a guarantee of sensitivity in every analysis. Companion results report effect sizes, intervals, p values, and applicable bases; the main text summarizes selected results.

Numeric indicators were tested against each measure in the form that fits the measure. Against cancellation, the indicator's engagement mean was correlated with the cancellation flag across the 150 engagements as a point-biserial r. An odds ratio per rating point and the area under the curve accompany it. Fisher's exact test compared the cancellation rate of engagements distressed on the indicator with that of the other engagements.

Primary customer-satisfaction analysis correlates the indicator’s engagement mean with satisfaction across 94 active engagements. Companion results also report a slope and squared correlation where applicable. Analysis against the engagement indicator mean uses all eligible engagements and excludes the indicator itself from that mean when it is a component.

Intent to leave is correlated with the indicator across the respondents who answered both questions. Its p value uses standard errors that allow for clustering by engagement, and its interval comes from a cluster bootstrap. Respondents distressed on the indicator are compared with the other respondents on the share at 7 or above. Beside the respondent-level result sits the engagement-level correlation, computed on engagement means.

Categorical indicators are compared across response levels. Engagement assignments use the unique most frequent response, with ties excluded. Cancellation comparisons use contingency-table tests, with Fisher’s exact test for sparse two-by-two tables or Monte Carlo inference for larger sparse tables. Continuous-outcome comparisons use Welch’s analysis of variance. Omega squared and its interval are calculated separately from the conventional analysis-of-variance decomposition. Levels with fewer than 10 eligible engagements are excluded from inferential comparisons and retained descriptively.

Segment comparisons cover outsourcing model, institutional type, process family, work class, engagement status and stage, respondent role, and vendor type. Numeric comparisons use Welch and

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Kruskal–Wallis tests; categorical comparisons use contingency-table methods. Engagement-defined families use engagement-level values. Some role and vendor-type comparisons use respondents without clustering adjustments, whereas specified respondent-level outcome tests use cluster-robust methods. The analytical unit and adjustment must be read for each result.

Segment analyses use four status-and-stage groups: active engagements in Build-Out, Transition/Cut-Over, and Production, plus canceled engagements. The protocol suppresses segment intervals below 30 observations and reports groups below 10 descriptively. The supplementary return analysis is a separate analysis class and reports intervals for 17 positive-return engagements; those exploratory intervals require particular caution and should not be treated as meeting the segment-reporting threshold.

Formal pairwise comparisons of numeric-indicator associations use engagement-level versions of all four measures on a common available base, oriented so higher values are favorable. Steiger's test compares dependent correlations sharing the indicator. These tests concern associations, not differences in causal importance. Categorical effect sizes are not compared with Steiger's test.

The computational protocol also compares oriented correlations with the study's median correlation using Fisher-z calculations. Because the indicator and reference correlations arise from shared data and correlated variables, these comparisons should be treated as descriptive benchmarks rather than evidence of a reliable ranking of indicators.

The v16 statistical layer specifies sequential simulation targets rather than a fixed number of draws for every result.

Bootstrap sampling uses batches of 10,000, a maximum of 500,000, and a target standard error of 0.0025 for each interval endpoint. Monte Carlo testing uses batches of 10,000, a maximum of 2,000,000, and a target simulation error of 0.0005 for p. Reaching a draw limit does not itself establish that the precision target was met; analysis-specific computation records govern that determination.

4.6 Correction for Multiple Testing

Multiple related tests increase the opportunity for false-positive findings. The study uses Holm adjustment within specified families, rather than treating every unadjusted p value below 0.05 as confirmatory evidence. Holm's procedure orders the p values and applies sequential multiplicity factors while preserving monotonic adjusted values.

Four families receive the correction in each companion analysis.

1. The tests of difference across the segment families.
2. The association with one measure across the study set and every segment level, run separately for each of the four measures.
3. The six pairwise comparisons of the four associations.

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4. The four comparisons with the study norm.

Holm adjustment applies to these defined families. The statistical record also retains unadjusted primary p values, and some main-text results report those values. An unadjusted p value should not be interpreted as adjusted unless explicitly identified. These within-analysis corrections do not control multiplicity across every indicator, written-response comparison, and analysis in the report.

For the 300 partial tests of the rated indicators net of the engagement indicator mean, the study controlled the false discovery rate, the expected share of false positives among the results that pass the test. Its smallest adjusted value was 0.323. The largest partial correlation in absolute value was 0.25.

4.7 Robustness Checks

The numeric-indicator protocol contains up to 22 checks distributed across the four measures. It does not apply 22 separate checks to every individual association. Checks are omitted or reported as noncomputable where an identity, unavailable base, or other constraint prevents estimation.

For a respondent-level numeric indicator with all checks computable, the protocol assigns five checks to cancellation, five to customer satisfaction, six to the engagement indicator mean, and six to intent to leave. The seven check types and their allocation are as follows.

1. Rank correlation in place of Pearson's r, applied to all four measures.

2. Non-answers excluded and then imputed at the engagement mean, applied to intent to leave.

3. Active engagements only, applied to the engagement indicator mean and intent to leave.

4. Removal of the most influential engagement, the one with the largest Cook's distance, applied to all four measures.

5. Engagements weighted by the number of their respondents, applied to cancellation, customer satisfaction, and the engagement indicator mean.

6. A bootstrap of engagements in place of the analytic interval, applied to all four measures.

7. Removal of the thin-base segments, applied to all four measures.

A check is recorded as holding when its result falls on the same side of the specified significance threshold as the primary test and, for a significant primary association, retains its direction. Interval-based checks assess whether zero is included. This criterion concerns consistency under the specified alternatives; it is not proof that an estimate is unbiased or that an association is causal. A bootstrap check is noncomputable if fewer than 90% of resamples are valid.

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Thin-base segments are the levels of the outsourcing model or the process family with fewer than 30 engagements. Type of financial institution is not used for that check, since every one of its levels holds fewer than 30 engagements.

Categorical indicators received checks suited to a comparison of levels. In one, the Kruskal-Wallis test replaced Welch's analysis of variance. Another repeated the test on active engagements only. A third repeated it at respondent level, as a Wald F test with standard errors clustered by engagement.

4.8 Equivalence Tests

A nonsignificant association test does not establish absence of an effect. The study's equivalence analysis asks whether an association is sufficiently small to fall within a prespecified region. For correlations, the region is $-0.30 < r < 0.30$. This is a study convention; effects within that interval may still matter in particular operational contexts.

For correlations, both one-sided tests must reject their respective boundary nulls at 0.05 to support equivalence within the stated interval. Equivalence does not mean a literal zero correlation. Categorical comparisons use an omega-squared bound of 0.09; for cancellation, this is calculated from the binary flag and is distinct from the contingency-table significance test. A small association can be statistically different from zero and still meet the equivalence criterion.

Each equivalence table prints the achieved power of the test and the smallest effect it could detect at 80% power, beside the detection floor of 0.23 at 150 engagements. Intent to leave was tested on its effective sample size rather than its count of respondents, since clustered answers carry less information than independent ones.

When an association is nonsignificant and does not meet the equivalence criterion, it is inconclusive. Limited sample size can produce this result. Ten of the 19 structural attributes examined met the study's equivalence criteria for all four core measures; the remaining results require measure-specific interpretation.

4.9 Clustering Within Engagements

Respondents within an engagement share circumstances, so their observations may be correlated. The protocol estimates an intraclass correlation and approximates the design effect as 1 + (mean cluster size − 1) × max(ICC, 0). Nominal sample size divided by this design effect gives an approximate effective sample size. The calculation summarizes information loss under its assumptions; it does not replace a cluster-adjusted model or fully capture unequal cluster sizes and higher-level dependence.

Clustering more than halved the information in respondent answers on the two indicators that follow. On whether the engagement was within budget, the intraclass correlation was 0.61 and the design effect

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2.63. Its 554 respondent answers carried the information of about 211 independent answers. For the quality of the financial institution's data across the systems the engagement depends on, the intraclass correlation was 0.57. Those 795 answers carried the information of about 230.

Aggregation removes duplication of respondent observations within an engagement but does not establish independence between engagements sharing institutions or vendors. Respondent-level intent-to-leave analyses use cluster-robust standard errors and cluster bootstrap intervals. Other intervals and tests follow their stated analytical units and methods.

Some segment comparisons by role and vendor type treat respondents as independent. Effective-sample-size summaries describe the extent of clustering but do not correct those tests. Separately reported cluster-robust outcome comparisons, including the role analysis, should not be confused with these unadjusted segment tests.

4.10 Treatment of the Written Answers

The data contain 8,918 written entries across the open-response and use-case fields. This is distinct from the broader total of 12,088 entries, which also includes 3,170 numbers entered in text boxes.

Under written coding rules, 6,908 were coded. Another 615 were stock non-answers, such as “none,” “n/a,” or “same as above,” classified by exact text. Answers on the laws and regulations governing the engagement, 548 in all, were not coded, and the obligations each named were extracted into a list. Use-case answers, 847 in all, were classified into the eight process families.

Rulebook version 0.5 linked answers to 211 measures, including 149 scored measures, 52 additional themes, seven expressed emotional states, and four non-answer types. Other-engagement accounts were flagged and excluded from links to the respondent’s own engagement. Initial rules were fixed before production coding, but later documented revisions expanded frequency-theme wording and added sentiment scores under version 0.6.

A mark needs the answer's own words to state it, and a meaning that could be inferred was not enough. Where the words fit two measures without settling which one the respondent meant, neither was marked.

AI language-model coders using Claude processed batches of answers under the rulebook. The documented workflow required five steps.

1. The question and the whole answer were read.

2. The answer was split into statements, each the shortest run of the respondent's own words that makes one point. Together the statements rebuild the answer word for word.

3. Each statement was marked with every measure, theme, and emotional state its words state.

4. Each marked measure with a favorable and an unfavorable end was scored.

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5. A second pass checked each assigned mark against the rulebook. This was an AI coding procedure, not independent human review of every answer.

Scores take five values. A score of −10 describes a subject at or near its worst, and a score of −5 a clear but partial problem. Zero marks no position, or good and bad in balance. A score of +5 describes a clear but partial strength, and a score of +10 a subject at or near its best. Either extreme needs words of totality or constancy, serious harm, or the respondent's strongest language.

Coding produced 28,513 statements and 22,024 marks across 6,908 answers. Automated validation checked permitted codes and scores, placement of marks, and exact reconstruction of the source answer; all 153 output files passed. These structural checks do not establish semantic accuracy of every code.

A separate AI coder, without access to the first coding, recoded 681 production answers and 100 calibration answers. Across the 781 double-coded answers, Krippendorff's alpha was 0.919 for topical marks, 0.926 for themes, 0.904 for emotional states, and 0.969 for scores, exceeding the prespecified 0.80 threshold. Production topical agreement was 0.916. These results measure consistency between AI coding runs; they are not independent human validation or proof of construct validity.

The two AI codings differed on at least one mark or score in 288 of the 681 production answers. High aggregate agreement can coexist with substantial record-level disagreement.

An author-ruled set of 48 difficult answers served as an additional check, and the final coding reproduced all 48 rulings. This targeted check does not establish accuracy across the full corpus.

On October 9, 2026, rulebook version 0.6 added 3,599 sentiment scores to previously unscored marks on 34 measures and an overall score to each of 6,874 substantive answers. Separate AI recoding of 777 answers yielded alpha values of 0.945 for overall scores and 0.930 for 429 paired additional measure scores. These additions were documented after the initial coding and should not be described as part of an unchanged original protocol.

A written response is an answer about the respondent's own engagement coded to an indicator. Primary responses come from the designated section's open question; secondary responses come from other questions. Counts describe the coded material and may include several answers per respondent. Structured ratings measure responses to their own wording, not the prevalence of every practice described in the comments. Fewer than 10 written responses support illustrative description only; larger qualitative samples remain self-selected.

Respondent quotations retain the supplied spelling and grammar. Ellipses identify omissions, and the supplied material includes the name substitutions described below. Attributions identify role, outsourcing model, and process family.

The study's documented preparation process states that a third party replaced financial-institution and vendor names before the material reached the author. The quotations retain those supplied

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substitutions. This describes deidentification of the analytical material, not a finding that no identifying information existed at any earlier stage.

4.11 Limits of the Evidence

The study primarily records vendor staff members' reported experiences, supplemented by the engagement-level fields in the analytical record. It does not include independent observation of delivery, inspection of institutional records, or validation by the financial institutions served.

One source supplied the evidence. No financial institution, model provider, or third-party provider contributed. Customer satisfaction and the return on the engagement are the figures recorded for the engagement, and the study holds no record from the financial institution against which to confirm them.

The analysis is cross-sectional. Associations do not establish temporal order or causal direction. Retrospective five-year items are perceptions collected at one time, not repeated observations; their interpretation is further limited by the short careers reported by many respondents.

Selection covered a range of types with partial intent. Within the study set, the share of any type of financial institution, outsourcing model, or use case does not reflect its frequency in the industry. Findings describe the 150 engagements studied.

Ratings from the 56 canceled engagements were collected after cancellation and may reflect it. Cancellation associations are retrospective contrasts. Primary satisfaction associations use the 94 active engagements, which avoids combining those scores with post-cancellation scores but introduces its own restriction to surviving engagements.

The measures and indicators were strongly interrelated. None of the 300 partial indicator–outcome associations remained significant after false-discovery-rate correction. This limits claims of distinct explanatory contributions; it does not establish that independent effects are absent. Descriptive rankings of means or coefficients should not be interpreted as tested rankings of importance.

Role and experience were closely related. Mean career experience was 1.9 years for individual contributors, 10.0 for engagement managers, and 15.1 for portfolio directors. The reported unadjusted comparisons do not isolate their respective contributions. Other shared respondent and engagement characteristics may also affect associations.

Missing and nonnumeric responses alter analytical coverage. For example, 554 respondents rated whether the engagement was within budget, while 242 answered "I do not know." Such an answer may reflect lack of information or uncertainty, rather than organizational ignorance. The study does not establish that excluded responses are missing at random.

Several groups have limited coverage. The two customer management executives support counts only. Portfolio-director analyses include at most 31 respondents, with clustering reducing effective

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information. Every institutional-type group contains fewer than 30 engagements, and three process families contain fewer than 10. Study thresholds determine which results are descriptive or eligible for inference.

Restricted variation limits inference. For example, every recorded answer on vendor experience in agentic AI outsourcing was two years or less (n = 571 respondents). Such a narrow range can reduce the ability to identify an association and cannot establish the value of substantially greater experience.

Respondent-level figures carry less information than their counts suggest. Clustering reduced 554 answers to the equivalent of about 211 independent answers, and 795 answers to about 230, on the two indicators of section 4.9.

Written answers are self-selected and influenced by question framing. Frequency-theme counts depend on documented wording rules, including a post-coding expansion, and may miss descriptions outside those rules. AI coding agreement measures consistency, while structural validation checks format and source reconstruction; neither establishes independent semantic accuracy for the full corpus.

Disclosure is measured through respondents' accounts of their own or management's discussion. Structured answers and coded written accounts have different bases and may differ. Neither establishes all information available to a financial institution through other channels.

No regulatory or legal breach can be determined from the study. Obligations the respondents named are reported as context for an audit and never as a legal conclusion.

The sample covers Build-Out, Transition/Cut-Over, and Production, not directly observed preparation or procurement stages. Return data comprise 30 production records, including 17 positive and 13 zero values, with incomplete documentation of the financial measure. Findings cannot establish industry-wide returns, prospective cancellation risk, or the effectiveness of the proposed executive actions.

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5 Appendix E: Companion Indicator Statistical Analyses

The 216 companion analyses provide indicator-level statistics and related derived analyses. Each follows a common structure, adapted to the type of measure and available evidence.

Analyses are grouped by the Part of the report that summarizes them. A first group of 46 analyses (Part 1) covers the three study measures computed from the engagement record, seven engagement fields, 31 survey questions on the engagement and the financial institution, and five derived analyses. Those derived analyses treat the active engagements, the four measures together, the indicator quintiles, measured return, and the associations net of the engagement indicator mean.

The second group of 101 analyses (Part 2) covers the 100 rated indicators of the five failure categories and one question on the vendor's preparedness to manage outsourcing engagements. The third group holds 48 analyses (Part 4), 47 on questions about the delivery workforce and one a derived analysis of experience by intent to leave. The fourth group holds 21 analyses (Part 5), 19 on manual alteration, its disclosure, and reporting alteration, and two derived analyses of manual alteration by role.

A companion analysis identifies the measure, wording, analytical unit, scale, valid responses, and non-answers. It then provides descriptive results, eligible segment comparisons, associations with the four core measures, written-evidence summaries, and applicable diagnostic checks.

Statistical sections include clustering, equivalence, robustness, and comparisons with the study norm where applicable. Exclusion of an item from a composite reduces mechanical self-inclusion but does not make the variables independent. Co-occurrence and written-sentiment comparisons provide further descriptive context.

Each companion analysis includes interpretation, limitations, definitions, and source information. Source sections identify input files and computational records, with fingerprints, computation dates, and template versions where available. These identifiers support traceability; they do not by themselves establish public availability of every input or independent reproducibility.

Appendix B maps each indicator to its main-text section and companion-analysis filename. The online index below provides access to the published pages.

The 216 companion analyses are available through Akholi's "Agentic AI Outsourcing Study Data" index at https://akholi.com/outsourcing-2026-agentic-ai-tier-1-banks/study-data/ (accessed October 16, 2026). The index also links related derived analyses. Online access to analysis pages should be distinguished from access to the underlying respondent data, computational environment, and all materials needed for independent reproduction.

Table 36. Register of the companion indicator statistical analyses

Part	*Companion analysis*	*Subject*	*Where reported*
Part 1	Analysis: Active Engagements	Analysis: Active Engagements	Part 1, 4.2.3; Introduction, 4.4.2; Part 1, 2
Part 1	Analysis: Four Measures	Analysis: Four Measures	Part 1, 4.2.1
Part 1	Analysis: Mean Quintiles	Analysis: Mean Quintiles	Part 1, 4.2.2

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Part	*Companion analysis*	*Subject*	*Where reported*
Part 1	Analysis: Measured Return	Analysis: Measured Return	Part 1, 3.3.1; Introduction, 4.5.5
Part 1	Analysis: Net Associations	Analysis: Net Associations	Part 1, 4.3.1
Part 1	C031	What type of a bank is the customer?	Part 1, 5.1.1
Part 1	C032	What is the outsourcing type?	Part 1, 5.3.1
Part 1	C033	Is the outsourcing engagement Corporate Functional, or Line of Business Operational?	Part 1, 5.3.2
Part 1	C035	How long ago did this specific engagement start, in months?	Part 1, 1.1.2
Part 1	C036	What stage is the engagement in?	Part 1, 1.1.1; Introduction, 4.5.2
Part 1	C037	How many months has the engagement been in its current stage?	Part 1, 1.1.3
Part 1	C038	Per the current plan, how many months from today until the engagement reaches Production/Delivery?	Part 1, 1.1.4
Part 1	C039	If the engagement has not been canceled, how likely is the customer to cancel the engagement?	Part 1, 2.2.1
Part 1	C040	How many people are on the vendor team for this engagement today?	Part 1, 5.6.1
Part 1	C041	What was the peak vendor team headcount on this engagement to date?	Part 1, 5.6.2
Part 1	C042	Per the current plan, how many people will be on the vendor team 12 months from now?	Part 1, 5.6.3
Part 1	C043	How many AI agents are running in production on this engagement today?	Part 1, 1.2.1
Part 1	C044	What is the pricing model for this engagement?	Part 1, 5.4.1
Part 1	C045	What is the contract term of this engagement, in months?	Part 1, 5.4.2
Part 1	C046	What is the annual contract value of this engagement, in USD?	Part 1, 5.4.3
Part 1	C047	I know the KPIs the customer uses to measure success.	Part 1, 3.2.4
Part 1	C048	The customer is happy with the performance of the engagement at this stage.	Part 1, 3.1.2
Part 1	C049	The engagement is meeting delivery dates successfully.	Part 1, 3.2.1
Part 1	C050	The engagement is within budget.	Part 1, 3.2.2
Part 1	C051	The engagement is not achieving stated KPIs.	Part 1, 3.2.3
Part 1	C062	What is the customer's approximate total asset size, in USD?	Part 1, 5.1.2
Part 1	C063	Does the customer operate its own global capability centers?	Part 1, 5.1.3
Part 1	C064	How many months has your employer been serving this customer across all work, not just this engagement?	Part 1, 5.2.1
Part 1	C065	How many agentic AI outsourcing engagements does your employer run concurrently with this customer today?	Part 1, 5.2.2
Part 1	C066	The customer is scaling their agentic AI outsourcing engagements.	Part 1, 5.1.5
Part 1	C067	The customer is increasing the number of agentic AI outsourcing engagements.	Part 1, 5.1.6
Part 1	C068	The customer is shifting more work to their global capability centers.	Part 1, 5.1.4
Part 1	C076	What type of company is your employer?	Part 1, 5.5.1
Part 1	C077	Approximately how many employees does your employer have worldwide?	Part 1, 5.5.2
Part 1	C078	How many years has your employer been delivering agentic AI outsourcing?	Part 1, 1.2.2
Part 1	C079	How many agentic AI engagements does your employer run for banks today?	Part 1, 5.5.3
Part 1	Field: Bank Type	Field: Bank Type	Part 1, 5.1.1
Part 1	Field: Class of Work	Field: Class of Work	Part 1, 5.3.2
Part 1	Field: Engagement Age	Field: Engagement Age	Part 1, 1.1.2
Part 1	Field: Engagement Phase	Field: Engagement Phase	Part 1, 1.1.1
Part 1	Field: Headcount	Field: Headcount	Part 1, 5.6.1
Part 1	Field: Outsourcing Type	Field: Outsourcing Type	Part 1, 5.3.1
Part 1	Field: Use Case	Field: Use Case	Part 1, 5.3.3
Part 1	Measure: Cancellation	Measure: Cancellation	Part 1, 2.1.1
Part 1	Measure: Indicator Mean	Measure: Indicator Mean	Part 1, 4.1.1; Introduction, 4.5.1
Part 1	Measure: Satisfaction	Measure: Satisfaction	Part 1, 3.1.1; Introduction, 4.5.3
Part 2	C093	Compared to 5 years ago, is my employer more or less prepared to manage outsourcing engagements?	Part 2, 4.8.1
Part 2	C094	Rate the quality of the customer's data across the systems this engagement depends on.	Part 2, 2.1.1
Part 2	C095	Rate how accessible the customer's data is to this engagement when and where the work requires it.	Part 2, 2.1.2
Part 2	C096	Rate how well the customer's data is normalized, with consistent formats and definitions across source systems.	Part 2, 2.1.3
Part 2	C097	Rate the maturity of the customer's data governance over the data this engagement uses.	Part 2, 2.1.4
Part 2	C098	Rate how well the customer's legacy systems support the integration this engagement requires.	Part 2, 2.2.1
Part 2	C099	Rate the readiness of the customer's technical infrastructure to support the agentic AI this engagement deploys.	Part 2, 2.2.2
Part 2	C100	Rate how completely the customer's processes are mapped and documented to the depth agentic AI requires.	Part 2, 2.3.1
Part 2	C101	Rate the maturity of the customer's processes in scope, meaning how standardized and repeatable they are.	Part 2, 2.3.2
Part 2	C102	Rate how consistently the customer performs the same processes across its business units and regions.	Part 2, 2.3.3
Part 2	C103	Rate the customer's willingness to redesign processes for agentic AI rather than automate them as they are.	Part 2, 2.3.4
Part 2	C104	Rate the agentic AI knowledge and skills of the customer staff working with this engagement.	Part 2, 2.4.2
Part 2	C105	Rate the effectiveness of the customer's management of its side of this engagement.	Part 2, 2.5.1

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Part	*Companion analysis*	*Subject*	*Where reported*
Part 2	C106	Rate the availability of the customer's subject matter experts when this engagement needs them.	Part 2, 2.4.3
Part 2	C107	Rate the customer organization's readiness to absorb the changes to daily work that agentic AI introduces.	Part 2, 2.4.1
Part 2	C108	Rate the customer's ability to provision the system access and identities that AI agents require.	Part 2, 2.7.1
Part 2	C109	Rate how quickly the customer responds when this engagement raises issues that need customer action.	Part 2, 2.5.2
Part 2	C110	Rate how well the customer's change control process handles the changes this engagement requires.	Part 2, 2.6.3
Part 2	C111	Rate the customer's capacity to govern and oversee the risks of AI agents doing this work.	Part 2, 2.6.2
Part 2	C112	Rate how clearly ownership and accountability for AI are assigned inside the customer organization.	Part 2, 2.6.1
Part 2	C113	Rate the stability of the customer's business case and ROI definition for this engagement.	Part 2, 2.8.1
Part 2	C115	Rate the overall effectiveness of your employer's top leadership team.	Part 2, 4.1.1
Part 2	C116	Rate how well your employer is transforming its commercial model as agentic AI reduces the billable human effort it sells today.	Part 2, 4.1.2
Part 2	C117	Rate how well your employer's internal management processes have been redesigned for agentic AI delivery rather than traditional staffed delivery.	Part 2, 4.2.1
Part 2	C118	Rate the effectiveness of your employer's process and leadership development programs.	Part 2, 4.5.2
Part 2	C119	Rate your employer's ability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements end to end.	Part 2, 4.2.2
Part 2	C120	Rate the depth of your employer's knowledge of the financial industry.	Part 2, 4.3.1
Part 2	C121	Rate your employer's ability to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements for global banks in particular.	Part 2, 4.2.3
Part 2	C122	Rate your employer's current supply of qualified agentic AI talent against what its engagements need.	Part 2, 4.5.1
Part 2	C123	Rate the adequacy of your employer's investment in training its workforce.	Part 2, 4.5.3
Part 2	C124	Rate how well your employer's training programs build practical agentic AI skills.	Part 2, 4.5.4
Part 2	C125	Rate how well your employer's training programs build financial industry knowledge.	Part 2, 4.5.5
Part 2	C126	Rate the maturity of your employer's playbook for taking agentic use cases from concept to governed production.	Part 2, 4.6.1
Part 2	C127	Rate your employer's quality assurance capability for agents whose outputs are not identical every run.	Part 2, 4.6.2
Part 2	C128	Rate your employer's ability to price agentic work profitably when billable hours no longer measure the value delivered.	Part 2, 4.1.3
Part 2	C129	Rate how well the technical platforms your employer builds or licenses are optimized for agentic AI outsourcing.	Part 2, 4.6.3
Part 2	C130	Rate your employer's readiness to take accountability when an agent it operates makes a costly error.	Part 2, 4.7.1
Part 2	C131	Rate the depth of your employer's knowledge of agentic AI.	Part 2, 4.3.2
Part 2	C132	Rate the depth of your employer's experience running agentic AI systems in live production, beyond pilots.	Part 2, 4.4.1
Part 2	C133	Rate your employer's ability to operate large numbers of agents in production, including monitoring and exception handling.	Part 2, 4.4.2
Part 2	C134	Rate your employer's overall qualification to deliver elite agentic AI outsourcing services to banks.	Part 2, 4.2.4
Part 2	C136	Rate how effectively the customer and vendor jointly manage this engagement now that agents perform part of the work.	Part 2, 3.1.1
Part 2	C137	Rate how clearly the two firms have settled who decides what agents may do without human approval.	Part 2, 3.1.2
Part 2	C138	Rate how clearly ownership of each workflow step is assigned when agents, vendor staff, and customer staff work in the same process.	Part 2, 3.1.3
Part 2	C139	Rate how clearly accountability lands on one firm when an agent's action causes a problem in this engagement.	Part 2, 3.1.4
Part 2	C140	Rate how well the two firms maintain a single shared view of the risks that agent work introduces.	Part 2, 3.2.1
Part 2	C141	Rate how effectively the two firms manage issues arising from agent work as one team rather than through two separate processes.	Part 2, 3.2.2
Part 2	C142	Rate how well the speed of joint issue resolution matches the speed at which agent-caused problems can spread.	Part 2, 3.2.3
Part 2	C143	Rate how quickly the two firms together can stop an agent that is behaving badly in live operations.	Part 2, 3.2.4
Part 2	C144	Rate how well the joint change control process keeps pace with the speed of agent behavior changes.	Part 2, 3.3.1
Part 2	C145	Rate how well agent updates made by one firm become visible to the other firm before they take effect.	Part 2, 3.3.2
Part 2	C146	Rate how well the two firms jointly govern changes agents make to their own behavior between formal releases.	Part 2, 3.3.3
Part 2	C147	Rate how well human review points are placed across the two firms at the moments where agent errors would matter most.	Part 2, 3.4.1
Part 2	C148	Rate how well joint human review capacity keeps up with the volume of output the agents produce.	Part 2, 3.4.2

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Part	*Companion analysis*	*Subject*	*Where reported*
Part 2	C149	Rate how much genuine scrutiny agent outputs receive at human review points rather than routine approval.	Part 2, 3.4.3
Part 2	C150	Rate how reliably the joint quality assurance loop catches agent errors before they reach live operations.	Part 2, 3.4.4
Part 2	C151	Rate how well the quality measures both firms use capture the kinds of errors agents actually make.	Part 2, 3.4.5
Part 2	C152	Rate how fully each firm can see what the other firm's agents actually did when questions arise.	Part 2, 3.5.1
Part 2	C153	Rate how closely the speed of joint decision making matches the speed at which the agents act.	Part 2, 3.5.2
Part 2	C154	Rate how well today's joint governance model fits work performed by agents rather than work performed by people.	Part 2, 3.5.3
Part 2	C155	Rate how ready the joint management model is for the level of agent autonomy you expect in this engagement within two years.	Part 2, 3.5.4
Part 2	C157	Rate the factual reliability of the AI tools' outputs on this engagement before any human review.	Part 2, 5.2.1
Part 2	C158	Rate the accuracy of citations, references, and quotations the tools produced against the real sources.	Part 2, 5.2.2
Part 2	C159	Rate the consistency of the tools' outputs when given the same input and instructions more than once.	Part 2, 5.2.3
Part 2	C160	Rate the end-to-end reliability of the tools on multi-step tasks, from first step to finished output.	Part 2, 5.2.4
Part 2	C161	Rate the predictability of the tools' token consumption for a given volume of work.	Part 2, 5.4.1
Part 2	C162	Rate the efficiency of the tools' token use, considering retries, loops, and reprocessing needed to complete work.	Part 2, 5.4.2
Part 2	C163	Rate how completely the tools kept each client's and each session's information isolated from every other client and session.	Part 2, 5.5.1
Part 2	C164	Rate how reliably the tools retained instructions and constraints given earlier in long tasks and sessions.	Part 2, 5.3.1
Part 2	C165	Rate how completely the tools captured material facts located anywhere in long documents, including mid-document content.	Part 2, 5.3.2
Part 2	C166	Rate the integrity of the tools' persistent memory against contamination by incorrect or malicious content encountered during work.	Part 2, 5.3.3
Part 2	C167	Rate the tools' resistance to hostile instructions embedded in the content they read and process.	Part 2, 5.5.3
Part 2	C168	Rate how consistently the agents took only intended and authorized actions when operating connected tools and systems.	Part 2, 5.6.1
Part 2	C169	Rate how safely the tools handled sensitive data, with no exposure through outputs, logs, or connected systems.	Part 2, 5.5.2
Part 2	C170	Rate how reliably the tools' built-in guardrails and safety controls held during production use.	Part 2, 5.6.2
Part 2	C171	Rate the overall production readiness of the AI tools for bank-grade work as experienced on this engagement.	Part 2, 5.1.1
Part 2	C172	Rate how accurately the tools' own reports of success or failure matched the actual outcomes of their work.	Part 2, 5.8.1
Part 2	C173	Rate the tools' ability to explain and evidence how each output was produced, at the depth an audit requires.	Part 2, 5.8.2
Part 2	C174	Rate how well the tools supported reliable testing, meaning correct behavior could be proven before work went live.	Part 2, 5.7.1
Part 2	C175	Rate the stability of the tools' behavior over the engagement when nothing changed on the engagement side.	Part 2, 5.7.2
Part 2	C176	Rate the quality of the tools' logs, traces, and usage telemetry for detecting and diagnosing failures.	Part 2, 5.8.3
Part 2	C178	Rate how well the agents on this engagement are protected from breaking silently when a third party changes something without warning.	Part 2, 6.2.1
Part 2	C179	Rate the quality of the fallback the engagement has ready when a critical third-party feed, platform, or model stops working.	Part 2, 6.7.1
Part 2	C180	Rate the security posture of the third-party tools, platforms, and sub-processors the engagement's agents connect to.	Part 2, 6.6.1
Part 2	C181	Rate the quality of advance notice third-party providers give before changes that can affect the agents on this engagement.	Part 2, 6.1.1
Part 2	C182	Rate how reliably word of an upcoming third-party change reaches the people who operate the affected agents in time to act.	Part 2, 6.1.2
Part 2	C183	Rate the engagement's monitoring for unannounced changes in the third-party APIs, data feeds, and models its agents depend on.	Part 2, 6.2.2
Part 2	C184	Rate how well the contracts with third-party providers deal with provider changes that can break the agents on this engagement.	Part 2, 6.4.1
Part 2	C185	Rate how well the engagement absorbs model version deprecations and retirements forced by model providers.	Part 2, 6.3.2
Part 2	C186	Rate the availability of true machine interfaces, rather than screens built for humans, across the third-party systems the agents must use.	Part 2, 6.5.1

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Part	*Companion analysis*	*Subject*	*Where reported*
Part 2	C187	Rate the stability of the third-party APIs and data structures the agents depend on, from one provider release to the next.	Part 2, 6.3.1
Part 2	C188	Rate the quality of the data arriving from third-party feeds, judged by whether agents can use it without human cleanup.	Part 2, 6.5.2
Part 2	C189	Rate how well third-party rate limits and quotas hold up under the volume the agents on this engagement generate.	Part 2, 6.5.3
Part 2	C190	Rate the engagement's ability to still perform by hand the manual workarounds that once absorbed third-party quirks and breakage.	Part 2, 6.7.2
Part 2	C191	Rate how completely the engagement knows where humans used to quietly fix third-party data and interface problems before agents took over.	Part 2, 6.7.3
Part 2	C192	Rate how deliberately the quiet human fixes for third-party quirks were replaced with explicit checks when agents took over the work.	Part 2, 6.7.4
Part 2	C193	Rate how well the engagement manages its dependence on a small number of model and cloud providers.	Part 2, 6.6.2
Part 2	C194	Rate how well this engagement could keep operating if it had to switch its primary model or cloud provider.	Part 2, 6.6.3
Part 2	C195	Rate how well third-party licenses on this engagement cover work done by agents rather than named human users.	Part 2, 6.4.2
Part 2	C196	Rate how completely the engagement has mapped every third and fourth party its agents depend on, down the full chain.	Part 2, 6.8.1
Part 2	C197	Rate how well the engagement manages agent dependence on gated external rails such as payment networks and regulatory submission systems.	Part 2, 6.8.2
Part 4	Analysis: Experience by Intent	Analysis: Experience by Intent	Part 4, 6.1.1
Part 4	C005	What is your role on this engagement?	Part 4, 1.1.1
Part 4	C007	How many years of experience do you have in your career?	Part 4, 1.2.1
Part 4	C008	How many years of experience do you have with agentic AI?	Part 4, 1.3.1
Part 4	C009	How many years have you been working in the outsourcing industry?	Part 4, 1.2.2
Part 4	C010	How many years have you been working within the financial industry?	Part 4, 1.2.3
Part 4	C011	How many agentic AI outsourcing engagements have you worked on across your career, including this one?	Part 4, 1.3.2
Part 4	C012	How well do you know the financial industry?	Part 4, 1.4.1
Part 4	C013	How well do you know agentic AI specific to the financial industry?	Part 4, 1.4.2
Part 4	C014	Rate your overall agentic AI expertise.	Part 4, 1.4.3
Part 4	C015	What professional certifications do you have?	Part 4, 1.5.1
Part 4	C016	What AI certifications do you have?	Part 4, 1.5.2
Part 4	C017	Where did you gain your AI knowledge?	Part 4, 1.5.3
Part 4	C018	How happy are you with your current job?	Part 4, 3.1.1
Part 4	C019	How likely are you to leave your current job in the next 12 months?	Part 4, 5.1.1; Introduction, 4.5.4
Part 4	C020	How happy is your extended team with the current engagement?	Part 4, 3.1.2
Part 4	C021	How likely are members of your current team to leave their jobs in the next 12 months?	Part 4, 5.1.2
Part 4	C022	Compared to 5 years ago, I am happier with the work I am doing now.	Part 4, 3.2.1
Part 4	C023	Compared to 5 years ago, I am more likely to seek a new job.	Part 4, 5.2.1
Part 4	C024	Compared to 5 years ago, the team I work with seems to be happier.	Part 4, 3.2.2
Part 4	C025	Compared to 5 years ago, the team I work with is more likely to seek a new job.	Part 4, 5.2.2
Part 4	C026	I want to continue working on projects in the global financial industry.	Part 4, 5.3.1
Part 4	C027	I would prefer to work directly for a bank in one of their global capability centers.	Part 4, 5.3.2
Part 4	C028	Working directly for a bank would be better than working for an outsourcing vendor.	Part 4, 5.3.3
Part 4	C069	I trust the customer.	Part 4, 4.1.1
Part 4	C070	The customer knows and cares about me.	Part 4, 4.1.2
Part 4	C071	I talk with peers inside the customer regularly.	Part 4, 4.2.1
Part 4	C072	I talk with engagement management inside the customer regularly.	Part 4, 4.2.2
Part 4	C073	I talk with the customer's leadership team regularly.	Part 4, 4.2.3
Part 4	C074	I know how the customer feels about my team.	Part 4, 4.1.3
Part 4	C075	I know how the customer feels about the engagement I am on.	Part 4, 4.1.4
Part 4	C080	My manager is effective.	Part 4, 2.1.1
Part 4	C081	My manager knows the financial industry well.	Part 4, 2.1.2
Part 4	C082	My manager knows agentic AI well.	Part 4, 2.1.3
Part 4	C083	My manager cares about me.	Part 4, 4.3.1
Part 4	C084	My manager cares about the larger team.	Part 4, 4.3.2
Part 4	C085	My manager knows how to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements.	Part 4, 2.1.4
Part 4	C086	My manager knows how to manage agentic AI outsourcing engagements for global banks.	Part 4, 2.1.5
Part 4	C087	My employer cares about me.	Part 4, 4.4.1
Part 4	C088	My employer cares about the team.	Part 4, 4.4.2
Part 4	C089	My employer's top leadership team cares about my wellbeing and development.	Part 4, 4.4.3
Part 4	C090	I trust my employer.	Part 4, 4.4.4
Part 4	C091	I trust my manager.	Part 4, 4.3.3
Part 4	C092	I am being used effectively by my employer.	Part 4, 4.4.5
Part 4	Field: CME Respondents	Field: CME Respondents	Part 4, 1.1.1
Part 4	Field: IC Respondents	Field: IC Respondents	Part 4, 1.1.1
Part 4	Field: PD Respondents	Field: PD Respondents	Part 4, 1.1.1

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Part	*Companion analysis*	*Subject*	*Where reported*
Part 4	Field: Total Respondents	Field: Total Respondents	Part 4, 1.1.1
Part 5	Analysis: Alterations by Role	Analysis: Alterations by Role	Part 5, 2.1.1
Part 5	Analysis: Manager Alterations	Analysis: Manager Alterations	Part 5, 2.2.1
Part 5	C052	The dashboard and performance reports given to the customer are accurate.	Part 5, 1.4.1
Part 5	C053	The vendor manipulates the dashboard and performance reports given to the customer.	Part 5, 1.4.2
Part 5	C054	Compared to 5 years ago, is manipulation of the dashboards and performance reports given to the customer more or less common now?	Part 5, 1.4.3
Part 5	C057	I fully understand how these laws, regulations, and similar affect the outsourcing engagement.	Part 5, 7.1.1
Part 5	C058	My management team fully understands these laws, regulations, and similar, and how they affect the engagement.	Part 5, 7.1.2
Part 5	C059	The customer's team actively discusses these laws, regulations, and similar with our team.	Part 5, 7.2.1
Part 5	C060	The training available to me effectively teaches me about these laws, regulations, and similar.	Part 5, 7.3.1
Part 5	C199	I have altered client-provided data	Part 5, 1.1.1
Part 5	C200	I discussed the data alteration with internal management	Part 5, 4.1.1
Part 5	C201	I or my management discussed data alteration with the client	Part 5, 4.2.1
Part 5	C203	My greater team regularly alters client provided data.	Part 5, 1.1.2
Part 5	C205	I have altered client processes	Part 5, 1.2.1
Part 5	C206	I discussed the process alteration with internal management	Part 5, 4.1.2
Part 5	C207	I or my management discussed process alteration with the client	Part 5, 4.2.2
Part 5	C209	My greater team regularly alters client processes.	Part 5, 1.2.2
Part 5	C211	I have altered AI outputs	Part 5, 1.3.1
Part 5	C212	I discussed the AI output alteration with internal management	Part 5, 4.1.3
Part 5	C213	I or my management discussed AI output alteration with the client	Part 5, 4.2.3
Part 5	C215	My greater team regularly alters AI outputs.	Part 5, 1.3.2

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6 Appendix F: Index

The index lists each term defined in Appendix A with the Part and section in which it appears. A term used in more than 40 sections is listed by Part.

Table 37. Index of defined terms

Term	*Where it appears*
10-point scale	Introduction: 3, 4, 4.1.2, 4.3.1, 4.5.1; Part 1: 4; Part 2: 1, 2, 4; Part 4: 1.1.1, 5
Active	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Agent	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Agentic AI outsourcing	Introduction: 3, 4, 4.3.1, 4.7.5; Part 1: 1, 1.2, 1.2.2, 5.1, 5.1.5, 5.1.6, 5.2.2; Part 2: 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.6.3; Part 4: 1.3, 1.3.2, 2.1.4, 2.1.5; Part 6: 1, 2.1
AI technology	Introduction: 3; Part 1: 4; Part 2: 1, 1.1, 5, 5.2.2, 5.3, 5.3.2, 5.6, 5.6.2, 6.8.2; Part 5: 3.4
Anecdote strength	Introduction: 4.1.1; Part 2: 3.5.4, 4.5.2, 4.8.1, 5.3.3, 5.5.3, 6.6.1, 6.7.4; Part 3: 5.1; Part 4: 1.2.1, 1.3.2, 1.4.2, 4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2; Part 5: 7.3.1
Base	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Build-Out	Introduction: 4.1.3; Part 1: 1, 1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 1.1.4, 1.2.1; Part 2: 1.1, 2.1.4, 3, 3.4.3; Part 4: 5.1; Part 5: 1.2.1
Canceled	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 4; Part 5
Canceled or at risk	Part 1
Cancellation likelihood	Introduction: 4.4.1, 4.4.2; Part 1: 2, 2.2, 2.2.1
Cancellation rate	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 4; Part 5
Chi-square test	Introduction: 4.7.3
Class of work	Part 1: 2.1.1, 5, 5.3, 5.3.2, 5.6.1
Clean estimate	Introduction: 4.2.5, 4.5.3, 4.7.1, 4.8.3
Cluster bootstrap	Part 1; Part 2; Part 4
Co-management	Introduction: 3; Part 1: 4; Part 2: 1, 1.1, 2.6, 3, 3.2.2, 3.5.4, 5; Part 3: 1, 1.2; Part 6: 1, 1.2, 2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5
Companion analysis	Introduction: 4, 4.7, 4.8.1, 4.8.2; Part 1: 5.3.4
Confidence interval	Introduction: 4.7.1
Customer management executive	Part 4: 1.1.1
Customer satisfaction	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 4; Part 5
Delivery team	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Delivery workforce	Introduction: 3; Part 1: 5.6; Part 2: 4.5; Part 4: 1, 1.2.1
Descriptive contrast	Introduction: 4.2.5, 4.7.1
Design effect	Appendix A only
Detection floor	Appendix A only
Did not hold	Introduction: 4.2.5, 4.3.3, 4.7.2; Part 1: 1.1.4, 5, 5.2.1, 5.6.2; Part 5: 4.1.1
Distressed	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Effective sample size	Appendix A only
Emotional state	Part 4: 5.4
Engagement	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Engagement attribute	Appendix A only
Engagement indicator mean	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 4; Part 5
Engagement level	Introduction: 4.5.2; Part 1: 5.4.3, 5.6.2; Part 2: 4.2.4, 5.2.1, 5.8.2; Part 4: 1, 1.5.2, 1.5.3; Part 5: 1.1.1, 4.1, 4.1.1, 4.1.3
Engagement manager	Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5
Equivalence bound	Introduction: 4.7.2
Equivalence test	Appendix A only
Failure category	Part 1: 4.1; Part 2: 1, 1.1; Part 5: 3.4; Part 6: 1
False discovery rate	Introduction: 4.7.1; Part 1: 4.3.1
Favorable-direction conversion	Introduction: 4, 4.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.1, 4.8.3; Part 1: 2.2.1, 3, 3.2, 3.2.3; Part 4: 5.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2; Part 5: 1.4.2, 1.4.3, 7, 7.3
Financial institution	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Financial institution disclosure	Introduction: 4.6.3
Financial institution readiness	Introduction: 3, 4.2.3; Part 1: 4; Part 2: 1, 1.1, 2, 2.3.1, 2.6.1, 5; Part 3: 1; Part 5: 1.1, 3.4; Part 6: 1, 1.1
Financial institution staff	Introduction: 3; Part 2: 2, 2.4.2; Part 6: 2
Four core study measures	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 4
Held	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
High risk	Introduction: 4.4.2
Holm correction	Part 1: 2.1.1, 5.6.1; Part 2: 3.1.3, 3.3.1; Part 5: 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3
Inconclusive null	Introduction: 4.7.2
Indicator	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5
Indicator class	Appendix A only
Indicator quintile	Part 1: 4.2.2; Part 5: 2.3
Indicators distressed	Introduction: 4.3.2, 4.5, 4.5.5
Individual contributor	Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5
Intent to leave	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Internal disclosure	Introduction: 4.6.3; Part 5: 4, 4.1, 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3
Intraclass correlation (ICC)	Appendix A only

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Term	*Where it appears*
Leave-one-out	Introduction: 4.5.1
Manual alteration	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Manual alteration of AI outputs	Introduction: 3, 4.6.1; Part 3: 2.3; Part 5: 1, 1.3.1
Manual alteration of financial institution processes	Introduction: 3, 4.6.1; Part 5: 1, 1.2.1
Manual alteration of financial-institution-provided data	Introduction: 3, 4.6.1; Part 2: 2.1, 2.1.4; Part 5: 1.1.1
Measured return	Introduction: 3, 4.5, 4.5.5; Part 1: 3, 3.3, 3.3.1
Model provider	Introduction: 4.2.1; Part 2: 6.6, 6.6.2, 6.6.3, 6.8.1; Part 6: 1.4
Moderate risk	Introduction: 4.4.2
Non-answer	Appendix A only
Null equivalent to zero	Introduction: 4.7.2
Outsourcing model	Introduction: 4.1.2, 4.7.3, 4.7.5, 4.7.6; Part 1: 2, 2.1.1, 5, 5.3, 5.3.1; Part 5: 1.2.1
p value	Introduction: 4.7
Partial test	Introduction: 4.7.1
Pearson's r	Introduction: 4.7.1
Perceived fact	Introduction: 4.3.3
Portfolio director	Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5
Primary and secondary response	Appendix A only
Process family	Introduction: 4.1.3, 4.7.6; Part 1: 2.1.1, 5, 5.3, 5.3.3, 5.6.1, 5.6.3; Part 2: 3.1.3, 3.3.1
Production	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 6
Question without a favorable end	Appendix A only
Rated indicator	Part 2: 3.5; Part 4: 1.4
Rating	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 4; Part 5
Reported experience	Introduction: 4, 4.2; Part 1: 1; Part 3
Reporting alteration	Introduction: 3, 4.6.1, 4.6.2; Part 5: 1.4, 1.4.3; Part 6: 1.3
Respondent	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Respondent level	Introduction: 4.5.4; Part 1: 5.4.3; Part 4: 1.1, 1.1.1, 1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.3.1, 1.3.2; Part 5: 2.3
Robustness check	Introduction: 4.8.2; Part 1: 2.1.1, 3.2; Part 2: 3.1.2, 3.2.2, 3.3.3, 3.4, 4.4, 5.5, 5.6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7.1; Part 4: 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.5.3, 2; Part 5: 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.3.1
Sentiment score	Introduction: 4.1.2, 4.7.6
Spearman's rho	Appendix A only
Structured answers	Introduction: 4.1.2, 4.8.1
Study norm	Appendix A only
Study set	Introduction: 4.1, 4.1.2, 4.2.1, 4.3.2, 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.5, 4.7.1, 4.7.2; Part 1: 1, 1.2, 2, 2.1.1, 3.1, 3.3, 4, 4.2, 5.3, 5.3.4; Part 2: 1, 1.1; Part 3; Part 4: 5.1; Part 5: 7
The two firms	Part 1: 5.2, 5.2.2; Part 2: 1, 1.1, 3, 3.1, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.4, 3.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.3, 3.3.3, 3.4, 3.4.1, 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 5, 5.6, 5.6.1, 5.8, 6.8.2; Part 3: 1, 2, 2.1, 2.2; Part 6: 1, 1.2, 2.4
Theme	Introduction: 4.8.3
Thin base	Introduction: 4.1.1
Third-party ecosystem	Introduction: 3; Part 1: 4; Part 2: 1, 1.1, 6, 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.5.1, 6.5.2, 6.5.3, 6.6.2, 6.6.3, 6.7.1, 6.7.2, 6.7.3, 6.7.4, 6.8.1, 6.8.2; Part 5: 1.5; Part 6: 2.3, 2.4
Third-party provider	Introduction: 4.2.1; Part 2: 6.4, 6.4.1, 6.5.3; Part 6: 1.4
Third-party work done by hand	Introduction: 3, 4.6.1; Part 2: 6; Part 5: 1.5
Transition/Cut-Over	Introduction: 4.1.3; Part 1: 1, 1.1, 1.1.4, 1.2.1; Part 2: 1.1; Part 4: 5.1; Part 5: 1.1.1, 1.3.1
Type of financial institution	Introduction: 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.7.3, 4.7.5; Part 1: 2, 2.1.1, 5, 5.1.1, 5.6.3
Unfavorable-direction indicator	Appendix A only
Vendor	Introduction; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6
Vendor capability	Introduction: 3; Part 1: 4; Part 2: 1, 1.1, 4, 4.2.2, 4.3, 4.3.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.5, 5; Part 6: 2
Vendor type	Introduction: 4.7.3; Part 1: 5, 5.5.1, 5.5.2; Part 4: 1.5.2, 1.5.3
Welch's analysis of variance	Introduction: 4.7.3
Written answers	Introduction: 4.1.2, 4.6.1, 4.6.2, 4.7.6, 4.8.1; Part 2: 6; Part 4: 3, 3.4; Part 5: 1, 1.4, 1.5, 3.4, 4.2, 5, 5.1, 6.2; Part 6: 1.3, 1.6
Written response	Introduction: 4.1.2, 4.2, 4.7.6; Part 1: 1.1.4, 1.2.2, 3.2.4, 5.1.4, 5.3.1; Part 2: 2.5.1, 2.7.1, 3.1.1, 3.1.3, 4.1.1, 4.2.3, 4.5.3, 5.2.3, 5.4.2, 5.8.3, 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.5.1, 6.8.1; Part 4: 1.2.3, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 3.1.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 4.2.2, 5.3, 5.3.3

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7 Appendix G: Disclosure of the Use of Artificial Intelligence

The report was prepared with assistance from Claude, an Anthropic AI system, for analysis, qualitative coding, organization, and drafting. OpenAI Codex assisted with the version 17 editorial revision, including review of prose, internal consistency, and supporting analytical records. These systems contributed to the preparation of the report; their outputs are not independent evidence validating its findings.

The statistical workflow used a computational program and recorded input fingerprints and analytical settings. Companion analyses incorporated figures programmatically. The author determined substantive conventions through documented rulings, some of which revised earlier decisions. Independent reproduction of the complete computational workflow has not been established.

Claude-based coders applied the documented qualitative rulebook. Separate AI runs recoded samples without access to the first coding, and an author-ruled set of 48 difficult answers supplied an additional check. Appendix D reports the agreement results and subsequent rulebook changes. These procedures should not be described as independent human validation of every coded answer.

AI systems assisted with drafting and editorial revision under the author's standards. The author retains responsibility for reviewing and approving the final wording, interpretations, and recommendations. Inserted respondent quotations were preserved during the version 17 editorial revision.

Responsibility for the study's design, analytical decisions, interpretations, and publication rests with the author. AI assistance does not remove the need to verify factual claims, assess methodological limitations, or distinguish recommendations from findings.

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